February 13, 2025- Triple R Development LLC v. Anthony Stinebaugh, No. A-1-CA-40877

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: February 13, 2025	3
No. A-1-CA-40877	4
TRIPLE R DEVELOPMENT LLC,	5
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Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY STINEBAUGH and
UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Erin B. O’Connell, District Court Judge
Saucedo Chavez, P.C.
Daniel C. Apodaca
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
New Mexico Legal Aid
Corinna Laszlo-Henry
Las Vegas, NM
for Appellants	20
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 2/13/2025 7:54 AM

OPINION	1
BACA, Judge.	2
{1} 	This appeal stems from Plaintiff Triple R Development, LLC’s, attempts to	3
gain possession of a home in which Defendant Anthony Stinebaugh was residing.	4
Following a trial, the metropolitan court granted Plaintiff possession of the home	5
through a forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Defendant appealed to the district court	6
but the appeal was dismissed and the district court issued a writ for forcible entry or	7
unlawful detainer. Defendant appeals to this Court. In this appeal, Defendant	8
advances two arguments: (1) the metropolitan and district courts erred in exercising	9
jurisdiction over this matter; and (2) the appellate process Defendant was afforded	10
was insufficient. Because a question of title was directly and necessarily involved in	11
resolving the question of possession, the metropolitan court lacked jurisdiction over	12
the matter. We accordingly reverse and remand the case to the metropolitan court	13
with instructions to dismiss the petition by owner for writ of restitution.	14
BACKGROUND	15
{2} 	The home at issue in this case was owned by Defendant’s parents, Gerald W.	16
and 	Dorcis 	Stinebaugh 	(Parents), 	who 	both 	died 	several 	years 	before 	the	17
commencement of this case in the metropolitan court. After Parents’ death,	18
Defendant continued to reside at the home with his daughter, Shelby, and at least	19
one other Stinebaugh child. Informal probate proceedings of Parents’ estates were	20

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initiated in 2019 by Shelby. Shelby was appointed as the personal representative of	1
both estates and sold the home to Plaintiff soon after.	2
{3} 	Seven months after the sale was executed, Plaintiff sent an eviction notice to	3
the occupants, pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA),	4
NMSA 1978, §§ 47-8-1 to -52 (1975, as amended through 2007), demanding that	5
the occupants vacate the home. Defendant contacted the probate court and informed	6
it that he had not signed consent to Shelby’s appointment as personal representative.	7
The probate court transferred the matter to district court for formal probate	8
proceedings.	9
{4} 	The district court sitting in probate for the Estate of Gerald Stinebaugh held	10
an emergency hearing soon after the matter was transferred. Plaintiff, Defendant,	11
Shelby, and one other Stinebaugh child attended the hearing. During the hearing,	12
Defendant maintained that he did not know about Shelby’s appointment as personal	13
representative, nor about the sale of the home. The district court asked Plaintiff why	14
it sent a notice of eviction. Plaintiff answered that, since it has a general warranty	15
deed showing that it rightfully bought the home, it is the owner of the home. After	16
hearing statements from each party in attendance, the district court set a presentment	17
hearing for inventory of the estate. When Plaintiff asked the district court whether it	18
should 	initiate 	eviction 	proceedings 	in 	metropolitan 	court, 	the 	district 	court	19
responded that it had not reviewed the sale of the home and that, at this point, it was	20

