State v. Reeves

- 427 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Zachary S. Reeves, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 22, 2026. 	Nos. S-25-300, S-25-301.
1. Motions to Dismiss: Prosecuting Attorneys: Appeal and Error. An
appellate court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss alleging a prosecutorial conflict
of interest.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in mat-
ters submitted for disposition.
3. Appeal and Error. It is an abuse of discretion to make an error of law
or clear errors of factual determination.
4. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Whether jury instructions are
correct is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves indepen-
dently of the lower court’s decision.
5. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. In an appeal based upon
a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden
to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise
adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.
6. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. The failure to object to a jury
instruction after it has been submitted to counsel for review precludes
raising an objection on appeal absent plain error.
7. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. Plain error is error of such a
nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integ-
rity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
8. Jury Instructions. An instruction which does not correctly state
the law or which is likely to confuse or mislead the jury should not
be given.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:43 AM CDT

- 428 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
9. ____. In construing an individual jury instruction, the instruction should
not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of
the overall charge to the jury considered as a whole.
10. ____. If the instructions as a whole fairly present the law so that the jury
could not be misled, there is no prejudicial error.
11. Jury Instructions: Verdicts. The purpose of instructions is to furnish
guidance to the jury in its deliberations and to aid it in arriving at a
proper verdict; and, with this end in view, the jury instructions should
state clearly and concisely the issues of fact and the principles of law
that are necessary to enable them to accomplish the purpose desired.
12. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel may be determined on direct appeal is
a question of law.
13. ____: ____. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed
facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively determine
whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether
the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient
performance.
14. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his
or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient per-
formance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
15. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.
16. ____: ____. To show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
17. Proof: Words and Phrases. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
18. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. In determining whether
there is a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of trial
counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding,
an appellate court may properly consider the strength of the admissible
evidence relating to the controverted issues in the case.
19. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appel-
lant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make

- 429 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes defi-
cient performance by trial counsel.
20. Witnesses. It is generally improper for a witness to testify as to the
credibility of another witness.
Appeals from the District Court for Nemaha County: Julie
D. Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Adam J. Sipple, of Sipple Law, for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Papik, J.
A county attorney filed two charges of first degree sexual
assault against Zachary S. Reeves. Before trial, Reeves sought
to have the charges dismissed or, in the alternative, to have
the county attorney disqualified based on an alleged conflict
of interest—Reeves alleged that years before, he had a sexual
encounter with the county attorney’s then-wife. After a hear-
ing, the district court found the county attorney was not dis-
qualified as a matter of law but recommended the appointment
of a special prosecutor. The district court sustained the county
attorney’s subsequent motion to appoint a special prosecu-
tor. At Reeves’ consolidated jury trial, the special prosecutor
presented evidence that Reeves sexually penetrated his accus-
ers without their consent after he had been drinking; Reeves
generally attempted to discredit his accusers. Reeves was
convicted and sentenced on both charges.
Now on appeal, Reeves does not dispute the sufficiency of
the evidence. But he claims that the charges should have been
dismissed because of the county attorney’s involvement and
that a jury instruction about intoxication was in error. He also
alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel

- 430 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
related to witness credibility. We reject Reeves’ arguments
and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Reeves Charged
In March 2023, Nemaha County Attorney Angelo Ligouri
(the county attorney) filed separate criminal complaints in the
county court charging Reeves with first degree sexual assault
of A.C. in July 2020 and of K.G. in May 2021. The county
attorney subsequently filed in the district court first degree
sexual assault charges against Reeves in both cases.
2. Pretrial Evidentiary Hearings
In September 2023, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-404
(Cum. Supp. 2024) or 27-414 (Reissue 2016), the county attor-
ney filed notices of the State’s intent to offer the testimony
of K.G. in the case involving A.C. and of A.C. in the case
involving K.G., along with the testimony, in both cases, of
M.H., who had also reported that Reeves assaulted her. Reeves
filed corresponding motions in limine seeking to preclude this
evidence. At hearings on the motions, the county attorney rep-
resented the State.
According to evidence at the hearings, Reeves owned a
bar and grill in Peru, Nebraska, that was a popular hangout
and workplace for local college students. In September 2022,
college student M.H. reported to the Nemaha County sher-
iff’s office that Reeves had assaulted her while they were on
a backroad.
The district court heard evidence about the ensuing inves-
tigation of M.H.’s allegations. There was evidence that, in
October 2022, Deputy Sheriff Nathan Boden and the county
attorney interviewed two women employed by Reeves. One
of those women said that Reeves once kissed her and that
she had to “push him off” of her; this occurred on the same
backroad M.H. identified in her report. Both women testified
that they terminated their interview with Boden and the county

