In re Guardianship of Tomas J.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
In re Guardianship of Tomas J., a minor child.
Marvin T. Jose Mateo, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 28, 2025. 	No. S-24-251.
1. Guardians and Conservators: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
reviews guardianship and conservatorship proceedings for error appear-
ing on the record made in the county court.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms
to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Child Custody: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In considering
whether jurisdiction exists under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, a jurisdictional question that does not involve a
factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent
from the trial court.
4. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Mootness is a justi-
ciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising juris-
diction, and an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under
the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions.
5. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before an appellate court reaches the
legal issues presented for review, it has a duty to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether the
issue is raised by the parties.
6. ____: ____. When a lower court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court
also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or ques-
tion presented to the lower court.
7. Child Custody: Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over a child custody proceed-
ing is governed exclusively by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:11 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
8. Child Custody: Guardians and Conservators: Words and Phrases.
Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the
term “child custody proceeding” is defined to include a proceeding for
guardianship of a minor.
9. Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Federal Acts. Nebraska courts
with jurisdiction over an “initial child custody determination” as that
term is used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1238(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024) also
have jurisdiction and authority to make special findings of fact similar
to those contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018).
10. Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Guardians and Conservators:
Evidence. A county court with a jurisdictional basis under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-1238(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024) and which has made an initial
child custody determination, such as appointing a guardian, has the
authority to make immigration-related factual findings where the evi-
dence is sufficient and the court has been requested to do so.
11. Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Guardians and Conservators. Where
the prospective minor ward in a guardianship proceeding has reached
the age of 18 and thus is no longer a “child” under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, a county court’s jurisdiction
is not governed by that act.
12. Courts: Jurisdiction: Legislature. As courts of limited jurisdiction,
county courts have only that jurisdiction which has been granted through
specific legislative enactment.
13. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Mootness does not
prevent appellate jurisdiction; rather, mootness is a justiciability doctrine
that can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction.
14. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case is moot if the facts under-
lying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no
longer alive.
15. Moot Question. A case becomes moot when the issues initially pre-
sented in litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cogni-
zable interest in the outcome of litigation.
16. ____. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes
in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have fore-
stalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
17. Moot Question: Judgments. If a judgment rendered by the trial court
will have no practical legal effect upon an existing controversy because
an intervening event renders any grant of effectual relief impossible for
the reviewing court, the case is moot.
18. Moot Question. As a general rule, a moot case is subject to summary
dismissal.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
19. Moot Question: Public Officers and Employees. The public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine requires the consideration of (1) the
public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of
an authoritative adjudication for the guidance of public officials, and (3)
the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.
20. Moot Question. The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine
exists so that authoritative judicial guidance can be provided on issues
that are likely to recur but would otherwise inherently evade review.
21. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. It is generally inappropriate for an
appellate court to review a moot case to address an issue that would not
otherwise evade review.
22. Moot Question: Criminal Law: Judgments: Sentences. The collateral
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine permits adjudication
of the merits of a criminal case where the petitioner may suffer future
state or federal penalties or disabilities as a result of the criminal judg-
ment, even though the criminal sentence has already been served.
Appeal from the County Court for Hall County, Arthur S.
Wetzel, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
David V. Chipman, of Monzón, Guerra & Chipman, for
appellant.
No other appearance.
Roxana Cortes-Mills and Anne Wurth for amicus curiae
Center for Immigrant and Refugee Advancement.
Dylan Severino and Rose Godinez for amicus curiae ACLU
of Nebraska.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Stacy, J.
Marvin T. Jose Mateo (Marvin) filed a petition in the Hall
County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for
his then 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. Marvin’s petition also
requested immigration-related factual findings pursuant to a
statute within the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). 1 After holding an evidentiary
hearing on Marvin’s guardianship petition, the county court
denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without
making the requested factual findings. Marvin appeals, assign-
ing error to several aspects of the county court’s ruling.
Our disposition of Marvin’s appeal is driven by Tomas’
age at different points in the proceeding. Because Tomas was
18 years old when the minor guardianship petition was filed,
we address as a threshold issue the impact of his age on the
county court’s jurisdiction to make a child custody determina-
tion under the UCCJEA. As a matter of first impression, we
conclude that in a minor guardianship proceeding where the
prospective ward has reached the age of 18 and is no longer a
“child” as defined by the UCCJEA, 2 a county court’s jurisdic-
tion is not governed by the UCCJEA and, instead, is governed
by other Nebraska statutes. And although we ultimately con-
clude the county court had jurisdiction over the minor guard-
ianship proceeding, we do not reach the merits of the issues
raised on appeal because we conclude the appeal became moot
once Tomas reached the age of majority. We therefore dismiss
the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Minor Guardianship Petition
On January 5, 2024, Marvin filed a petition in the Hall
County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for
his younger brother, Tomas. The petition alleged that Tomas
was born in Guatemala in October 2005, was brought to the
United States as a minor in 2018, and had been in Marvin’s
care since 2019. The petition further alleged that Marvin
and Tomas had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since
January 2022, that no other court had jurisdiction over Tomas,
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1226 to 43-1266 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
2024).
2 See § 43-1227(4).

