PALMER (CHRISTOPHER) v. STATE

140 Nev., Advance Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CHRISTOPHER DEANGELO PALMER, No. 86560-COA
Appellant,
vs. FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. JUN 27 Mit
ELI H A. BRO. N
OLE E CO
EY
C EF DEPU1Y CLERK

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of battery constituting domestic violence—strangulation, false
imprisonment, pandering, misdemeanor assault constituting domestic
violence, and misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joseph Hardy, Jr., Judge.
Reversed and rernanded.

F. Virginia Eichacker, Special Public Defender, and Melinda E. Simpkins
and Julian Gregory, Chief Deputy Special Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and Karen L. Mishler, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
WESTBROOK, JJ.

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OPINION

By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant
the right to a public trial. This public trial right helps ensure that the
defendant will be tried fairly, that the trial court and the prosecutor "carry
out their duties responsibly," and further "encourages witnesses to come
forward and discourages perjury." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
The public trial right is considered so fundamental that a violation
constitutes structural error •when preserved for appellate review. See
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 299 (2017); Jeremias v. State, 134
Nev. 46, 47, 412 P.3d 43, 46 (2018).
Before a court may exclude members of the public from a
criminal trial, it must satisfy the four-factor test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Waller and adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court
in Feazell v. State, 111 Nev. 1446, 1449, 906 P.2d 727, 729 (1995). In
Feazell, the supreme court concluded that a partial courtroom closure was
justified by a witness's fear for her personal safety after applying the four-
part Waller test. Since Feazell was decided nearly 30 years ago, Nevada's
appellate courts have never addressed in a published decision the
circumstances under which a partial closure would not be justified. We take
the opportunity to do so here and conclude that the trial court violated
Christopher Deangelo Pahner's right to a public trial by excluding Palmer's
family from the courtroom during the complaining witness's testimony
based on her nonspecific "concern" about their presence. Because the
district court did not comply with Waller, we reverse Palmer's judgment of
conviction and remand for a new trial.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from allegations that Palmer encouraged his
then-girlfriend, Wilkeshia Hunter, to engage in prostitution to make money
while they were both unemployed. Allegedly, after her first prostitution
"date," Palmer told Hunter that she had taken too long and then physically
attacked her over the course of several hours. In connection with these
allegations, the State charged Palmer with multiple crimes, including:
(1) battery constituting domestic violence—strangulation, (2) sex
trafficking, (3) first degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon,
(4) assault with a deadly weapon constituting domestic violence, (5) coercion
constituting domestic violence with the use of a deadly weapon, and
(6) misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence.1
Pending his trial, Palmer remained in custody at the Clark
County Detention Center for approximately ten months. During this
period, Palmer called and spoke with Hunter approximately 400 times, and
he also called and spoke with members of his family. These phone calls
were recorded. During one call, Hunter told Palmer that she no longer
wanted to be in a relationship with him, and on another call, Hunter stated
that she was "done" and was "just gonna leave [Palmer] alone." On a third
call, Palmer's mother told him that she was going to reach out to Hunter
and "guarantee" to her that "when [Palmer] comes home he won't bother
you, he won't call you, he won't act like you exist."
Palmer's six-day jury trial began in February 2023. During jury
selection, the district court excluded Palmer's brother from the courtroom