- 431 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
attorney because they felt their words were being twisted, mis-
understood, or not “reciprocated correctly.” The woman who
mentioned the incident on the backroad testified that based
on “the direction that the [interview] was going,” she was not
“interested in being involved any more.”
K.G., who frequented Reeves’ bar when she was a student,
testified that when she heard about M.H.’s allegations, she
reported to the Nemaha County sheriff’s office that Reeves
had sexually assaulted her in May 2021. K.G. testified at the
hearing that Reeves had sexually penetrated her without her
consent. There was evidence presented that on the night of
the assault, K.G. obtained a sexual assault examination at a
hospital and spoke to a law enforcement officer, but that for
a period of time afterward, she did not return calls from law
enforcement. K.G. testified that after she renewed contact
with law enforcement, she spoke to the county attorney twice:
the day before the hearing and the day of the hearing.
According to testimony at the hearing, the investigation of
allegations against Reeves led Boden to contact A.C. She tes-
tified that, in total, she had spoken with the county attorney
twice on the phone and met with him once, which was the day
before the hearing. According to A.C., during the in-person
interview, she and the county attorney went through her testi-
mony and “what answers should be,” but she also denied that
the county attorney told her how to answer.
There was evidence at the hearing that during an in-person
interview with Boden, A.C. recounted that she had a non-
consensual sexual encounter with Reeves in early July 2020.
There was other evidence that in the weeks after the alleged
sexual assault, A.C. told several people about it, including her
sister, a coach, and a counselor, but that she decided at that
time not to report the incident to law enforcement. In her inter-
view with Boden, A.C. initially denied that Reeves sexually
penetrated her during the encounter. But when the legal defini-
tion of sexual penetration was explained to A.C. later in the

- 432 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
investigation, she acknowledged that Reeves had penetrated
her vagina without her consent.
There was conflicting evidence about who clarified the
legal definition of sexual penetration for A.C. She testified
that it was the county attorney during a phone conversation
about a week after her initial interview. Boden initially testi-
fied that he believed he may have clarified for A.C. the legal
definition of sexual penetration, but he was not certain; Boden
did not recall having followup conversations with the county
attorney about it. Later in the hearing, Boden testified that he
did not clarify the definition for A.C. during his one interview
with her but that he may have spoken to A.C. over the phone
and explained it then. Boden denied that the county attorney
participated in the phone call.
Boden eventually interviewed Reeves, who denied any non-
consensual sexual encounters with K.G. and A.C. A video of
the interview was received in evidence. During the interview,
Reeves accused the county attorney, who was not present,
of conducting a “witch hunt” because Reeves had a “his-
tory” with the county attorney’s ex-wife “right when they got
divorced.” Reeves asserted in the interview that the county
attorney should have “stepped out of this before” because the
county attorney “threatened [him] before back when [Reeves]
and [the county attorney’s ex-wife] messed around.” Reeves
expressed the belief that the county attorney could not pros-
ecute him due to his “conflict of interests,” and Reeves said
he would hire a lawyer to sue the county attorney. Reeves also
said that his two employees had told him that during their
interview, the county attorney tried “to coach them and tell
them to say stuff.”
The district court sustained the State’s motions to allow
K.G. and A.C. to testify pursuant to § 27-414. In so ruling, the
district court found, among other things, clear and convincing
evidence that Reeves committed the offense of sexual assault
against K.G. and against A.C.

- 433 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
3. Pretrial Motions for Relief From
Prosecutorial Misconduct
(a) Motions for Relief
In June 2024, Reeves filed identical motions for relief from
prosecutorial misconduct in each case, making specific allega-
tions that the county attorney had a conflict of interest relating
to “sexual encounter(s)” or a “sexual relationship” that Reeves
had with the county attorney’s then-wife during the marriage.
According to the motions, the county attorney knew about
the “encounter(s)” before filing charges against Reeves for
the sexual assaults of K.G. and A.C. Reeves requested three
alternative forms of relief: (1) an order dismissing the charges
against him, (2) an order barring testimony of all witnesses
who had direct contact or interviews with the county attorney’s
office because the contact rendered them incompetent to tes-
tify, or (3) an order disqualifying the county attorney’s office
and appointing a special prosecutor.
(b) Evidentiary Hearing
At an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the records of the
previous hearings were received in evidence. The county attor-
ney represented the State.
The county attorney’s ex-wife testified that she believed
she had a sexual encounter with Reeves prior to March 2016
while she and the county attorney were still married, but
separated, and while she was dating a man whom she would
later marry. She testified that she and Reeves had spent the
evening drinking with friends and that she did not remember
having a sexual encounter with Reeves. However, she also
testified that she woke up later wearing different clothes and
heard rumors that she had a sexual encounter with Reeves. At
the hearing, the county attorney’s ex-wife characterized the
encounter as a “sexual assault” or “[o]ne-night assault.” She
testified that when the county attorney learned of the sexual
encounter, he was upset by it, but she did not tell him that it

- 434 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
was an assault. It was not clear from her testimony when the
county attorney learned of the sexual encounter.
Reeves’ sister testified that prior to the county attorney’s
divorce, Reeves and the county attorney’s ex-wife once spent
the night at her house, and she observed them in the middle
of the night “on the couch cuddled up under a blanket.”
Reeves’ sister testified that the county attorney found out about
this incident and that it created “issues” and “some turmoil”
between the county attorney and his ex-wife. It was not clear
from this testimony when the county attorney learned about
any sexual encounter between his ex-wife and Reeves.
The employee who had reported that Reeves had tried to
kiss her while they were on a backroad testified that during
her interview with Boden and the county attorney, the county
attorney asked all the questions. She recalled that she left the
interview out of frustration that the county attorney “was kind
of hinting, leaning towards [her] doing something against
[Reeves] or saying a story against [him].” She testified that she
and the other employee were uncomfortable with the question-
ing because the county attorney was “twisting” her words and
“trying to make [her] have a story that [she] wasn’t willing to
say, didn’t want to have.”
Boden testified that he investigated Reeves’ case, prepared
the arrest warrant and probable cause affidavit, and presented
the matter to the county attorney, who decided what charges
to bring against Reeves. He denied that the county attorney
had influenced him or interfered with the investigation. Boden
also denied that during the interview the county attorney
twisted the statements of the employee who said Reeves had
tried to kiss her.
Boden testified that he spoke to A.C. on the phone several
days after her initial interview to clarify the legal definition of
sexual penetration and to determine whether it had occurred
with Reeves. He was not aware whether the county attorney
also spoke to A.C. about the matter of penetration. At the
hearing, Boden denied having information indicating that