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
and that Marvin was a suitable and proper person to be
appointed Tomas’ permanent guardian. Finally, the petition
asked the court to make specific factual findings pursuant to
§ 43-1238(b), including findings that Tomas had been aban-
doned and neglected by his parents, that reunification with his
parents was not viable due to such abandonment and neglect,
and that it would not be in Tomas’ best interests to be returned
to Guatemala.
2. Minor Guardianship Hearing
Both Marvin and Tomas appeared for the guardianship hear-
ing on February 1, 2024, and both testified. No one appeared
to oppose the petition.
Marvin was represented by counsel, who introduced two
exhibits. The first was a document prepared by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee
Resettlement titled “Sponsor Care Agreement.” That exhibit
summarized the procedure for becoming the sponsor of “an
unaccompanied alien child in the care and custody of the
Federal Government,” 3 and it outlined the sponsor’s responsi-
bilities upon “enter[ing] into a custodial arrangement with the
Federal Government” to provide for the child’s care. The sec-
ond exhibit was a report summarizing the political, economic,
and humanitarian conditions in Guatemala.
(a) Marvin’s Testimony
Marvin testified that he is a U.S. citizen and that Tomas is
his younger brother. Consistent with the facts alleged in the
minor guardianship petition, Marvin testified that Tomas was
born in Guatemala in 2005 and was brought to the United
States by their father in 2018. Tomas’ father was deported
to Guatemala shortly thereafter, and Tomas was placed in a
3 See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2018) (defining term “unaccompanied alien
child” to mean “child who . . . has no lawful immigration status in the
United States [and] has not attained 18 years of age” and who has no
“parent or legal guardian in the United States . . . to provide care and
physical custody”).

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
facility for unaccompanied alien children. Eventually, fed-
eral immigration authorities released Tomas to Marvin and
another sibling.
Marvin testified that in 2020, he entered into a sponsor care
agreement with the federal government and was “appointed
as the sponsor for Tomas[’] immigration.” Tomas has been
in Marvin’s exclusive care since that time, and Marvin has
provided 	him 	with 	housing 	and 	necessary 	medical 	care,
enrolled him in school, and helped him be “approved . . . for
Medicaid.” Marvin and Tomas had lived in Grand Island since
January 2022. At the time of the hearing, Tomas was attending
high school in Grand Island and was expected to graduate in
May 2024.
Marvin testified that he and Tomas are of Mayan ancestry,
and he described discrimination and violence against Mayans
in Guatemala, including against members of his extended
family. Marvin testified both he and Tomas felt much safer in
the United States than in Guatemala. He testified that Tomas’
parents were still living in Guatemala and had “some finan-
cial issues.” Marvin testified Tomas had not seen his parents
since 2018, and they did not provide financial support for
Tomas in the United States.
When Marvin was finished testifying, the court asked him
whether he had “a delegation of parental authority or a power
of attorney over Tomas.” Marvin replied that his parents had
given him power of attorney, but the only time he used it was
with “Immigration when I took charge of [Tomas].”
(b) Tomas’ Testimony
Tomas testified that when he lived with his parents in
Guatemala, they lived in poor conditions and his parents could
not financially afford to support him and his siblings. Tomas
told the court that Marvin had taken good care of him since
he came to the United States and that he wanted Marvin to
be appointed as his permanent guardian. Tomas explained that
he felt much safer in the United States, he was doing well in

