SC Public Interest Foundation v. City of Greenville

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, and
Edward D. Sloan, Jr., and Robert M. Lloyd, individually
and as a taxpayers of the City of Greenville, South
Carolina, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Appellants/Respondents,

v.

City of Greenville, Mayor Knox H. White, and The Cliffs
at Glassy, Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom City of Greenville and Mayor Knox H. White
are the Respondents/Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212137

Appeal From Greenville County
D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-218
Heard April 16, 2014 – Filed June 11, 2014

AFFIRMED

James G. Carpenter and Jennifer J. Miller, both of the
Carpenter Law Firm, PC, of Greenville, for
Appellants/Respondents.
Kathleen Kempe, of the City Attorney's Office, of
Greenville, for Respondents/Appellants.

PER CURIAM: In this civil appeal arising from a boundary dispute, the South
Carolina Public Interest Foundation, Edward D. Sloan Jr., and Robert M. Floyd,
individually and as taxpayers of the City of Greenville, South Carolina, and on
behalf of others similarly situated (collectively Appellants), argue the trial court
erred in awarding only part of their requested attorney's fees. The City of
Greenville and Mayor Knox (collectively, Respondents) cross-appeal and argue the
trial court erred in awarding Appellants any attorney's fees.

We affirm the trial court on the appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities: Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley Inc., 393
S.C. 152, 156, 711 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2011) ("'The decision to award or deny
attorney['s] fees under a state statute will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion.'" (quoting Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 382 S.C.
8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009))); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-300 (Supp. 2013)
("In any civil action brought by the State, any political subdivision of the State or
any party who is contesting state action, unless the prevailing party is the State or
any political subdivision of the State, the court may allow the prevailing party to
recover reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate
agency if: (1) the court finds that the agency acted without substantial justification
in pressing its claim against the party; and (2) the court finds that there are no
special circumstances that would make the award of attorney's fees unjust.");
Sloan, 393 S.C. at 156-58, 711 S.E.2d at 897-98 (finding that under the FOIA
statute, the plaintiff was a prevailing party despite a ruling that the underlying
action was moot because "[h]onoring legislative intent as expressed in FOIA by
awarding attorney's fees in these circumstances may serve as an impetus for public
bodies to comply with a FOIA request and thus avoid the imposition of an
attorney's fee award")1; Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 445, 658 S.E.2d 320, 326

1
Appellants did not raise the issue of whether it was appropriate to extend the
definition of a prevailing party given in Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley Inc., 393
S.C. 152, 156, 711 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2011), beyond a fact scenario involving the
FOIA attorney's fee statute. See In the Interest of Bruce O., 311 S.C. 514, 515 n.1,
429 S.E.2d 858, 858 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[A]n appellant may not use oral
argument as a vehicle to argue issues not argued in the appellant's brief."). Thus, it
(2008) ("[I]n deciding whether a state agency acted with substantial justification,
the relevant question is whether the agency's position in litigating the case had a
reasonable basis in law and in fact."); see also Heath v. Cnty. of Aiken, 302 S.C.
178, 184, 394 S.E.2d 709, 712 (1990) ("Clearly this litigation enured to the benefit
of the citizens of Aiken County. Therefore, if any special circumstances exist, they
are such circumstances as would make it unjust not to award attorney's fees, for it
would obviously be unfair for Sheriff Heath to bear the costs of litigation which
benefitted all the citizens of Aiken County.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

is the law of the case. ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327
S.C. 238, 241, 489 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1997) (holding that an unappealed ruling is
law of the case); Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 161, 177 S.E.2d
544, 544 (1970) (finding that an unchallenged ruling, "right or wrong, is the law of
this case and requires affirmance.").