M.P, on behalf of R.P. v. Board of Education of Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School District, Bergen County, 9/8/25 (#436-25)

436-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01556-25
Agency Dkt. No. 390-12/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
M.P, on behalf of R.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of Ramapo Indian Hills Regional
High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed and considered.1
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner, R.P.’s father, has standing
for the purposes of this motion. 	The Commissioner further concurs with the ALJ that the petition is
untimely under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), and that petitioner has failed to present a compelling reason or
exceptional circumstances warranting relaxation of the ninety-day rule.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of
appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 8, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	September 8, 2025
1 Petitioner's exceptions, filed on August 21, 2025, were untimely and, therefore, not considered.
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 390-12/25
M.P. O/B/O R.P.
Petitioner,
v.
RAMAPO-INDIAN HILLS REGIONAL
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BERGEN COUNTY
Respondent.
_____________________________________
M.P., appearing pro se
Rachel Fairley Esq., for respondent (Porzio, Brombeg & Newman, attorneys)
Record Closed: June 4, 2025 	Decided: June 16, 2025
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 7, 2024, the petitioner challenged the respondent's failure to
correct his son's ninth-grade education transcript following a meeting in June 2024

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
2
when his son was in the eleventh grade. Is the claim time-barred? Yes. Under N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.3(d), a petitioner must challenge the respondent's actions "no later than the 90th
day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action" by the
district or its board.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 7, 2024, the petitioner filed a Petition with the Commissioner of the
Department of Education (the Commissioner or DOE) on behalf of his minor son,
seeking to correct his ninth-grade transcript to reflect his completion of that grade and to
adjust his overall grade point average to 3.73. Furthermore, the petitioner requests that
the Department of Education note that his son is in eleventh grade, not twelfth grade.
Additionally, the petitioner believes the Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School
(District) should move his son up in English coursework. He asserts these issues were
part of a discussion with the District in June 2024.
In response to the petition, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss in place of an
Answer on January 14, 2025, arguing that M.P. lacks standing or authorization to file
the claim on behalf of R.P., who was eighteen years old at the time, and that M.P. filed
the petition out of time.
The DOE received the petition on December 11, 2024, but opted not to address
the respondent's motion to dismiss and transmitted this case to the OAL.
On January 17, 2025, the OAL filed the contested case under the Administrative
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the act establishing the OAL, N.J.S.A.
52:14F-1 to -13, for a hearing under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules,
N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.
On January 21, 2025, this tribunal requested that the petitioner submit his
opposition to the motion by February 10, 2025, which he supplied on February 7, 2025.
The parties attempted to resolve their disputes, but the attempt was unsuccessful, and
the respondent renewed its motion to dismiss on April 16, 2025. Over the respondent's
objection, this tribunal allowed the petitioner to supplement his opposition, including an

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
3
extension 	of 	time 	at 	his 	request. 	On 	May 	13, 	2025, 	the 	petitioner 	supplied 	his
supplemental opposition.
On June 4, 2025, the District replied, and I closed the record. Although the
petitioner supplied further opposition on June 8, 2025, I did not accept his submission
as it was out of time and addressed actions outside of the petition.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the petition and its supporting documents, I FIND the following as
FACT for purposes of this motion only and viewed with all reasonable inferences:
R.P. is a student currently enrolled in the District. 	M.P. is the parent of R.P.
Undeniably, 	all 	claims 	noted 	in 	the 	petition 	against 	the 	District 	pertain 	to 	R.P.'s
education.
When M.P. filed his application with the DOE, R.P. was eighteen years old, and
M.P. had no legal guardianship over his son. Further, M.P. had no authorization from
his son to file this action. Still, M.P. obtained a notarized authorization from R.P. to
maintain this action against the District on his behalf after he filed the petition. The
authorization will remain in effect until June 30, 2026.
R.P. first enrolled in the District for the ninth grade in the 2021-22 school year.
The 2024-25 school year represents R.P.'s fourth year in the District.
Despite his enrollment for the 2021-22 school year, R.P. did not attend any of his
classes. M.P. maintains that R.P. had medical issues preventing his attendance at
school. In December 2021, M.P. filed a petition with the DOE, which the DOE then
transmitted to the OAL as a contested case. Petitioner supplies no decision or order
from that case but noted that no other pending cases exist between the parties.