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
high school, and he had plans to join the U.S. Marines after
graduation.
(c) Marvin’s Argument
After the evidence was complete, Marvin’s counsel acknowl-
edged the delay in petitioning to establish a minor guardian-
ship, but he argued that although Tomas had turned 18 years
old several months earlier, Tomas was “still eligible” for a
minor guardianship, which was “still the least restrictive”
option for his care. 4 Counsel also acknowledged evidence that
Tomas had been “able to navigate many things without [a]
guardianship,” but he argued there could still be circumstances
where Tomas “would need [the] assistance of a guardian or a
parent.” Finally, counsel argued that the evidence supported
the immigration-related factual findings requested pursuant to
§ 43-1238(b).
3. Court’s Ruling
Ruling from the bench, the court denied the petition for
minor guardianship without addressing the request for factual
findings under § 43-1238(b). The court generally questioned
the need for a minor guardianship, considering that Tomas
was 18 years old; Marvin had been given a power of attorney
by Tomas’ parents; and for 6 years, Tomas had not experi-
enced problems getting medical care or enrolling in school.
The court made no finding of parental abandonment or unfit-
ness and expressly found that the power of attorney executed
by Tomas’ parents allowed Marvin to “exercise authority
over Tomas, without a guardianship.” The court’s ruling was
memorialized in a journal entry dated February 1, 2024.
4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) and (B) (2018) (requiring that
“unaccompanied alien child” be placed in “least restrictive setting that
is in the best interest of the child” and that once such child “reaches 18
years of age and is transferred to the custody of the Secretary of Homeland
Security,” the secretary “shall consider placement in the least restrictive
setting available”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
4. Motion to Alter or Amend
On February 2, 2024, Marvin filed a motion to alter or
amend the judgment or, alternatively, to reopen the evidence.
In his supporting brief, Marvin argued that the court applied
the wrong legal standard and failed to adequately consider
whether the appointment of a minor guardian would serve
Tomas’ best interests. 5 Alternatively, Marvin asked the court to
reopen the evidentiary record so he could show that the power
of attorney executed by Tomas’ parents was no longer valid.
At the March 28, 2024, hearing on the motion, the court
received a copy of what Marvin identified as the power of
attorney document his parents had given him in December
2019. The document was signed by both parents and was
notarized in Guatemala. It was written in Spanish, so the court
asked the certified court interpreter to provide a translation of
the document in English for the record.
According to that translation, the parents “request[ed] that
the present power of attorney be taken . . . as our mani-
festation” to voluntarily give “our authority to [Marvin] of
American nationality . . . so that he may be able, [on] our
behalf, [to] be responsible for our minor son, [Tomas,] and to
represent us before all the necessary authorities in the country
of [t]he United States of America.” The document also stated
that “due to our economic conditions, it is impossible for us
to transport to the place where he is located at present.”
Marvin’s counsel did not object to the document’s transla-
tion, nor did he argue that its provisions were legally insuf-
ficient to delegate parental authority under the law of either
Guatemala or Nebraska. Instead, he argued that under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 30-2604 (Reissue 2016), any parental delegation
had expired.
5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2611 (Reissue 2016) (“[u]pon hearing, if the
court finds that a qualified person seeks appointment, venue is proper,
the required notices have been given, the requirements of section 30-2608
have been met, and the welfare and best interests of the minor will be
served by the requested appointment, it shall make the appointment”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
Section 30-2604 states that a parent may use a power of
attorney to delegate their authority regarding the care and cus-
tody of a minor child “for a period not exceeding six months.”
Marvin’s counsel argued that because Tomas’ parents executed
the power of attorney in 2019, any parental delegation of
authority had expired under § 30-2604. Alternatively, counsel
argued that regardless of the current validity of the parental
delegation, it was still in Tomas’ best interests to have Marvin
appointed as his guardian for the remainder of his minority.
Speaking from the bench, the court overruled the motion
and later memorialized its ruling in a journal entry filed the
same day. The court did not make an express finding regarding
the validity of the power of attorney executed by Tomas’ par-
ents but noted there was “zero” evidence that Tomas’ parents
were unwilling to execute another power of attorney to pro-
vide for Tomas’ care until he reached the age of majority. The
court reiterated that for the past 6 years, Marvin had been able
to care for Tomas and address all his needs without a guard-
ianship in place, and the court said it appeared the guardian-
ship petition was filed for the “sole purpose, not to protect the
minor child, [but] to have me make [i]mmigration findings.”
The court said it regularly made such factual findings in minor
guardianship cases but was “not going to create a guardianship
for the limited purpose of making specific findings of fact.”
Marvin filed a timely notice of appeal, and we moved the
appeal to our docket on our own motion.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Marvin assigns, consolidated and restated, that the county
court erred by (1) denying the guardianship petition without
considering whether the appointment of a minor guardian
would serve Tomas’ best interests and (2) failing to make the
requested factual findings under § 43-1238(b).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews guardianship and conser-
vatorship proceedings for error appearing on the record made

