State v. Brooks

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Paul Douglas Brooks, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 3, 2025. 	No. S-24-721.
1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy
trial grounds is a factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.
2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
3. ____. The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question
of law.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court
is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination
reached by the court below.
5. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Factual determinations pertaining
to the exceptions listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) through (f)
(Reissue 2016) must be supported by specific findings, which appel-
late courts review for clear error. However, the proper interpretation of
§ 29-1207(4) and its application to the undisputed historical facts of a
case are questions of law.
6. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court
must exclude the day the information was filed, count forward 6
months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defend-
ant can be tried.
7. Speedy Trial: Proof. The State bears the burden to show, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded
time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016).
8. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Words and Phrases. “Good cause,” for
purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016), means a
substantial reason and one that affords a legal excuse.
9. Good Cause. Good cause is a factual question dealt with on a case-by-
case basis.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:03 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
10. Good Cause: Proof. A trial court’s good cause findings must be sup-
ported by the evidence in the record, and the State bears the burden of
establishing facts showing that good cause existed.
11. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. When a trial court relies on Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy trial
calculation, a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice. Instead,
the court must make specific findings as to the good cause which
resulted in the delay.
12. Speedy Trial: Words and Phrases. Because a “period of delay” is
generally synonymous with a “period of time,” excludable periods can
result from delays in the progression of a criminal case regardless of
whether the trial date was postponed or remained unchanged.
13. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Proof. The phrase “period of delay” in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016) refers to a specified
period of time in which trial did not commence, and the State must
prove that there was good cause why trial did not commence during
such period in order to exclude it from the speedy trial computation
under § 29-1207(4)(f).
Appeal from the District Court for Furnas County: Patrick
M. Heng, Judge. Affirmed.
F. Matthew Aerni, of Aerni Law, L.L.C., for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Jacob 	M.
Waggoner for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Paul Douglas Brooks appeals the order of the district court
for Furnas County that overruled his motion for absolute dis-
charge of the charges against him based on statutory speedy
trial grounds. The court determined, inter alia, that the time
Brooks had requested to take depositions of witnesses that
the State gave notice it would call at trial to provide evidence
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414 (Reissue 2016) was excludable
in calculating the time to bring Brooks to trial. We affirm the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
district court’s order that overruled Brooks’ motion for abso-
lute discharge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 11, 2024, the State filed an information in the
district court charging Brooks with two counts of first degree
sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault
of a child. All three counts involved the same victim, identi-
fied as H.S. On January 13, Brooks filed a plea in abatement,
which the district court overruled on March 5. Brooks was
arraigned on March 21, and the court set a status hearing for
May 23.
On the date of the status hearing, May 23, 2024, the State
filed a notice of its intent to offer evidence of other sexual
assaults committed by Brooks as permitted by § 27-414. In
the notice, the State identified the victims of the other assaults
as S.N., J.S., and C.G., and the State requested a hearing for
the court to determine whether the evidence would be admis-
sible at Brooks’ trial. In a journal entry after the status hearing,
the court stated that Brooks had “advised he wanted to take the
depositions of the [§ 27-414] witnesses and could have those
completed by mid-July,” and the court set a hearing for August
19 on the State’s notice under § 27-414.
Brooks filed notices in the district court indicating that he
had taken the deposition of J.S. on June 26, 2024, of C.G. on
July 30, and of H.S. on August 9. Although there is no notice
of deposition in the record, in his appellate brief, Brooks
stated that he took the deposition of S.N. on August 15. The
court held the hearing on the State’s notice under § 27-414 on
August 19 and 29. On August 29, the court filed an order set-
ting trial for October 1, and on September 11, the court entered
an order permitting the State to offer evidence pursuant to
§ 27-414 at Brooks’ trial.
On September 18, 2024, Brooks filed a motion for abso-
lute discharge in which he asserted that his constitutional
and statutory rights to speedy trial had been violated. In this
appeal, we have been asked to address only Brooks’ statutory

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
speedy trial rights. In the discharge motion, Brooks conceded
that the 52 days between his filing of the plea in abatement on
January 13 and the court’s ruling on the plea on March 5 were
excludable, but he asserted there were no other excludable
periods. In connection with his statutory claim, he contended
that the last date to bring him to trial under the 6-month
provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2016) was
September 1.
