E.B., on behalf of minor child, B.B. v. Board of Education of the Township of Hainesport, Burlington County, 7/27/26 (#271-26)

271-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 15578-25
Agency Dkt. No. 282-8/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
E.B., on behalf of minor child, B.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Hainesport, Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, and for the reasons thoroughly detailed in the Initial 	Decision, the
Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that E.B. has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the
Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably when it determined that her son, B.B.,
committed an act of harassment, intimidation, or bullying.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition
of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 27, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	July 27, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 282-8/25
E.B. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD B.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF HAINESPORT, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
Respondent.
E.B., petitioner, pro se
Audra A. Pondish, Esq., for respondent (Adams Lattiboudere Croot & Herman,
attorneys)
Record Closed: January 16, 2026 	Decided: April 29, 2026
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, 	the 	Hainesport 	Board 	of 	Education 	(respondent 	or 	Board),
determined that student B.B. committed an act of harassment, intimidation, or bullying
(HIB) and imposed a two-day suspension. 	Petitioner, E.B. (petitioner or E.B.) appeals

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
2
seeking to have the disciplinary action removed from B.B.’s pupil records. The inquiry is
whether there are material issues of fact in dispute to warrant a hearing.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 20, 2025, petitioner filed a petition with the New Jersey Department of
Education’s 	Office 	of 	Controversies 	and 	Disputes 	(OCD), 	appealing 	respondent’s
decision to impose discipline upon petitioner’s son, B.B. 	Respondent filed its answer
with affirmative defenses on September 3, 2025. 	The matter was transmitted by the
Department of Education to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed
on September 9, 2025, as a contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; and N.J.S.A.
52:14F-1 to -13.
Respondent filed a motion for summary decision that was received on December
29, 2025. 	Petitioner filed a response that was received on January 12, 2026, and
respondent’s reply was received on January 16, 2026.
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following undisputed facts were gleaned from the written submissions of the
parties, which I adopt and FIND as FACTS:
1. 	Anthony Procopio serves as the Assistant Principal/Director of the Child
Study Team and Anti-Bullying Coordinator for respondent. (Resp’t’s Br. ¶ 1.)
2. 	For the 2024-2025 school year, B.B. was a thirteen-year-old seventh-grade
student attending Hainesport Elementary School. (Pet’r’s Pet.)
3. 	On May 14, 2025, a female student, L.A., reported to the school counselor
and submitted an incident report stating that there were male students,
including B.B., who called her “board game.” 	L.A. did not know what that
meant until another student explained that it meant she was flat in the front
and rear areas of her body. (Resp’t’s Br. ¶ 4.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
3
4. 	On May 14, 2025, Mr. Procopio contacted L.A.’s mother explaining that she
could file a HIB claim. On May 15, 2025, L.A.’s mother told Mr. Procopio and
other staff that she wanted to start the HIB complaint process. 	(Resp’t’s Br.
¶¶ 6-9.)
5. 	By letter dated May 15, 2025, Mr. Procopio notified petitioner that B.B. may
be an offender in a HIB incident. 	(Ex. 3, Resp’t’s Br.) 	He also sent E.B. an
email on the same date. (Id. at Ex. 9.)
6. 	On May 23, 2025, Mr. Procopio and the Anti-bullying specialist discussed the
findings and possible discipline with B.B., explaining that an act of HIB was
founded 	because 	another 	student 	verified 	B.B.’s 	comments 	about 	L.A.
(Procopio Certif. at ¶17-18.)
7. 	During this meeting B.B. shared that female students had made comments
about his appearance in the prior school year, and that he only made his
comments about the female student this year because of the name-calling
from the previous school year. 	The district had no record of B.B. reporting
any alleged HIB during the prior school year. (Id. at ¶19.)
8. 	Mr. Procopio asked B.B. to provide the relevant information, such as students’
names and the alleged comments about B.B., so that Mr. Procopio could
conduct an investigation. (Id. at ¶20.)
9. 	On May 23, 2025, Mr. Procopio notified E.B. via email that B.B. was found to
have committed an act of HIB and would be subject to a two-day out-of-
school suspension. 	(Ex. 8, Resp’t’s Br.) 	Mr. Procopio offered one-to-one
counseling for B.B. (Ibid.)
