Christine Skurbe v. Board of Education of the Township of Monroe, Middlesex County; Kathleen Kolupanowich, Board President, Steven Riback, Board Vice President; and Jill DeMaio, Board Member, 7/22/19, (#188-19)

188-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Christine Skurbe,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Monroe,
Middlesex County; Kathleen Kolupanowich,
Board President; Steven Riback, Board Vice
President; and Jill DeMaio, Board Member,
Respondents.
Synopsis
Petitioner – formerly the vice president of the Monroe Township Middle School Parent Teacher
Organization (MTMS PTO), a parent organization that hosts fundraising activities for the benefit of
students and staff – founded a second parent organization in 2018, the Monroe Township Middle School
Parent Staff Association (MTMS PSA), of which she is president. 	A majority of members of the
respondent Board voted to recognize the MTMS PSA at a meeting on August 22, 2018. 	Petitioner,
however, believed that dissenting Board members would hold a second vote to revoke MTMS PSA’s
status as an organization over alleged violation of certain Board policies. A petition for due process was
filed by petitioner in February 2019, in which she requested that the Commissioner investigate board
members for allegedly retaliatory conduct and declare that the Board cannot revoke MTMS PSA’s status.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, asserting
that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction in this matter.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: 	the Commissioner has jurisdiction to “hear and determine….all
controversies and disputes 	arising under the 	school laws,” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9; 	in this role, the
Commissioner 	adjudicates disputes and can review certain final decisions of a board of education to
determine if it acted in and “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner”; the Commissioner does not
have investigative powers, but rather has the power to review final rulings or actions of a board of
education; 	as the Board in this matter has not moved to revoke the MTMS PSA’s status as a parent
organization, the issues raised by petitioner herein are not yet suitable for consideration by the
Commissioner. Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the findings and conclusion of the ALJ, for the reasons
thoroughly expressed in the Initial Decision. According, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as
the final decision in this matter. The petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
July 22, 2019

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05352-19
Agency Dkt. No. 35-2/19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Christine Skurbe,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Monroe, Middlesex County;
Kathleen Kolupanowich, Board President;
Steven Riback, Board Vice President;
and Jill DeMaio, Board Member,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon such review, the Commissioner agrees with the Administrative Law Judge –
for the reasons thoroughly expressed in the Initial Decision – that this matter is not ripe for
review. 	Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this
matter, and the petition is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 22, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	July 22, 2019
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION ON
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 5352-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 35-2/19
CHRISTINE SKURBE,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF MONROE, MIDDLESEX
COUNTY; KATHLEEN KOLUPANOWICH,
BOARD PRESIDENT; STEVEN RIBACK,
BOARD VICE PRESIDENT; AND JILL
DE MAIO, BOARD MEMBER,
Respondents.
Christine Skurbe, petitioner, pro se
Robert 	M. 	Tosti, 	Esquire, 	for 	respondents 	(Purcell, 	Mulcahy, 	Hawkins, 	&
Flanagan, LLC, attorneys)
Record Closed: June 11, 2019 	Decided: June 27, 2019

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BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to the 2018 school year in the Monroe Township Middle School, there was
one-parent organization that hosted fundraising activities for the benefit of the students
and its staff. 	It was the Monroe Township Middle School Parent Teacher Organization
(MTMS PTO). 	Petitioner Christine Skurbe (Skurbe or petitioner) served as its vice
president before founding her own organization, Parent Staff Association (MTMS PSA),
of which she is the president. 	Respondent refused to recognize the MTMS PSA and
requested to revoke its status as an organization because it violated some of the Board
policies.
Skurbe argues her organization has not violated the relevant Board policies, and
as such, there is not a valid basis for board members to consider revoking its Class I
status. She alleges, therefore, that their discussions were “clearly retaliation,” and asks
that the matter be “looked into,” “investigated,” and “stopped.”
On February 15, 2019, petitioner filed a petition for due process with the Office of
Controversies and Disputes of the New Jersey Department of Education requesting that the
Commissioner: (1) investigate board members for allegedly retaliatory conduct; and (2)
declare that the Board cannot, consistent with its own policies, revoke the organization’s
Class 	I 	status. 	On April 18, 2019, the complaint was transmitted to the Office of
Administrative Law for disposition.
In 	lieu 	of 	an 	answer, 	Monroe 	Township 	Board 	of 	Education 	(Monroe 	or
respondents) filed a motion to dismiss the petition, for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” (R. 4:6-2(e).) They argue that even accepting the alleged
facts as true, the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.
The question is whether the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction to investigate a
board of education and declare if it would violate its own policies if it voted in a certain
way on a hypothetical matter.