After a hearing, the court entered an order on September
24, 2024, in which it denied Brooks’ motion for absolute
discharge. The court set forth its determination of the statu-
tory time for bringing Brooks to trial under § 29-1207. The
court first determined that, as Brooks conceded, the time from
Brooks’ filing of the plea in abatement until the court’s ruling
thereon was excludable.
The court then considered two additional periods of time
that the State argued were excludable. The court first rejected
the State’s argument that the period from the arraignment on
March 21, 2024, until the status hearing on May 23 should be
excluded. The State noted that Brooks had requested the court
to allow 90 days before the status hearing so that Brooks could
conduct discovery, and the State attempted to characterize
Brooks’ request as a request for a continuance. But the court
stated that it had scheduled the status hearing for 60 days after
the arraignment because the State raised speedy trial concerns,
and the court determined that Brooks’ request for 90 days did
not amount to a request for a continuance.
As to the second period that the State asserted was exclud-
able, the court agreed with the State’s argument that the
period of time from the status hearing on May 23, 2024, until
Brooks conducted his third deposition on August 9 should
be excluded. The court stated that its decision to schedule
the hearing for August 19 was “a direct result of [Brooks’]
request to schedule the hearing after mid-July to allow [him]
to complete depositions of the [§ 27-414] witnesses.” The
court stated that when the State filed its notice pursuant to

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
§ 27-414 on May 23, “it was prepared to proceed with the
hearing” but Brooks “specifically requested that the Court not
schedule the matter until after [he] completed his discovery.”
The court determined that the period of delay in scheduling
the hearing was a continuance at Brooks’ request or con-
sent and was therefore excludable pursuant to § 29-1207(4)
(b). The court further determined that under § 29-1207(4)(f),
“good cause exists to exclude this time frame from the speedy
trial calculation.” The court determined that the period of time
from the May 23 status hearing until July 15, or “mid-July,”
should be excluded based on Brooks’ request and that exclud-
ing that period moved the date to bring Brooks to trial to
October 26. The court further determined that the period until
Brooks completed the third deposition on August 9 should
also be excluded.
The court concluded that after excluding the time period
relating to the plea in abatement, the time period when Brooks
was taking depositions related to the § 27-414 notice, and
the time period relating to the motion for absolute discharge,
the last date to bring Brooks to trial had been extended to
November 17, 2024; therefore, the trial scheduled for October
1 was within the statutory speedy trial period. The court there-
fore overruled Brooks’ motion for absolute discharge.
Brooks appeals the order in which the district court over-
ruled his motion for absolute discharge.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Brooks claims that the district court erred when it over-
ruled his motion for absolute discharge based on its findings
that (1) Brooks requested or consented to a continuance under
§ 29-1207(4)(b) when he requested time to take depositions
of witnesses named in the State’s notice under § 27-414 and
that (2) good cause existed under § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude
time after May 23, 2024, during which Brooks was taking
depositions of witnesses named in the State’s notice under
§ 27-414.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual
question that will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly errone-
ous. State v. Rashad, 316 Neb. 101, 3 N.W.3d 325 (2024).
[2-4] Statutory interpretation is a question of law. State v.
Lear, 316 Neb. 14, 2 N.W.3d 632 (2024). Likewise, the appli-
cation of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. Id.
On questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach
a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the
court below. Id.
[5] Applying these general standards of review to ques-
tions regarding periods of delay excluded when determining
the statutory speedy trial period, we have stated as follows:
Factual determinations pertaining to the exceptions listed in
§ 29-1207(4)(a) through (f) must be supported by specific
findings, which we review for clear error. State v. Nelson,
313 Neb. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023). However, the proper
interpretation of § 29-1207(4) and its application to the undis-
puted historical facts of a case are questions of law. State v.
Nelson, supra.
ANALYSIS
Brooks generally claims that the district court erred when
it determined that his request for time to take depositions of
witnesses named in the State’s notice under § 27-414 resulted
in time that was excludable from the speedy trial period under
§ 29-1207(4). He claims that the court erred both when it
found that his request was a request for a continuance under
§ 29-1207(4)(b) and when it found that good cause existed
under § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude time related to his request.
