Crystal Saylor v. the Board of Education of the Town of West New York, Hudson County, 9/26/19, (#260-19)

260-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Crystal Saylor,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Town of
West New York, Hudson County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner – formerly employed by the respondent Board’s school district, most recently as
Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent – appealed her termination from employment,
alleging that she was a tenured secretary and entitled to statutory tenure protections. 	Petitioner
began employment with the Board in 2010 as a secretary and was promoted in 2011 to the
position of Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent. In 2015, petitioner was
promoted to Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, the position in which she remained
until her termination in June 2018 for conduct unbecoming a public employee. 	The Board
contended that its actions were lawful, as petitioner was employed in a position without union or
statutory rights when she was terminated; 	further, she had never earned tenure in any of her
positions with the school district.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the issue here is whether petitioner was protected from summary
termination under the tenure laws, such that she would have the right to be returned to her
position with back pay from June 5, 2018; N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 governs the tenure of individuals
who are employed by school districts in secretarial or clerical positions; the preponderance of
evidence demonstrates that petitioner never acquired tenure rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2
while she served as a secretary in the Business Department, where she worked for less than three
years performing basic secretarial and clerical tasks; petitioner’s duties changed significantly in
her “confidential” positions as Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent and
Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent; 	when she was terminated, petitioner was
employed in a position 	without union or statutory rights. 	The ALJ concluded that petitioner
does not have tenure, was never awarded tenure, and was last employed in a position that would
not earn tenure. 	Accordingly, the ALJ affirmed the Board’s action to terminate petitioner’s
employment and dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the determination of the ALJ in this matter and
adopted the Initial Decision as the final decision, for the reasons expressed therein. The petition
was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
September 26, 2019

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OAL Dkt. No. EDU 15592-18
Agency Dkt. No. 219-8/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Crystal Saylor,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Town of
West New York, Hudson County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Board’s reply thereto.1
In this matter, petitioner challenges her termination from respondent’s district,
alleging that she was a tenured secretary and was entitled to statutory tenure protections. By way
of background, petitioner began her employment with the Board on January 16, 2010 as a
secretary in the Business Department, in which role she answered phones and typed documents.2
She was promoted to the position of Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent,
Clara Herrera, effective November 16, 2011.3 	On or about July 15, 2015, after Clara Herrera
was promoted to Superintendent of Schools, petitioner was promoted to the position of
1 The Commissioner was not provided with a transcript of the May 20, 2019 hearing at the OAL.
2 Petitioner earned an annual salary of $33,000.
3 Petitioner’s annual salary was $40,000 during the 2011-12 and 2012-13 schools years and increased to
$41,616 in the 2013-14 school year.

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Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent.4 	In this role, she was given additional
responsibilities, including preparing agendas for Board meetings, coordinating professional
development for District-wide staff, overseeing the Read Across America program in the
District, renewing contracts for the early childhood program, and arranging accommodations for
out-of-district seminars. 	She remained in that position until she was terminated for conduct
unbecoming a public employee on June 5, 2018.
Following a hearing on the matter, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found
that petitioner does not have tenure, never earned tenure, and was last employed in a position that
would not earn tenure. The ALJ explained that petitioner was not employed as a secretary in the
Business Department long enough to earn tenure, and could only earn tenure if she maintained a
“secretarial or clerical position” without a break to a non-secretarial position. 	The ALJ found
that when petitioner became an Administrative Assistant, she was no longer in a secretarial
position and was instead a “confidential” employee, as she had additional job responsibilities
beyond that of a secretary. Accordingly, the Board was permitted to terminate petitioner.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that she earned tenure as a secretary.
Although her duties and responsibilities increased upon her promotion to Administrative
Assistant, petitioner maintains that her new duties were not out of the ordinary for a secretary.
Petitioner cites Rita Hibo and Susan Arillo v. Board of Education of the West Essex Regional
School Distrtict, EDU 1226-96, Initial Decision (November 12, 1997), adopted Commissioner’s
Decision No. 659-97, decided December 29, 1997, for the proposition that because her position
as Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent did not require any specialized training or skill,
and since she simply handled routine work for her supervisor, she was a secretary for purposes of
tenure. Petitioner further emphasizes that whether Superintendent Herrera referred to her title as
4 Petitioner’s annual salary increased to $72,500.

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a Confidential Secretary is irrelevant because the Board did not present evidence to demonstrate
that petitioner was a “confidential” employee pursuant to the PERC definition. 	Instead, the
substance of petitioner’s job duties demonstrate that she was not a confidential employee.