- 435 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
the investigation was a “witch hunt,” as Reeves had claimed
during his interview. Boden also denied being aware of any
support for Reeves’ claim that the county attorney had “tried
to coach a couple girls.”
(c) Motions for Relief Overruled, but
Special Prosecutor Appointed
The district court denied Reeves’ requests for relief from
prosecutorial misconduct. Relevant here, the district court
found that the county attorney was not disqualified as a mat-
ter of law. But to avoid “the appearance of impropriety and
the muddying of the waters,” the district court suggested that
the county attorney disqualify himself and request a special
prosecutor. The district court explained that it made this rec-
ommendation “not on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct,
not because [the county attorney] initiated this case with a
vendetta against [Reeves], and not because he is attempting
to avoid his duties as Nemaha County Attorney, but rather
because [his ex-wife’s] testimony . . . expressly accused
[Reeves] of sexually assaulting her.” (Emphasis in original.)
The district court “suspect[ed] that this accusation came as a
surprise to the attorneys for both parties.”
The county attorney subsequently moved to disqualify him-
self and his office and for the appointment of the Nebraska
Attorney General’s office to prosecute the cases. The district
court sustained the motions, and the Attorney General’s office
represented the State in all subsequent proceedings.
4. Trial and Sentencing
There is no dispute that at a consolidated trial, the jury
heard testimony that supported the State’s position that Reeves
committed first degree sexual assault against K.G. and A.C.;
K.G. and A.C.’s accounts of the sexual assaults were sub-
stantially similar to their testimony at the pretrial evidentiary
hearings. There was also evidence, including Reeves’ own
statements to law enforcement, that before each of the sexual
encounters, Reeves drank multiple alcoholic beverages, and

- 436 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
that he was “drunk” prior to the sexual encounter with A.C.
Reeves tried to impeach K.G.’s and A.C.’s credibility and
otherwise demonstrate that the sexual encounters were consen-
sual. We include additional details about the evidence and jury
instructions in the analysis section below.
The jury ultimately found Reeves guilty on both charges of
first degree sexual assault. The district court accepted the ver-
dicts and adjudged Reeves guilty. The district court sentenced
Reeves to a term of 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment for each
offense, to be served concurrently.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Reeves assigns, condensed and restated, that the district
court erred in (1) providing a jury instruction regarding intoxi-
cation and (2) failing to dismiss the charges based on the
county attorney’s alleged conflict of interest.
Reeves also assigns three specific instances of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, when his trial counsel (a) failed
to object to Boden’s testimony that one of Reeves’ employ-
ees gave false testimony, (b) failed to introduce timekeeping
records from the bar to impeach “A.C.’s testimony that she
quit working for Reeves immediately after her encounter with
him,” and (c) failed to introduce into evidence a video to
impeach “A.C.’s testimony she did not spend time in the bar
after the encounter when Reeves was present.”
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We set forth the applicable standards of review in the rel-
evant sections of the analysis below.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. Prosecutorial Conflict of Interest
Reeves argues that the district court erred by denying his
pretrial motions to dismiss the cases on the grounds that the
county attorney had a conflict of interest. As we will explain,
assuming without deciding that Reeves preserved the issue
for appellate review by filing pretrial motions to dismiss, but

- 437 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
no such motions on the same grounds at or after trial, we are
unconvinced that the district court erred in declining to dis-
miss the cases.
(a) Standard of Review
[1] Reeves does not suggest what standard of review
should apply to the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss
based on a prosecutor’s alleged conflict of interest, and we do
not appear to have previously identified one. We have, how-
ever, held that whether an apparent conflict of interest justi-
fies the disqualification of prosecutors is a matter committed
to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. McGuire, 286
Neb. 494, 837 N.W.2d 767 (2013) (whether apparent con-
flict of interest justifies disqualification of other members
of prosecuting office after trial court has granted prosecu-
tor’s motion to withdraw is matter committed to discretion
of trial court). See, also, U.S. v. Watkins, 107 F.4th 607 (7th
Cir. 2024) (whether conflict of interest justifies disqualifying
prosecutor is matter committed to discretion of trial court). In
other bids for relief due to prosecutorial misconduct, we have
also applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. See,
e.g., State v. Schmaltz, 304 Neb. 74, 933 N.W.2d 435 (2019)
(decisions regarding motions for mistrial due to alleged pros-
ecutorial misconduct are directed to discretion of trial court
and will be upheld in absence of abuse of discretion); State
v. McSwine, 292 Neb. 565, 873 N.W.2d 405 (2016) (appellate
court reviews motion for new trial on basis of prosecutorial
misconduct for abuse of discretion by trial court). Federal
courts have reviewed a lower court’s decision to deny a
motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ramos-González, 775
F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d
Cir. 2011). Considering all the foregoing authority, we will
review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of
Reeves’ pretrial motions to dismiss alleging a prosecutorial
conflict of interest.