[6,7] The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in
§ 29-1207 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).
Section 29-1208 provides that a criminal defendant is entitled
to absolute discharge if he or she is not brought to trial before
the running of time as provided by § 29-1207. Section 29-1207
provides that a defendant shall be brought to trial within 6

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319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
months, starting from the date the indictment is returned or the
information filed and excluding periods of delay falling into
any of the exceptions listed in § 29-1207(4)(a) through (f).
To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must
exclude the day the information was filed, count forward 6
months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under
§ 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant can be
tried. State v. Nelson, supra. The State bears the burden to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of
one or more of the excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4).
State v. Nelson, supra.
Regarding § 29-1207(4)(b) and the exclusion of a period
of delay resulting from a continuance, Brooks cites State v.
Space, 312 Neb. 456, 467, 980 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2022), in which
we held that “continuance,” as it is used in § 29-1207(4)(b),
“refers to the circumstance where a court proceeding set for
one date is postponed to a future date.” Brooks argues that
there was no “continuance” in this case and that instead, the
court was setting the initial date for the hearing on the State’s
notice under § 27-414 and no proceeding that had already been
set was being postponed due to Brooks’ request to allow him
time to conduct the depositions.
In response to Brooks’ continuance argument, the State
asserts in its appellate brief that we do not need to reach
the continuance issue, because the time related to Brooks’
request for time to take the depositions was properly exclud-
able based on the district court’s finding of good cause under
§ 29-1207(4)(f). As discussed below, we determine that the
finding of good cause was not error and justified the exclu-
sion of time sufficient to warrant overruling Brooks’ motion
for absolute discharge, and we therefore agree with the State
that determination of the continuance issue is not necessary to
resolve this appeal.
[8-11] Brooks challenges the district court’s finding that
good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) supported the exclusion of
time attributed to his taking the depositions to prepare for the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
hearing pursuant to § 27-414. Specific periods of delay are
required under § 29-1207(4)(a) through (e) to be excluded in
computing the 6-month time for trial. However, § 29-1207(4)(f)
also excludes “[o]ther periods of delay not specifically enumer-
ated . . . , but only if the court finds that they are for good
cause.” “Good cause,” for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(f), is
not defined by statute, but we have held that “good cause,”
as used in the speedy trial statutes, means a substantial rea-
son and one that affords a legal excuse. See State v. Rashad,
316 Neb. 101, 3 N.W.3d 325 (2024). Good cause is a factual
question dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Id. A trial court’s
good cause findings must be supported by the evidence in the
record, and the State bears the burden of establishing facts
showing that good cause existed. Id. When a trial court relies
on § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude time from the speedy trial calcu-
lation, a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice. State
v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981, 987 N.W.2d 613 (2023). Instead, the
court must make specific findings as to the good cause which
resulted in the delay. Id.
Brooks argues that there was not sufficient evidence to sup-
port the district court’s finding of good cause. He contends
that the only evidence was his request for time to conduct the
depositions, and he asserts that the State did not present evi-
dence regarding the availability of earlier dates for the hearing
and did not present evidence that the State had requested an
earlier hearing. Brooks also argues that obtaining depositions
in preparation for a hearing pursuant to § 27-414 is a standard
step in trial preparation that should not result in an exclusion.
Brooks concedes that a motion to take depositions may com-
mence an excludable period but that the excluded period lasts
only until the motion is decided and not until the depositions
are completed.
In State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797, 804, 587 N.W.2d 384,
389 (1998), we recognized that the time excluded under
§ 29-1207(4)(a) relating to a motion for taking depositions
extends to the disposition of the motion but that “the period of

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
time from the trial court’s ruling on a motion for depositions
until the depositions are concluded is not excludable under
§ 29-1207(4)(a).” However, turning to § 29-1207(4)(f), we
further stated in State v. Murphy that the time consumed by
a defendant to take depositions “may or may not be excluded
under § 29-1207(4)(f), with the inquiry turning upon whether
there is ‘good cause’ for the delay.” 255 Neb. at 804, 587
N.W.2d at 389. On the facts in State v. Murphy, we rejected
the trial court’s finding that the time to take depositions was
excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). Although we recognized
that the time could be excluded for “good cause” under
§ 29-1207(4)(f), because the trial court in State v. Murphy had
not made a finding of good cause or of facts to support that
finding, we remanded the matter to the trial court to consider
whether the time should be excluded under § 29-1207(4)(f).