Additionally, petitioner argues that the ALJ misinterpreted DiNapoli v. Board of
Education of the Township of Verona, 434 N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 217
N.J. 589 (2014), as the case actually supports petitioner’s position. 	In that case, the petitioner
did not keep her tenure when she left a tenured secretary position to move to a separately
tenurable position as Assistant Business Administrator, which requires a certification. Petitioner
maintains that her position did not require a certification and she never transferred out of a
secretarial position. 	Therefore, she contends that she earned tenure by the time she was
promoted to Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, and her tenure rights must transfer
with her as the position was inherently the same.
Petitioner also argues that the ALJ ignored Lisa Salimbene v. Board of Education
of the Township of Dennis, Cape May County, EDU 9322-10, Initial Decision (October 5, 2011),
remanded Commissioner’s Decision No. 511-11, decided November 10, 2011, which is directly
on point. 	In that matter, the ALJ found the petitioner was the tenured Secretary to the
Elementary School Principal and had rights to the position of Administrative Assistant to the
Superintendent over a non-tenured secretary, as the job qualifications were very similar.5
Petitioner maintains that since she was promoted from Administrative Assistant to the Assistant
Superintendent to Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, she has an even stronger claim
5 Although the job qualifications were similar, the Commissioner found that the job descriptions for the
positions were quite different. 	Accordingly, the Commissioner remanded the matter for further fact-
finding on the issue of whether the petitioner had the skills required for the position of Administrative
Assistant to the Superintendent.

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as to why her tenure rights should transfer, as the responsibilities in her positions were more
similar than the petitioner’s positions in Salimbene.
Moreover, petitioner contends that even if she was a confidential employee
without statutory tenure rights, her employment contract indicated that she was tenured when she
was Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent, so her tenure should extend to her
promotion, as the positions were substantially similar. Accordingly, petitioner contends that she
had obtained tenure, and therefore the Board improperly terminated her.
In reply, the Board argues that the ALJ correctly found that petitioner was not a
tenured secretary. The Board maintains that petitioner admitted that her duties were well beyond
that of a secretary in the Business Department. For example, as Administrative Assistant to the
Superintendent, 	petitioner 	drafted 	agendas 	for 	Board 	meetings, 	coordinated 	professional
development for District-wide staff members, oversaw the Read Across America program, and
renewed contracts for the early childhood program, as opposed to her position as a secretary,
where she answered phones and sorted mail. 	The Board points out that the increases in her
annual 	salary 	– 	from 	$33,000 	when 	she 	started 	as 	a 	secretary 	to 	$72,500 	when 	she
became Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent – further demonstrate her increased
responsibilities.
The 	Board 	distinguished 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	petitioner 	in 	her 	exceptions.
Additionally, the Board contends that regardless of whether petitioner’s 2013-14 employment
contract used the word “tenured,” the contract is irrelevant because tenure is acquired by law and
not by contract. 	The Board maintains that the only secretarial position that petitioner held was
secretary to the Business Department, and she was not in that position for the three years
required to earn tenure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. 	The Board points out that N.J.S.A.

5
18A:17-2 does not extend tenure beyond the time that the employee holds the secretarial
position, so even if petitioner had earned tenure as a secretary, she would have relinquished her
tenure when she transferred to the positions of Administrative Assistant to the Assistant
Superintendent and Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent. 	As such, the Board argues
that it acted within its authority when it terminated petitioner.
