August 19, 2026- Janet M. Di Luzio v. City of Santa Fe, No. A-1-CA-41627

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OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
2
3
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: August 19, 2026
No. A-1-CA-41627	4
JANET M. DI LUZIO, surviving spouse	5
of FRANK DI LUZIO, Deceased,	6
Worker-Appellee,	7
v.	8
CITY OF SANTA FE,	9
Employer/Insurer-Appellant.	10
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION	11
Anthony “Tony” Couture, Workers’ Compensation Judge	12
Gerald A. Hanrahan	13
Albuquerque, NM	14
for Appellee	15
Garcia Law Group, LLC	16
Teague Williams	17
Albuquerque, NM	18
for Appellants	19
Court of Appeals of New MexicoFiled 8/19/2026 9:02 AM

OPINION	1
BACA, Judge.	2
{1} 	This case asks us to interpret the death benefit provisions of the New Mexico	3
Occupational Disease Disablement Law (ODDL), NMSA 1978, §§ 52-3-1 to -60	4
(1945, as amended through 2026). Worker Frank Clark Di Luzio was a firefighter	5
for the City of Santa Fe New Mexico (the City), for over twenty years. After he	6
retired, 	he 	developed 	Stage 	IV 	mantle 	cell 	non-Hodgkin’s 	lymphoma, 	an	7
occupational disease linked to his years of firefighting. Worker became disabled in	8
January 2012 and remained disabled for the rest of his life. The City paid Worker	9
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits for 492 weeks, approximately nine and	10
one-half years, totaling $360,714.72. Worker died from the disease on June 2, 2021,	11
at the age of sixty-six.	12
{2} 	After his death, wife Janet Marlene Di Luzio (Widow), filed a claim for death	13
benefits under the ODDL. Following trial, the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)	14
entered a compensation order (the Order) awarding Widow 700 weeks of death	15
benefits at $733.16 per week, totaling $513,212. The WCJ concluded that the City	16
was not entitled to reduce those death benefits by the 492 weeks of disability benefits	17
it had already paid to Worker during his life. The total benefit period under the Order	18
was therefore 1,192 weeks, almost twenty-three years, totaling $873,926.72.	19

2
{3} 	The City appeals, advancing three arguments. First, Section 52-3-14(H) of the	1
ODDL requiring death to occur “within the period of two years” from the	2
disablement bars Widow’s claim because Worker died more than nine years after	3
the onset of his disablement. Second, Section 52-3-10(B)(4) of the ODDL bars death	4
benefits because Worker died more than three years after his last day of employment	5
with the City. Third, the total duration of all benefits is limited to 700 weeks, and	6
the 492 weeks of disability benefits paid to Worker during his life must be credited	7
against that limit, leaving only 208 weeks of death benefits available to Widow.	8
{4} 	For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the two-year clause in Section	9
52-3-14(H) does not bar death benefits where Worker remained continuously	10
disabled until his death. We decline to reach the merits of the second argument under	11
Section 52-3-10(B)(4), because the City did not preserve the issue for appellate	12
review. However, we do conclude that the 700-week aggregate limit on all collective	13
benefits under the ODDL, in Section 52-3-14(D), applies to Widow’s death benefits.	14
Because Worker received 492 weeks of disability benefits during his life, Widow’s	15
death benefits are limited to the remaining 208 weeks.	16
BACKGROUND	17
{5} 	The facts in this case are undisputed. Worker began working as a firefighter	18
for the City in March 1979. Over the next twenty-one years, he advanced through	19
the ranks, ultimately becoming fire chief. Worker left the fire department in January	20

3
2000 to serve briefly as a manager for the City. He retired from employment with	1
the City on August 1, 2001.	2
{6} 	On January 6, 2012, approximately twelve years after Worker’s last day with	3
the fire department, he was diagnosed with Stage IV mantle cell non-Hodgkin’s	4
lymphoma. He became physically unable to work on January 11, 2012, and never	5
recovered. Worker remained continuously disabled from that date until his death on	6
June 2, 2021, a period of almost nine and one-half years. At the time of Worker’s	7
death, the City had paid him almost $1,086,659.09 in medical benefits and	8
$360,714.72 in disability benefits, and later reimbursed Widow $2,332.03 for his	9
funeral expenses.	10
{7} 	Prior to his death, in June 2012, Worker filed a workers’ compensation claim,	11
seeking disability benefits under Section 52-3-32.1 (2009, amended 2026) of the	12
ODDL. At that time, the statute created a presumption that certain diseases,	13
including non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, were caused by employment as a firefighter	14
when a firefighter had served more than fifteen years. 	Section 52-3-32.1(B)(5)	15
(2009, amended 2026); see Di Luzio v. City of Santa Fe, 2015-NMCA-042, ¶ 14,	16
357 P.3d 401 (“By enacting the firefighter [ODDL], the Legislature adopted a	17
statutory presumption that the development of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma by a	18
firefighter is linked to [their] service in that role under certain circumstances.”).	19
Following a 2013 trial on Worker’s claim, a WCJ entered a compensation order	20