- 438 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
[2,3] A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the rea-
sons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just
results in matters submitted for disposition. McGuire, supra.
It is an abuse of discretion to make an error of law or clear
errors of factual determination. State v. Trail, 312 Neb. 843,
981 N.W.2d 269 (2022).
(b) Merits
According to Reeves, he demonstrated at a pretrial hear-
ing that the county attorney had a personal interest in target-
ing Reeves for prosecution because, at the time the county
attorney investigated and charged Reeves, the county attorney
knew of a prior sexual encounter involving Reeves and the
county attorney’s then-wife. Reeves argues the county attor-
ney’s participation in the cases, despite this personal interest,
violated his right to due process. Reeves contends that the
county attorney’s actions required the district court to dismiss
the charges against him before trial. He now asks us to vacate
his convictions for the same reason.
In State v. Galindo, 315 Neb. 1, 54, 994 N.W.2d 562, 599
(2023), we expressed agreement “with those courts that have
recognized that there may be situations in which a prosecutor’s
personal interests so undermine the fundamental fairness of a
criminal proceeding that the defendant’s right to due process
is violated.” In Galindo, however, it was not necessary for us
to decide the standard used to determine when such a con-
flict of interest arises. Instead, we assumed in that case that a
defendant seeking postconviction relief had alleged the type of
personal interest on the part of a prosecutor that could rise to
the level of a due process violation, but we determined that any
due process violation amounted to only harmless error.
We follow a similar course here. We acknowledge the
State’s argument that, at the time of the alleged sexual
encounter involving Reeves and the county attorney’s then-
wife, the county attorney and his then-wife were in the midst

- 439 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
of divorce proceedings and living separately and his then-wife
was in a relationship with another man whom she eventu-
ally married. More specifically, we acknowledge that these
facts may suggest the county attorney lacked the same level
of personal interest in targeting Reeves that he would have
had if the encounter involving Reeves and his ex-wife had
occurred in the midst of a previously thriving marriage. Even
so, we will assume, purely for the sake of this analysis, that
the county attorney had the type of personal interest in target-
ing Reeves that could rise to the level of a due process viola-
tion or otherwise require disqualification. As we will explain,
however, even with that assumption, we find that the district
court did not err in declining to dismiss the charges against
Reeves as Reeves requested.
Reeves’ primary argument that the district court was obli-
gated to grant his motions to dismiss the charges against him is
that the county attorney’s involvement in the cases amounted
to structural error. Structural error is the term the U.S. Supreme
Court has used to refer to “a very limited class of errors that
trigger automatic reversal because they undermine the fairness
of a criminal proceeding as a whole.” See United States v.
Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 186 L. Ed. 2d 139
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reeves argues that
because there was structural error, he is entitled to automatic
reversal of his convictions.
In support of his argument for structural error, Reeves relies
on Young v. U. S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787,
107 S. Ct. 2124, 95 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987) (Vuitton). In Vuitton,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the criminal contempt con-
victions of several individuals accused of violating an injunc-
tion. The prosecutors in the criminal contempt proceedings
were private attorneys appointed by the trial court as special
prosecutors. Those attorneys were counsel to an opposing
party to the injunction and thus were in a position to “use the
threat of prosecution as a weapon in civil negotiations.” State
v. Galindo, 315 Neb. 1, 56, 994 N.W.2d 562, 600 (2023).

- 440 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the trial court “erred in
appointing as prosecutors counsel for an interested party in the
underlying civil litigation.” Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 802. A four-
justice plurality also concluded that “[g]iven the fundamental
and pervasive effects of such an appointment,” the presence of
conflicted prosecutors was not subject to harmless error review.
Id., 481 U.S. at 814.
Reeves argues that we should follow Vuitton, conclude that
the county attorney’s involvement in the cases was structural
error, and vacate his convictions without additional analysis.
We are not persuaded we should do so for multiple reasons.
First, Vuitton does not compel us to find that a prosecuto-
rial conflict of interest amounts to a structural error requiring
automatic reversal. As we explained in Galindo, supra, Vuitton
was decided based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s supervisory
power over contempt proceedings in federal court, rather than
the Due Process Clause. Additionally, the portion of Vuitton
concluding the appointment of conflicted prosecutors was
structural error was joined by only four justices, not a majority
of the Court.
Furthermore, even if Vuitton were binding authority, we
find it distinguishable. The Vuitton plurality concluded that
the appointment of the special prosecutors was not subject to
harmless error review because it is “an error whose effects
are pervasive.” 481 U.S. at 812. The plurality explained that
because a prosecution involves many discretionary decisions,
it would be extremely difficult to determine how the appoint-
ment affected the ultimate outcome. While Reeves argues
the same is true here, he ignores a major factual difference
between Vuitton and this case: In this case, the prosecutor
with the alleged conflict of interest stepped aside and the case
was tried by a prosecutor for whom there was no alleged con-
flict of interest.
In our view, the fact that the prosecutor’s office that tried
the case and obtained the convictions against Reeves was not
alleged to have a conflict of interest undermines any argument

