A.W., on behalf of minor child, J.W. v. Board of Education of the Township of Mount Olive, Morris County, 9/8/2025 (#435-25R)

435-25R
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12064-24
Agency Dkt. No. 245-7/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
A.W., on behalf of minor child, J.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Mount
Olive, Morris County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
and the exceptions filed by respondent Board of Education of the Township of Mount Olive
(Board) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 have been reviewed and considered.
In this matter, petitioner challenges the Board’s determination that her son, J.W.,
committed an act of harassment, intimidation, or bullying (HIB) as defined by N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
The Board moved for summary decision, claiming that its determination was not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. 	Petitioner filed opposition and maintained that disputed factual
issues needed to be resolved at a contested hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Board’s motion for summary decision,
decided to treat petitioner’s opposition brief as a cross-motion for summary decision, granted
the cross-motion, and ordered that the Board’s HIB determination be reversed. The ALJ held that

2
HIB did not occur as a matter of law because J.W.’s conduct did not substantially disrupt or
interfere with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students.
The Board takes exception to 21 of the ALJ’s findings and contends overall that its decision
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Board also contends, as a procedural matter,
that the ALJ improperly converted petitioner’s opposition brief into a cross-motion for summary
decision. The Board explains that it was not given the opportunity to oppose the converted cross-
motion. The Board requests that the Commissioner either grant its motion for summary decision
and dismiss the petition or remand the matter to the OAL for a contested hearing.
Upon review, the Commissioner rejects the Initial Decision. As asserted by petitioner in
her opposition brief, the material facts underlying the Board’s decision that J.W.’s conduct
constituted an act of HIB—including, but not limited to, facts related to the Board’s
determination that the incident caused a substantial disruption or interference with orderly
operation of the school or the rights of other students—are contested and present a genuine
issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).
Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the OAL for a contested hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 8, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	September 8, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
AGENCY DKT NO. 245-7/24
A.W., ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, J.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT OLIVE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, MORRIS COUNTY,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
A.W., petitioner, pro se
John 	G. 	Geppert, 	Jr., 	Esq., 	for 	respondent 	(Scarinci 	Hollenbeck, 	L.L.C.,
attorneys)
Record Closed: May 26, 2025 	Decided: June 12, 2025
BEFORE MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, A.W., the parent of minor child J.W., has challenged the determination
made by the respondent, Board of Education of the Township of Mount Olive, Morris
County (respondent or District), that J.W. committed an act of harassment, intimidation,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
2
and bullying (HIB) against a classmate on January 22, 2024, pursuant to a complaint
that was brought per N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 to -37 (the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The HIB complaint arises out of an incident that occurred during a 4 th grade
library class at Sandshore Elementary School in Budd Lake, New Jersey on January 22,
2024. 	At that time, it is alleged that J.W. sent multiple emails to a game developer that
contained the “N-word.”
The District was contacted by the parent of the alleged victim (“A.V.”) the
following day and an HIB investigation was instituted on January 23, 2024. On or about
February 6, 2024, the District advised petitioners that it had been determined that J.W.
had committed an HIB violation and the matter was presented to the Board of Education
on February 12, 2024.
On or about April 12, 2024, A.W. advised the District that she wished to appeal
the HIB finding. 	Given the timing of the appeal and the next Board of Education
meeting (April 15, 2024), the District requested that A.W. waive the “10-day rule” and
permit the matter appeal to be heard at the April 29, 2024 meeting. 	A.W. appeared at
the April 29 meeting and by letter dated May 1, 2024, she was advised that the Board
upheld the report’s findings.
On 	July 	30, 	2024, 	this 	appeal 	of 	the 	April 	29, 	2024 	Board 	of 	Education
determination was filed with the Department of Education’s Office of Controversies and
Disputes. 	Respondent filed an Answer to the appeal on August 20, 2024, and the
Department transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on
September 2, 2024, for a hearing as a contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and
N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
An initial conference was scheduled for October 23, 2024, but was adjourned
due to a notice issue. 	That conference instead took place on October 28, 2024. 	That

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
3
was followed by a conference on December 9, 2024, during which a schedule for
respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision was set.
However, in reviewing the Motion papers, I determined that there are no issues
of material fact in dispute one way or the other that would prevent a decision as to
whether the District’s HIB determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	I
will therefore treat petitioner’s opposition to respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision
as a Cross-Motion for Summary Decision. N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.3(a)(b), N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(d).
Thereafter, the record officially closed on May 26, 2025.
THE REPORT
There is no real dispute about what occurred. 	However, the “why” it occurred
and its impact are absolutely in dispute.
The initial HIB report was completed on February 6, 2024. 	(R-D.) 	It was
prepared by Jennifer Curry, the Sandshore Elementary School principal. 	The HIB
“Type” was listed as: “The student knowingly engaged in bullying behavior but was not
aware of the potential negative impact on the victim.” 	A.V.’s parent made the initial
report.
Initial Report information that is being investigated:
Today, during library, while playing a game, [J.W.] sent a
message 	to 	someone 	he 	was 	battling 	and 	[J.W.] 	typed
“n****r”1, “n****r”, “n****r”, literally, three times, and then sent
it; [witness name redacted] saw [J.W.] do this. 	[Witness
name redacted] did not tell because he was not sure if this
was something to tell an adult about but he knew that what
[J.W.] said was very wrong.