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that petitioner was not
employed 	as 	secretary 	when 	she 	held 	the 	position 	of 	Administrative 	Assistant 	to 	the
Superintendent, and therefore did not have tenure rights when she was terminated. 	When
petitioner transferred from a secretary in the Business Department to Administrative Assistant to
the Assistant Superintendent and then to Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, her
responsibilities, as well as salary, increased dramatically. She went from answering phones and
typing documents to preparing for Board meetings, coordinating District-wide professional
development activities, renewing contracts for the early childhood program, and coordinating the
Read Across America program. 	The ALJ appropriately relied upon Joanne Burger v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Maywood, Bergen County, Commissioner’s Decision No. 191-11,
decided May 19, 2011, affirmed 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1244 (App Div. 2012), certif.
denied, 212 N.J. 431 (2012), where the ALJ, Commissioner, and Appellate Division all found
that a tenured secretary was not entitled to the position of Administrative Assistant to the
Superintendent over a non-tenured employee, after the hours of her secretary position were
reduced 	as 	part 	of 	a 	reduction 	in 	force. 	Just 	as 	the 	Administrative 	Assistant 	to 	the
Superintendent in Burger was not considered to be a secretary because of her increased
responsibilities 	– 	including 	supervising 	other 	secretaries 	in 	the 	Superintendent’s 	office,
coordinating district-wide administrative activities, overseeing the hiring of substitute teachers,

6
and preparing for Board meetings – the petitioner’s job responsibilities also extended far beyond
her former duties as a secretary, so the positions are not substantially similar.
The Commissioner does not find petitioner’s exceptions, or the cases she cites, to
be persuasive. 	Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, Hibo, supra, does not support her position,
because her job duties as Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent are far more in depth
than the duties of the secretaries in that case, which involved routine tasks such as sorting mail,
typing correspondence, and handling phone calls.
In DiNapoli, supra, the Appellate Division found that DiNapoli did not retain her
tenure when she transferred from a tenured secretary position to Assistant Board Secretary, a
certificated 	position. 	Petitioner’s 	argument 	that 	since 	her 	position 	as 	Assistant 	to 	the
Superintendent did not require a certificate, she did not leave her secretarial position, is of no
moment. 	It is clear that the reasoning in DiNapoli applies equally when an employee transfers
out of a tenured secretary role and into a non-secretarial position, regardless of whether that new
position requires a certificate. 	Further, the Appellate Division in DiNapoli explained that “the
language of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 limits the retention of tenure to the time during which the
employee holds a secretarial office, position or employment.” 434 N.J. Super. at 239. As such,
when petitioner transferred out of her secretarial position, she relinquished any tenure rights that
she had earned.
Petitioner relies on Salimbene, supra, for the proposition that secretarial tenure
rights apply to the position of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, because the job
qualifications 	are 	similar. 	Petitioner’s 	reliance 	is 	misplaced 	because 	the 	Commissioner
remanded that matter to the OAL for further fact-finding as to whether the petitioner could
perform the job duties of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, because although the

7
job qualifications were similar, the job descriptions were vastly different. 	Additionally,
Salimbene predates Burger, which is on point and found that a tenured secretary was not entitled
to the position of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent over a non-tenured employee
due to the higher-level, district-wide responsibilities performed by the Administrative Assistant.
Here, once again, petitioner held more advanced, district-wide responsibilities that were well
beyond the role of a secretary.
Finally, petitioner’s 2013-14 employment contract did not provide her with tenure
because tenure rights are statutory under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and not contractual. 	DiNapoli,
supra, 434 N.J. Super. at 237. As such, petitioner was not a tenured employee when she held the
position of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent and was terminated by the Board.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in
this matter for the reasons expressed therein, and the petition is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 26, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	September 30, 2019
6 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
AGENCY DKT. NO. 219-8/18
CRYSTAL SAYLOR,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF
WEST NEW YORK, HUDSON COUNTY,
Respondent.
______________________________________
Sanford R. Oxfeld, Esq., on behalf of petitioner Crystal Saylor (Oxfeld Cohen,
attorneys)
Lester E. Taylor, III, Esq., for respondent Board of Education of the Town of
West New York (Florio Perucci Steinhardt & Cappelli, attorneys)
Record Closed: June 21, 2019 	Decided: July 8, 2019
BEFORE GAIL M. COOKSON, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner, Crystal Saylor (petitioner or Saylor) appeals her termination effective
June 5, 2018, from the Board of Education of the Town of West New York (Board)
under cover of August 23, 2018. 	The Board filed its Answer to the Petition on Appeal
under cover of October 11, 2018. 	The matter was transmitted to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), on October 26, 2018, for hearing as a contested case

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
2
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. The central issue is
whether petitioner held a tenured position from which she could not be summarily
terminated.