Therefore, in State v. Murphy, we did not have occasion to
review findings to support good cause for a period of delay
such that time for taking depositions could be excluded pursu-
ant to § 29-1207(4)(f).
In contrast to State v. Murphy, the district court in this
case did find good cause, and we therefore have findings to
review. The court found good cause to exclude the time from
May 23, 2024, until July 15, based on Brooks’ request that the
court refrain from scheduling the hearing on the State’s notice
under § 27-414 until “mid-July” so that he could obtain the
depositions. The court separately found that there was also
good cause to exclude the additional time that Brooks took
to complete the depositions, which period the court found to
extend to August 9. In its order on the motion for absolute
discharge, the court stated that excluding the period of delay
from May 23 until July 15 would extend the time for trial until
October 26.
As we discuss below, we determine that the district court’s
finding that the time from May 23, 2024, until July 15 should
be excluded as being for good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f)
was not in error. Excluding the time from May 23 until July

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STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
15 would be sufficient to justify overruling the motion for
absolute discharge because it would extend the time to bring
Brooks to trial until after both September 18, the date Brooks
filed his motion for absolute discharge, and October 1, the
date the court scheduled the trial to commence. Therefore, to
dispose of this appeal, we need not also determine whether the
time after July 15 that Brooks took to complete the deposi-
tions is also excludable. We therefore need not address Brooks’
argument that the State did not present evidence to show why
the hearing could not have been scheduled before August 19
on a date closer to the “mid-July” date by which Brooks indi-
cated at the May 23 hearing that he would be able to complete
the depositions.
[12,13] As an initial matter in reviewing the district court’s
finding of good cause, we first note that § 29-1207(4)(f) pro-
vides for exclusion of “[o]ther periods of delay” that the court
finds are for good cause. An initial question then is whether
there was a “period of delay” occasioned by Brooks’ request to
delay scheduling the hearing under § 27-414 until mid-July so
that he could conduct the depositions. In State v. Coomes, 309
Neb. 749, 767-68, 962 N.W.2d 510, 524 (2021), we stated that
“for purposes of the speedy trial calculation, there is no mean-
ingful distinction between the phrases ‘period of time’ and
‘period of delay.’” We further stated that because a “period
of delay” is generally synonymous with a “period of time,”
excludable periods can result from delays in the progression
of a criminal case regardless of whether the trial date was
postponed or remained unchanged. Id. at 708, 962 N.W.2d at
524. We have also said that “[t]he phrase ‘period of delay’ in
§ 29-1207(4)(f) refers to a specified period of time in which
trial did not commence” and that “[t]he State must prove that
there was good cause why trial did not commence during such
period in order to exclude it from the speedy trial computation
under § 29-1207(4)(f).” State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145,
155, 672 N.W.2d 627, 635 (2004).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
With this understanding of “period of delay,” we determine
that there was a “period of delay” related to Brooks’ request
for the court to refrain from setting a hearing until “mid-July”
so that he could complete depositions of witnesses named in
the State’s § 27-414 notice. To honor that request, the court
could not schedule the hearing under § 27-414 before “mid-
July,” and, consequently, the court could not schedule the trial
to commence during that period. Therefore, the time from May
23, 2024, until July 15 was a period when trial did not com-
mence and therefore was a period of delay.