Executive Summary
The target reported the incident to his parent who then input
the information into HIBster. 	After meeting with witnesses,
1 The offensive racial slur spelled out in full.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
4
the aggressor, the victim and reviewing the emails sent, this
HIB is founded as there was a substantial disruption for the
victim. 	He went home upset and reported it to a parent. 	In
addition, witnesses reported victim reported feeling shock,
anger 	and 	upset. 	Also, 	there 	is 	the 	distinguishing
characteristic of race/ethnic origin.
The MOPD2 was informed of this incident as it was a Bias
Related Incident. 	The MO BOE has a memorandum of
understanding with the MOPD what when a biased related
incident occurs, it must be reported to the police.
Officer Leach visited Sandshore School and spoke with Ms.
Curry and Mrs. Reyes regarding the initial report. 	The
MOPD conducted their own investigation and determined the
following: 	“After speaking to [name redacted], I concluded
that this is nothing else to be investigated on the police side
of the incident.”
INVESTIGATION NOTES:
This class of students were in Library for special. 	The
students were directed to access a variety of activities and
games in their Google Classroom that focused on Dewey
Decimals. 	One of the various activities available required
visiting a website that had games created by an educator.
At the bottom of the page was the option to “send email” to
the 	creator 	of 	the 	games 	which 	was 	an 	educator 	from
another state.
The aggressor typed out various emails including the word
“n****r” 	and 	went up to 	a different table to 	show 	other
students. 	The victim was a student at the table that was
approached by the aggressor. 	The victim [w]as upset and
as reported by the parent, “mad” that this word was being
used. 	The aggressor sent 5 emails and had one draft email
to the game creator. 	The four of six emails included the
word n****r (spelling at times varied). 	Witnesses shared
seeing the emails as well.
A.V., the librarian and multiple students were interviewed. 	The report included
the following:
2 Mount Olive Police Department.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The target [A.V.] reported the incident to his parent who then
input 	the 	information 	into 	HIBster. 	After 	meeting 	with
witnesses, [J.W.], [A.V.] and reviewing the emails sent, this
HIB is founded as there was a substantial disruption for the
victim. 	He went home upset and reported it to a parent. 	In
addition, witnesses reported victim . . . feeling shock, anger
and upset. 	Also, there is the distinguishing characteristic of
race/ethnic origin.
THE MOTION
Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Decision, arguing that there are no
material facts in dispute that would permit the petitioner to demonstrate that the
District’s 	finding 	of 	an 	HIB 	violation 	against 	J.W. 	was 	arbitrary, 	capricious 	or
unreasonable.
It points out that a District “is entitled to a presumption of correctness” and that
without 	“an 	affirmative 	showing 	that 	such 	decision 	was 	arbitrary, 	capricious 	and
unreasonable,” it must prevail. 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super.
327, 332 (App. Div. 1965). See also Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super.
288, 294 (App. Div. 1960).
It was argued that there is clear evidence that a thorough investigation was
performed in compliance with the District’s HIB policy (R-C) and that the facts satisfy the
criteria required under the definition of HIB, as articulated in the statute. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-14. 	Its position is that the dispute at this point is simply a legal one concerning
the outcome of the investigation and not its contents. More specifically;
Here, petitioner has failed to show that the Board acted in
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, and, based
upon applicable Commissioner of Education decision, the
Petition 	should 	be 	dismissed 	as 	it 	does 	not 	satisfy 	the
requirements of Harassment, Intimidation and Bullying set

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
6
forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 et seq and that this Petition is
otherwise moot.
[Resp’t Reply Br., at 2.]
As 	for 	any 	alleged 	procedural 	missteps, 	the 	respondent 	claims 	that 	the
investigation 	clearly 	complied 	with 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:37-15 	et 	seq. 	and 	that 	A.W.’s
complaints concerning same were misstatements of both facts and law.
In her Opposition/Cross-Motion, A.W. emphasizes J.W.’s claim that he was
dared to perform the act in question by A.V. and that he was further unaware of the
consequences of the use of the word in question. She also argued that the only one of
the HIB prongs that the District was able to prove was A.V.’s race. By not investigating
the allegation that A.V. dared J.W. to send the email, she claims that the balance of the
investigation by definition was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 	Petitioner cited
to N.U. ex rel. M.U. v. Board of Education of the Town of Mansfield, 2022 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 632 (June 27, 2022) in support of her argument that the District had failed to
demonstrate 	that 	J.W.’s 	actions 	caused 	a 	hostile 	educational 	environment 	or
substantially disrupted or interfered with the rights of other students or the orderly
operation of the school. 	See also W.D. & J.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson,
2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1787 (App. Div., Sept. 29, 2020).
Finally, 	petitioner alleges 	that respondent made multiple 	administrative 	and
procedural errors during the investigation that are violative of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 to -
37 and its own District policies and that the HIB finding should be overturned.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary decision may be granted “if the papers and discovery which have been
filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of
law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	The OAL summary decision rule is essentially the same as
the summary judgment rule under the New Jersey Court Rules, which states:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
7
The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact
challenged 	and 	that 	the 	moving 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	a
judgment or order as a matter of law. 	An issue of fact is
genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial,
the 	evidence 	submitted 	by 	the 	parties 	on 	the 	motion,
together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the
non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to
the trier of fact.