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not clear whether the home was part of the estate. Nevertheless, prior to the	1
presentment hearing, Plaintiff filed the instant case in the metropolitan court.	2
{5} 	Plaintiff filed a petition by owner for writ of restitution (the Petition)	3
ostensibly, pursuant to UORRA in the metropolitan court. The Petition alleged, inter	4
alia, (1) Plaintiff purchased the home in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from Shelby;	5
(2) at the time it purchased the home, Plaintiff was advised that the home was	6
uninhabited; (3) Plaintiff later determined that Defendant continued to reside in the	7
home; and (4) Plaintiff did not have a rental agreement with any individual,	8
including Defendant, related to the home. Based on those allegations, Plaintiff	9
sought immediate possession of the home, issuance of a writ of restitution, costs and	10
attorney fees. In his response to the Petition,0F
1 Defendant alleged that Shelby forged	11
his name on the paperwork to become personal representative of his Parents’ estates,	12
and that the probate court had revoked the appointment. At a hearing before the	13
metropolitan court on the Petition, the Petition was amended and was treated as an	14
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.	15
{6} 	A trial on the Petition was held on June 27, 2022. Defendant did not attend	16
the trial, and as a result, the metropolitan court granted the Petition and issued a writ	17
of execution for forcible entry or unlawful detainer that ordered Defendant to be	18
1 Defendant’s pleading is labeled as a motion, but we construe it as a response
to the Petition. See Bruce v. Lester, 1999-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d
84 (“[W]e regard pleadings from pro se litigants with a tolerant eye.”).

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removed from the home. On July 1, 2022, Defendant timely filed a motion to set	1
aside the judgment. On August 12, 2022, the metropolitan court issued its order	2
granting Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment of June 27, 2022. On August	3
16, 2022, three days before the next trial setting, Defendant filed a pleading with the	4
metropolitan court stating that Shelby had forged his signatures on documents	5
leading to her appointment as personal representative of his Parents’ estates and that	6
Shelby’s appointment had since been revoked by the probate court. Even so,	7
following the second trial on August 19, 2022, the metropolitan court again issued a	8
writ of execution for forcible entry or unlawful detainer ordering Defendant be	9
removed from the home. Defendant timely appealed to the district court.	10
{7} 	On appeal before the district court, Plaintiff moved the district court to hear	11
the appeal on an expedited basis. On October 5, 2022, the district court held a status	12
conference at which Defendant did not appear. The district court dismissed	13
Defendant’s appeal based upon Defendant’s failure to file a timely statement of	14
appellate 	issues, 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	1-073(H) 	NMRA. 	On 	October 	19, 	2022,	15
Defendant moved the district court to set aside the dismissal. On November 29,	16
2022, without a hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to set aside the	17
order of dismissal. In the order, the district court noted that Defendant failed to	18
provide a good faith or substantive basis for reconsideration. That same day, the	19
district court issued an amended order of dismissal and its own writ of execution for	20

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forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Defendant timely appealed to this Court and the	1
district court subsequently quashed the writ of execution pending the appeal.	2
DISCUSSION	3
{8} 	As 	stated 	above, 	Defendant 	brings 	two 	challenges 	on 	appeal: 	(1) 	the	4
metropolitan court and the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over this	5
matter; and (2) the appellate process Defendant was afforded was insufficient.	6
Because we agree with Defendant’s argument that the metropolitan court lacked	7
jurisdiction to issue a judgment for forcible entry or unlawful detainer in this matter,	8
we do not reach Defendant’s second challenge on appeal. This case asks us to	9
determine whether the question of title was directly and necessarily involved with	10
the question of possession, such that the metropolitan court was deprived of its	11
jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.	12
{9} 	In New Mexico, metropolitan courts “constitute a state magistrate court.”	13
NMSA 1978, § 34-8A-2 (1980). “Magistrate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction	14
and are without authority to take action unless authority is affirmatively granted by	15
the Constitution or statutory provision.” White v. Farris, 2021-NMCA-014, ¶ 14,	16
485 P.3d 791 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see	17
Martinez v. Sedillo, 2005-NMCA-029, ¶ 4, 137 N.M. 103, 107 P.3d 543 (“[Article	18
6, Section 26 of the New Mexico C]onstitution affords the [L]egislature the ability	19
to confer jurisdiction upon courts of original limited jurisdiction.”). “[A] district	20