On November 28, 2018, and January 10, 2019, I held case management
conferences telephonically with the parties in which discovery, potential motion practice,
and hearing dates were discussed. 	A hearing was thereafter scheduled for May 13,
2019, but was adjourned at the request of one or both parties. The plenary hearing was
ultimately held on May 20, 2019. 	Post-hearing briefs were permitted and the record
closed on June 21, 2019, with receipt of the written closing statements as the final
submissions.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Based upon due consideration of the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented at the hearing, and having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and assess their credibility, I FIND the following FACTS:
Petitioner commenced employment with the Board on January 16, 2010, as a
Secretary assigned to the Business Department at an annual salary of $33,000. [P-A,
B.] She described her responsibilities at that time as clerical, attending to phones, typing
documents, etc. 	Petitioner continued in her position within the Business Department
under annual contracts for the next school year, with an increase in her salary to
$34,304 (2010-2011). [P-C.] 	As set forth in her evaluation in March 2011, Saylor was
not tenured at that time.
Petitioner was transferred to the position of Administrative Assistant to the
Assistant Superintendent, Clara Herrera, at a salary of $40,000 during the 2011-2012
school year. 	The Board Resolution had an effective date of November 16, 2011 (P-G)
but the Contract has a date of July 1, 2011. 	Petitioner remained in the title of
Administrative Assistant for the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years. 	[P-H, I.] 	For
the 2013-2014 school year, her salary increased to $41,616 (P-J), and the contract
stated that she was “tenured.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
3
On or before July 1, 2015, Herrera was promoted to Superintendent of Schools.
[P-L.] On or about July 15, 2015, Saylor was approved for a promotion as her Secretary
or 	Administrative 	Assistant 	at 	a 	substantially 	increased 	salary, 	recommended 	by
Herrera, of $72,500. 	[P-M, N.] 	Saylor testified that her large salary increase was
justified because her duties then included, in addition to answering the phone and
making appointments, preparing for meetings and workshops, preparing documents for
monthly Board meetings, communicating with parents and resolved concerns/issues,
and fulfilling requests for supplies. 	Saylor further testified that following her promotion
to Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, she was given additional duties,
including 	drafting 	agendas 	for 	the 	Board 	meetings, 	coordinating 	professional
development for staff members District-wide; she was responsible for the Read Across
America 	program 	in 	the 	District, 	she 	renewed 	contracts 	for 	the 	early 	childhood
program(s), and arranged accommodations for out-of-district seminars.
On June 5, 2018, petitioner was relieved of her duties “immediately” for conduct
unbecoming a public employee, and given sixty (60) days pay in lieu of notice. [P-O, P.]
Under cover of August 1, 2015, counsel for Saylor adviced the Board that it was their
position that petitioner had tenure rights as someone who held a “secretarial or clerical
position” for more than three years, and was thus entitled to a hearing for cause before
she could be terminated. [P-Q.]
On cross-examination, petitioner was asked to review the several contracts and
resolutions that impacted her positions over the years. 	She acknowledged that tenure
requires “three years and a day.” Petitioner could not recall the conversations that took
place as she was transferred with Herrera to be the Superintendent’s Administrative
Assistant but it was definitely discussed between them. While petitioner stated that she
was not provided the reasons for her termination, she admitted that the termination
notice did set forth the reason.
Clara Herrera testified for the Board with respect to the hiring and supervision of
petitioner as her confidential secretary. 	Herrera has worked for the district for almost
forty years. 	She has been the Superintendent for the Board since July 1, 2015, prior to

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
4
which she was the Assistant Superintendent for Payroll and Personnel, as well as a
Principal for over a decade.
Herrera stated that she and petitioner used to work together quite a number of
years earlier before petitioner took a long break from Board employment. 	Herrera
recalled petitioner contacting her as soon as it was announced that Herrera was being
promoted to the position of Assistant Superintendent. 	She agreed to have Saylor work
as her Administrative Assistant. 	Herrera explained that this position is sometimes
referred to as a Confidential Secretary to a Board Cabinet level position, of which there
are five, overseen by the Superintendent. 	As she understood, persons in those
positions did not acquire tenure, although a few have been tenured before they were
promoted or transferred into such a position. In this case, petitioner did not have tenure
rights before becoming Herrera’s assistant.