[R. 4:46-2(c).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has modified and clarified the analysis required
when considering a motion for summary decision/judgment. 	In Brill v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the Court adopted the summary
judgment standard utilized by federal courts:
Under this new standard, a determination whether there
exists 	a 	“genuine 	issue” 	of 	material 	fact 	that 	precludes
summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider
whether the competent evidential materials presented, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. The
“judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the
evidence 	and 	determine 	the 	truth 	of 	the 	matter 	but 	to
determine 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	genuine 	issue 	for 	trial.”
[Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986).] . . . If there exists
a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue
of 	fact, 	that 	issue 	should 	be 	considered 	insufficient 	to
constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of
R. 4:46-2. Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct.
at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 213. 	The import of our holding is
that when the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law,” Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at
252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214, the trial court
should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[Id. at 540.]
The burden is on the moving party to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are drawn

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
8
against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana v. DiMedio, 275
N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994). 	The critical question therefore is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citation
omitted). 	If the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment should not be denied. 	See Bowles v. City of Camden,
993 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
An 	action 	by 	a 	local 	board 	of 	education 	“is 	entitled 	to 	a 	presumption 	of
correctness and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1965). 	Our courts have held that “[w]here
there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised
honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous
conclusion has been reached.” Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 122 N.J.
Super. 184, 199–200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974). Thus,
in order to prevail, those challenging a decision made by a board of education “must
demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in utter disregard of the circumstances
before it.” 	G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Lakes, 2014 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 19 (Feb. 24, 2014) (citation omitted), adopted, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1137
(Apr. 10, 2014). Also, a board’s decision may be overturned if its determination violates
the legislative policies expressed or implied in the governing act. 	J.A.H. ex rel. C.H. v.
Twp. of Pittsgrove Bd. of Educ., 2013 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 58 (Mar. 11, 2013) (citing
Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)), adopted, 2013 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 436 (Apr. 25, 2013).3
The Anti-Bullying Act is designed “to strengthen the standards and procedures
for preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents of harassment,
intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1(f). 	Under the Act, “[h]arassment, intimidation or bullying” is
defined as:
3 See R.Z. & L.D. ex rel. minor child, L.Z. v Northern Valley Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2025 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 78 (Feb. 12, 2025), adopted, Comm’r (Apr. 28, 2025), from which much of this section is borrowed .

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
9
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or
a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion, 	ancestry, 	national 	origin,
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression,
or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other
distinguishing 	characteristic, 	that 	takes 	place 	on 	school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or off school grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.
2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the
rights of other students and that:
a. 	a reasonable person should know, under
the 	circumstances, 	will 	have 	the 	effect 	of
physically or emotionally harming a student or
damaging the student’s property, or placing a
student 	in 	reasonable 	fear 	of 	physical 	or
emotional harm to his person or damage to his
property;
b. 	has the effect of insulting or demeaning any
student or group of students; or
c. 	creates a hostile educational environment
for the student by interfering with a student’s
education 	or 	by 	severely 	or 	pervasively
causing 	physical 	or 	emotional 	harm 	to 	the
student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]
Each school district must adopt a policy that prohibits HIB and provides “a
procedure for prompt investigation of reports of violations and complaints.” 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6). 	Once an alleged HIB incident is reported to the school principal, the
principal must initiate an investigation within one school day of the report. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). 	The investigation shall be conducted by a school anti-bullying
specialist, but “[t]he principal may appoint additional personnel who are not school anti-
bullying specialists to assist in the investigation.” 	Ibid. 	The investigation shall be
completed within ten days of the initial HIB complaint. Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
10
The 	results 	of 	the 	investigation 	shall 	then 	be 	quickly 	reported 	to 	the
superintendent of schools, who may take certain remedial action. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-
15(b)(6)(b). 	In particular, “the superintendent may decide to provide intervention
services, establish training programs to reduce [HIB] and enhance school climate,
impose discipline, order counseling as a result of the findings of the investigation, or
take or recommend other appropriate action.” Ibid.
At this point, it is important to note that the interplay of sections (a), (b), and (c) of
the HIB statute was addressed by the Commissioner in Wehbeh v. Board of Education,
Township of Verona, 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 50 (Feb. 4, 2020).
[A] 	finding 	of 	[HIB] 	requires 	three 	elements. 	First, 	the
conduct must be reasonably perceived as motivated by any
actual 	or 	perceived 	enumerated 	characteristic 	or 	other
distinguishing characteristic and, second, the conduct must
substantially 	disrupt 	or 	interfere 	with 	the 	rights 	of 	other
students or the orderly operation of the school. 	The third
condition is that one of the three criteria enumerated in the
Act 	regarding 	the 	effect 	of 	the 	conduct 	must 	also 	be
satisfied.
[Id. at *7–8 (footnotes omitted).]
The Commissioner explained that “as a matter of standard statutory construction,
the term “or” between subsections (b) and (c) also applies to subsection (a), such that a
demonstration of any of these three criteria can support a finding of HIB.” Ibid. at n.2.