'Palmer was also charged with ownership or possession of a firearm
by a prohibited person, but that charge was bifurcated before the jury trial
and is not at issue in this appeal.
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after he stood up in the gallery and "mumbled something out loud" that
some prospective jurors "probably" could hear. Palmer did not object to his
brother's removal.
Later that day, the State requested that Palmer's entire family
be excluded from the courtroom during Hunter's upcoming testimony. The
prosecutor stated that the request was not only based on Palmer's family's
actions during the court proceedings, but also because Hunter expressed a
general "concern" about the family's presence. Additionally, the State noted
a concern of its own:
The big reason is because [Palmer], through
jail calls, had given [Hunter's] number to his
mother. To reach out to her. Things of that nature.
I'm not trying to say that anybody's threatened her
with death or anything like that. I'm not trying to
overblow this, Your Honor. But still, it's the course
of it and gives the State a lot of concern.
Palmer objected and offered alternatives to courtroom closure,
including having his family sit in the back of the courtroom during Hunter's
testimony or moving a monitor to block Hunter's view of the family. The
district court did not directly address the parties' arguments but stated it
would take the matter under advisement, and the State subsequently
provided the district court with a recording of the jail call between Palmer
and his mother.
Jury selection continued, and at the end of the following day the
State renewed its request to exclude Palmer's family from the courtroom
during Hunter's testimony, which was scheduled to begin the next day. The
State conceded that Palmer's family had not threatened Hunter but argued
Palmer's prior phone calls to his mother and to Hunter demonstrated
coerciveness:

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But when we talk about coercive behavior, as
we know, there's a—there's a continuum along a
long kind of array of what that can mean. And
that's why the State sent over the jail call so Your
Honor could listen to it and hear this is the kind of
conversation that's going on. Hey, reach out to
[Hunter] or hey, let her know. And [Palmer's
mother's] like yeah, no, I'm going to let her know
that, you know, he's not going to bother you
anymore. I mean, all those things it all goes to the
coercive behavior. It all goes to what's going on
behind the scenes, and not so much behind the
scenes because of his 450-400 and some odd calls to
the victim. And over and over, this is—it's a full-
court press, Your Honor. The full-court press is
going, and we could get it from—from the jail call.
So, the State has provided proof on this, and
we have shown good cause. This is not something—
the State did not go to the victim and say hey, are
you scared, do you want us to do this. This is
something she asked us about. She's aware of the
situation. She's very aware of it, and she has
concerns. And I think those are very well-founded
concerns. I—if somebody just said hey, I'm—I'm
scared of the family, I would tell them,
unfortunately, it's an open courtroom and we can't
do anything about that. And listen, I've had that
happen plenty in my career.
But in this case, that's not what happened
here. We're having somebody express a concern
because this is a family that has been reached out
to by the Defendant as we can hear on the jail calls
to reach out to the victim. They—they dated for
eight rnonths, the Defendant and the victim, so
everybody knows each other. And that's what we
hear on that jail call. . . . [I]f you're going to work on
dissuading witnesses, I think you forfeit your right
to sit—get the right to sit down and hear that
witness testify and stare at them from the back of
the courtroom.
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In response, Palmer argued that there was no evidence of
witness dissuasion and that the number of jail calls was not coercive
because Hunter accepted all of them. Palmer further argued there was no
evidence that his family had threatened Hunter or that his mother ever did,
in fact, reach out to Hunter. Ultimately, the district court decided to exclude
Palmer's family during Hunter's testimony, citing the "totality of the
circumstances," including its need to maintain "control in the courtroom,"
the misbehavior of Palmer's brother during jury selection, the jail calls
between Palmer and Hunter, and Palmer's alleged request for his mother
to reach out to Hunter.2
During Hunter's testimony, she acknowledged she had
extensive contact with Palmer while he was at the Clark County Detention
Center. Hunter stated that she accepted Palmer's numerous phone calls
after his arrest, went to the detention center to conduct video visits with
him, and put money on his books.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Palmer guilty of
(1) battery constituting domestic violence—strangulation, (2) pandering,
(3) gross misdemeanor false imprisonment, (4) misdemeanor assault
constituting domestic violence, and (5) misdemeanor battery constituting
domestic violence. The court sentenced Palmer to an aggregate prison term
of four to ten years with credit for time served on all misdemeanor and gross
misdemeanor offenses. On appeal, Palmer argues that the district court
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by excluding his family
during Hunter's testimony. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand
for a new trial.