4
awarding Worker PTD benefits. The City appealed. On appeal, this Court affirmed	1
the award, concluding that Worker was entitled to the statutory presumption because	2
he had served more than fifteen years as a firefighter, and reversed only the	3
calculation of the compensation rate. See Di Luzio, 2015-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 2, 25.	4
{8} 	After Worker’s death, Widow filed a separate claim for death benefits under	5
the ODDL. In response, the City asserted a single defense, the two-year period	6
limitation in Section 52-3-14(H). Following a trial on Widow’s claim, the WCJ	7
entered the Order awarding Widow 700 weeks of death benefits at $733.16 per week	8
and concluding that the City was not entitled to a “credit” for the 492 weeks of	9
disability benefits paid to Worker during his life. The City appeals from the Order.	10
DISCUSSION	11
I. 	Standard of Review	12
{9} 	In 	this 	appeal, 	we 	are 	called 	upon 	to 	interpret 	the 	ODDL. 	Statutory	13
interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Tom Growney	14
Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320; Ruiz v.	15
Los Lunas Pub. Sch., 2013-NMCA-085, ¶ 5, 308 P.3d 983.	16
{10} 	When we interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to legislative	17
intent. Aeda v. Aeda, 2013-NMCA-095, ¶ 11, 310 P.3d 646. “To discern the	18
Legislature’s intent, we rely on the classic canons of statutory interpretation and look	19
first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning,	20

5
unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Fowler v. Vista Care,	1
2014-NMSC-019, ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 630 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	2
This Court will not read into a statute language that is not there, especially if it makes	3
sense as written. High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-	4
NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599. We avoid interpretations that would	5
render any statutory language superfluous or meaningless. Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-	6
NMSC-043, ¶ 24, 309 P.3d 1047. Moreover, we do not interpret a statute in a way	7
that produces absurd, unreasonable, or contradictory results. See State v. Smith,	8
2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. “If we determine that the	9
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for additional	10
analysis of the statute” and “it is the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute	11
as written.” Aeda, 2013-NMCA-095, ¶ 11 (omission, internal quotation marks, and	12
citation omitted). When several sections of a statute are involved, we must read them	13
together to give effect to all parts, including amendments. High Ridge Hinkle Joint	14
Venture, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5. This Court analyzes the statute’s overall structure	15
and its role within the broader legislative framework. See Smith, 2004-NMSC-032,	16
¶ 10. We do not view a statutory subsection in isolation but rather in relation to the	17
entire statute and to other statutes addressing the same general subject. See id.	18
{11} 	“Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its	19
meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar and common usage. A	20

6
word or phrase that has acquired a technical or particular meaning in a particular	1
context has that meaning if it is used in that context.” NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-2	2
(1997).	3
{12} 	Importantly, for our purposes here, our Legislature has declared that the	4
ODDL is “not remedial in any sense and [is] not to be given a broad liberal	5
construction in favor of the claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights	6
and interests of the employer to be favored over those of the employee on the other	7
hand.” NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990). Our Supreme Court has interpreted this to	8
mean that we interpret the ODDL with “a balanced and evenhanded construction.”	9
Gomez v. B.E. Harvey Gin Corp., 1990-NMSC-057, ¶ 9, 110 N.M. 100, 792 P.2d	10
1143. Put simply, we do not favor one party over the other. We read the text as	11
written and follow where the statutory language leads. With these principles in mind,	12
we turn to the City’s three arguments on appeal.	13
II. 	The Two-Year Clause in Section 52-3-14(H) Does Not Bar Widow’s	14
Claim for Death Benefits	15
{13} 	The City argues that Widow is not entitled to death benefits under the ODDL	16
because, in its view, Section 52-3-14(H) requires a worker’s death to occur within	17
two years of the onset of disablement, and here Worker died more than nine years	18
after he became disabled. For support, the City argues that for “the period of two	19
years” to have meaning, it must be logically tied to a specific event—namely, the	20
date on which a worker’s disability begins. See id.	21

7
{14} 	Section 52-3-14(H) is the ODDL provision governing death benefits. It	1
provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n case death proximately results from the	2
disablement within the period of two years, compensation benefits to be paid such	3
worker shall be in the amounts and to the persons as follows.” (Emphasis added.)	4
Two conditions must be met before death benefits become payable. First, the	5
worker’s death must “proximately result[] from the disablement,” meaning the	6
occupational disease that caused the worker’s disablement must also be the cause of	7
the worker’s death. Id.; see § 52-3-4(D) (defining “disablement” in the ODDL);	8
Proximate Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“A cause that directly	9
produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred.”). Second,	10
the death must occur “within the period of two years.” Section 52-3-14(H). The	11
parties do not dispute the first condition. Their dispute concerns the second.	12
{15} 	Under the City’s reading, death benefits would be available in this case if	13
Worker died within two years of January 11, 2012, the onset of his disablement.	14
Widow argues that contrary to the City’s contention, the statute does not say “after	15
the beginning of such disablement.” Widow contends that the “period of two years”	16
refers to the ongoing period of the disablement itself, and that because Worker	17
remained continuously disabled until his death, his death necessarily fell within the	18
period of that disablement. See id.	19