Put another way, for there to be a valid finding of an HIB violation, these things
had to have happened:
1. 	A reasonable person would perceive that the conduct
was based upon a distinguishing characteristic.
AND
2. 	The conduct took place on school property.
AND

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
11
3. 	The conduct must substantially disrupt or interfere with
the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other
students.
AND
3a. A 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know 	that 	the
conduct 	would 	have 	the 	effect 	of…emotionally
harming a student.
OR
3b. The 	conduct 	has 	the 	effect 	of 	insulting 	or
demeaning the student.
OR
3c. The 	conduct 	created 	a 	hostile 	educational
environment for the student by interfering with the
student’s education or by severely or pervasively
causing emotional harm to the student.
[See 	generally, 	Shim 	v. 	Ridgefield 	Pub. Schools 	Bd. 	of
Educ., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 526 (July 26, 2023), adopted,
Comm’r, 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 441 (Sept. 7, 2023).]
In other words, in order for there to be a cognizable finding of an HIB violation,
respondent must demonstrate that it met prongs 1, 2 and 3 and then any of 3a, 3b or
3c. Any break in the chain causes the charge to fail.
Here, 	respondent’s 	reasoning 	in 	support 	of 	its 	findings 	that 	J.W.’s 	actions
constituted an HIB violation was:
The target [A.V.] reported the incident to his parent who then
input 	the 	information 	into 	HIBster. 	After 	meeting 	with
witnesses, [J.W.], [A.V.] and reviewing the emails sent, this
HIB is founded as there was a substantial disruption for the
victim. 	He went home upset and reported it to a parent. 	In
addition, witnesses reported victim . . . feeling shock, anger
and upset. 	Also, there is the distinguishing characteristic of
race/ethnic origin.
[R-D.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
12
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Prong 	1 	- 	The 	conduct 	was 	reasonably 	perceived 	to 	be 	based 	upon 	a
distinguishing characteristic
The petitioner conflates two defenses in responding to this Prong. 	First, is the “I
didn’t know it was/mean it to be offensive” defense, which is posited in conjunction with
the “he dared me to do it” defense.
As for the “he dared me” defense, that is largely a credibility call and as will be
seen in some of the cases referenced below, as long as the investigation is reasonably
conducted and there is some support for the District’s position, it is very difficult to
challenge that conclusion.
However, where New Jersey law is clear is that J.W.’s intent is effectively
irrelevant. 	Rather, it is the perception of the victim that controls; as long as they would
reasonably 	perceive 	that 	the 	action 	was 	motivated 	by 	an 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic, it would satisfy Prong 1.
One of the first cases to discuss this issue was Melynk v. Teaneck Board of
Education, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161524 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016);
On its face, the HIB Policy requires that several factors must
be 	met 	before 	an 	expression 	can 	be 	found 	to 	be
harassment. 	First, the communication must be “reasonably
perceived 	as 	motivated” 	by 	an 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic. 	That 	is 	to 	say, 	the 	comment 	must 	be
objectively perceived to a reasonable person as motivated
by a characteristic.
[Id. at *17–18.]
Melynk was cited with approval in R.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Borough of Sayreville
Board of Education, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83587 (D.N.J. May 12, 2023):

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
13
First, the communication must be “reasonably perceived as
being 	motivated 	either 	by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic, 	such 	as 	race 	. 	. 	.” 	among 	other 	things.
N.J.S.A. § 18A:37-14. “The ‘reasonably perceived’ test is an
objective one that has withstood constitutional scrutiny,” and
does 	not 	present 	a 	vagueness 	issue. 	See 	Melynk 	v.
Teaneck Bd. of Educ., No. 16-0188, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161524, 2016 WL 6892077, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016)
(collecting cases).
[Id. at 13.]
This result is also alluded to in S.A. v. Board of Education of Moorestown, 2019
N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2114 (App. Div. Oct. 15, 2019). There, in a case involving a
teacher who requested a student’s (poor) test papers as part of his job duties, the Court
concluded that an HIB violation had not occurred, since;
we do not discern sufficient facts to support a conclusion that
any actions by R.L. were motivated by G.A.’s ADHD or other
personal characteristics.
[Id. at *6.]
It further noted that:
even if we presume R.L. was insensitive or even unkind,
there is no evidence R.L. was prompted by any actual or
perceived 	characteristic, 	such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion,
ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory
disability, or by any other distinguishing characteristic.
[Id. at *7]
This prong was again discussed in L.K. & T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Mansfield Board of
Education, 2019 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 62 (Jan. 22, 2019), Final Decision, 2019 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 345 (Comm’r of Educ. Apr. 22, 2019), reversed and remanded, L.K. v. Board of
Education of Mansfield, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2082 (App. Div. Nov. 2, 2020).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
14
In L.K., the ALJ found that “the statute focuses on the impact of [the] conduct on
[the alleged victim] and what [the alleged victim] reasonably perceived.” 	However, in
that case involving young children and a gender-transitioning student, the tribunal
further found;
There is no requirement that the Board find that A.K.’s
conduct 	was 	actually 	motivated 	by 	the 	perceived
characteristic, because, as petitioners argue, A.K. most likely
does 	not 	even 	know 	what 	“gender 	identity” 	means.