21t does not appear that Hunter provided a statement or otherwise
participated in the State's request to exclude Palmer's family.
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ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall
enjoy "the right to a . . . public trial." In Waller v.. Georgia, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that this right "may give way in certain
cases to other rights or interests" and set forth a four-factor test that must
be met before a court can completely exclude the public from criminal trial
proceedings. 467 U.S. at 45. First, the trial court must find that "the party
seeking to close the hearing [has advanced] an overriding interest that is
likely to be prejudiced;" second, "the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect [the overriding] interest;" third, "the trial court must
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding;" and fourth, the
trial court "must make findings adequate to support the closure." Feazell,
111 Nev. at 1448, 906 P.2d at 728-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). However, when a court only partially closes the
proceedings, the court must find a "substantial reason" to justify the
closure, instead of an "overriding interest." Id. at 1448, 906 P.2d at 729
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When properly preserved, a violation of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, whether due to a full or partial courtroom
closure, is structural error. Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 47, 412 P.3d at 46. Thus,
the error "entitles an appellant to automatic reversal of his judgment of
conviction without an inquiry into whether the error affected the verdict."
Id.
In this case, because the district court temporarily excluded
Palmer's family during Hunter's testimony without closing the courtroom
completely, "it is appropriate to apply the less stringent 'substantial reason'
test to determine whether a defendant's right to a public trial was violated."
Feazell, 111 Nev. at 1448, 906 P.2d at 728 (quoting Woods v. Kuhlmann,
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977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992)). Therefore, when addressing the first Waller
factor, this court must determine if there was a "substantial reason" to
justify excluding Palmer's family. Palmer argues that Hunter's "amorphous
concern" did not justify closure and was insufficient to override his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial.
What constitutes a "substantial reason" is not subject to a
bright-line rule and varies based on the facts and circumstances of each
case. However, the presence of a defendant's family and supporters is of
particular importance. "[W]ithout exception all courts have held that an
accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948); see also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 216 (2010)
(reversing an appellant's conviction for drug trafficking because his uncle
was wrongly excluded during voir dire); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91
(2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing a "heightened interest in the exclusion of family
members and friends"). With this in mind, we turn to the reasons offered
by the district court to exclude Palmer's family: maintaining courtroom
control, the misbehavior of Palmer's brother, and Palmer's jail calls to
Hunter and to his mother. We conclude that none of these reasons justified
the partial courtroom closure in this case.
The first reason given—courtroom control—did not justify
excluding Palmer's family because nothing in the record indicated that
closure was necessary due to Palmer's family being disorderly or failing to
maintain courtroom decorum during the trial. Further, the district court
did not explain why excluding Palmer's entire family was necessary to
maintain courtroom control. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 744 N.Y.S.2d
407, 407 (App. Div. 2002) ("The trial court's exclusion of defendant's

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children, ages eight and nine, from the courtroom violated defendant's right
to a public trial, there being no support in the record for the contention that
the children were being disruptive."); cf. Clemons v. State, 720 So. 2d 961,
971 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (concluding the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right was not violated by closing the courtroom after several individuals in
the audience began causing disruptions during trial and "the record
show[ed] clea'rly that the judge closed the courtroom doors to preserve order
and decorum"). Because the district court did not address why the exclusion
was necessary to exercise courtroom control, nor was it apparent in the
record, this was not a substantial reason to justify closure.
The second, and related, reason given was the prior exclusion
of Palmer's brother during jury selection. However, Palmer's brother had
already been excluded from the courtroom, and the district court did not
explain why the brother's previous removal warranted excluding Palmer's
entire family, particularly when no other family members caused similar
interruptions during the trial and the closure was only during Hunter's
testimony. Cf. Woods, 977 F.2d at 77 (upholding the exclusion of the
defendant's entire family because the trial court expressly "considered, but
dismissed as ineffective, the possibility of removing only the family
members who threatened" the witness). Thus, this was also not a
substantial reason to justify closure.
The next reason provided was the high number of calls between
Palmer and Hunter. While the State argued that the sheer volume of calls
between Palmer and Hunter was "coercive," Palmer responded that Hunter
voluntarily accepted all of these calls and visited Palmer at the detention
center. Hunter's subsequent testimony confirmed that she did in fact
voluntarily accept Palmer's calls and visit him, and she did not testify that