8
{16} 	The WCJ agreed with Widow, reasoning that Worker “remained continuously	1
disabled due to his occupational disease until his death” and that “Worker had not	2
recovered from his disability such that he was able to fully return to work and such	3
that the [two]-year statute of limitations found in [Section] 52-3-14(H) would	4
apply.” We agree with Widow and the WCJ and explain.	5
{17} 	Consistent with our canons of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text	6
of Section 52-3-14(H). The critical clause within Section 52-3-14(H) is “death	7
proximately results from the disablement within the period of two years.” We are	8
acutely aware of what that provision does not say. Section 52-3-14(H) does not say	9
“within two years after the beginning of such disablement.” Nor does it say “within	10
two years of the date the worker became disabled.” It simply says “within the period	11
of two years,” without identifying a starting point. Section 52-3-14(H). This	12
omission is significant because our canons of statutory construction inform us that	13
the Legislature is fully capable of including language establishing the beginning of	14
a time period if it so chooses. See State v. Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 41, 548 P.3d 66	15
(“[The L]egislature is presumed to say what it means and mean what it says.”); State	16
v. Greenwood, 2012-NMCA-017, ¶ 38, 271 P.3d 753 (“The Legislature knows how	17
to include language in a statute if it so desires.” (alteration, internal quotation marks,	18
and citation omitted)). As well, these canons direct us not to read language into a	19

9
statute that is not there, especially if the statute makes sense as written. See High	1
Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5.	2
{18} 	If the Legislature intended the two-year limitation period in Section 52-3-	3
14(H) to begin at the onset of a worker’s disablement, it would have included that	4
language in Section 52-3-14(H), as it did in other sections of the ODDL and in a	5
similar provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 52-	6
1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2025). For example, Section 52-3-19(A) of	7
the ODDL requires a worker to give their employer written notice of an occupational	8
disease “within fifteen days after the beginning of such disablement.” The same	9
subsection sets an outer limit on a worker’s notice to their employer, “not later than	10
sixty days after the beginning of such disablement.” Id.	11
{19} 	This point is reinforced by comparing Section 52-3-14(H), the ODDL’s death	12
benefit provision, with the parallel provision of the WCA, Section 52-1-46. Both the	13
ODDL and WCA address workers’ compensation benefits and include death-benefit	14
provisions that are similarly structured and worded. The Legislature enacted and	15
maintains 	both 	as 	part 	of 	a 	single 	worker’s 	compensation 	framework. 	The	16
Legislature’s intent in passing both statutes is set forth in a single purpose section,	17
§ 52-5-1, and the WCA administrative rules define “Act” to include both the WCA	18
and the ODDL collectively. See 11.4.1.7(A) NMAC (“‘Act’ means collectively: the	19
[WCA], the Workers’ Compensation Administration Act, and the [ODDL].”).	20

10
Because the Legislature drafted the WCA and ODDL as components of the same	1
legislative scheme, when it uses specific language in one and omits it from the other,	2
we treat that omission as intentional. Cf. State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-010, ¶ 28,	3
141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659 (“[W]hen the Legislature includes a particular word in	4
one portion of a statute and omits it from another portion of that statute, such	5
omission is presumed to be intentional.”).	6
{20} 	A review of these two comparable sections of the same statutory scheme	7
reveals that Section 52-1-46 of the WCA expressly ties the two-year period to a	8
specific event, the worker’s accidental injury. Whereas, Section 52-3-14(H) of the	9
ODDL does not contain this language. On the one hand, Section 52-1-46 provides	10
that death benefits are payable “if an accidental injury sustained by a worker	11
proximately results in the worker’s death within the period of two years following	12
the worker’s accidental injury.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, Section 52-	13
3-14(H) does not tie its two-year period to any specific event. It reads: “In case death	14
proximately 	results 	from 	the 	disablement 	within 	the 	period 	of 	two 	years,	15
compensation benefits to be paid such worker shall be in the amounts and to the	16
persons as follows.” Id. The Legislature enacted and has maintained both statutes,	17
and we must respect its choice to anchor the time period in Section 52-1-46 and not	18
in Section 52-3-14(H). The City asks us to read the statute as if it said: “[W]ithin	19
two years after the beginning of such disablement.” We decline to do so.	20

11
{21} 	Nevertheless, the City argues that this reasoning would render the two-year	1
clause in Section 52-3-14(H) superfluous. The City contends that if a worker remains	2
continuously disabled and then dies from the occupational disease, the death will	3
always have occurred “within the period” of disablement, since the worker was still	4
disabled at the time of death. See id. Stated otherwise, the City argues that our	5
reading would serve as an automatic gateway rather than a meaningful limitation	6
imposed by our Legislature. The City presses this argument further, anticipating the	7
response that the clause would retain meaning in cases where a worker recovers and	8
later dies from a recurrence of the disease. The City contends that the statutory	9
framework makes that scenario impossible.	10
{22} 	The City’s argument begins with the statutory definition of “disablement”	11
under 	Section 	52-3-4(D), 	which 	refers 	to 	physical 	incapacity 	caused 	by 	an	12
occupational disease, not the disease itself. If a worker recovers and returns to work,	13
the incapacity has ended, and the worker is no longer disabled within the meaning	14
of the statute. From this premise, the City reasons that if the disablement no longer	15
exists, a subsequent death cannot “proximately result[] from the disablement” under	16
Section 52-3-14(H). And if the recovery scenario cannot produce a death that	17
satisfies both conditions of Section 52-3-14(H), the City concludes that the two-year	18
clause has no scenario under which it could bar recovery under Widow’s reading.	19