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4
However, the District provided home instructions to R.P. until R.P.'s medical issues
resolved.
R.P. returned to in-person instruction for the 2023-24 school year and obtained
"A" grades. M.P. states that R.P. had to take state-mandated testing for the wrong
grades, given the District's failure to correct R.P.'s ninth-grade transcript to reflect
completed courses. R.P. will attend the 2025-26 school year as a senior and graduate
high school in 2026.
During a meeting in June 2024, M.P. raised concerns regarding R.P.'s transcript,
testing levels, and R.P.'s interest in taking specific English courses. Yet, the District did
not make the requested changes or accommodations. 	Furthermore, the petitioner also
had notice of R.P.'s assigned classes and the District's continued designation of R.P. as
an eleventh-grader. 	Yet, M.P. nor his son made any formal complaint or filing against
the District until December 7, 2024. Although the petitioner does not specify the date of
the June meeting, if the meeting occurred on the last day of June, then I FIND that M.P.
filed his petition far more than ninety days after that meeting and the District's failure to
make the requested changes.
Although this tribunal allowed the petitioner to respond twice to the motion, he
only addressed his standing to pursue this matter. M.P. does not explain or provide any
excuse for his untimely filing or circumstances that precluded the prompt filing of the
petition. Instead, he only reiterates that he is entitled to the relief sought.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A motion to dismiss filed in lieu of an answer under the administrative rule
governing education cases, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g), is the functional equivalent of seeking
dismissal for the failure to state a claim under the New Jersey Superior Court Rule, R.
4:6-2(e). 	Graves v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark & Cami Anderson, 2017 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2417. In ruling on a motion to dismiss,

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The judge considers whether all the evidence together with
all legitimate inferences therefrom could sustain a judgment
in favor of the party opposing the motion. The judge is not
concerned 	with 	weight, 	worth, 	nature, 	or 	extent 	of 	the
evidence. The judge must accept all the evidence supporting
the party defending against the motion and accord that party
the 	benefit 	of 	all 	inferences 	that 	can 	reasonably 	and
legitimately 	be 	deduced 	therefrom. 	If 	reasonable 	minds
could differ, the motion must be denied.
[37 New Jersey Practice, Administrative Law and Practice §
5.19, at 259-60 (Steven Lefelt, Anthony Miragliotta & Patricia
Prunty) (2d ed. 2000)];
See also, Graves, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2417, at 7 (concluding that a court
must determine the adequacy of the pleading and decide whether a cause of action is
"suggested" by the facts when reviewing Rule 4:6-2(e) motions) (internal citations
omitted).
Further, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-10, provides that, “at any time prior to transmittal of the
pleadings to the OAL, in the Commissioner's discretion or upon motion to dismiss filed
in lieu of answer, the Commissioner may dismiss the petition on the grounds that the
petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if the petitioner's factual allegations are
accepted as true or for lack of jurisdiction, failure to prosecute, or other good reason.”
In other words, this regulation provides even more expansive grounds for dismissing
petitions.
A tribunal should grant the motion "if even a generous reading of the allegations
does not reveal a legal basis for recovery." Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357
N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div. 2003).
Standing
A party must have standing to be able and entitled “to maintain an action before
the court.” In re Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (N.J.,1999). Standing is "a threshold

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
6
justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled to initiate and maintain an
action before a court or other tribunal." In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et
seq., 372 N.J. Super 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004).
New Jersey Courts set a relatively low threshold for standing that is more
expansive than in the federal courts. In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et
seq., 	372 	N.J. 	Super. 	at 	85. 	Standing 	is 	even 	more 	liberal 	within 	the 	State's
administrative system. 37 New Jersey Practice, Administrative Law and Practice § 7.4
(Steven Lefelt, Anthony Miragliotta & Patricia Prunty) (rev. 2d ed. 2000); see Osborne v.
Twp. 	of 	Lakewood 	Bd. 	of 	Educ., 	EDU 	6348-02, 	Initial 	Decision 	(May 	16,
2003), modified, 	Comm'r. 	(August 	26, 	2003), 	http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal
(finding petitioner demonstrated a sufficient stake in the outcome of the proceedings to
confer standing to pursue his claims).
Notably, the petitioner was present at the June 2024 meeting with the District,
and his son was not eighteen when his ninth-grade attendance became an issue.
Further, R.P. authorized his father to act on his behalf in this case against the District in
a notarized statement. Thus, any concerns that M.P.'s interests differ from those of his
son are alleviated.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner, R.P.'s father, has standing in this
case and for purposes of this motion.
Timeliness
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), a party must file an appeal with the Commissioner of
Education “no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final
order, ruling, or other action by the district board of education, individual party, or
agency, that is the subject of the requested contested case hearing.” This rule "provides
a measure of repose, an essential element in the proper and efficient administration of
the school laws," giving school districts the “security of knowing” that an aggrieved party