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court hearing an appeal from the magistrate court is bound by the lower court’s	1
jurisdictional limits and . . . if the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction, the district	2
court would also lack jurisdiction.” Cruz v. FTS Constr., Inc., 2006-NMCA-109,	3
¶ 19, 140 N.M. 284, 142 P.3d 365; see McCann v. McCann, 1942-NMSC-051, ¶ 11,	4
46 N.M. 406, 129 P.2d 646 (“District [c]ourts upon appeals, exercise only such	5
jurisdiction as the lower tribunal possessed.”). “The question of whether a court has	6
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de novo.” Palmer	7
v. Palmer, 2006-NMCA-112, ¶ 13, 140 N.M. 383, 142 P.3d 971.	8
{10} 	A forcible entry or unlawful detainer action permits a plaintiff who is lawfully	9
entitled to possession of real property at the time of suit to regain possession of the	10
property against a defendant who is in possession of the real property but who has	11
no right to lawful possession. See NMSA 1978, § 35-10-1(A) (1968) (listing the	12
circumstances in which forcible entry or unlawful detainer are permitted). “Forcible	13
entry or unlawful detainer . . . does not determine title to the property or the absolute	14
right to possession. A judgment has only the effect of placing the parties in their	15
original positions prior to the forcible entry or unlawful detainer.” Ott v. Keller,	16
1976-NMCA-124, ¶ 6, 90 N.M. 1, 558 P.2d 613.	17
{11} 	Section 	35-10-1(B) 	expressly 	grants 	New 	Mexico’s 	magistrate 	court	18
jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer of real property.	19
However, “questions of title or boundaries of land shall not be investigated in an	20

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action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.” NMSA 1978, § 35-10-3(C) (1968).	1
Moreover, a magistrate court cannot investigate questions of title in a forcible entry	2
or unlawful detainer action because they are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction	3
in actions in which the title or boundaries of land may be in dispute or drawn into	4
question. See NMSA 1978, § 35-3-3(C)(4) (2001) (“A magistrate has no jurisdiction	5
in a civil action . . . in which the title or boundaries of land may be in dispute or	6
drawn into question.”). Thus, to determine whether the metropolitan court had	7
jurisdiction in this case, we must examine whether a question of title was directly	8
and necessarily involved in resolving the question of possession.	9
{12} 	Our Supreme Court first evaluated whether questions of title deprive a court	10
of limited jurisdiction of its jurisdiction in Wood Garage v. Jasper, 1937-NMSC-	11
019, 41 N.M. 289, 67 P.2d 1000. The Court concluded that a court of limited	12
jurisdiction is not deprived of its jurisdiction where a question of title is drawn into	13
question only indirectly or incidentally. See id. ¶¶ 14, 16; see also State v. Brown,	14
1963-NMSC-127, ¶ 12, 72 N.M. 274, 383 P.2d 243 (concluding that the justice of	15
the peace had jurisdiction to hear the matter because “the issue as to who owns the	16
lands 	[was] 	only 	incidentally 	involved”); 	cf. 	White, 	2021-NMCA-014, 	¶ 	20	17
(rejecting the argument that the magistrate court was deprived of jurisdiction in a	18
UORRA action because “[the p]laintiff’s claim for possession did not threaten to	19
change title to the property”). A question of title may deprive a court of its	20

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jurisdiction; however, when the question of title is “directly and necessarily	1
involved.” Wood Garage, 1937-NMSC-019, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and	2
citation omitted). The question of whether title is directly and necessarily involved	3
in the action is dependent upon “the facts of each case from the pleadings and	4
evidence,” and whether the title issues being litigated “demand a judgment affecting	5
title.” Id. ¶¶ 13, 15-16, 24-25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see	6
Brown, 1963-NMSC-127, ¶ 11 (same).	7
{13} 	Here, Plaintiff’s right to possession relied entirely on the validity of its alleged	8
title. To show that it had a lawful right to possession and was therefore entitled to a	9
judgment to remove Defendant (and the other occupants) from the home, Plaintiff	10
introduced a general warranty deed. The introduction of the warranty deed in	11
evidence, in and of itself, did not necessarily place the title to the home directly and	12
necessarily in dispute. See Wood Garage, 1937-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (“[T]he defendant	13
cannot, by the introduction of the proof of title, take away the jurisdiction, for that	14
would put it in his power to defeat the action.” (internal quotation marks and citation	15
omitted)).	16
{14} 	However, in response, Defendant alleged that Shelby had forged paperwork	17
to become the personal representative of the estate in order to sell the home, and	18
stated that the probate court had revoked Shelby’s appointment as personal	19
representative. While the metropolitan court did not determine the accuracy of	20