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FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The following facts are not in dispute and as such I FIND AS FACT that parent
organizations host fundraising activities for the benefit of a school’s students and its
staff. 	In 	Monroe 	Township 	Middle 	School, 	before 	2018, 	there 	was 	one 	such
organization, the Parent Teacher Organization (MTMS PTO). 	Petitioner Christine
Skurbe served as its vice president before founding her own organization, Parent Staff
Association (MTMS PSA), of which she is the president. Her organization submitted the
necessary paperwork to the Monroe Board of Education and asked that it be recognized
and granted Class I user status. In August 2018, the Board considered that request.
District Policy 9210 governs the Board’s relationship with parent organizations. It
promises that the Board “will encourage and support” such organizations “whose
objectives are to promote the educational interests of district pupils.” District employees
are thus required to treat “representatives of recognized parent organizations” “as
interested friends of the schools and as supporters of public education.” The Board,
however, “reserves the right to withdraw recognition from any parent organization
whose actions are inimical to the interests of the pupils of the district.”
Organizations and individuals that wish to use school facilities are designated as
either Class I or Class II users. The Class I status comes with certain benefits. District
Regulation 7510 provides that, as between the two classes, “Class I users will be given
priority for the use of school facilities.” Class I users also do not need to pay a “fee or
charge for custodial and service (fuel, water, and electricity) costs,” whereas Class II
users must do so. Regulation 7510 lists the eligible Class I users, including Parent
Teacher Organizations and Parent Teacher Associations.
On this subject, the Board was not of one mind. The Board’s President, Kathleen
Kolupanowich, took the position that it should not grant MTMS PSA Class I status
because there should be only one parent organization in the school. (Ms. Skurbe later
filed an ethics complaint against Ms. Kolupanowich, which was dismissed by the School

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Ethics Commission on December 19, 2018.) Other members, including Ken Chiarella,
disagreed. He argued that because the organization met the definition of a Class I user
under Regulation 7510, it should be designated as such. The number of parent
organizations, he submitted, is the principal’s concern, not the Board’s.
On August 22, 2018, a five-member majority voted to recognize MTMS PSA and
grant 	it 	Class 	I 	user 	status. 	Three members 	voted 	against 	the 	motion 	and 	one
abstained. 	Months later, at its January 26, 2019 meeting, Ms. Skurbe alleges that two
of the dissenting members expressed their desire to hold a second vote. The Board’s
president and vice president, she claims, “made it clear that they are looking for the
Board to take another vote to take away Class I status” because its fundraising success
had adversely affected the other parent organization’s success.
Believing that such a vote was imminent, Ms. Skurbe filed a Petition of Appeal
with the Commissioner of Education on February 15, 2019, naming the Board and the
three dissenting members as respondents. On this record, the Board has not voted to
revoke the organization’s Class I status.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
In her petition, Skurbe maintains that her organization has not violated the
relevant Board policies, and as such, there is not a valid basis for board members to
consider revoking its Class I status. She alleges, therefore, that their discussions were
“clearly retaliation,” and asks that the matter be “looked into,” “investigated,” and
“stopped.” 	Again, liberally construed, the petition requests that the Commissioner: (1)
investigate board members for allegedly retaliatory conduct; and (2) declare that the
Board cannot, consistent with its own policies, revoke the organization’s Class I status.
However, even accepting all the alleged facts as true, the Commissioner does
not have jurisdiction to grant the requested relief and as such, the petition should be
dismissed in full.