However, even under the actual wording of the statute, the
only corroborated finding from the investigation was that A.K.
asked questions about why N3 dressed like a girl even
though N3 asked her to stop. Therefore, the age of A.K. was
relevant to whether A.K.’s conduct was motivated by the
perceived characteristic or because a seven-year-old would
be curious about why a student she knew as a boy was
dressing like a girl. 	The investigators had the time to find
and interview someone in the cafeteria who may have heard
A.K. continue the “harassment,” but they did not.
[L.K. & T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Mansfield Bd. of Educ., 2019 N.J.
AGEN LEXIS 62 at *66.]
Given the lack of clarity in the statute, there will of course be some confusion.
However, that lack of clarity was addressed in Wehbeh v. Board of Education of the
Township of Verona, 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 50 (Comm’r of Educ. Feb. 4, 2020), where
the Commissioner found that a “standard reasonableness determination common in
many types of adjudications” should be utilized. It was noted that to require an actor to
have intentionally committed the offense, the burden concerning motivation would be
improperly placed on the alleged victim. Id. at *8 n.3.
Ultimately, I FIND that in order to find that the first prong of the statute had been
satisfied, an investigating body must view the evidence in its entirety and determine
whether a reasonable person could perceive that the conduct could be “motivated by an
actual or perceived characteristic.” 	That determination should take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the traits/characteristics of the alleged victim, the
age, knowledge, and experience of the actor, as well as the time, place and location of
the act, etc.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
15
Then, if the investigator makes a determination that a reasonable person would
conclude that the act was motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic, the
investigation will proceed to the next element of the HIB offense. 	In essence, the
consideration of this prong does not focus purely on either the perception of the alleged
victim or the expressed intent of the alleged actor, but instead provides an objective
standard based on the totality of the circumstances.
In doing so, I FIND that a reasonable person could very easily conclude that
J.W.’s motivation in showing A.V. the email was racial. 	It is by no means a stretch to
expect that a reasonable person (and that includes a reasonable 5 th grader) would
make that connection even accepting J.W.’s assertions of ignorance as being true.
Prong 2 – Location of the Conduct
That the second prong of the HIB statute, concerning the location of the incident,
has been met is unchallenged, since the conduct occurred in the school library.
Prong 3 – The conduct substantially disrupted or interfered with the orderly
operation of the school or the rights of other students.
Here, frankly, is the issue. 	This incident occurred at about 1:00 p.m. on January
22, 2024, and appears to have been reported by A.V.’s parent that evening via HIBster.
Per the report, A.V.’s mother reported that he was “mad” that the word had been used
and had come home “upset.”
Significantly, there is no evidence that A.V. left school early or that it impacted
the balance of his school day. 	Further, A.V. attended school the next day, where he
was interviewed as part of the investigation at about 11:16 a.m. 	The entirety of the
interview is as follows:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
16
A.V. – I[n] library we were doing a game and you could
email[] and [J.W.] came over and typed the n word three
times. [Name redacted] saw it to[o].
Q. – [J.W.] came where? Up to your table?
A.V. – Yes
Q. – Whose chromebook was he on?
A.V. – His
Q. – When he cam[e] over what did he do?
A.V. – He wrote it then sent it.
Q. – What did you do or say?
A.V. – Oh my goodness.
Q. – Did [name redacted] say or do anything?
A.V. – No they just saw.
Q. – Did you or anyone tell the teacher?
A.V. – No.
Q. – What happened next?
A.V. – They called out table to get books.
Q. – Who else was at your table?
A.V. – [Names redacted].
Q. 	– 	Did 	[J.W.] 	say 	anything 	when 	you 	said 	“oh 	my
goodness?”
A.V. – He said nothing.
Q. – Is there anything else you want me to know?

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
17
A.V. – No.
Q. – How are you doing?
A.V. – Good.
Other witnesses described A.V.’s reaction as “like OMG”4 and “what the hell?”
There is no indication that the librarian/teacher was ever made aware of the incident,
and per the student interviews, other than in the immediacy of the event, there was no
disruption of the educational process as students continued to be “busy on Dewey
Decimal stuff” on their laptops.
And that is the only evidence presented by the respondent to support its
conclusion that this event “substantially disrupt[ed] or interfere[d] with the orderly
operation of the school or the rights of other students.”
While there is relatively limited case law on this prong, there is some guidance on
the use of 	the 	word “n****r” 	in 	HIB 	cases. 	First, 	however, 	as 	background, 	the
Commissioner in D.D.K. ex rel. D.K. v. Board of Education of Readington, 2016 N.J.
AGEN LEXIS 1348 (Nov. 11, 2016) provided a solid primer concerning this prong;
However, the report determined that the incident did not
amount to HIB because the comments did not substantially
disrupt or interfere with the orderly operation of the school or
the rights of other students. 	In support of this finding, the
report noted that D.K. stated in his interview that "fortunately,
this was not problematic for my learning experience, but it
ticked me off at the time." 	(Exhibit J-l) 	The student witness
observed 	the 	alleged 	aggressor 	make 	an 	"embarrassed
laugh" to himself when he realized what he had said had
come out wrong, but did not hear anyone else laugh and did
not think D.K. was upset as a result of the comment. 	Ibid.