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she felt coerced or threatened at any time following Palmer's arrest. We
disagree with the State's position, which it reasserts on appeal, that a large
number of calls between two willing participants alone, without any
reference to the calls' substance, is inherently coercive. Further, it is
unclear from the record why the high number of calls between Palmer and
Hunter would justify excluding Palmer's entire family, and the district court
did not provide an explanation on this point.3 Therefore, the number of calls
between Palmer and Hunter did not constitute a substantial reason to
justify the partial closure.4
The final reason offered by the district court was the jail call
between Palmer and his mother. During this call, Palmer purportedly gave

3We recognize that the charges in this case involved domestic violence
and sex trafficking and that the court could properly consider the
relationship between Palmer and Hunter when evaluating the existence of
coercion by Palmer. Cf. Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108, 118, 270 P.3d 1244,
1250 (2012) (recognizing that a "victim's prior accusations of domestic
violence were relevant because they provide insight into the relationship
and the victim's possible reason for recanting her prior accusations"). But
the State presented no argument or evidence below to suggest that Palmer's
family was part of a team trying to prevent her from testifying.

4Shortly before Hunter testified, the State made a record that Hunter
had received a text message that morning from an unknown number that
said, "twenty to life, don't go to Court." The district court excluded the text
message from evidence because the sender was unknown, and the court
reasoned that introducing the text message to the jury created a risk the
jury would improperly speculate that Palmer or someone connected to him
sent the message. On appeal, the State contends that this text message
justified the courtroom closure, but the message was sent a day after the
district court announced its decision to exclude Palmer's family. In
addition, to rely on the text message to retroactively justify the courtroom
closure would require this court to speculate that the message originated
from Palmer's family when the district court expressly rejected that
conclusion.
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Hunter's phone number to his mother, and his mother stated that she would
reach out to Hunter and tell her that Palmer would not bother her anymore.
The State argued to the district court that Hunter had a general "concern"
with Palmer's family being present in the courtroom because of this cal1.5
On appeal, however, the State specified that Hunter was concerned for her
44personal safety" and that her concern about
personal safety was a
substantial reason to justify the courtroom closure.
A witness's fear for her personal safety may be a substantial
reason to warrant a courtroom closure. See, e.g., Feazell, 111 Nev. at 1447-
49, 906 P.2d at 729. However, whether a closure is justified due to a
witness's fear frequently turns on whether objective evidence exists in the
record to establish that witness's fear, which may include evidence of direct
or indirect threats. See United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding a partial closure was justified when there was evidence in the
record showing that the defendant had threatened the complaining witness
and the witness feared retaliation by the defendant and his family); Nieto
v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a partial
closure was justified because the record showed "clear references to [the