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
in the county court. 6 When reviewing a judgment for errors
appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 7
[3] In considering whether jurisdiction exists under the
UCCJEA, a jurisdictional question that does not involve a
factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion
independent from the trial court. 8
[4] Mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to pre-
vent courts from exercising jurisdiction, and an appellate court
reviews mootness determinations under the same standard of
review as other jurisdictional questions. 9
IV. ANALYSIS
Because Tomas’ age at different points in this minor guard-
ianship proceeding is critical to our disposition, we begin our
analysis there.
It is undisputed that Tomas was born in October 2005. When
Marvin filed his petition to establish a minor guardianship in
January 2024, Tomas was already 18 years old. He turned 19
years old in October 2024, prior to oral argument in this appeal.
Now that Tomas is 19 years old, he has reached the age
of majority under Nebraska law 10 and is considered an adult,
6 In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Barnhart, 290 Neb. 314, 859
N.W.2d 856 (2015).
7 In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.F., 307 Neb. 452, 949 N.W.2d
496 (2020).
8 In re Guardianship of S.T., 300 Neb. 72, 912 N.W.2d 262 (2018).
9 See MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, 316 Neb. 746, 6 N.W.3d 799 (2024).
10 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2101(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (“[a]ll persons
under nineteen years of age are declared to be minors, but in case any
person marries under the age of nineteen years, his or her minority ends”);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2209(26) (Reissue 2016) (for purposes of Nebraska
Probate Code, “minor” is defined as “an individual under nineteen years
of age, but in case any person marries under the age of nineteen years his
or her minority ends”).

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
with all the rights granted and responsibilities imposed by
statute or common law. 11 But on the date Marvin filed the
minor guardianship petition, Tomas was still 18 years old, and
that age has legal significance under Nebraska law too.
Once a person reaches the age of 18, that person’s status
changes under Nebraska law. Nebraska law authorizes an
18-year-old who is not a ward of the state to do many things
adults can do, including entering into binding contracts, leases,
and mortgages; acquiring and conveying title to real property;
and obtaining mental health services without the consent of
a parent or guardian. 12 Moreover, once a person reaches the
age of 18, that person is no longer considered a “juvenile”
under the Nebraska Criminal Code 13 or the Nebraska Juvenile
Code. 14 And, importantly, reaching the age of 18 means that
an individual is no longer considered a “child” under several
substantive areas of Nebraska law. For example, a “child”
under Nebraska’s paternity statutes is defined as one who is
“under the age of eighteen years.” 15 And, as most relevant
here, under the UCCJEA, a “child” is defined as “an indi-
vidual who has not attained eighteen years of age.” 16
To 	summarize, 	under 	Nebraska’s 	statutory 	framework,
Tomas was still considered a “minor” under the Nebraska
11 See § 43-2101(2).
12 See id.
13 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1201 (Supp. 2023) (defining “juvenile” as “any
person under the age of eighteen years”).
14 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(11) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (“[j]uvenile means
any person under the age of eighteen”).
15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1401(1) (Reissue 2016). But cf., Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2922(4) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (defining “child” under Nebraska’s
Parenting Act as “a minor under nineteen years of age”); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-4602(3)(A) (Reissue 2016) (defining “child” under Uniform Deployed
Parents Custody and Visitation Act as “an unemancipated individual who
has not attained nineteen years of age”).
16 § 43-1227(2).

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
Probate Code 17 on the date the minor guardianship petition
was filed, but he was no longer considered a “child” under the
UCCJEA. 18 Because our prior minor guardianship cases have
not expressly addressed jurisdiction under such circumstances,
we requested supplemental briefing.
More specifically, we asked Marvin to address whether the
statutory definition of “child” under the UCCJEA impacted the
county court’s jurisdiction to establish a minor guardianship
for Tomas and/or to make immigration-related factual findings
under § 43-1238(b) of the UCCJEA. We also asked Marvin to
address whether any Nebraska statute other than § 43-1238(b)
expressly authorizes a county court, as a court of limited
jurisdiction, 19 to make such factual findings.
[5,6] Marvin filed a supplemental brief addressing these
issues, and we have carefully considered his arguments. We
acknowledge these jurisdictional issues were not raised by the
parties or presented to the county court. But before an appel-
late court reaches the legal issues presented for review, it has
a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the mat-
ter before it, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by the
parties. 20 And when a lower court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an
appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits
of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court. 21
Because our jurisdiction to review Marvin’s assigned errors
depends on whether the county court had jurisdiction over this
minor guardianship proceeding, we begin by reviewing that
court’s jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
17 See § 30-2209(26).
18 See § 43-1227(2).
19 See State v. A.D., 305 Neb. 154, 939 N.W.2d 484 (2020).
20 See Perkins Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Mid America Agri Prods., 317 Neb. 1, 8
N.W.3d 716 (2024).
21 In re Estate of Weeder, ante p. 393, 16 N.W.3d 137 (2025).