The teachers did not hear any of the alleged comments.
Previously, conduct has been determined to substantially
disrupt the orderly operation of the school when students are
so upset or embarrassed that they are "not fully available for
4 Oh, my God.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
18
learning." 	G.H. and E.H. on behalf of K.H. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Franklin Lakes, Bergen County,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13204-13, decided February 24, 2014,
adopted Commissioner Decision No. 157-14, April 10, 2014.
Additionally, 	when 	other 	students 	are 	"so 	affected" 	by
behavior that they report it, the orderly operation of the
school may be substantially disrupted. 	T.R. and T.R. on
behalf of E.R. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Board of
Education, 	OAL 	Dkt. 	No. 	EDU 	10208-13, 	decided
September 25, 2014, adopted Commissioner Decision No.
450-14, November 10, 2014. 	Given that D.K. indicated that
the 	comments 	were 	not 	problematic 	for 	his 	learning
experience and other students did not appear to be affected
by them -- combined with a lack of any other evidence to the
contrary -- the Commissioner is constrained to agree that
petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the
comments 	substantially 	disrupted 	or 	interfered 	with 	the
orderly 	operation 	of 	the 	school 	or 	the 	rights 	of 	other
students.
[D.D.K. ex rel. D.K., 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1348 at *5–7.]
As for the use of the word “n****r,” it was addressed in detail in the infamous
case of W.D. & J.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Board of Education of Jefferson, 2020 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 1787 (App. Div., Sept. 29, 2020). 	That case involved a group text chain
amongst a racially diverse group of female 5 th grade students who utilized an amazing
array of offensive terms, including the word “n****r,” which was sent by a white member
to the group. 	There was then testimony concerning the impact of the incident on the
A.V. (G.D.);
G.D.’s Mother agreed to send G.D. to school the following
Monday but sent additional emails to Lipton that she was
considering 	keeping 	G.D. 	out 	of 	school, 	demanding 	the
school remove J.D. from G.D.’s classroom, and stating G.D.
was “very uncomfortable about the entire situation.” 	On
January 30, 2017, Lipton notified the parents of G.D. and
J.D. that the school commenced an HIB investigation.
On 	Monday, 	January 	30, 	2017, 	Lyndsay 	LaConti, 	the
school’s 	anti-bullying specialist, 	investigated 	the 	incident.
LaConti 	conducted 	approximately 	sixty 	previous 	HIB
investigations. 	She met with G.D. and her grandmother,
interviewed the students involved, and obtained statements
from five students, including G.D. 	LaConti also spoke with

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
19
Ms. Young, who advised that G.D. seemed to be her happy,
normal self in class on the Monday after the incident. 	Ms.
Young later testified the incident and subsequent events did
not adversely affect G.D.’s attendance or grades.
[Id. at *5–6.]
The HIB report determined that since the behavior did not constitute HIB since
there was no evidence that it:
• 	substantially 	disrupted 	or 	interfered 	with 	the 	orderly
operation of the school or the rights of other students.
• created a hostile educational environment for the students
by interfering with a student’s education or by severely or
pervasively 	causing 	physical 	or 	emotional 	harm 	to 	the
student
[Id. at *6–7.]
The ALJ upheld the Board’s decision and found that G.D. “‘appeared to suffer no
detrimental effect,’ noting her grades ‘were virtually unaffected’ and that she appeared
‘nonplussed 	by 	the 	incident.’” 	Id. 	at 	*10. 	The 	decision 	was 	upheld 	by 	the
Commissioner. Ibid.
In its appeal, amongst other things, G.D. argued that “the Commissioner erred in
determining J.D.’s single use of the N-word toward G.D. was not HIB per se.” Id. at *14.
The Appellate Division refused to make such a finding and noted that:
[T]he record does not establish G.D. suffered any significant
impact beyond being rightfully upset following the incident
and wanting to avoid resulting awkwardness at school the
next day. 	Nor is there evidence the incident interfered with
G.D.’s ability to safely and effectively learn. 	Petitioners are
therefore unable to demonstrate the incident substantially
disrupted 	or 	interfered 	with 	the 	orderly 	operation 	of 	the
school or the rights of G.D.
If we were to adopt petitioner’s position, that the single use
of a racial slur is a per se violation of the Act, this Court
would effectively legislate, and give new meaning to the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
20
plain language of the Act. We are guided not to assume that
role. 	See Watt v. Mayor and Council of Franklin, 21 N.J.
274, 277, 121 A.2d 499 (1956). 	Instead, our review is
limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision
was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or unsupported by
substantial credible evidence in the record.
[Id. at *15–16.]
Respondent cites to two cases in support of its position concerning the alleged
use of the word “n****” or another racial epithet. In R.M. & J.M. ex rel. O.M. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Mountain Lakes, 2024 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 961 (Sept. 30,
2024), adopted, No. 447-24 (Comm’r Dec. 9, 2024), it was alleged that the A.V. was
called a “n****r” by the petitioner (and another non-party student), while the petitioner
denied using the word. Both of the students involved were in the 9 th grade at Mountain
Lakes High School. 	A teacher overheard the A.V. telling her mother about the incident
on the phone and in her statement claimed that the A.V. “was very upset about what . . .
had [been] said behind her back in the hallway.” 	The teacher told her to come to her
classroom if she needed support, and indeed she did and reported exactly what was
said. Id. at *4–5.