5The recording of the jail call was transmitted to this court as an
original trial exhibit. The call was largely unintelligible, and, upon our
review, we were unable to discern that Palmer gave his mother Hunter's
phone number. While Palmer's mother did offer to reach out to Hunter, it
was unclear if Palmer requested that contact, but in any event, there was
no indication in the record that Palmer's mother actually contacted Hunter.
Further, the call neither contained any facially threatening or coercive
remarks directed at Hunter, nor was there anything apparent in the call
that would support a finding of witness dissuasion, as argued by the State.
See NRS 199.230 (defining witness dissuasion, in pertinent part, as
attempting to or preventing another person from testifying "by persuasion,
force, threat, intimidation, deception or otherwise").
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witness's] fear or concern" about other assailants who had not been
apprehended, the defendant and defendant's family knew where the
witness lived, and the police advised the witness to buy a gun); cf. Garcia v.
Bertsch, 470 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to grant postconviction
relief but noting that, had the issue come before the panel on direct appeal,
it may not have found the closure justified where the witness "did not say
why he was reluctant to testify. The trial court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing to clarify the reasons for [his] silence. As such, there is no evidence
in the record of any specific threats against him personally, or against his
family members.").
In Feazell, an eyewitness refused to testify unless the district
court excluded four African-American men from the courtroom "whom she
felt posed a threat to her personal safety." 111 Nev. at 1447, 906 P.2d at
728. The witness informed the court that she felt threatened specifically
"because she had received two telephone calls telling her not to testify and
because somebody had left a dead bird in a plastic bag on her patio." Id. at
1447-48, 906 P.2d at 728. After the witness identified the individuals she
did not want in the courtroom during her testimony, the district court made
findings regarding the threats and the witness's concern for her safety and
excluded the four men. Id. at 1448-49, 906 P.2d at 728-29. The Nevada
Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion did not violate Feazell's Sixth
Amendment rights because the witness's interest in her personal safety
"qualifie[d] as both a 'substantial reason' and an 'overriding interest'
sufficient to justify partially closing the trial." Id. at 1448-49, 906 P.2d at
729.
In Woods v. Kuhlmann, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit similarly determined that the appellant's Sixth

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Amendment rights were not violated when his family was excluded during
a witness's testimony. 977 F.2d at 78. The court first observed that, based
on the prosecutor's representations, the witness was "'scared to death'
because she had been threatened by at least one member of the defendant's
family," who had gone to the witness's house "telling her she had better not
testify, she had better not go to court." Id. at 75-76. Further, immediately
before the witness testified, she confirmed to the presiding judge that "she
was reluctant to testify because of 'certain fears' that she had for the safety
of herself and her family." Id. at 75. The Second Circuit found that, while
the court's questioning "may not have been exhaustive, we do not doubt that
by hearing her answer and observing her demeanor during this exchange,
the judge was able to adequately determine for herself the scope of [the
witness's] fear of the [defendant's] family." Id. at 77.
Unlike in Feazell and Woods, where the court was advised of
the specific, objective reasons why the witnesses feared for their personal
safety, the prosecutor in this case did not articulate to the district court why
Hunter was concerned about the family's presence, nor did the prosecutor
offer to have Hunter express her concerns directly to the court. The district
court did not have an "exchange" with Hunter to clarify the reasons for her
concern, and so the district court was not able to hear her answer or observe
her demeanor and could not adequately determine the scope of Hunter's
concern. More importantly, the State acknowledged that there were no
threats against Hunter.
While the State argues on appeal that Hunter's "concern" was
actually a fear for her personal safety, this was not reflected in the district

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court record.° The State neither proffered, nor did Hunter herself claim,
that she was afraid. Cf. Feazell, 111 Nev. at 1447-49, 906 P.2d at 728-29;
Woods, 977 F.2d at 77. To the extent that the State implied that Hunter
was concerned because Palmer had given his mother Hunter's phone
number during a jail call, the record does not establish that Palmer's mother
ever contacted Hunter. This creates further uncertainty and emphasizes
the lack of a clear record as to the source of Hunter's "concern" with Palmer's
family being present during her testimony. In the absence of a supporting
record or factual findings, Hunter's general "concern" was not a substantial
reason to justify the partial courtroom closure. Because none of the reasons
given by the district court were a "substantial reason" to justify the partial
courtroom closure, the first Waller factor was not met. Feazell, 111 Nev. at
1448, 906 P.2d at 729.
The second Waller factor, that the exclusion be "no broader than
necessary" to protect the identified substantial reason, was also not
satisfied in this case. 467 U.S. at 48. The record is unclear why excluding
Palmer's entire family was necessary. See Guzrnan v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772,
776 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a
defendant's family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial,