10. By letter dated July 23, 2025, respondent notified petitioner that respondent
determined that B.B. was involved in an act of HIB. (Id. at Exs. 3 and 12.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
4
11. On May 15, 2025, Board staff interviewed B.B. (Ex. 4, Resp’t’s Br.)
12. Under the Board’s Student Code of Conduct, a confirmed act of HIB, first
offense, for grades six through eight, results in a three-day out-of-school
suspension and contact with the parent or guardian. 	(Ex. 7, Resp’t’s Br. at
13.) In addition, a suspended student may not attend dances, special events,
or extra-curricular activities during the suspension. (Id. at 34.)
13. E.B. appealed the Board’s decision and requested a hearing before the Board
in an email dated June 3, 2025. (Ex. 13, Resp’t’s Br.)
14. The Board secretary responded on June 4, 2025, setting the hearing for June
17, 2025. (Ibid.)
15. On July 10, 2025, the Board Secretary notified E.B. that the Board planned to
issue its decision at the July 22, 2025, board meeting. (Ibid.)
Parties’ Arguments
The Board contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of petitioner
and, thus, summary decision should be awarded in its favor. Specifically, the Board set
forth three justifications: 	1) it did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
determining 	that 	B.B.’s 	conduct 	constituted 	HIB; 	2) 	all 	elements 	necessary 	to
substantiate 	a 	HIB 	complaint 	were 	met 	and 	thus 	the 	discipline 	imposed 	was
appropriate; and 3) B.B.’s complaint was handled fairly and investigated appropriately
under the circumstances. 	Finally, the Board contends that the “other factors” included
in petitioner’s opposition to the Board’s motion for summary decision are irrelevant and
must be disregarded, specifically, because the text messages between B.B. and L.A.
were sent long after the incident, and the pending contested case before the OAL cited
by petitioner relates to petitioner’s other child and is not a HIB matter.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
5
Conversely, E.B. asserts that a hearing is required because: 	1) there are
competing interpretations of the evidence, including B.B.’s motive, context of the
comment, impact on L.A., and credibility of witnesses; 2) the preponderance of the
evidence proves that the Board acted in bad faith or in disregard for the circumstances,
and the conclusion is not supported by the evidence; 3) the Board failed to meet the
prongs necessary to satisfy a HIB finding; and 4) other factors such as: L.A. sent a text
to B.B. in August apologizing for getting him into trouble, and there is another pending
contested case filed against the Board related to how the Board handles investigations
and discipline.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A motion for summary decision may be granted if the papers and discovery
presented, as well as any affidavits that may have been filed with the application, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). If the motion is sufficiently supported, the non-
moving party must demonstrate by affidavit that there is a genuine issue of fact which
can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding, in order to prevail in such an
application. 	Ibid. 	These provisions mirror the summary judgment language of R. 4:46-
2(c) of the New Jersey Court Rules.
The 	motion 	judge 	must 	“consider 	whether 	competent 	evidential 	materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . are
sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.” 	Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).
And even if the non-moving party comes forward with some evidence, this forum must
grant summary decision if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving party] must
prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 536.
An issue is “genuine” if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the
evidence submitted on the motion and all legitimate inferences could sustain a decision
in favor of the non-moving party. 	Id. at 530. 	A fact is “material” if it will “affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
6
242, 248 (1986). 	Significantly, “[b]are conclusions in the pleadings, without factual
support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary
judgment.” 	U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399−400
(App. Div. 1961) (citation omitted).