The matter was reported to the principal and they attempted to interview A.V. that
day, but she had been picked up from school early. 	The Vice Principal had previously
been advised that this might occur, because A.V. was “upset and feeling uncomfortable
in school.” 	Id. at *6. 	The investigation documented that both of the alleged offenders
denied using the word in question, but in her interview, A.V. was adamant that they had.
She also confirmed that she had left school early that day because she “didn’t feel
comfortable in school” and “you never know what will happen . . . like if [she] was going
to be harassed or jumped.”
In determining that the Board’s decision to uphold the finding that an act of HIB
had occurred, the ALJ wrote on Prong 3:
[T]he conduct towards the Victim substantially disrupted the
Victim 	and 	interfered 	with 	her 	rights 	in 	violation 	of 	the
ABBRA and the Board policy. 	She retreated from the scene

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
21
of the Incident, texted her mother, and then went to the
bathroom so she could call her mother “to calm [her] down.”
She expressed that she “didn’t feel comfortable in school”
and had her grandmother come to pick her up early. 	The
Victim also reported a concern that she could possibly be
“harassed or jumped” if she had stayed in school.
[Id. at *15–16.]
In adopting the Initial Decision, the Commissioner focused on the thoroughness
of the investigation and the credibility of the witnesses as well as the “arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable” standard and did not specifically comment on the ALJ’s
Prong 3 findings. R.M., No. 447-24 (Comm’r Dec. 9, 2024).
The other case cited by respondent was R.R. ex rel. A.R. v. Board of Education
of the Borough of Ramsey, 2024 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 72 (Jan. 29, 2024), adopted,
Comm’r No. 131-24 (Mar. 8, 2024). There, a 5 th grade student was accused of telling a
black classmate that “Black is bad.” 	While he denied saying it, the ALJ found that the
A.V. was credible and that the District’s conclusion that an act of HIB had occurred was
not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
In addition to wrestling with the “he said – she said” nature of the accusation, the
ALJ had the most difficulty with Prong 3, writing:
The second element is arguably less clear because the HIB
report did not state that the incident created a “substantial
interruption in the ordinary operation of the school or in the
disruption of the victim's education or the rights of other
students.” 	However, 	the 	school 	maintains 	that 	A.R.’s
conduct not only created a hostile educational environment
for the victim, but to its students, meeting this prong of the
statutory analysis. 	The incident was a limited one-time
comment and did not begin a series of events at the school.
However, the victim was crying at the time and “felt off” the
rest of the day. 	Other students became involved after the
unsettling incident took place in response to the victim's
distress. 	In D.D.K. o/b/o D.K v. Board of Education of the
Township of Readington, Hunterdon County, EDU 07682-15
(October 6, 2016), adopted, Comm'r Decision (November
11, 	2016), 	https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, 	the
Commissioner discussed those situations where the Board's

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
22
HIB determination satisfied the second prong, explaining
that:
[C]onduct has been determined to substantially
disrupt 	the 	orderly 	operation 	of 	the 	school
when students are so upset or embarrassed
that they are "not fully available for learning."
G.H. and E.H. on behalf of K.H. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Franklin Lakes,
Bergen County, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13204-13,
decided 	February 	24, 	2014, 	adopted
Commissioner Decision No. 157-14, April 10,
2014. 	Additionally, when other students are
"so affected" by behavior that they report it, the
orderly 	operation 	of 	the 	school 	may 	be
substantially 	disrupted. 	T.R. 	and 	T.R. 	on
behalf of E.R. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional
Board of Education, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10208-
13, 	decided 	September 	25, 	2014, 	adopted
Commissioner Decision No. 450-14, November
10, 2014.
Id.
[Id. at *15–17.]
The 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	adopting the ALJ’s 	decision 	centered 	on 	the
petitioner’s exceptions to the ruling, which focused solely on whether the incident had
occurred as claimed by the A.V. and not the statutory requirements of the HIB finding.
R.R. ex rel. A.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Ramsey, Comm’r No. 131-24 (Mar. 8,
2024).
Prong 3 was also addressed in R.P. ex rel. A.P. v. Board of Education of
Township of Hamilton, 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 83 (Feb. 13, 2018), adopted, Comm’r,
2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 346 (Mar. 29, 2018). 	That matter involved a ten-year-old
student who was exposed to repeated sexual innuendo and gestures by another
student. 	She wrote a letter to the school “urgently seeking help . . . due to A.P.’s
ongoing inappropriate behavior. 	Through this letter and confirmed during her interview
with [a school official], S.W. expressed her extreme discomfort and distress over A.P.’s
ongoing conduct.” 	R.P., 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 83 at *14. 	Given the severity of the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
23
harassment, the tribunal found that the student’s “extreme discomfort and distress” was
sufficient to satisfy the “disruption” prong. Ibid. See also W.D. & J.D., 2020 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 1787.