12
{23} 	This Court agrees with the City that “disablement” under Section 52-3-4(D)	1
means the physical incapacity caused by an occupational disease, not the disease	2
itself. A worker who can no longer perform their employment duties because of an	3
occupational disease is disabled under the ODDL. Section 52-3-4(D) (defining	4
“disablement” to mean “an employee [cannot] perform any work for remuneration	5
or profit in the pursuit in which the employee was engaged” or the “incapacity of an	6
employee . . . to perform to some percentage extent any work for which [they are]	7
fitted by age, education and training”). When the incapacity lifts, the disablement	8
ends, even if the underlying occupational disease persists. The City is also correct	9
that in many cases involving a recovery followed by a fatal recurrence, the	10
recurrence itself would produce a new period of physical incapacity before death. In	11
that situation, the worker would become disabled again, and the death would occur	12
during the new disablement period and be proximately caused by it. The two-year	13
clause would be satisfied rather than triggered as a bar because the death would occur	14
within the period of new disablement. We therefore agree with the City that under	15
our reading, the scenarios in which the two-year clause of Section 52-3-14(H) would	16
bar recovery may be infrequent. Yet, they do exist.	17
{24} 	To illustrate, we offer the following non-exhaustive example. A worker with	18
an occupational disease becomes disabled, receives treatment, recovers enough to	19
return to work, thereby ending their disablement, and then, three years later, dies	20

13
suddenly. It is determined that the cause of death is not a new illness. Instead, it is a	1
long-term complication of the original occupational disease. The worker never	2
became physically incapable of working prior to death. As a result, there was no new	3
disablement period. In this example, the death may well have been the proximate	4
result of the original disablement, but it would not have occurred “within the period	5
of two years” of that disablement because no new disablement period existed.	6
Section 52-3-14(H). Therefore, the two-year clause would prevent the payment of	7
death benefits. As the WCJ correctly recognized, a worker can “become cured” and	8
“still ultimately die of one of the enumerated conditions after a period of wellness,”	9
thereby triggering the two-year limitation in Section 52-3-14(H).	10
{25} 	This Court, again, acknowledges that this may be an infrequent scenario. That	11
observation, however, does not establish surplusage. A statutory provision need not	12
be applied frequently to have meaning. A provision that applies in unusual but	13
plausible scenarios still has effect. We identified at least one such scenario above.	14
That is sufficient to conclude that our reading does not render the two-year clause	15
superfluous. Because the two-year clause of Section 52-3-14(H) retains operative	16
meaning, even if only in a narrow set of scenarios, the superfluity concern does not	17
compel us to adopt the City’s reading or to add language to the statute that our	18
Legislature did not include.	19

14
{26} 	We hold that the two-year period in Section 52-3-14(H) is not measured from	1
the date a worker is deemed disabled. Instead, the two-year period is tied to the	2
physical incapacity related to the disablement. While a worker remains continuously	3
disabled by an occupational disease, that disablement is ongoing for purposes of	4
Section 52-3-14(H) because the worker is physically incapable of performing their	5
duties of employment. Here, Worker remained continuously disabled by his	6
occupational disease from January 11, 2012, until his death on June 2, 2021, and the	7
parties agree that his death proximately resulted from that disablement. Therefore,	8
his death fell within the two-year period of that disablement. We affirm the WCJ’s	9
determination that the two-year clause does not bar Widow’s claim for death	10
benefits.	11
III. 	The City Did Not Preserve Its Section 52-3-10(B)(4) Argument for	12
Appellate Review	13
{27} 	The City argues that Section 52-3-10(B)(4) of the ODDL independently bars	14
Widow’s death benefits. The portion of Section 52-3-10(B)(4) at issue states that	15
in those cases where death results during a period of continuous	16
disablement from an occupational disease 	other than silicosis or	17
asbestosis for which compensation has been paid or awarded or for	18
which a claim, compensable but for such death, is on file with the	19
director, and in these cases compensation shall be paid if death results	20
within three years from the last day upon which the employee actually	21
worked for the employer against whom compensation is claimed.	22
(Emphasis added.) The City contends that Section 52-3-10(B)(4) imposes a three-	23
year time limit, measured from the last day the worker actually worked for the	24

15
employer, within which the continuously disabled worker’s death must occur for	1
death benefits to be payable. Here, Worker retired from City employment on August	2
1, 2001. Worker died on June 2, 2021, almost twenty years later. As a result, because	3
Worker’s death falls beyond the three-year limit prescribed by Section 52-3-	4
10(B)(4), the City contends that Widow’s claim for death benefits is barred.	5
{28} 	However, before we consider the merits of this argument, we must address a	6
threshold matter. Widow contends that “[the City] did not raise Section 52-3-10 as	7
a contested issue nor as an affirmative defense in the [p]re-[t]rial [o]rder” and the	8
“[City’s] failure to raise Section 52-3-10[(B)(4)] as an affirmative defense in any	9
pleadings prior to trial precludes the raising of this issue on appeal.” Essentially,	10
Widow contends that the City failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.	11
We agree.	12
{29} 	Notably, the City’s own brief in chief acknowledges that “[t]he WCJ in the	13
present case did not address the applicability of . . . Section 52-3-10(B)(4).” Only in	14
its reply, after Widow raised preservation, did the City attempt to demonstrate that	15
the issue was properly preserved before the WCJ and this Court. Because the City	16
now maintains the applicability of Section 52-3-10(B)(4) was preserved, we address	17
each of its contentions as to how it preserved its argument, and explain why the	18
record shows otherwise.	19