The issue here is whether the Board’s finding that B.B. committed an act of HIB
was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in light of the information that the Board
possessed when it made its determination. 	The Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (“Act”),
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 et seq., is designed “to strengthen the standards and procedures for
preventing, 	reporting, 	investigating, 	and 	responding 	to 	incidents 	of 	harassment,
intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1(f). The Act defines HIB as follows:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or
a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion, 	ancestry, 	national 	origin,
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression,
or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other
distinguishing 	characteristic, 	that 	takes 	place 	on 	school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or off school grounds . . . that substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the
rights of other students and that:
a. 	a 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know, 	under 	the
circumstances, 	will 	have 	the 	effect 	of 	physically 	or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the student’s
property, 	or 	placing 	a 	student 	in 	reasonable 	fear 	of
physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to
his property;
b. 	has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student
or group of students; or
c. 	creates 	a 	hostile 	educational 	environment 	for 	the
student by interfering with a student’s education or by
severely or pervasively causing physical or emotional
harm to the student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 (emphasis added).]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
7
Thus, to establish a finding of HIB, three elements must be established: 	1) the
conduct 	must 	be 	reasonably 	perceived 	as motivated by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
enumerated characteristic or other distinguishing characteristic that occurs on school
property, at a school-sponsored event, or on the school bus; 2) the conduct must
substantially disrupt or interfere with the rights of other students or the orderly operation
of the school; and 3) a reasonable person should know that the conduct will have the
effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or insulting or demeaning a
student, or creates a hostile educational environment by interfering with a student’s
education. 	Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of Verona, Essex Cnty., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10981-
18, Comm’r (February 4, 2020) (footnote omitted), https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/.
Only one element in the last category must be met. Ibid.
Each school district must adopt a policy that prohibits HIB and provides for a
prompt response to any alleged HIB incident. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15. 	Once an alleged
HIB 	incident 	is 	reported 	to 	the 	school 	principal, 	the 	principal 	must 	initiate 	an
investigation within one school day of the report. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). 	The
investigation shall be conducted by a school anti-bullying specialist and shall take no
longer than ten school days to be completed. Ibid. The results of the investigation shall
then be quickly reported to the superintendent of schools, who may take certain action,
including intervention services, establish training programs to enhance the school
climate, impose discipline, order counseling or other appropriate action. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(b). 	Consequences and appropriate remedial action for a student who
commits a first act of HIB may include:
a copy of the results of the investigation shall be placed in
the student’s record and the student may be subject to
remedial actions, including the provision of counseling or
behavioral intervention services, or discipline, or both, as
determined by the principal in consultation with appropriate
school staff.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(4) (emphasis added.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
8
The results of the investigation shall be reported to the board of education “no
later than the date of the board of education meeting next following the completion of
the investigation, along with information on any services provided, training established,
discipline imposed, or other action taken or recommended by the superintendent.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(c).
The parents of the students involved in any alleged HIB incident are entitled to
receive 	information 	about 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	investigation 	and 	the 	result 	of 	the
investigation. 	They may request a hearing before the board of education, which shall
be held within ten days of the request. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(d). 	The board must
issue a decision at the first meeting after its receipt of the investigation report. N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(e). 	The board may affirm, reject, or modify the superintendent’s
decision. 	Ibid. 	The board’s decision may be appealed to the Commissioner of
Education. Ibid.
An action by a board of education “is entitled to a presumption of correctness and
will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such decision was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable.” 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327,
332 (App. Div. 1965). 	Thus, to prevail, those challenging a HIB decision made by a
board of education “must demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in utter
disregard of the circumstances before it.” 	G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Franklin Lakes, EDU 13204-13, Initial Decision (February 24, 2014) (citation omitted),
adopted, 	Comm’r 	(April 	10, 	2014), 	https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php. 	The
Commissioner will not substitute his or her judgment for that of the board of education,
whose exercise of its discretion may not be disturbed unless shown to be “patently
arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by improper motives.” 	Kopera v. W. Orange
Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div. 1960). 	Our courts have held that
“[w]here there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an
erroneous conclusion has been reached.” 	Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Envt’l
Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199–200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App.
Div. 1974); see also T.B.M. v. Moorestown Bd. of Educ., EDU 2780-07, Initial Decision
(February 6, 2008) (citing Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
9
(App. 	Div. 	1965), 	aff’d, 	46 	N.J. 	581 	(1966)), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(April 	7, 	2008),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php.1
In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a
reviewing court must examine:
(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or implied
legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law;
(2) whether 	the 	record 	contains 	substantial 	evidence 	to
support the findings on which the agency based its action;
and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the
relevant factors.