Just to reiterate, here, the District’s explanation for finding that this prong of the
test was:
HIB is founded as there was a substantial disruption for the
victim. 	He went home upset and reported it to a parent. 	In
addition, witnesses reported victim . . . feeling shock, anger
and upset.
This is simply not enough. 	The “immediacy” position taken by the District to
support its decision is not only belied by the facts, but is directly and persuasively
addressed in W.D. & J.D. 	Not only did A.V. literally note that he only stated “oh my
goodness” in immediate response to the incident, that reaction was confirmed by some
of the student witnesses. 	Contrary to the report’s conclusion, none of them reported
that A.V. exhibited “anger” or was “upset.”5 	As noted above, the librarian/teacher was
not advised of the incident and there was clearly no outcry. 	There is no evidence that
even the rest of this “special” period was interrupted, or that most of the class was even
aware of the event, let alone that they were upset by it and none of them reported it to
anyone. 	The evidence further shows that A.V. attended school as normal the next day
and told the investigator that he was doing “good.”
This (lack of) impact mirrors the situation in W.D. & J.D., where the Court held:
[T]he record does not establish G.D. suffered any significant
impact beyond being rightfully upset following the incident
and wanting to avoid resulting awkwardness at school the
next day. 	Nor is there evidence the incident interfered with
G.D.’s ability to safely and effectively learn. 	Petitioners are
therefore unable to demonstrate the incident substantially
disrupted 	or 	interfered 	with 	the 	orderly 	operation 	of 	the
school or the rights of G.D.
[Id. at *15.]
5 The only person who reported that A.V. was “mad” or “upset” was his mother in the initial HIBster report.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
24
That is the case here. 	While by no means underestimating the potential impact
of the use of this word in particular, it is clear that its mere utilization is insufficient to
support an HIB finding. 	Similarly, it is clear that there must be something more beyond
the immediate reaction to an incident to justify an HIB finding. 	There has been literally
no 	evidence 	supplied 	by 	the 	District 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	this 	incident 	caused 	a
“substantial disruption” to anyone’s educational experience or interfered with the orderly
operation of the school or A.V.’s rights.
Prong 3a – A reasonable person should know that the conflict would have the
effect of…emotionally harming a student.
Prong 3b – The conduct has the effect of insulting or demeaning the student.
Prong 3c – The conduct created a hostile educational environment for the student
by interfering with the student’s education or by severely or pervasively causing
emotional harm to the student.
With the District’s failure to meet Prong 3 of the HIB test, there is no need to
review Prongs 3a, 3b, and 3c. 	However, I would note that in order for there to be a
finding of an HIB violation, only one of those three prongs has to be satisfied. 	Here,
even assuming that the assertion that J.W. did not know the derogatory meaning of the
word “n****r,” or by inference that he would not know that the conduct would have the
effect of “emotionally harming a student,” that only relieves the burden of Prong 3a.
Here, there is no question that the only evidence presented is that J.W.’s
conduct, no matter the intent (or lack thereof), had “the effect of insulting or demeaning”
A.V. This is documented in the HIB report, and I FIND the Prong 3b was clearly met.
The support for a violation of Prong 3c is clearly not as strong as Prong 3b, but
with the finding on Prong 3b, whether Prong 3c is met is doubly irrelevant (i.e., since
Prong 3 was not met).
Given the above, there is no need to review the petitioner’s allegations of
procedural violations by the District.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
25
Ultimately, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has demonstrated that respondent’s
determination that J.W.’s actions constituted a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 to -37
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent’s Motion for
Summary Decision be and is hereby DENIED and;
It is further ORDERED that petitioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Decision be
and is hereby GRANTED and;
It is further ORDERED that respondent’s determination that J.W. committed an
act of HIB in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 to -37 (the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act)
be and is hereby REVERSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 	Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
26
08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other
parties.
June 12, 2025
DATE 	MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	June 12, 2025
Date Mailed to Parties: 	June 12, 2025
sej

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-24
27
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For Petitioner:
None
For Respondent:
R-A 	A.W. Pro Se Petition of Appeal (July 30, 2024)
R-B 	Respondent Answer to Petition (August 20, 2024)
R-C 	Mount Olive Board of Education HIB Policy (5512)
R-D 	HIBster Report (February 12, 2024)
R-E 	BOE meeting agenda (April 29, 2024) BOE meeting minutes (April 29, 2024)
R-F 	Petitioner’s Answers to Interrogatories
R-FA 	Email from petitioner to principal (February 6, 2024; 2:05 p.m.)
R-FB 	Email from petitioner to principal (February 6, 2024; 8:10 p.m.)
Email from principal to petitioner (February 6, 2024; 3:16 p.m.)
R-FC Email exchange between petitioner and anti-bullying coordinator
(February 6, 2024 through February 14, 2024)
R-FD Same as R-C
R-FE 	Same as R-D
R-FF 	Email exchange between petitioner and anti-bullying coordinator (April 13,
2024 through April 15, 2024)
R-FG HIB Hearing Notice (April 25, 2024)
R-FH Email from anti-bullying coordinator to petitioner (April 30, 2024)
R-FI 	BOE meeting agenda (April 29, 2024)
R-FJ 	BOE meeting minutes (April 29, 2024)
R-FK 	HIB Appeal result (May 1, 2024)