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The Commissioner has jurisdiction to “hear and determine” “all controversies and
disputes 	arising 	under 	the 	school 	laws.” 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:6-9. 	In 	this 	role, 	the
Commissioner 	adjudicates 	disputes. 	The 	Commissioner 	can, 	among 	other 	things,
review certain final actions of a board of education to determine if it acted in an
“arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.”
But the power to adjudicate does not include the power to investigate. The Office
of 	Controversies 	and 	Disputes, 	within 	the 	Department 	of 	Education, 	is 	not 	an
investigative 	agency, 	and 	the 	Legislature 	has 	not 	granted 	the 	Commissioner
investigatory powers. 	For this reason, the Commissioner cannot investigate individual
board members for allegedly retaliatory conduct. Neither can the Commissioner declare
that the Board would violate its own policies if it revoked the organization’s Class I
status.
This matter is not justiciable. The Commissioner does not “render advisory
opinions or function in the abstract.” Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities
Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971); Milano v. Franklin Twp. Bd. of Educ., EDU 6797-06, Final
Decision (July 24, 2008), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Respondents argue that petitioner lacks standing. In New Jersey, a litigant has
standing if her “concern with the subject matter evidenced a sufficient stake and real
adverseness.” Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107
(1971). The antecedent question, however, is whether this matter is ripe. If it is not, then
no person has standing to pursue it; in this way, these justiciability doctrines overlap.
See Trombetta v. Mayor & Comm'rs of City of Atlantic City, 181 N.J. 203, 223 (Law Div.
1981), aff'd, 187 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1982) (“The standing question bears close
affinity to questions of ripeness, that is, whether the harm asserted has matured
sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.”).
The 	“ripeness” 	doctrine 	“protects 	against 	deciding 	issues 	before 	they 	are
necessary.” 	Brodie v. Saddle Brook Twp. Bd. of Educ., 93 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 694. The
two relevant factors are “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship

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to the parties of withholding court consideration.” ibid (quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967.) Legal issues are suitable for resolution if “the ruling
or action complained of is final.” Ibid (citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149).
In Brodie, 93 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 694, a resident challenged the Board’s decision
to close a school before the Department of Education had approved the closure. The
ALJ and Commissioner agreed that because the challenged action was not final, the
claim was not ripe for review. “Each time a public entity, or official, determines to pursue
a course of conduct,” the ALJ observed, it “does not immediately give rise to a litigable
issue.” “Only after the approval has been given is a ‘school law dispute’ ripe.”
In this case, the Board has not voted to revoke the organization’s Class I status.
If it chooses to do so, at that time, Ms. Skurbe would be aggrieved by a final action of
the Board and could properly challenge it. 	Before then, however, she has not suffered
any harm and the matter is not ripe for review because the Commissioner’s decision
would amount to an “advisory opinion.”
Respondents offer two additional arguments for dismissal. Both lack merit and
neither needs to be addressed if the case is dismissed on ripeness grounds.
First, respondents cite Jordan v. Bd. of Educ., No. A-4420-14T1, 2017 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1865 (App. Div. July 21, 2017), for the proposition that “there is
no authority that would require a Board to be bound by its own policies.”
That case involved the Board’s decision not to renew the contract of a non-
tenured guidance counselor. Id. at *1-2. It provided notice of that decision after the date
required by its policy but before the date required by the relevant statute. Id. at *10-11.
In an unpublished opinion, the court noted that fact without further comment. Ibid
(“While the Board failed to comply with its own policy providing notice of re-employment
by April 24, the Board's action remained in compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10, as
plaintiff received notice prior to May 15.”).

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Thus, if Jordan stands for anything, it is for the modest proposition that a Board’s
failure to follow its policies may be excused if it otherwise complies with statutory
mandates. It does not stand for the more sweeping proposition, however, that a Board
may ignore its policies without consequence.
Second, respondents argue that the petition is untimely under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
1.3(i). Known as the “ninety-day” rule, it provides that a petition must be filed “no later
than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other
action by the district board of education, individual party, or agency, that is the subject
of the requested contested case hearing.”
Respondents contend that all the claims raised in the petition relate to the
Board’s meeting on August 22, 2018. 	Measured from that date, the petition—filed on
February 15, 2019—would be untimely. 	But petitioner is not challenging any action
taken 	at 	that meeting, 	and for 	good 	reason: The 	Board 	voted 	to 	recognize 	her
organization and grant it Class I status, which is exactly what she requested.
Her claim instead relates to the January 26, 2019, meeting where certain
members discussed holding another vote to revoke the organization’s Class I status.
The problem with this claim is not that its untimely. It is instead that the Board did not
take any final action that would even trigger the ninety days to file under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
1.3(i). That, as previously explained, is a ripeness problem.
I FIND AS FACT that there are no genuine issues of material fact requiring a
hearing. 	For the foregoing reasons, I CONLUDE Monroe’s motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
Having CONCLUDED that respondent Board’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 	It
is hereby ORDERED that the petitioner’s appeal be DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.

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This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
June 27, 2019
DATE 	DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
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