16
{30} 	“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that [the] appellant	1
fairly invoked a ruling of the [tribunal] on the same grounds argued in the appellate	2
court.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133, ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d	3
717; 	accord 	Rule 12-321(A) NMRA. “Our precedent explains that the party	4
claiming error must have raised the issue below clearly and have invoked a ruling	5
by the lower tribunal,” and that “to invoke a ruling from a tribunal, a party must have	6
asserted a legal principle, developed any facts necessary to show that the legal	7
principle applies, and brought the issue to the attention of the decision-maker.” N.M.	8
Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. N.M. Env’t Improvement Bd., 2026-NMCA-061, ¶ 18, 591	9
P.3d 208 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Where the	10
record fails to indicate that an argument was presented to the [tribunal] below, unless	11
it is jurisdictional in nature, it will not be considered on appeal. Error may not be	12
predicated upon matters not raised in the [tribunal].” Woolwine, 1987-NMCA-133,	13
¶ 20 (citations omitted). This Court recognizes that our preservation requirement	14
should not be implemented in an overly technical manner; instead, it “should be	15
applied with its purposes in mind.” Gracia v. Bittner, 1995-NMCA-064, ¶ 18, 120	16
N.M. 191, 900 P.2d 351. “The primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to	17
specifically alert the [tribunal] to a claim of error so that any mistake can be corrected	18
at that time, (2) to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the claim	19
of error and to show why the [tribunal] should rule against that claim, and (3) to	20

17
create a record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding	1
the contested issue.” Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-	2
NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791. With this in mind, we turn to	3
consider the arguments of the City vis-à-vis preservation of this issue.	4
{31} 	In a workers’ compensation proceeding, when a complaint is filed, the	5
respondent must file an informal response that includes “a statement of facts and	6
affirmative defenses together with a short summary of reasons for denials of any	7
benefits claimed.” 11.4.4.10(C)(1)(a)-(b) NMAC. The respondent must then file an	8
answer admitting or denying each claim in the complaint, and “[a]ny affirmative	9
defenses to the complaint shall be stated in the answer.” 11.4.4.13(D) NMAC. The	10
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts apply to WCA proceedings unless	11
otherwise stated or necessarily implied by the WCA administrative rules. See	12
11.4.4.9(A)(2) NMAC. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts,	13
a party “shall set forth affirmatively” any matter constituting “an avoidance or	14
affirmative defense” when “pleading to a preceding pleading.” Rule 1-008(C)	15
NMRA. The consequences of failing to comply with these requirements are well	16
established. “[A]ffirmative defenses must be pled or they are waived.” Santistevan	17
v. Centinel Bank of Taos, 1981-NMSC-092, ¶ 13, 96 N.M. 730, 634 P.2d 1282;	18
Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 1968-NMSC-174, ¶ 3, 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d	19
868. “[T]he burden is on the [respondent] to raise any matter which will constitute	20

18
an avoidance or an affirmative defense to plaintiffs’ complaint.” McCasland v.	1
Prather, 1978-NMCA-098, ¶ 22, 92 N.M. 192, 585 P.2d 336. These pleading	2
requirements matter here because an affirmative defense that was not pled could not	3
have been ruled upon below, and without a ruling fairly invoked, nothing is	4
preserved for our review.	5
{32} 	The City had three opportunities to assert Section 52-3-10(B)(4) as a defense,	6
yet it did not. First, the City filed its informal response. The only defense asserted	7
was the two-year clause in Section 52-3-14(H). The City simply stated, “Pursuant to	8
Section 52-3-14(H), it sets forth, ‘[i]n case death proximately results from the	9
disablement within the period of two years, compensation benefits to be paid.’”	10
Section 52-3-10(B)(4) was not referenced. Second, the City filed its answer. Again,	11
the only affirmative defense asserted was the two-year clause in Section 52-3-14(H),	12
which quoted the same statutory language as the informal response. Section 52-3-	13
10(B)(4) was not referenced. Third, the parties agreed in the pretrial order on the	14
issues to be addressed at trial. None of those contested issues referenced Section 52-	15
3-10(B)(4). The City responds that the pretrial order’s central contested issue,	16
whether Widow “is entitled to death benefits,” necessarily encompassed Section 52-	17
3-10(B)(4) because it addresses Widow’s entitlement to death benefits. However, a	18
generic framing of the ultimate question does not assert a specific legal principle or	19
bring a particular statutory defense to the decision-maker’s attention, see N.M. Auto.	20

19
Dealers Ass’n, 2026-NMCA-061, ¶ 18, and it serves none of the purposes of	1
preservation. See Sandoval, 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56. Simply put, in the above-	2
mentioned pleading process before trial, the City never identified Section 52-3-	3
10(B)(4) as a defense to Widow’s claim.	4
{33} 	The City notes that the parties discussed Section 52-3-10(B)(4) at the trial.	5
Although that is accurate, context matters. It was Widow, not the City, who raised	6
Section 52-3-10(B)(4) at trial. The City merely responded to Widow’s Section 52-	7
3-10(B)(4) argument. The City cannot rely on Widow’s argument for the first time	8
on appeal. See Fredenburgh, 1968-NMSC-174, ¶ 4 (holding that the appellant could	9
not “be allowed to take advantage of [the] appellee’s proof for the first time on	10
appeal”).	11
{34} 	The City highlights that, after the trial, both parties tendered findings of fact	12
and conclusions of law addressing Section 52-3-10(B)(4). In the Order, the WCJ	13
explained that “[a]ny tendered findings not expressly adopted herein are hereby	14
rejected” and that “[a]ny tendered [c]onclusions of [l]aw not expressly adopted	15
herein are hereby rejected.” Typically, when a decision-maker declines to adopt a	16
proposed finding of fact, it is effectively making a negative finding on that point,	17
which, in this case, is a ruling that this Court may review. See Hill v. Cmty. of	18
Damien of Molokai, 1996-NMSC-008, ¶ 41, 121 N.M. 353, 911 P.2d 861 (“Failure	19
to adopt a proposed finding of fact is in effect a negative finding with respect to that	20