Herrera explained that, unlike a secretary in the Business Department, petitioner
had authority to speak on her behalf, to access confidential documents, and other non-
secretarial 	tasks. 	When 	Herrera 	was 	being 	promoted 	to 	Superintendent, 	the
Administrative 	Assistant 	who 	had 	been 	working 	for 	the 	then-Superintendent 	was
retiring. So Herrera specifically spoke with petitioner about moving her into that position
along with her own promotion. 	She described the increased duties and hours, which
she thought might be a burden on petitioner’s family, but also told her that she would
advocate for a substantial increase in salary.
On cross-examination, Herrera confirmed that she was unaware of any policy on
tenure for Administrative Assistants. 	She elaborated on the “confidential” aspect of
positions that assist the Cabinet members and reiterated that they are non-tenured.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
The issue at hand is whether petitioner was protected from summary termination
under the tenure laws such that she would have the right to be returned to her position
with back pay from June 5, 2018.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
5
Tenure statutes are “designed to aid in the establishment of a competent and
efficient school system by affording to [covered employees] a measure of security in the
ranks they hold after years of service.” 	Viemeister v. Bd. of Educ. of Prospect Park, 5
N.J. Super. 215, 218 (App. Div. 1949). In general, they are meant to protect competent
and qualified employees who have completed a probationary period from removal for
“unfounded, flimsy, or political reasons.” Zimmerman v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 38 N.J.
65, 71 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956, 83 S. Ct. 508, 9 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1963).
To acquire the security of tenure, the precise conditions enunciated in the
applicable statute must be met. 	See Picogna v. Bd. of Educ. of Cherry Hill, 143 N.J.
391, 400 (1996); Kletzkin v. Bd. of Educ. of Spotswood, 136 N.J. 275, 278 (1994);
Spiewak v. Bd. of Educ. of Rutherford, 90 N.J. 63, 72 (1982); Zimmerman, 38 N.J. at
72. 	Tenure “arises only by passage of the time fixed by the statute . . . .” 	Canfield v.
Bd. of Educ. of Pine Hill, 97 N.J. Super. 483, 490 (App. Div. 1967) (Gualkin, J.,
dissenting), rev’d on dissent, 51 N.J. 400 (1968).
N.J.S.A. 	18A:17-2 	specifically 	governs 	the 	tenure 	of 	individuals 	who 	are
employed by school districts in secretarial or clerical positions.
a. Any 	secretary, 	assistant 	secretary, 	school 	business
administrator or business manager of a board of education
of any school district who has or shall have devoted his full
time to the duties of his office and has or shall have served
therein for three consecutive calendar years, and
b. Any person holding any secretarial or clerical position or
employment 	under 	a 	board 	of 	education 	of 	any 	school
district or under any officer thereof, after
1. The 	expiration 	of 	a 	period 	of 	employment 	of 	three
consecutive calendar years in the district or such shorter
period as may be fixed by the board or officer employing
him,
or
2. Employment 	for 	three 	consecutive 	academic 	years,
together 	with 	employment 	at 	the 	beginning 	of 	the 	next
succeeding academic year, an academic year being the
period between the time when school opens in the district

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
6
after the general summer vacation and the beginning of the
next succeeding summer vacation, and
c. Any person, who has acquired, or shall hereafter acquire,
tenure 	in 	any 	secretarial 	or 	clerical 	office, 	position 	or
employment under the board of education of a school district
and has been appointed district clerk or secretary, or shall
hereafter be appointed secretary of said district, as such
secretary, shall hold his office, position or employment under
tenure during good behavior and efficiency and shall not be
dismissed or suspended or reduced in compensation, except
for neglect, misbehavior or other offense and only in the
manner prescribed by subarticle B of article 2 of chapter 6 of
this title.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2.]