[In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citation omitted).]
As stated above, the Act establishes three elements that must be satisfied to find
that a student committed an act of HIB. 	The first is whether the action is reasonably
perceived as being motivated by any actual or perceived characteristic. 	This “requires
an analysis of how the actor’s motivation is perceived and whether that perception is
reasonable. 	It does not require an analysis of the actual motivation of the actor.”
Wehbeh, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10981-18, Comm’r, https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/
(footnote omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that B.B. called L.A. a “board game,” which was a
reference to her gender and physical appearance. 	E.B. contends that a hearing is
required to consider B.B.’s motive and the context of the statement. 	However, these
are irrelevant. 	What is critical is whether it is reasonable that a fourteen-year-old girl
would perceive that B.B.’s choice of words was motivated by an actual or perceived
characteristic, in this case, her gender and physical appearance.
While “physical appearance” is not specifically enumerated in the Act, our courts
have ruled that “[t]he statute has not limited ‘distinguishing characteristic’ to those
1 	This decision and other administrative and unpublished court decisions are not binding. 	They are
referenced because they provide relevant guidance.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
10
specifically enumerated[.]” 	K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337,
351 (App. Div. 2011).
By its plain terms, the Legislature made clear that courts and
school districts should not limit the scope of the statute to the
more 	classic 	protected 	characteristics 	such 	as 	race 	or
religion, and they intended instead that the statute apply
whenever the harassment at issue was motivated by any
distinguishing characteristic of the targeted student. 	Instead
of 	providing 	a 	longer 	list, 	the 	Legislature 	in 	the 	[Act]
intentionally included a very open-ended phrase, “any other
distinguishing characteristic,” to signal that the Act would
apply 	to 	a 	broad, 	unlimited 	range 	of 	distinguishing
characteristics, so long as the distinguishing characteristic
motivated the bully to harass the targeted student.
[R.A. ex rel. B.A., v. Bd. of Educ. of Hamilton, EDU 10485-
15, Initial Decision (May 12, 2016), adopted, Comm’r (June
22, 2016), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php .]
For example, in J.M.C. ex rel. A.C. v. Board of Education of East Brunswick,
EDU 04144-12, Initial Decision (November 27, 2012), adopted, Comm’r (January 9,
2013), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php, the Commissioner found that a single
incident in which a male student was demeaned by a statement that he “danced like a
girl” was a violation of the Act because the bullying was based on the distinguishing
characteristic of the perception of the targeted student’s dancing. In C.C. ex rel. S.C. v.
Board of 	Education of 	Jefferson, EDU 	10872-14, 	Initial 	Decision 	(April 	6, 	2015),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php, adopted, Comm’r Decision No. 153-15 (May
12, 	2015), 	https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/, 	the 	Commissioner 	found 	that 	a
perception that the targeted student was not a good athlete was sufficient to trigger the
protection of the Act. The Commissioner noted that “the HIB statute is intended to drive
home the principle that cruel words will not be tolerated in a school environment.”
Similarly, in W.C.L. & A.L. ex rel. L.L. v. Board of Education of Tenafly, EDU 03223-12,
Initial 	Decision 	(November 	26, 	2012), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(January 	10, 	2013),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php, the Commissioner held that even a single and
true comment by a student that the targeted student had dyed her hair because she had
head lice violated the statute.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
11
Applying these decisions to the present circumstances, it is reasonable that a
fourteen-year-old girl would perceive that being called a “board game” was based upon
the distinguishing characteristics of her gender and physical appearance. 	The fact that
L.A. did not know initially what the term meant does not invalidate this.
E.B, however, contends that her son did not make the offending comment as
alleged in L.A.’s incident report,2 but made the comment in the cafeteria on another
date, and, thus, respondent had no basis to make a HIB finding against B.B. 	However,
when he made the offending comment is of no moment because B.B. does not deny
that he said it, and it is uncontested that he said it while on school property. While L.A.
did not know what the term meant, B.B. acknowledged that he said it. 	In addition,
petitioner contends that B.B. only made the comment because female students had
made derogatory comments about him during the previous school year; however, the
appropriate focus of the present matter remains on the events during the 2024–2025
school 	year. 	Accordingly, 	based 	upon 	the 	evidence 	presented 	to 	the 	Board, 	I
CONCLUDE that petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Board’s 	determination 	concerning 	the 	first 	element 	is 	arbitrary, 	capricious, 	or
unreasonable.
