Raymond A. Wedlake v. Board of Directors of Woodington Homeowners' Association, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Raymond A. Wedlake, as a Member of Woodington
Homeowners' Association, Inc. and on behalf of all other
similarly situated members of Woodington Homeowners'
Association, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Board of Directors of Woodington Homeowners'
Association, Inc., comprised of Mona Craigo, Edward
Decker, and Sandra LaCroix; McCabe, Trotter, &
Beverly, P.C.; and State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000511

Appeal From Greenville County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-184
Submitted April 14, 2022 – Filed April 27, 2022

AFFIRMED

Raymond A. Wedlake, of Greenville, pro se.

James P. Walsh, of Clarkson, Walsh & Coulter, P.A., of
Greenville, for Respondents Board of Directors of
Woodington Homeowners' Association, Inc., Mona
Craigo, Edward Decker, and Sandra LaCroix.

Stephanie Trotter Kellahan, of McCabe, Trotter &
Beverly, P.C., of Columbia, for Respondent McCabe,
Trotter & Beverly, P.C.

Jennifer Elizabeth Johnsen, of Gallivan, White & Boyd,
PA, of Greenville; Natalie Rae Ecker, of Greenville; and
Nicholas Andrew Farr, of Rogers Townsend LLC, of
Greenville, all for Respondent State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company.

PER CURIAM: Raymond A. Wedlake appeals the circuit court's Form 4 order
affirming the magistrate court's dismissal of his complaint. On appeal, Wedlake
argues many issues. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. As to issues B, F, G, H, I, and M: Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675
S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the
trial court."); id. ("That standard requires the Court to construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if the 'facts alleged and the
inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to
relief on any theory of the case.'" (quoting Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 233,
553 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2001))).

2. As to issues AA, AB, and A: Carolina Renewal, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,
385 S.C. 550, 554, 684 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Collateral estoppel, also
known as issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was
decided in a previous action, regardless of whether the claims in the first and
subsequent lawsuits are the same."); id. ("The party asserting collateral estoppel
must demonstrate that the issue in the present lawsuit was: (1) actually litigated in
the prior action; (2) directly determined in the prior action; and (3) necessary to
support the prior judgment.").1

1
As to issue AC: id. at 554-55, 684 S.E.2d at 782 ("While the traditional use of
collateral estoppel required mutuality of parties to bar relitigation, modern courts
recognize the mutuality requirement is not necessary for the application of
collateral estoppel where the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and
3. As to issue C: Trancik v. USAA Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 549, 553-54, 581 S.E.2d 858,
861 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding a third party who is not a party to a contract cannot
bring suit for breach of contract); Park v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 251 S.C. 410,
415, 162 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1968) (providing an injured person who is not a party to
the insurance contract has "no primary standing to litigate a dispute between the
insured and insurer until and unless he establishes liability against [the insured]").

4. As to issue D: The magistrate court's order addressed causes of action raised in
the complaint and the amended complaint. Thus, we find Wedlake's argument
without merit.

5. As to issue E, K, and L: Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 49, 557 S.E.2d 676, 684
(Ct. App. 2001) ("A shareholder may maintain an individual action only if his loss
is separate and distinct from that of the corporation. A shareholder's suit is
derivative if the gravamen of his complaint is an injury to the corporation and not
to the individual interest of the shareholder." (quoting Hite v. Thomas & Howard
Co., 305 S.C. 358, 361, 409 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991), overruled on other grounds
by Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559, 560, 462 S.E.2d 860, 861 (1995))); Rule
23(b)(1), SCRCP ("The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation
or association."). To the extent Wedlake argues he represents the members of
Woodington Homeowners' Association, Inc., this argument is without merit: In re
Unauthorized Prac. of L. Rules Proposed by S.C. Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 306, 422
S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992) ("We modify [South Carolina case law] today to allow a
business to be represented by a non-lawyer officer, agent or employee . . . in civil
magistrate's court proceedings. . . . The magistrate shall require a written
authorization from the entity's president, chairperson, general partner, owner or
chief executive officer, or in the case of a person possessing a Limited Certificate,
a copy of that Certificate, before permitting such representation.").

6. As to issue J: Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 422, 483 S.E.2d 477, 484 (Ct.
App. 1997) (explaining no South Carolina case has recognized a cause of action
for "false light"). To the extent Wedlake's cause of action for "false light" can be
construed as one for defamation: Harris v. Tietex Int'l Ltd., 417 S.C. 533, 542, 790
S.E.2d 411, 416 (Ct. App. 2016) ("In South Carolina, defamation claims are

fair opportunity to previously litigate the issues." (quoting Snavely v. AMISUB of
S.C., Inc., 379 S.C. 386, 398, 665 S.E.2d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 2008))).
subject to a two-year statute of limitation."); id. ("The limitations period begins
when the alleged defamatory statement is made, not when the plaintiff learns of the
statement.").

AFFIRMED.2

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.