20
fact, which binds this Court on appeal.”). However, here, the WCJ could not have	1
ruled on an affirmative defense the City did not plead, and without a ruling on a	2
fairly invoked issue, nothing is preserved for our review. Furthermore, the City’s	3
tenders marked the first time it asserted Section 52-3-10(B)(4) as an affirmative	4
defense to Widow’s claim. And tendering a defense for the first time in the requested	5
findings submitted at the close of a case is too late to raise the issue. 	See	6
Fredenburgh, 	1968-NMSC-174, 	¶ 	4 	(holding 	that 	it 	“was 	too 	late 	[for 	the	7
respondent] to raise [an] issue” because “the requested finding was, so far as the	8
record disclose[d], the first intimation regarding this defense”).	9
{35} 	Lastly, the City asserts that the WCJ “underwent an analysis” of Schirmer v.	10
Homestake Mining Co., 1994-NMSC-095, 118 N.M. 420, 882 P.2d 11, in the Order,	11
and that Schirmer “squarely discusses the application of . . . Section 52-3-10 to death	12
claims under the ODDL.” Whatever Schirmer discusses, the Order’s citation to it	13
was explicitly tied to Section 52-3-14(H), not Section 52-3-10(B)(4).	14
{36} 	The City has not identified any other instances in which it raised the Section	15
52-3-10(B)(4) argument below, and this Court is “not obligated to search the record	16
on a party’s behalf to locate support for [the] propositions a party advances.” See	17
Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 42, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. We therefore	18
conclude the issue is unpreserved and decline to consider it. See State v. Aragon,	19
1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (“There is a presumption of	20

21
correctness in the district court’s rulings. Accordingly, it is [the d]efendant’s burden	1
on appeal to demonstrate any claimed error below.” (alterations, internal quotation	2
marks, and citation omitted)).	3
IV. 	Section 52-3-14(D) Limits the Total Duration of Disablement and Death	4
Benefits to 700 Weeks	5
{37} 	The City’s final argument concerns the total duration of all benefits payable	6
under the ODDL. The City contends that Section 52-3-14 places an aggregate limit	7
of 700 weeks on all collective benefits under the ODDL. The City submits that under	8
Section 52-3-14(D), because Worker received 492 weeks of disability benefits,	9
Widow’s death benefits should be limited to the remaining 208 weeks. Conversely,	10
Widow contends that her death benefit claim is independent of Worker’s disability	11
claim and is not reduced by the disability benefits Worker received during his life.	12
The WCJ agreed with Widow, awarding a separate and distinct 700 weeks of death	13
benefits. For the following reasons, we agree with the City and hold that the WCJ	14
erred on this point.	15
{38} 	Consistent with our canons of statutory construction, we begin by examining	16
the language of Section 52-3-14(D). Section 52-3-14(D), which was added to the	17
ODDL by a 2015 amendment, provides:	18
In no event shall the duration of any combination of disablements,	19
whether temporary or partial disablements, and death be payable for a	20
period in excess of seven hundred weeks.	21

22
The 	use 	of 	the 	word 	“and” 	clearly 	indicates 	a 	conjunctive 	meaning. 	See	1
Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The	2
doctrine that in a legal instrument, and joins a conjunctive list to combine items,	3
while or joins a disjunctive list to create alternatives.”). According to the rules of	4
grammar and common usage, “‘and’ links independent ideas.” State v. Lopez, 2023-	5
NMSC-011, 	¶ 	15, 	529 	P.3d 	893 	(emphasis 	omitted). 	Accordingly, 	“any	6
combination” 	encompasses 	both 	“disablements” 	and 	“death,” 	joined 	by 	the	7
conjunction “and,” leaving no doubt that both categories of benefits fall within the	8
700-week aggregate limit. Section 52-3-14(D). Further, the phrase “[i]n no event”	9
precludes exceptions to the 700-week aggregate limit. Id. In addition, the limit is	10
expressed as a “period in excess of seven hundred weeks,” a durational limit	11
measured in the same unit used to pay disability and death benefits. See id.	12
{39} 	In the Order, the WCJ reasoned that the term “death” in Section 52-3-14(D)	13
applies only to the death benefits described in Section 52-3-14(H)(1). Section 52-3-	14
14(H)(1) 	addresses 	the 	death 	benefits 	payable 	when 	a 	worker 	dies 	without	15
dependents. See § 52-3-13 (defining “dependents” under the ODDL). These death	16
benefits include funeral expenses not exceeding $7,500, medical and hospital	17
expenses for the deceased, “together with such other sums as the deceased may have	18
been paid for disablement.” Section 52-3-14(H)(1). The WCJ reasoned that these are	19
death benefits “not tied to an independent recipient’s entitlement.” On that basis, the	20