Petitioner argues that this provision protected her employment with the Board
even after she became the confidential secretary to Herrera. 	A claimant of tenure in
situations such as this one imposes upon petitioner the burden of presenting sufficient
competent and credible evidence of facts essential to her claim. 	Here, petitioner must
prove by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that the respondent
employed her in a clerical position in order for her claim for tenure to succeed. 	Wright
and E. Orange Personnel Ass’n v. E. Orange Bd. of Educ., 99 N.J. 112, 118-19 (1985).
See also DiNapoli v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J. Super. 233, 238 (App.
Div. 2014).
As the preponderance of the credible and documentary evidence demonstrates,
petitioner never acquired tenure rights while she served as a secretary of the Business
Department. 	With respect to the question whether she could tack on her service to
Herrera to her less-than-three years with the Business Department, the DiNapoli court
set forth the answer thusly:
Rather, 	the 	language 	of 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:17-2 	limits 	the
retention of tenure to the time during which the employee
holds her secretarial office, position or employment. The
Commissioner’s 	conclusion 	that 	secretarial 	staff 	maintain
tenure upon transfer to nonsecretarial positions is unfounded
under the express terms of the statute.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
7
An alternative legal means by which petitioner could have acquired tenure rights is if
she earned same as the Administrative Assistant or Confidential Secretary to Herrera.7
Yet factually, petitioner was in that position for less than three years also. 	Accordingly,
petitioner can only succeed on her argument herein if she maintained a “secretarial or
clerical position” throughout this relevant period with no break for a transfer to a
nonsecretarial position. I CONCLUDE that she did not so maintain.
The State unclassified service shall not be subject to the
provisions of this title unless otherwise specified and shall
include the following:
h. One 	secretary 	and 	one confidential assistant 	to 	each
department 	head, 	board, 	principal 	executive 	officer 	and
commission. Each certification and appointment hereunder
shall 	be 	recorded 	in 	the 	minutes 	of 	the 	Civil 	Service
Commission;
[N.J.S.A. 11A:3-4.]8
As our courts have made clear, a “confidential” secretary or assistant is more of a
confidante and less of a secretary.
A confidential secretary 	is 	privy 	to 	the 	most 	critical
policymaking decisions and has access and exposure to the
policymakers as well. It is a position of trust. Those charged
with 	the 	responsibility 	of 	making 	policy 	for 	what 	they
perceive to be the public good cannot have their attention
diverted by even a suggestion that those in whom they
confide, either directly or indirectly, are not committed to the
same view or vision. 	While this case implicates significant
constitutional principles, 	it 	resolves 	itself 	as 	a matter 	of
common sense. 	By assuming a position of confidence such
as the secretary to a high-level cabinet officer, an individual
assumes a degree of knowledge and access which limits his
or her ability to associate freely and without restriction even
though such conduct might otherwise be protected by the
Federal or State Constitutions.
7 Petitioner argues that her employment contract from July 1, 2013, noted that she was tenured.
Respondent speculates in its post-hearing submission, although without any evidentiary testimony having
been presented on the point, that such contract might have been created or edited by petitioner herself.
For other reasons set forth herein, I need not reach this issue. I do take cognizance, however, of the fact
that no Board Resolution noted petitioner as tenured.
8 In State service, each department head, principal executive officer, board and commission may appoint
one unclassified secretary and one unclassified confidential assistant. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.4(a).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
8
The 	job 	specifications 	for 	the 	position 	of 	“confidential
secretary” to the Secretary of State (and to the Assistant
Secretary of 	State) confirms that its inherent duties are
similar to those of the unprotected “confidential” position of
secretary 	to 	the 	mayor 	in City 	of 	North 	Olmstead,
supra,whose inherent duties were summarized as follows:
“[The] mayor’s secretary must undertake those functions in
relation 	to 	the 	flow 	of 	information, 	whether 	by 	writing,
speech, or personal visit, to and from the mayor’s office, that
the mayor wants the secretary to perform.” 927 F.2d at 913-
914. 	An office holder may legitimately compel the loyalty
and 	commit-ment necessary 	for 	the 	office 	holder 	to
effectively fulfill his or her responsibilities. Plaintiff’s position
is not protected by the federal or state constitutions as a
matter of law.
[Weisel 	v. 	Hooks, 	277 	N.J. 	Super. 	78, 	86-87 	(Ch. 	Div.
1994).]