- 441 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
for structural error. Structural errors “infect the entire trial
process.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). But most constitutional
errors are not structural errors. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 578, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986) (structural
errors are “the exception and not the rule”). Rather, the U.S.
Supreme Court has instructed that “if the defendant had coun-
sel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong
presumption that any other errors that may have occurred
are subject to harmless-error analysis.” Id., 478 U.S. at 579.
Finally, “a defining feature of structural error is that the result-
ing unfairness or prejudice is ‘necessarily unquantifiable and
indeterminate,’ . . . such that ‘any inquiry into its effect on
the outcome of the case would be purely speculative.’” U.S. v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 182 (1993), and Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108
S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988)).
In this case, not only did Reeves have counsel and a trial
conducted by an impartial adjudicator, the prosecutor’s office
that pursued his cases through trial and obtained his convic-
tions is not alleged to have conflicts of interest. We need not
speculate about the effects of the county attorney’s initial par-
ticipation in the cases because the convictions were ultimately
obtained by someone else. The county attorney’s participation
did not “infect the entire trial process.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at
630. We reject Reeves’ argument that he has demonstrated
structural error and is entitled to automatic reversal.
Alternatively, Reeves argues that, even in the absence of
structural error, we should reverse his convictions given the
specific actions of the county attorney in the cases before
the appointment of the special prosecutor. In support of this
argument, Reeves emphasizes that the county attorney made
the decision to charge Reeves with sexual assault in both cases.
He also points to evidence regarding the county attorney’s
involvement in the investigation. Specifically, Reeves points

- 442 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
to testimony of A.C. that while she initially denied to law
enforcement that Reeves penetrated her vagina, she changed
that assertion after the county attorney informed her of the
definition of sexual penetration under Nebraska law. He also
points to testimony of his two employees who generally tes-
tified that they ended an interview with the county attorney
because they were uncomfortable with his questions.
Although we do not rule out the possibility that a prosecu-
tor with a conflict of interest could take pretrial actions that
so fundamentally undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial
as to require reversal of a conviction obtained by a prosecutor
with no alleged conflicts, we do not find that to be the case
here. As we have emphasized, the district court, at the county
attorney’s request, appointed a special prosecutor who tried the
case and obtained the convictions at issue. While the county
attorney made the decision to initially charge Reeves, once the
Attorney General’s office was appointed as a special prosecu-
tor, it had the discretion to dismiss the charges if it felt they
were not warranted or to pursue lesser charges. See Asbell
v. State, 468 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 1984) (if there is “any
evidence of overreaching or unethical conduct” by charging
prosecutor, special prosecutor appointed after charges are filed
has “the discretion to dismiss the charges”). This is thus not a
case in which “we do not know and cannot now ascertain what
would have happened if the prosecuting attorney had been free
to exercise the fair discretion which he owed to all persons
charged with crime in his court.” Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d
709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).
Moreover, there was no evidence that the county attor-
ney coerced or otherwise did anything improper concerning
the testimony of A.C. At most, there was evidence that he
explained to A.C. the definition of sexual penetration under
Nebraska law, a fact Reeves’ counsel could and did elicit at
trial. And while two women who worked for Reeves may have
testified they were not comfortable with the county attorney’s
questions in their interview, there was no evidence the county

- 443 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
attorney’s conduct in that interview led to the development of
damaging evidence.
Finally, we observe that this issue was only presented to the
district court via Reeves’ pretrial motions. As a result, at most,
Reeves preserved one issue for appellate review related to an
alleged conflict of interest: whether the district court should
have granted Reeves’ pretrial motions to have the charges
dismissed because of the county attorney’s involvement in the
cases. See State v. Kalita, 317 Neb. 906, 12 N.W.3d 499 (2024)
(basic tenet of appellate review is that issue first be presented
to and passed upon by trial court). Reeves has not directed us
to any examples, however, of a trial court dismissing criminal
charges pretrial because of a prosecutor’s conflict of interest,
as opposed to merely appointing a special prosecutor. In any
event, the district court determined that Reeves had failed to
demonstrate that the charges against him should be dismissed
based on the evidence adduced in support of the motions. We
discern no abuse of discretion in that determination.
2. Jury Instructions
We next address Reeves’ contentions that the district court
erroneously instructed the jury about intoxication. For reasons
we will explain, we perceive no reversible error.
(a) Background
After the parties presented their evidence, the district court
conducted a jury instruction conference. The State cited evi-
dence that Reeves had been drinking alcohol before he sexually
assaulted K.G. and A.C. and asked the district court to instruct
the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense. Reeves
objected and argued:
[I]t’s unnecessary . . . because there’s been no argument or
evidence presented to the jury in any way, shape, or form
that [intoxication] is a defense [and it] could confuse the
jury. They know he was intoxicated, and there’s been no
indication to the jury that they could find him not guilty
because of his intoxication, so we think it’s unnecessary.

- 444 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
The district court overruled the objection and gave the follow-
ing instruction:
There has been evidence that [Reeves] was intoxicated
at the time that the crime for which he is charged was
committed.
A person who is intoxicated is criminally responsible
for his or her conduct. Intoxication is not a defense to any
criminal offense and shall not be taken into consideration
in determining the existence of a mental state that is an
element of the criminal offense.
The district court also instructed the jury on the elements of
first degree sexual assault. That instruction directed the jury to
decide whether Reeves “[s]ubject[ed]” K.G. and A.C. to “sex-
ual penetration” “[w]ithout [their] consent” or, for A.C., when
“he knew or should have known that [she] was mentally or
physically incapable of resisting or of appraising the nature of
her conduct.” The instruction further directed, “If you decide
that the state proved each element of that particular crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find [Reeves] guilty
of that crime. Otherwise, you must find [Reeves] not guilty of
that crime.” The instructions included a definition for “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jury was also instructed that
“[n]o one of these instructions contains all of the law appli-
cable to this case” and that it should “consider each instruction
in light of all of the others.”
(b) Analysis
Now on appeal, Reeves asserts that the district court erred
in instructing the jury that “[a] person who is intoxicated is
criminally responsible for his or her conduct.” According to
Reeves, this instruction misstated the issues and was confus-
ing because he did not claim at trial that he should be acquit-
ted because he was intoxicated. Reeves further contends that
the instruction “created [a] prejudicial risk the jury would
decide the case on an improper basis, to wit: that the issue of
consent should be determined against Reeves because he was