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
Cite as 318 Neb. 503
1. Jurisdiction Under UCCJEA
[7,8] The Nebraska Legislature enacted the UCCJEA in
2003 22 and made it “the exclusive jurisdictional basis for mak-
ing a child custody determination by a court of this state.” 23
The UCCJEA defines a “child custody determination” as any
“judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the
legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to
a child,” 24 and it expressly defines a “child custody proceed-
ing” to include a proceeding for “guardianship.” 25 Based on
this statutory framework, our cases broadly recognize that
“[j]urisdiction over a child custody proceeding is governed
exclusively by the UCCJEA” 26 and that “[u]nder the UCCJEA,
the term ‘[c]hild custody proceeding’ is defined to include a
proceeding for guardianship of a minor.” 27
In 2018, the Legislature amended the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the UCCJEA to provide:
In addition to having jurisdiction to make judicial deter-
minations about the custody and care of the child, a
court of this state with exclusive jurisdiction under sub-
section (a) of this section has jurisdiction and authority
to make factual findings regarding (1) the abuse, aban-
donment, or neglect of the child, (2) the nonviability of
reunification with at least one of the child’s parents due
to such abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis
under state law, and (3) whether it would be in the best
interests of such child to be removed from the United
22 See 2003 Neb. Laws, L.B. 148.
23 § 43-1238(b).
24 § 43-1227(3).
25 § 43-1227(4).
26 In re Guardianship of S.T., supra note 8, 300 Neb. at 76, 912 N.W.2d at
266.
27 Id. See, also, In re Guardianship of Carlos D., 300 Neb. 646, 653, 915
N.W.2d 581, 586 (2018) (“[u]nder Nebraska statutes and jurisprudence, a
guardianship of a child is a child custody determination”).

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States to a foreign country, including the child’s country
of origin or last habitual residence. If there is sufficient
evidence to support such factual findings, the court shall
issue an order containing such findings when requested
by one of the parties or upon the court’s own motion. 28
[9,10] We have recognized that although the factual find-
ings authorized by § 43-1238(b) of the UCCJEA do not pre-
cisely track the language of the federal immigration statutes
and regulations governing special immigrant juvenile (SIJ)
status, 29 the enactment of § 43-1238(b) served to clarify that in
Nebraska, “courts with jurisdiction over an ‘initial child cus-
tody determination’ as that term is used in § 43-1238(a) also
have jurisdiction and authority to make special findings of fact
similar to those contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).” 30
And after the 2018 amendments to § 43-1238(b), we have
consistently held that a “county court with a jurisdictional
basis under § 43-1238(a) and which has made an initial child
custody determination, such as appointing a guardian, has the
authority to make immigration-related factual findings where
the evidence is sufficient and the court has been requested to
do so.” 31 Such factual findings can then be used by the child
to support a separate application for SIJ status under federal
immigration law. 32
Here, there is no dispute that Marvin’s minor guardianship
petition asked the county court to make an initial custody
determination involving Tomas by appointing Marvin as his
permanent guardian and that it further asked the court to
make certain SIJ findings pursuant to § 43-1238(b) of the
28 § 43-1238(b) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
29 See, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2024).
30 See Hernandez v. Dorantes, 314 Neb. 905, 920, 994 N.W.2d 46, 59 (2023)
(quoting In re Guardianship of Carlos D., supra note 27).
31 In re Guardianship of Luis J., 300 Neb. 659, 664, 915 N.W.2d 589, 593
(2018); Accord In re Guardianship of Carlos D., supra note 27.
32 See, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.