°The district court did not find that Hunter's concern was for her
personal safety or that Hunter's personal safety justified closure. Rather,
the State argued repeatedly that Hunter was "concerned" without ever
specifying the nature of that concern, and the district court agreed with the
State's argument as it was framed at trial. Though the State asks this court
to infer that Hunter's concern was tied to a fear for her personal safety, we
decline to speculate about the district court's reasoning for the closure. See
State u. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1176-77, 147 P.3d 233, 237-38 (2006)
(concluding that when the district court "does not include express findings
of fact," the appellate court will not "speculate about the factual inferences"
that the district court may have drawn).
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is not a step to be taken lightly."). The State's proffered reasons for the
exclusion, on their face, applied only to Palmer's mother and brother, but
otherwise did not implicate Palmer's other family members. Therefore,
even if a substantial reason existed to exclude Palmer's mother and brother
from the proceedings, that reason would not automatically apply to
Palmer's other family members absent findings to explain the necessity for
their exclusion. Cf. Woods, 977 F.2d at 77. Without such findings, this court
cannot hold that the closure was no broader than necessary to satisfy the
second Waller factor.
We are also concerned with the lack of consideration given to
"reasonable alternatives" to the partial closure under the third Waller
factor. Presley, 558 U.S. at 210 ("[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial
court had an overriding interest in closing voir dire, it was still incumbent
upon it to consider reasonable alternatives to closure. It did not, and that
is all this Court needs to decide."). Palmer offered two alternatives to
exclusion—having his family sit in the back of the room during Hunter's
testimony and moving a courtroom monitor to block Hunter's view of his
family—and the record does not reflect that the district court considered
these, or any other, alternatives to closure. See id. at 214 (noting that "trial
courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are
not offered by the parties"). Because the record does not reflect that the
district court considered or addressed the proposed reasonable alternatives
to closure, the third Waller factor was also not satisfied. See Feazell, 111
Nev. at 1448, 906 P.2d at 729.
Finally, the fourth Waller factor required the district court to
make adequate findings on the record to support its decision. 467 U.S. at
48. In this case, although the district court did make limited findings, it

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found that excluding Palmer's family was justified "under the totality of the
circumstances," rather than under the four-factor test provided in Waller.
While the district court identified reasons for the partial closure, as noted
above, the record does not support the court's conclusory findings that
closure was warranted to maintain courtroom control, to address
misbehavior by Palmer's brother, or in light of Palmer's numerous jail calls.
Further, the court did not find that excluding Palmer's entire family was no
broader than necessary and did not address the proposed reasonable
alternatives to closure. Because the record contains no findings that relate
to the second and third factors of the Waller test, this court cannot make
reasonable inferences from the record to support the district court's decision
without resorting to speculation. State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1177, 147
P.3d 233, 238 (2006).
Because the record does not support that the partial courtroom
closure was justified pursuant to Waller, the closure violated Palmer's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, which constitutes structural error
necessitating reversal.7 Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 47, 412 P.3d at 46.
CONCLUSION
The district court violated Palmer's Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial when it excluded his entire family from the courtroom during
the complaining witness's testimony in contravention of the four-part

7Palmer also alleges that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated
when his brother was removed during jury selection and when the marshal
excluded his family at the start of jury selection, even though the district
court subsequently corrected the marshal and instructed him to let Palmer's
family inside the courtroom. We need not reach these issues given that we
reverse on other grounds. See Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89 & n.26,
188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 & n.26 (2008) (explaining that this court need not
address issues that are unnecessary to resolve the case at bar).
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Waller test. First, none of the reasons advanced by the State and credited
by the court constituted a "substantial reason" to justify the partial
courtroom closure. Second, even if a substantial reason existed to justify
excluding Palmer's mother and brother, this court cannot find that the
closure was "no broader than necessary," as applied to Palmer's entire
family. Third, the record does not reflect that the court considered
reasonable alternatives to the closure. Finally, the court did not make
adequate findings to support the closure. Because the violation of Palmer's
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was a structural error, we reverse
Palmer's judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.8

J.
Westbrook

We concur:

, C.J.

J.
Bulla

8Insofar as Palmer raised other arguments that are not specifically
addressed in this opinion, we conclude that they either do not present a
basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.
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