- 445 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
intoxicated.” Brief for appellant at 16-17. Reeves posits that
the instruction suggested to jurors that they must find him
guilty, that is, “‘criminally responsible’ . . . because he was
drunk,” thereby diminishing the State’s burden to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[4] When an appellant challenges jury instructions, our stan-
dard of review is well-settled: Whether jury instructions are
correct is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves
independently of the lower court’s decision. State v. Logan,
320 Neb. 554, 28 N.W.3d 510 (2025).
[5] Generally, in an appeal based upon a claim of an erro-
neous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show
that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise
adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. State
v. Fernandez, 313 Neb. 745, 986 N.W.2d 53 (2023). But the
State urges that the facts do not require us to use that analytical
framework here.
[6,7] The State points to authority that the failure to object
to a jury instruction after it has been submitted to counsel for
review precludes raising an objection on appeal absent plain
error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. See State
v. Briggs, 317 Neb. 296, 9 N.W.3d 632 (2024). And we have
defined plain error as error of such a nature that to leave it
uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation,
or fairness of the judicial process. See State v. Sellers, 279
Neb. 220, 777 N.W.2d 779 (2010). It is this rule that governs
our analysis, the State contends, because Reeves’ objection
at the jury instruction conference was not specific enough to
preserve his arguments on appeal.
The State is correct that in the context of jury instructions,
an objection, based on a specific ground and properly over-
ruled, does not preserve a question for appellate review on any
other ground. See State v. Mowell, 267 Neb. 83, 672 N.W.2d
389 (2003). So, the initial question is whether the arguments
in Reeves’ appellate brief were raised as objections before the
district court below.

- 446 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
When we view the record of the jury instruction confer-
ence side by side with Reeves’ brief, we see one objection in
common: Both before the district court and on appeal, Reeves
argued that the intoxication instruction was confusing to jurors
because he had not raised intoxication as a defense at trial.
Reeves has preserved this alleged error, but he cannot establish
the instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected
a substantial right.
[8-10] We have long said that an instruction which does not
correctly state the law or which is likely to confuse or mislead
the jury should not be given. E.g., State v. Haynie, 317 Neb.
371, 9 N.W.3d 915 (2024). In construing an individual jury
instruction, the instruction should not be judged in artificial
isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall
charge to the jury considered as a whole. State v. Devers, 306
Neb. 429, 945 N.W.2d 470 (2020). If the instructions as a
whole fairly present the law so the jury could not be misled,
there is no prejudicial error. See State v. Pope, 305 Neb. 912,
943 N.W.2d 294 (2020).
Reading the jury instructions in this case as a whole, we
conclude that the challenged instruction correctly stated the
law and was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury. To begin,
the instruction correctly stated the law. The language of the
instruction mirrored language from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-122
(Reissue 2016), which provides:
A person who is intoxicated is criminally responsible
for his or her conduct. Intoxication is not a defense to any
criminal offense and shall not be taken into consideration
in determining the existence of a mental state that is
an element of the criminal offense unless the defendant
proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she
did not (1) know that it was an intoxicating substance
when he or she ingested, inhaled, injected, or absorbed the
substance causing the intoxication or (2) ingest, inhale,
inject, or absorb the intoxicating substance voluntarily.

- 447 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
We have explained that “§ 29-122 is a ‘legislative judgment
regarding the circumstances under which individuals may be
held criminally responsible for their actions.’” See State v.
Abejide, 293 Neb. 687, 700, 879 N.W.2d 684, 695 (2016) (cit-
ing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 361 (1996)).
[11] We understand Reeves to have preserved an argument
that although the jury instruction contained language from
§ 29-122, it was not a correct statement of the law as applied
to this case because he did not raise a defense that put intoxi-
cation at issue. But defenses raised are not the only basis for
deciding what constitutes an appropriate instruction. The pur-
pose of instructions is to furnish guidance to the jury in its
deliberations and to aid it in arriving at a proper verdict; and,
with this end in view, the jury instructions should state clearly
and concisely the issues of fact and the principles of law
that are necessary to enable them to accomplish the purpose
desired. State v. Brennauer, 314 Neb. 782, 993 N.W.2d 305
(2023). And here, Reeves does not dispute that the jury heard
evidence that before sexual encounters with K.G. and A.C., he
knowingly and voluntarily consumed alcohol, and, with A.C.
at least, he was intoxicated. Given these facts, an instruction
stating the law of § 29-122 enabled the jury to arrive at a
proper verdict, that is, a verdict that did not incorrectly dimin-
ish Reeves’ responsibility for his criminal conduct based on
evidence that he was intoxicated.
Next, reading the instructions as a whole, as the jury was
told to do, we are assured that the instruction on intoxication
would not confuse the jury, even though Reeves did not raise
intoxication as a defense at trial. The instructions correctly
directed the jury to decide whether the State had proved the
elements of first degree sexual assault beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the instruction on the law related to intoxication
did nothing to change those directives. To the contrary, the
instruction that voluntary intoxication is not a defense assisted
the jury in its duty. Read with the other instructions, it