OAL decisions have concurred and been upheld. 	Petitioner’s job description for
Secretary to the Business Department was consistent with the common understanding
of the duties of a secretary. 	However, the duties of the Administrative Assistant to the
Superintendent are significantly different. 	Her duties as an Administrative Assistant to
the Assistant Superintendent are not interchangeable with her duties as Secretary to the
Business Department. 	As an Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent,
Saylor performed work that a secretary would not, including preparation for workshops
and Board meetings. 	Petitioner was a “confidential” employee, who admittedly was
responsible to “stand in” for the Superintendent as the supervisor of the office when she
was out of the office. Burger v. Borough of Maywood Board of Education, EDU 7616-10
Initial 	Decision 	(Apr. 	4, 	2011), 	Final 	Decision 	Comm’r 	(May 	19, 	2011)
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.shtml.
The administrative assistant was a confidential employee
and, 	along 	with 	the 	secretary 	to 	the 	school 	business
administrator, was employed on a twelve month basis under
a 	separate 	employment 	contract 	and 	excluded from 	the
collective 	negotiation 	agreement. 	The 	administrative
assistant was the sole staff member in the Superintendent's
office.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
9
The 	responsibilities 	of 	an 	administrative 	assistant 	were
defined in a job posting issued by the Central Office of
Administration, and included: coordinating workflow in the
school system; performing secretarial duties including typing
scheduling, fielding telephone calls, filing, etc.; supervising
the 	activities 	of 	other 	secretarial 	and 	clerical 	personnel
assigned to the Superintendent's office; maintaining district-
wide personnel records; facilitating new-student registrations
and 	residency 	checks; 	maintaining 	a 	filing 	system;
scheduling 	workshops 	and 	conferences 	for 	the
Superintendent; 	overseeing 	the 	hiring, 	qualification, 	and
scheduling of substitute teachers; preparing and submitting
of all State reports; preparing all Board communications,
agendas, and minutes; facilitating background checks for
new 	hires 	and 	substitutes; 	preparing 	conference 	and
workshop materials and purchases; acting as a liaison and
"voice of the district" at all times, with the public, parents,
and the district attorney; and performing other duties as
assigned by the Superintendent.
[Burger v. Bd. of Educ., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1244, *4-5 (App. Div. June 5, 2012).]
Based on the foregoing facts and applicable law, I CONCLUDE that petitioner
was employed as an Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, without union or
statutory rights. 	Therefore, she does not have tenure, was never awarded tenure, and
was last employed in a position that would not earn tenure.
ORDER
Accordingly, and for the reasons articulated above, it is ORDERED that the termination
action of respondent the Board of Education of the Town of West New York is hereby
AFFIRMED. 	It is further ORDERED that the appeal of petitioner for relief under Title
18A is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice consistent with the reasons set forth above.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
10
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
July 8, 2019
DATE 	GAIL M. COOKSON, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	7/8/19
Date Mailed to Parties:
id

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15592-18
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APPENDIX
LIST OF WITNESSES
For Petitioner:
Crystal Saylor
For Respondent:
Clara Herrera
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE
For Petitioner:
P-A 	Board Resolution, dated December 9, 2009
P-B 	Employment Contract, dated January 16, 2010
P-C 	Employment Contract, dated July 1, 2010
P-D 	Evaluation, dated March 25, 2011
P-E 	Board Resolution, dated June 30, 2011
P-F 	Employment Contract, dated July 1, 2011
P-G 	Board Resolution, dated November 9, 2011
P-H 	Board Resolution, dated May 24, 2012
P-I 	Board Resolution, dated June 27, 2013
P-J 	Employment Contract, dated July 1, 2013
P-K 	Employment Agreement, dated May 5, 2014
P-L 	Board Resolution, dated May 13, 2015
P-M 	Board Resolution, dated July 15, 2015
P-N 	Salary Change Form, dated July 16, 2015
P-O 	Letter from Cardenas to Saylor, dated June 5, 2018
P-P 	Letter from Cardenas to Saylor, dated June 5, 2018
P-Q 	Letter from Oxfeld to Cardenas, dated August 1, 2018
P-R 	Decision of Appeal Tribunal, dated September 25, 2018
For Respondent:
[Relied On Petitioner’s Exhibits]