23
WCJ concluded that the 700-week aggregate limit in Section 52-3-14(D) does not	1
apply to the weekly death benefits payable to surviving dependents under Section	2
52-3-14(H)(2).	3
{40} 	The WCJ’s reasoning appears to rest on the premise that Section 52-3-14(D)	4
should not be read to reduce death benefits payable to Widow based on disability	5
benefits already paid to Worker; both being separate and independent benefits to	6
each recipient. This reasoning is not sound because Section 52-3-14(D) does not	7
distinguish among recipients. The provision limits “the duration of any combination	8
of disablements . . . and death.” Section 52-3-14(D) (emphasis added). It does not	9
state that “any combination of benefits payable to the same recipient.” Nor does it	10
limit its reach to benefits flowing to the worker alone. Rather, it addresses the total	11
duration of all collective benefits under the ODDL, regardless of the recipient.	12
{41} 	We also disagree with the WCJ’s conclusion that “death” in Section 52-3-	13
14(D) applies only to the benefits listed in Section 52-3-14(H)(1). Section 52-3-	14
14(H)(1) contains three components. The first two are lump-sum payments without	15
a durational component. See § 52-3-14(H)(1), (2)(d). Therefore, these components	16
cannot be what Section 52-3-14(D) measures when it limits a “period in excess of	17
seven hundred weeks.” The third component is “such other sums as the deceased	18
may have been paid for disablement,” which Section 52-3-14(H)(1) bundles with the	19
phrase “together with.” Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that these “such	20

24
other sums” may have a durational component, they are not new benefits awarded	1
to the worker or a surviving dependent after death. See § 52-3-14(H)(1). Instead,	2
Section 52-3-14(H)(1) references the benefits the worker has already received over	3
their life. It clearly describes those “such other sums” as amounts the deceased	4
worker “may have [already] been paid for disablement.” Id. A worker must be alive	5
to receive disability benefits. Thus, Section 52-3-14(H)(1) provides that if death	6
proximately results from the disablement within the two-year period, and the worker	7
has no surviving dependents, “the compensation shall be limited to” the lump-sum	8
payments, “together with” disability payments paid to the worker while they were	9
alive. Section 52-3-14(D) already captures those durational benefits paid to a worker	10
while still alive under the term “disablements.” If “death” in Section 52-3-14(D)	11
referred 	only 	to 	Section 	52-3-14(H)(1), 	it 	would 	add 	nothing 	beyond 	what	12
“disablements” already covers. See Katz v. N.M. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 1981-NMSC-	13
012, ¶ 18, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (explaining that a “statute must be construed	14
so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous”). For “death” to	15
have independent meaning in Section 52-3-14(D), it must refer to a category of	16
benefits that “disablements” does not cover. That category is the weekly death	17
benefits paid to surviving dependents under Section 52-3-14(H)(2).	18
{42} 	Widow relies heavily on Buchanan v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1995-NMCA-131,	19
121 N.M. 12, 908 P.2d 242. In 	Buchanan, this Court held that a surviving	20

25
dependent’s right to death benefits under the ODDL is independent of the worker’s	1
disability benefit claim. Id. ¶ 7. The surviving dependent’s claim is “a new and	2
separate claim and is not derivative of the worker’s claim.” Id. This Court also	3
observed that at that time, the ODDL “d[id] not provide for a deduction, credit, or	4
setoff against an employer’s liability to dependents for death benefits on account of	5
payments to a worker during [their] lifetime.” Id. ¶ 11.	6
{43} 	We do not disturb the core holding of Buchanan. A surviving dependent’s	7
right to death benefits remains independent of the worker’s claim, and a worker’s	8
settlement or release does not extinguish the surviving dependent’s right. However,	9
Buchanan does not control the question before us. Buchanan was issued in 1995,	10
and our Legislature added Section 52-3-14(D) to the ODDL by amendment in 2015.	11
The 2015 amendment redesignated the subsequent subsections, so that what	12
Buchanan referred to as Section 52-3-14(G), Buchanan, 1995-NMCA-131, ¶ 11, is	13
now Section 52-3-14(H). When the Buchanan Court observed that the ODDL	14
contained no mechanism for deducting, crediting, or setting off disability payments	15
against death benefits, it was analyzing a version of the statute that did not include	16
what is now Section 52-3-14(D). See Buchanan, 1995-NMCA-131, ¶ 11. Simply	17
put, the 2015 amendment altered the statutory landscape. We cannot ignore it and	18
read Section 52-3-14(D) as though nothing has changed since we issued Buchanan	19
in 1995.	20

26
{44} 	The WCA reinforces this reading. Its death benefit provision, Section 52-1-	1
46, contains no equivalent to Section 52-3-14(D). In enacting and maintaining both	2
statutory schemes, our Legislature imposed an aggregate limit only in the ODDL.	3
We must infer that the difference is intentional. Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 41.	4
Accordingly, Section 52-3-14(D) reflects a judgment by our Legislature specific to	5
cases involving occupational diseases.	6
{45} 	Widow argues that Section 52-3-14(H)(2) specifically provides that death	7
benefits “continue for the period of seven hundred weeks from the date of death of	8
such worker,” and that this specific provision should control over the general limit	9
in Section 52-3-14(D). This argument invokes the general-specific canon. Under this	10
canon, a specific statute ordinarily governs a general one when the two conflict. See	11
State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 4, 123 N.M. 589, 943 P.2d 1042. If the	12
Legislature enacted the specific statute later, it was meant to create an exception to	13
the general statute. See id. ¶ 6. On the other hand, if the Legislature enacted the	14
specific statute earlier, it was intended to remain an exception unless the general	15
statute expressly or by implication repealed it. See id. We conclude, however, that	16
Section 52-3-14(D) and (H)(2) do not conflict. In fact, they work together.	17
{46} 	The key is in the text of Section 52-3-14(H)(2), which states that the weekly	18
death benefits payable to dependents are “subject to the limitations of the [ODDL].”	19
Section 52-3-14(D) is one of those limitations. As a result, there is no conflict to	20