- 448 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
demonstrated to the jury that whether Reeves was voluntarily
intoxicated during his encounters with K.G. and A.C. had no
relevance to the verdicts. Indeed, the intoxication instruction
was especially helpful to the jury’s determinations regarding
A.C.; with respect to her, the jury may have been required
to decide whether Reeves “knew or should have known that
[she] was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or of
appraising the nature of her conduct.” Without an instruc-
tion to apprise the jury of the law regarding intoxication,
a panel of laypeople may have been inclined to consider
whether Reeves’ intoxication prevented him from knowing
whether A.C. could resist or understand her conduct, but such
an approach would not have conformed to the law.
Because we are unpersuaded that the jury instruction refer-
ring to intoxication was an incorrect statement of the law or
that it confused the jury, Reeves has not satisfied his burden
to show that it was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected
a substantial right. See State v. Fernandez, 313 Neb. 745, 986
N.W.2d 53 (2023).
For similar reasons, the arguments raised by Reeves for
the first time on appeal fail upon plain error review. We dis-
cern no probability of a miscarriage of justice here, where the
jury instructions correctly stated the law and where, read as a
whole, they would not confuse the jury.
Given all this, we conclude that the district court did not err
in instructing the jury that “[a] person who is intoxicated is
criminally responsible for his or her conduct.”
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, represented by new counsel on appeal, Reeves
claims several instances of ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel. Before we address his specific claims, we recall some
governing principles.
[12,13] Our appellate standard of review of such claims is
well established. Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a question

- 449 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
of law. State v. Wilson, 320 Neb. 728, 30 N.W.3d 165 (2026).
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the
undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient
to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not
provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was
or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient per-
formance. Id.
[14-18] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show
that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s
defense. Wilson, supra. To show that counsel’s performance
was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel’s per-
formance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training
and skill in criminal law. Id. To show prejudice in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demon-
strate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In determining
whether there is a reasonable probability that any deficient
performance of trial counsel would have resulted in a different
outcome in the proceeding, an appellate court may properly
consider the strength of the admissible evidence relating to the
controverted issues in the case. Id.
[19] When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised in a direct appeal, the appellant is not required to allege
prejudice; however, an appellant must make specific allega-
tions of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient
performance by trial counsel. Id.
Applying these principles in Reeves’ direct appeal, we find
the undisputed facts are sufficient to reject his claims of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel.

- 450 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
(a) False Testimony
At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence about
Boden and the county attorney’s interview of two women
employed by Reeves. Boden testified for the State that during
the interview, the women directed him to talk to A.C. When one
of those women later testified for Reeves, she denied on cross-
examination by the State that she or the other woman requested
that their interview with Boden and the county attorney not be
recorded. She also denied that during that interview she told
Boden to contact A.C. because Reeves had assaulted A.C. On
rebuttal by Reeves’ counsel, Boden testified that this testimony
about the interview was not “truthful.” Reeves’ counsel did
not object but immediately proceeded to cross-examine Boden
about other witnesses’ police interviews.
On appeal, Reeves assigns and argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to Boden’s testimony that
the woman testified falsely for Reeves. Reeves argues that there
could be no plausible trial strategy for allowing the State’s lead
investigator to opine that the defense elicited testimony that
was not truthful. We pause to note that Reeves makes the same
argument regarding Boden’s comments on the other woman’s
testimony, but his brief lacks a corresponding assignment of
error. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to Reeves’ contentions
regarding the testimony cited in Reeves’ assignment of error,
see State v. Lopez, ante p. 118, 32 N.W.3d 868 (2026), and we
determine that Reeves’ claim fails.
[20] We have observed that it is generally improper for a
witness to testify as to the credibility of another witness. See,
State v. Wilson, 320 Neb. 728, 30 N.W.3d 165 (2026); State
v. Vazquez, 319 Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025); State v.
Archie, 273 Neb. 612, 733 N.W.2d 513 (2007). We have also
recognized that it is improper for a prosecutor to inquire of
a witness whether another person may or may not have been
telling the truth. Id. We have cautioned that the credibility of
a witness is the province of the fact finder and that no wit-
ness, expert or otherwise, should give an opinion that another

- 451 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
mentally and physically competent witness is or is not telling
the truth. See Wilson, supra (citing State v. Beermann, 231
Neb. 380, 436 N.W.2d 499 (1989)).
But 	even 	assuming 	the 	foregoing 	propositions 	support
Reeves’ claim that his counsel performed deficiently in not
objecting to Boden’s testimony that Reeves’ employee did
not give a “truthful” account of her interview, Reeves cannot
demonstrate prejudice. In the context of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, we have declined to find prejudice
where, in response to a successful objection, the prosecutor
could be expected to simply rephrase the question in a way
that elicited the same information, but without asking the wit-
ness to comment directly on the veracity of another witness.
See Vazquez, supra. Likewise, even if Reeves’ counsel had
objected to Boden’s testimony about the woman’s veracity, the
State could have elicited the same information without asking
Boden to remark on her truthfulness. We conclude that Reeves
cannot show a reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted him had such an objection been made.
(b) Timekeeping Records
Reeves claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel related
to whether A.C. avoided Reeves after the alleged sexual
assault. A.C. testified on direct examination by the State that
she quit her job at the bar “[a]round a week-ish” after the
alleged assault and that she was never alone with Reeves after
the alleged assault. On cross-examination by Reeves’ counsel,
A.C. initially denied working approximately 16 shifts over the
month following the alleged early July 2020 assault and later
testified that she could not recall. Reeves’ counsel referred to
the bar’s timekeeping records and marked them as an exhibit
but did not offer them into evidence. Reeves’ counsel asked
A.C. whether she worked on specific dates in early August
2020, and A.C. responded that she did not recall and denied
that looking at the records would refresh her memory because
she “[didn’t] really remember that time that much.” A.C.