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IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF TOMAS J.
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UCCJEA. And there is no dispute that on the date the guard-
ianship petition was filed, Tomas was no longer a “child” as
defined by the UCCJEA.
Marvin’s 	supplemental 	briefing 	generally 	concedes 	that
because Tomas was 18 years old when the petition for minor
guardianship was filed, Tomas was no longer a “child” under
the UCCJEA and, therefore, the county court’s jurisdiction was
not governed by the UCCJEA. We agree.
[11] Where, as here, the prospective minor ward in a guard-
ianship proceeding has reached the age of 18 and thus is no
longer a “child” under the UCCJEA, a county court’s jurisdic-
tion is not governed by the UCCJEA. And for the sake of com-
pleteness, we observe that because Tomas was not yet 19 years
old on the date the guardianship petition was filed, jurisdiction
was not governed by the provisions of the Nebraska Uniform
Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction
Act (UAGPPJA), 33 either. As such, under Nebraska’s current
statutory scheme, the goals the Legislature sought to advance
by enacting the UCCJEA and the UAGPPJA 34 do not apply to
18-year-old prospective wards who are too old to be a “child”
under the former and too young to be an “adult” 35 under
the latter.
2. Jurisdiction Over Minor Guardianships
But our holding that the UCCJEA does not apply to this
minor guardianship proceeding does not end our jurisdic-
tional analysis. Marvin argues that even though the juris-
dictional provisions of the UCCJEA do not apply here, other
33 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-3901 to 30-3923 (Reissue 2016).
34 See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 272 Neb. 647, 724 N.W.2d 24 (2006) (goal
of UCCJEA is to promote uniformity and avoid jurisdictional conflict in
child custody matters, ensure custody determinations are made in state
best suited to decide child’s best interests, discourage interstate custody
controversies, avoid relitigating custody issues, and facilitate enforcement
of custody orders).
35 See § 30-3902(1) (defining “adult” as “an individual who has attained
nineteen years of age”).

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Nebraska statutes give county courts subject matter jurisdic-
tion over minor guardianship proceedings. He also argues that
§ 43-1238(b) of the UCCJEA should not be considered the
only Nebraska statute to authorize county courts to make SIJ
findings in minor guardianships.
[12] As courts of limited jurisdiction, county courts have
only that jurisdiction which has been granted through specific
legislative enactment. 36 Marvin contends that when a minor
guardianship proceeding involves a potential ward who is 18
years old and thus is no longer considered a child under the
UCCJEA, the county court’s jurisdiction is governed exclu-
sively by either Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517(2) (Cum. Supp.
2022), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2211(a) (Reissue 2016), and/or
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2602(a) (Reissue 2016). Moreover, he
urges this court to construe the language of § 30-2211 to
impliedly give county courts authority to make SIJ findings in
minor guardianships.
Section 24-517(2) is found within chapter 24 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes governing the courts generally. It states, in
relevant part, that “[e]ach county court [has] [e]xclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction in all matters relating to the guardianship
of a person, except if a separate juvenile court already has
jurisdiction over a child in need of a guardian, [then,] concur-
rent original jurisdiction with the separate juvenile court in
such guardianship.” 37 Section 30-2602(a) is found within the
Nebraska Probate Code, and it provides: “The [county] court
has jurisdiction over protective proceedings and guardianship
proceedings.” And § 30-2211(a), also within the probate code,
provides, in relevant part, that “[t]o the full extent permit-
ted by the Constitution of Nebraska, the [county] court has
36 See State v. A.D., supra note 19. Accord In re Estate of Evertson, 295
Neb. 301, 311, 889 N.W.2d 73, 81 (2016) (“[c]ounty courts can acquire
jurisdiction only through a specific legislative mandate as a result of a
legislative enactment”).
37 § 24-517(2).