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Defendant’s allegations, it is undisputed that, at the time that Plaintiff initiated the	1
action in the metropolitan court, the district court presiding over the formal probate	2
of the estate was attempting to determine whether Shelby had authority to convey	3
the home. That issue has not yet been resolved, and the parties continue to litigate	4
whether the appointment of the personal representative was valid; and whether	5
Shelby had the authority to transfer marketable title. Because it remains unclear	6
whether Shelby could transfer marketable title, it is also unclear whether Plaintiff	7
holds a valid general warranty deed, or whether the home should be deemed an asset	8
in the estate inventory. But if Plaintiff does not have valid title, then it has no grounds	9
to oust Defendant—and the other occupants of the home—through an action for	10
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. See Reinhart v. Lindholm, 1972-NMSC-087,	11
¶¶ 2, 4, 84 N.M. 546, 505 P.2d 1222 (concluding that an unlawful detainer judgment	12
was improper where the plaintiff’s claimed title was “based upon a bitterly disputed	13
contract between the parties” because “the question of title to land shall not be	14
investigated in an action for unlawful detainer”); cf. McCann, 1942-NMSC-051,	15
¶ 14 (concluding that the probate court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract	16
dispute where the appellee would be entitled to take property as an heir unless the	17
contract would defeat her claim). Accordingly, a question of title is directly and	18
necessarily involved in this action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, because	19

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the metropolitan court could not answer whether Plaintiff had a lawful right of	1
possession without implicitly grappling with validity of the disputed title.1F
2
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{15} 	For these reasons, we conclude that the metropolitan court could not resolve	3
Plaintiff’s right to possession without also investigating the question of title, and, as	4
a result, the metropolitan court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the action for	5
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. See Reinhart, 1972-NMSC-087, ¶ 4; McCann,	6
1942-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 7, 14; Wood Garage, 1937-NMSC-019, ¶ 16; see also Parrish	7
v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 787 S.E.2d 116, 123 (Va. 2016) (concluding that a lower	8
court 	lacked 	jurisdiction 	over 	an 	action 	for 	unlawful 	detainer 	because 	the	9
defendants’ raised a bona fide question of title requiring the court to try the question	10
of title); Mitchell v. Armstrong Cap. Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App. 1995)	11
(concluding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over an action for forcible	12
detainer where the defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s title was void, and the	13
plaintiff’s 	right 	to actual possession depended solely on the validity of the	14
circumstances in which the plaintiff obtained the title). As a consequence of the	15
metropolitan court’s lack of jurisdiction, the district court also lacked jurisdiction to	16
address the merits on appeal. See Cruz, 2006-NMCA-109, ¶ 19.	17
2 We note that the district court sitting in probate has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether the appointment of the personal representative was valid, and, by
extension, whether the warranty deed to Defendant was valid. See NMSA 1978,
§ 45-1-302(A)(1) (2011).

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CONCLUSION	1
{16} 	For the reasons stated above, the metropolitan court lacked jurisdiction over	2
the matter. We accordingly reverse and remand this case to the metropolitan court	3
with instructions that it dismiss the Petition.	4
{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
_________________________	6
GERALD E. BACA, Judge	7
WE CONCUR:	8
_________________________________	9
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge	10
_________________________________	11
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	12