Having determined that there was a period of delay in this
case, we note that we have further stated that “[i]f a trial court
relies on [§ 29-1207(4)(f)] in excluding a period of delay
from the 6-month computation, a general finding of ‘good
cause’ will not suffice and the trial court must make specific
findings as to the good cause or causes which resulted in the
extensions of time.” State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. at 155, 672
N.W.2d at 635. In accordance with State v. Feldhacker, the
district court’s fact findings in support of its finding of good
cause included the following: The court found that its May 23,
2024, order in which it set the hearing on the State’s notice
of intent pursuant to § 27-414 for August 19 was “a direct
result of [Brooks’] request to schedule the hearing after mid-
July to allow [him] to complete depositions of the [§ 27-414]
witnesses.” The court further found that when the State filed
its notice on May 23, the State “was prepared to proceed with
the hearing” but that Brooks “had not completed his discovery
and requested additional time to do so prior to scheduling the
§ 27-414 hearing.” The court found that Brooks “specifically
requested that the Court not schedule the matter until after [he]
completed his discovery.” The court found that excluding the
53 days between May 23 and July 15, in addition to the time
excluded relating to Brooks’ plea in abatement, “would result
in the speedy trial expiration date of October 26, 2024.” In
conclusion, the district court found that “the period of delay
prior to the scheduling of the § 27-414 hearing was the direct

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STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
result of the request” of Brooks and that good cause existed
under § 29-1207(4)(f) such that the period of delay should be
excluded from the speedy trial calculation.
We have reviewed the record, and we agree with the dis-
trict court’s determination that good cause existed under
§ 29-1207(4)(f) such that the period of delay occasioned by
Brooks’ request for time from May 23, 2024, until “mid-July”
should be excluded from the statutory speedy trial calcula-
tion. Allowing time for Brooks to complete the depositions
was a substantial reason for the delay, and it afforded a legal
excuse for the delay in commencing the hearing and, con-
sequently, the trial. Although the need for a hearing under
§ 27-414 was occasioned by the State’s decision to present
evidence pursuant to that statute, the delay in setting the hear-
ing, which consequently delayed commencement of the trial,
was at Brooks’ request.
We note in this regard that § 27-414(2) requires the State
to provide notice of its intent to offer evidence under the sec-
tion “at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial
or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.”
We find the 15-day requirement significant in that it indicates
that the State’s notice was filed within a reasonable time prior
to when trial might have commenced. We also read it as a
legislative determination that 15 days is sufficient time for a
defendant to prepare for the hearing at which the court will
determine whether the § 27-414 evidence may be admitted.
We think that this legislative determination bolsters our deter-
mination that Brooks’ request occasioned a period of delay for
good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f). At the May 23, 2024, hear-
ing, Brooks asked for time until mid-July, or a period of more
than 45 days, to take the depositions in preparation for the
hearing. Brooks’ request resulted in a period of delay beyond
that which was legislatively determined to be sufficient to pre-
pare for the hearing.
Given the facts, it is sufficient that we limit our consid-
eration to the exclusion of the time from the May 23, 2024,

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STATE v. BROOKS
Cite as 319 Neb. 377
status hearing when Brooks made his request until July 15,
or “mid-July,” the time he specifically requested he would
need to complete the depositions. By limiting our analysis to
this period, we focus on the specific time Brooks requested
and the delay that was a direct result of his request. With this
limited focus, we need not consider Brooks’ contention that
the State failed to show good cause for setting the hearing
for August 19, rather than some date closer to the “mid-July”
timeframe he specifically requested. We also need not con-
sider whether there was good cause to exclude the time from
“mid-July” until Brooks completed the depositions in August.
We believe it is unnecessary to speculate on the possible
exclusion for good cause of periods after mid-July. We do not
comment on whether there was good cause related to time
beyond mid-July, because excluding time from May 23 until
July 15 was sufficient to justify overruling Brooks’ motion for
absolute discharge.
CONCLUSION
We determine that the time from May 23, 2024, through
“mid-July” was for good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) such
that the time should be excluded for calculating the statutory
speedy trial period. In its order, the district court found that
excluding the time related to the plea in abatement and exclud-
ing the time from May 23 until July 15 extended the time for
bringing Brooks to trial to October 26. Because excluding
these periods of delay extended the time for bringing Brooks
to trial until after both September 18, the date Brooks filed
his motion for absolute discharge, and October 1, the date the
district court scheduled the trial to commence, we conclude
that the district court did not err when it overruled Brooks’
premature motion for absolute discharge. We therefore affirm
the district court’s order in which it overruled Brooks’ motion
for absolute discharge.
Affirmed.
Bergevin, J., not participating.