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jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to . . . (2) protection
of minors and incapacitated persons . . . .”
We have generally recognized that under § 24-517(2),
“unless a juvenile court has acquired jurisdiction over a child
in need of a guardian, a county court has exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters relating to a guardianship.” 38 But our prior
cases have not required that we harmonize, or prioritize, the
various statutes governing a county court’s jurisdiction over
minor guardianships. This case does not require that we do
so either.
Instead, we are satisfied that pursuant to either §§ 24-517(2),
30-2211(a), and/or 30-2602(a), the Hall County Court had
jurisdiction over Marvin’s petition for appointment of a minor
guardian, and that therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the
merits of the county court’s guardianship ruling. But, as we
address next, the county court’s statutory authority to make
SIJ findings outside the statutory framework of the UCCJEA
is less clear.
(a) Jurisdiction to Make SIJ Factual
Findings in Minor Guardianship
Marvin contends that although § 43-1238(b) of the UCCJEA
did not apply here, the UCCJEA should not be considered the
“sole source” 39 of a county court’s jurisdiction to make SIJ
findings in minor guardianship proceedings. He suggests that
under § 30-2211, the Legislature gave county courts “juris-
diction over all subject matter relating to . . . protection of
minors,” 40 including “full power to make orders . . . and take
all other action necessary and proper to administer justice
in the matters which come before it.” 41 Marvin relies on the
38 In re Guardianship of Brydon P., 286 Neb. 661, 672, 838 N.W.2d 262, 271
(2013).
39 Supplemental brief for appellant at 11.
40 § 30-2211(a).
41 § 30-2211(b) (emphasis supplied).

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language italicized above to argue that where § 43-1238(b) of
the UCCJEA does not apply to grant jurisdiction, we should
hold that Ҥ 30-2211 gives a county court authority to make
SIJ predicate findings in a guardianship proceeding.” 42
We decline to consider, in this case, whether any Nebraska
statute other than § 43-1238(b) gives a county court jurisdic-
tion to make SIJ factual findings when a minor guardian has
been appointed. We instead leave that question for another day,
because as we explain next, now that Tomas has reached the
age of majority, addressing the question in this opinion would
be merely advisory. 43
3. Mootness
[13-18] Mootness does not prevent appellate jurisdiction;
rather, mootness is a justiciability doctrine that can prevent
courts from exercising jurisdiction. 44 A case is moot if the
facts underlying the dispute have changed, such that the issues
presented are no longer alive. 45 Stated differently, a case
becomes moot when the issues initially presented in litiga-
tion cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome of litigation. 46 The central question
in a mootness analysis is whether changes in circumstances
that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled
any occasion for meaningful relief. 47 If a judgment rendered
by the trial court will have no practical legal effect upon an
existing controversy because an intervening event renders any
grant of effectual relief impossible for the reviewing court, the
42 Supplemental brief for appellant at 13.
43 See State v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 313 Neb. 763, 778, 986 N.W.2d 78, 88
(2023) (“[i]t is generally not the function of appellate courts to render
advisory opinions”).
44 Johnson v. Vosberg, 316 Neb. 658, 6 N.W.3d 216 (2024).
45 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 314 Neb. 748, 993 N.W.2d 105 (2023).
46 In re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
47 MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, supra note 9.

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case is moot. 48 And as a general rule, a moot case is subject to
summary dismissal. 49
Because Tomas has reached the age of majority, the relief
of appointing a minor guardian is no longer available under
Nebraska law, 50 and Marvin does not contend otherwise.
Indeed, at oral argument before this court, the only relief
Marvin requested was to remand this matter to the county
court with directions to make the requested SIJ factual find-
ings. But Marvin has not explained how such findings could be
made in the absence of an order appointing a minor guardian
for Tomas.
Under federal immigration law, factual findings to support
SIJ status must be made by a state court that has entered an
order either declaring the immigrant to be dependent on the
court or placing the immigrant in the custody of an agency
or department of the state or an individual or entity appointed
by the court. 51 In other words, a state court’s order of depen-
dency or custody is a fundamental feature of the federal SIJ
framework.
Here, unlike our prior guardianship cases involving SIJ
findings, 52 no minor guardian was appointed for Tomas, and
thus no custody order exists to support related SIJ factual
findings. Moreover, now that Tomas has reached the age of
48 See id.
49 State ex rel. Peterson v. Ebke, 303 Neb. 637, 930 N.W.2d 551 (2019).
50 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2614 (Reissue 2016) (minor guardian’s authority
and responsibility terminates “upon the minor’s death, adoption, marriage
or attainment of majority”).
51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). Accord 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1)(i)(B) (to
be eligible for special immigrant juvenile status, petitioner must be subject
of court order declaring petitioner dependent or placing petitioner “under
the custody of an agency or department of a State, or an individual or
entity appointed by a State or juvenile court”).
52 Cf., In re Guardianship of Luis J., supra note 31; In re Guardianship of
Carlos D., supra note 27.