- 452 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
admitted that the timekeeping records shown to her by Reeves’
counsel listed her as having worked on August 2 but that she
was not sure whether the records were accurate.
Reeves’ counsel later elicited testimony from Reeves’ sis-
ter, who was also the bar’s bookkeeper, that A.C. returned to
the bar “[q]uite a few” times after the alleged assault to work
or to socialize with friends. According to Reeves’ sister, A.C.
worked at the bar until August 1, 2020; she recalled that at a
special event at the bar that day, A.C. had a disagreement with
Reeves and “walked out.”
During closing arguments, Reeves’ counsel reminded the
jury that the timekeeping records showed that A.C. worked 16
shifts after the alleged assault and that Reeves’ sister testified
that A.C. worked on August 1, 2020.
On appeal, Reeves assigns and argues that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to introduce the timekeeping records to
impeach A.C.’s testimony that she quit working for Reeves
immediately after the alleged sexual assault. We read Reeves’
brief to argue that his trial counsel was deficient in not offer-
ing the timekeeping records into evidence because the records
would have generally discredited A.C. as a witness and dem-
onstrated that she did not act like she had been sexually
assaulted by Reeves.
Even if Reeves has established that his trial counsel was
deficient, he cannot show that he was prejudiced. Although
the timekeeping records were not offered into evidence for the
jury to review, the questions posed to A.C. by Reeves’ coun-
sel conveyed to the jury that the timekeeping records contra-
dicted A.C.’s testimony that she quit working for Reeves soon
after the alleged assault. Reeves’ counsel repeated the point
for the jury during closing arguments. What is more, Reeves’
counsel presented the testimony of Reeves’ sister that A.C.
worked on August 1, 2020, a date several weeks after the
alleged assault. In light of all this, Reeves cannot show a rea-
sonable probability that the result of Reeves’ trial would have

- 453 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
been different if his trial counsel had offered the timekeeping
records into evidence.
(c) Video
In another attempt to establish that A.C. did not avoid
Reeves, Reeves’ counsel elicited testimony from A.C. that she
occasionally returned to the bar as a patron after the alleged
assault to see her friends. A.C. testified that she checked ahead
of time to ensure that Reeves was not at the bar and that she
was not in the same room as Reeves. A.C. did not recall being
at the bar with Reeves and K.G. “after this whole incident.”
A.C. denied that a video of her, Reeves, and K.G. at the bar
would refresh her memory because, although she would be able
to identify herself, she would not be able to recollect whether
the video was taken before or after the alleged assault. Reeves’
counsel did not offer any such video into evidence or indicate
that it had been marked as an exhibit.
Reeves assigns and argues that his counsel was ineffective in
failing to introduce the video to impeach A.C.’s testimony that
after the alleged assault, she did not spend time at the bar while
Reeves was present. Again, we understand Reeves to argue that
his trial counsel performed deficiently in not offering the video
into evidence to discredit A.C. as a witness in general and to
demonstrate that she did not behave like Reeves had sexually
assaulted her.
We question whether Reeves’ counsel could have laid suf-
ficient foundation for the video to be received as an exhibit.
But even assuming without deciding that Reeves has demon-
strated his trial counsel performed deficiently in not offering
the video into evidence, he cannot demonstrate that any such
deficient performance prejudiced him. As discussed above,
defense counsel already impeached A.C.’s testimony that she
quit working for Reeves soon after the alleged sexual assault,
communicating to the jury that A.C. did not avoid Reeves as
she claimed she had. Because the jury was already aware of
evidence that A.C. returned to the bar during the weeks after

- 454 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. REEVES
Cite as 321 Neb. 427
the alleged assault, we do not see a reasonable probability that
the jury would have acquitted Reeves had his trial counsel
offered the video into evidence.
(d) Cumulative Error
Finally, Reeves argues that the foregoing claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel “in combination” were prejudicial
to him. Brief for appellant at 26. He does not mention cumu-
lative error in his assignments of error. But to the extent that
Reeves makes a claim for relief under the cumulative error
doctrine, see State v. Dap, 315 Neb. 466, 997 N.W.2d 363
(2023), he cannot prevail. Recently, in State v. Vazquez, 319
Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025), we observed that we have
not expressly held that meritorious claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel are properly included in a cumulative error
analysis. Even assuming ineffective assistance claims could
be considered part of a cumulative error analysis, we held that
the result in Vazquez would not have supported finding cumu-
lative error because the assigned errors had no merit. For the
same reason here, any claim of cumulative error that Reeves
makes must fail.
V. CONCLUSION
Unpersuaded by Reeves’ claims of district court error and
his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we affirm.
Affirmed.