The Commissioner addressed the type of situations that may satisfy the second
element of the HIB statute:
[C]onduct has been determined to substantially disrupt the
orderly operation of the school when students are so upset
or 	embarrassed 	that 	they 	are 	“not 	fully 	available 	for
learning.” 	G.H. and E.H. on behalf of K.H. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Franklin Lakes, Bergen County,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13204-13, decided February 24, 2014,
adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 157-14, April 10, 2014.
Additionally, 	when 	other 	students 	are 	“so 	affected” 	by
behavior that they report it, the orderly operation of the
school may be substantially disrupted. 	T.R. and T.R. on
behalf of E.R. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Board of
Education, 	OAL 	Dkt. 	No. 	EDU 	10208-13, 	decided
September 25, 2014, adopted, Commissioner Decision No.
450-14, November 10, 2014.
2 L.A. stated that the comment was made in a classroom.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
12
[D.D.K. ex rel. D.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Readington, Hunterdon
Cnty., 	EDU 	07682-15, 	Comm’r 	(November 	11, 	2016),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/OAL/index.php.]
Here, 	L.A. 	reported 	the 	offending 	language 	to 	the 	school 	counselor 	and
requested to have her classes changed because she no longer felt comfortable in her
classes. 	Other students were involved to the extent that B.B. told them that he thought
L.A. was a “board game,” and another student explained what that meant to L.A.
Petitioner opines that this is insufficient; however, she did not present any evidence to
prove otherwise. 	Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Board’s determination concerning the second
element is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
The third element requires a finding that the act at issue is one that “a reasonable
person should know, under the circumstances, will have the effect of physically or
emotionally harming a student,” “has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or
group of students,” or “creates a hostile educational environment.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
Any one of the three criteria satisfies the third element. 	In Wehbeh, the Commissioner
wrote that “[n]one of these criteria require the actor to have actual knowledge of the
effect that her actions will have, or to specifically intend to bring about that effect.” OAL
Dkt. No. EDU 10981-18, Comm’r, https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/.
Here, the Board found that B.B. engaged in verbal behavior that hurt and made
L.A. uncomfortable. 	As discussed above, this impacted L.A. and had the effect of
insulting and demeaning her. 	At a minimum, a reasonable person should know that
such behavior would place a student in reasonable fear of at least emotional harm. 	In
addition, the uncontroverted fact that L.A. was upset by the comment once she learned
of its meaning, and requested a change in her classes and locker, demonstrates that
B.B. and others created a hostile educational environment. I therefore CONCLUDE that
petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board’s
determination concerning the third element is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
13
Finally, E.B. offered an exchange of text messages purportedly between L.A. and
B.B. in which L.A., approximately three months later, apologizes for getting B.B. into
“trouble” as proof that L.A. was not harmed but had a “crush” on B.B. that was not
reciprocated. 	(Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s MSD.) 	Whether L.A. and B.B. had a friendly
relationship following the incident has no impact on the HIB finding. “There is nothing in
the Act that requires that a hostile educational environment persist for a specified period
of time.” 	L.K. and T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Mansfield, Burlington Cty., OAL
Dkt. 	No. 	EDU 	07067-16, 	Comm’r 	(December 	9, 	2021),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/.
Petitioner’s 	concern 	for 	her 	child 	and 	her 	desire 	to 	protect 	him 	are
understandable and commendable. 	However, for all of the reasons stated above, I am
compelled to CONCLUDE that she has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Even if there were room for an alternate conclusion, the Board’s determination was
supported by the evidence, and there is no evidence of improper motivation.
ORDER
I hereby ORDER that respondent’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED
and petitioner’s appeal is DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15578-25
14
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 	Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other
parties.
April 29, 2026
DATE 	KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
KCB/gd