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majority under Nebraska law, 53 no such custody order can ever
be entered. Regardless of Marvin’s arguments that the county
court erred by denying his minor guardianship petition and by
failing to make SIJ findings, Tomas is now an adult, and he
cannot be the subject of a minor guardianship under Nebraska
law. And without an order of custody appointing a minor
guardian for Tomas, we are aware of no legal basis for making
SIJ factual findings. Under the circumstances, this court can-
not fashion meaningful relief on either of the issues Marvin
raises on appeal, and the appeal is moot.
Nevertheless, Marvin asks us to reach the merits of the
issues he raises on appeal under either of two recognized
exceptions to the mootness doctrine: the public interest excep-
tion or the collateral consequences exception. We address each
exception in turn and conclude that neither applies.
(a) Public Interest Exception
We understand Marvin’s argument regarding the public
interest exception to be limited to his first assignment of error,
which challenges the legal standard applied by the county
court to deny the minor guardianship petition. We limit our
analysis accordingly.
[19,20] The public interest exception to the mootness doc-
trine requires the consideration of (1) the public or private
nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an
authoritative adjudication for the guidance of public officials,
and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar
problem. 54 As these factors demonstrate, the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine exists so that authoritative
judicial guidance can be provided on issues that are likely to
recur but would otherwise inherently evade review. 55
[21] Marvin suggests there is confusion regarding the proper
legal standard to apply when deciding whether to appoint a
53 See § 43-2101.
54 City of Hastings v. Sheets, 317 Neb. 88, 8 N.W.3d 771 (2024).
55 MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, supra note 9.

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minor guardian, and he argues the issue is “capable of repeti-
tion [so] this Court should give probate courts clear direction
on [the] issue.” 56 We question Marvin’s assertion that there is
confusion over the applicable legal standard for appointing
minor guardians. Section 30-2611(b) of the probate code lists
the specific criteria that must be met before a court can appoint
a guardian for a minor, so the applicable legal standard is well
established. But even if we could be persuaded that confu-
sion over the applicable legal standard exists and is likely to
recur, we cannot agree it will inherently evade judicial review,
especially given the volume of guardianship appeals. Because
it is generally inappropriate for an appellate court to review a
moot case to address an issue that would not otherwise evade
review, 57 we decline to apply the public interest exception to
address Marvin’s first assignment of error.
(b) Collateral Consequences Exception
Marvin asks us to reach the merits of both assignments of
error under the collateral consequences exception, asserting
that the county court’s “denial of Tomas’ guardianship and
the . . . failure to address his request for special findings has
collateral consequences for Tomas even after turning 19 years
of age.” 58
[22] In Nebraska, the collateral consequences exception to
the mootness doctrine “‘permits adjudication of the merits of
a criminal case where the petitioner may suffer future state
or federal penalties or disabilities as a result of the [criminal]
judgment[,]’ even though the criminal sentence has already
been served.” 59 Similarly, the Nebraska Court of Appeals has
56 Brief for appellant at 26.
57 See, MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, supra note 9; NP Dodge Mgmt. Co.
v. Holcomb, supra note 45.
58 Brief for appellant at 24.
59 MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, supra note 9, 316 Neb. at 752, 6 N.W.3d
at 804. Accord NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 45. See, also,
State v. Patterson, 237 Neb. 198, 465 N.W.2d 743 (1991).

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applied the collateral consequences exception in a juvenile
delinquency case to allow an adjudicated youth to withdraw
his admission to a charge of criminal mischief after his case
was closed and he had been discharged from custody. 60
But appellate courts in Nebraska have declined to apply
the collateral consequences exception outside the criminal or
juvenile delinquency context. 61 And because Marvin offers no
principled reason to depart from that precedent, we decline his
invitation to apply the collateral consequences exception in
this minor guardianship proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a county court’s
jurisdiction over a minor guardianship proceeding is not gov-
erned by the UCCJEA where the prospective ward has reached
the age of 18 and is no longer a “child” as defined by the
UCCJEA. 62 And although we conclude that other Nebraska
statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor
guardianship proceeding at issue here, and that therefore, we
have jurisdiction to review the merits of the county court’s
guardianship ruling, we decline to exercise that jurisdiction.
Instead, we conclude that the issues raised on appeal became
moot once Tomas reached the age of majority and that none
of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine urged by Marvin
apply. We therefore must dismiss the appeal as moot.
Appeal dismissed.
60 See In re Interest of Justin V., 18 Neb. App. 960, 797 N.W.2d 755 (2011).
61 See, e.g., MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis, supra note 9; NP Dodge Mgmt.
Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 45; In re Interest of Justin V., supra note 60.
62 See § 43-1227(4).