27
resolve. Section 52-3-14(H)(2) sets the maximum duration of death benefits,	1
standing alone, at 700 weeks from the date of a worker’s death, while Section 52-3-	2
14(D) limits the combined total of all collective benefits, including disability and	3
death, to a 700-week aggregate limit. This reading gives meaning and effect to every	4
part of the statute. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5.	5
{47} 	Section 52-3-14(H)(2) provides further support for reading Section 52-3-	6
14(D) as an aggregate limit on all collective benefits under the ODDL. Section 52-	7
3-14(H)(2) includes within the death benefit calculation “such other sums as the	8
deceased may have been paid for disability.” The Legislature’s inclusion of prior	9
disability payments within the death benefit framework demonstrates an awareness	10
that the two benefit streams are related. It also shows that prior disability payments	11
are included in the overall calculation, especially when the phrase begins with the	12
inclusive “together with.” Section 52-3-14(H)(2). This is consistent with reading	13
Section 52-3-14(D) as an aggregate limit that encompasses all collective benefits	14
under the ODDL.	15
{48} 	Widow notes that, under our reasoning, a worker who exhausts the full 700	16
weeks of disability benefits before dying would leave their surviving dependent(s)	17
with no durational death benefits. “We will not construe statutes to achieve an absurd	18
result or to defeat the intended object of the [L]egislature.” State v. Herrera, 1974-	19
NMSC-037, ¶ 6, 86 N.M. 224, 522 P.2d 76. Given this, we do not interpret the result	20

28
expressed herein as doing so. The aggregate limit in Section 52-3-14(D) reflects a	1
legislative judgment to limit employers’ total exposure, a “legitimate legislative	2
goal,” per our Supreme Court in Schirmer, 1994-NMSC-095, ¶ 8. Unless there is	3
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that our Legislature has enacted an unconstitutional	4
statute, we will uphold the statute. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064,	5
¶ 10, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250. “We will not question the wisdom, policy, or	6
justness of legislation enacted by our Legislature.” 	Id. 	Here, our Legislature	7
determined that 700 weeks is the aggregate limit of all collective benefits under the	8
ODDL. That judgment applies evenhandedly, regardless of how the 700 weeks are	9
allocated 	between 	the worker 	and 	the worker’s 	surviving 	dependent(s). 	The	10
aggregate limit does not eliminate death benefits; it limits how long they can be paid.	11
If no disability benefits have been paid during the worker’s life, the surviving	12
dependent(s) receive(s) the full 700 weeks under Section 52-3-14(H)(2). If disability	13
benefits have been paid, the surviving dependent(s) receive(s) whatever remains of	14
the 700-week period. In either case, the aggregate limit is the same. The only thing	15
that changes is how the 700 weeks are divided between the worker and the surviving	16
dependent(s). That is the structure Section 52-3-14(D) creates.	17
{49} 	The question under the absurdity canon is not whether the result in this case	18
is harsh, but whether it produces an absurd result or defeats the Legislature’s	19
intended objective. See Herrera, 1974-NMSC-037, ¶ 6. The limit is itself the	20

29
intended objective of the 2015 amendment. Enforcing it does not defeat the	1
Legislature’s objective—it gives effect to it. Widow’s reading, by contrast, would	2
allow almost twenty-three years of benefits (492 weeks of disability plus 700 weeks	3
of death benefits), totaling $873,926.72, despite the words “[i]n no event shall the	4
duration . . . be payable for a period in excess of seven hundred weeks.” Section 52-	5
3-14(D). That reading would render Section 52-3-14(D) a nullity for any worker	6
who received disability benefits before death. It is Widow’s reading, not the City’s,	7
that would defeat the objective of the 2015 amendment and produce an absurd result.	8
{50} 	In practical terms, this means the following. Worker received 492 weeks of	9
disability benefits during his life. Widow’s death benefits are limited to the	10
remaining 208 weeks of the 700-week aggregate limit.	11
{51} 	To the extent the City relies on Section 52-3-14(B) in arguing this issue, we	12
deem that argument unpreserved. The City did not assert Section 52-3-14(B) as a	13
defense at any point during the pleading process. Widow, not the City, raised Section	14
52-3-14(B) at trial. The City’s response at trial overwhelmingly addressed Section	15
52-3-14(D), not Subsection (B). The City addressed Section 52-3-14(B) in its	16
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted posttrial. Applying the	17
same rationale as our analysis in Section III herein, any argument by the City	18
regarding Section 52-3-14(B) is unpreserved and unreviewable by this Court under	19
Rule 12-321(A).	20

30
CONCLUSION	1
{52} 	We remand to the WCJ to enter an amended order awarding Widow death	2
benefits of $733.16 per week for 208 weeks, commencing on the date of Worker’s	3
death, June 2, 2021. We otherwise affirm.	4
{53} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
_________________________	6
GERALD E. BACA, Judge	7
WE CONCUR:	8
___________________________	9
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge	10
___________________________	11
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	12