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cannot challenge its actions after ninety days. Kaprow v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp.,
131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993).
Courts 	strictly 	construe 	and 	consistently 	apply 	the 	ninety-day 	limitation
period. Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-89; Nissman v. Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super 373, 380-
81, (App. Div. 1994); Riely v. Bd. of Educ., 173 N.J. Super. 109, 112-14, (App. Div.
1980). This period begins to run when the petitioner "learn[s] from the Local Board the
existence of that state of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim." Kaprow, 131
N.J. at 588-89. Indeed, the "notice of a final order, ruling or other action" is "sufficient to
inform an individual of some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the
communicating party has a duty to communicate." Id. at 587. Notably, a petitioner does
not need to receive official and formal notification that they may have a valid claim to
initiate the ninety days. 	Id. at 588.
To determine when the ninety days begin to accrue, a tribunal employs the
discovery rule, which is “essentially a rule of equity.” Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273
(1973). This rule provides that a cause of action will not accrue “until the injured party
discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have
discovered that [they] may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Id. at 272. Indeed, the
inquiry is “whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising
ordinary diligence that [they were] injured due to the fault of another.” Martinez v.
Cooper Hosp.- Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 51 (2000).
Even accepting M.P.'s position that the District failed to correct R.P.'s ninth-grade
transcript, revise his GPA, provide correct testing levels, or allow R.P. to take an English
class of his choice, the petitioner needed to file a timely petition challenging those
failures. Undeniably, M.P. acknowledges that he was at the June 20024 meeting and
was aware of the District's refusal to honor his requests or address his concerns soon
after. Thus, the ninety-day limitation period began at that meeting and expired at the
latest by the end of September. Indeed, I found that the December 7, 2024, petition was

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
8
indisputably late. Furthermore, M.P. was also aware of his son's ninth-grade attendance
issues and filed a 2021 petition to address them.
Still, the Commissioner may exercise his authority under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1.6 to
relax the application of the 90-day rule "where strict adherence thereto may be deemed
inappropriate or unnecessary or may result in injustice." Ibid. Yet, exceptions to the
ninety-day rule are only appropriate where compelling circumstances exist to justify the
enlargement or relaxation of the time limit. 	See Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 590; DeMaio v.
New Providence Bd. of Educ., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 449, 453.
M.P. offers no circumstances, let alone compelling ones, to justify his lack of
diligence here.
Furthermore, this extraordinary relief is reserved only for situations where the
party presents a substantial constitutional issue or a matter of significant public interest
that extends beyond the concerns of the parties. Portee v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 94
N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 381, 384; Wise v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., EDU 160-00, Initial Decision
(July 	25, 	2000), adopted, 	Comm'r 	Decision 	(September 	11, 	2000), aff'd, 	St. 	Bd.
(January 3, 2001), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Notably, the petitioner's claim has only personal significance, making relaxation
of the rule even less appropriate. If the Commissioner were to relax the filing timeframe
for every harsh result, that action would nullify the rule's salutary public policy of
encouraging the prompt resolution of disputes. 	Pacio v. Bd. of Educ. of Lakeland Reg.
High Sch. Dist., 1989 S.L.D. 2060 (Comm'r July 29, 1989). Thus, I CONCLUDE that the
petitioner does not present exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason that
warrants relaxation of the ninety-day rule and that he filed the petition beyond the
required time frame.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
9
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the District’s
motion to dismiss be GRANTED. 	I further ORDER that the Petition of Appeal be
DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01556-25
10
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
June 16, 2025
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	June 16, 2025
Date Mailed to Parties:
ljb