In the Matter of: The Estate of Roy E. Mevers, Jr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: The Estate of Roy E. Mevers, Jr.

South Carolina Attorney General, Respondent,

v.

Minnie Lee Newman Mevers, Appellant,

v.

J. James Duggan, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001152

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge,
Tamara C. Curry, Probate Court Judge,
Irvin G. Condon, Probate Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-119
Submitted February 26, 2024 – Filed April 17, 2024

VACATED

Daniel Francis Blanchard, III, of Rosen Hagood LLC, of
Charleston, for Appellant.
John James Duggan, of Duggan Wynn Law Firm, LLC,
of Charleston, for Respondent J. James Duggan.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Solicitor General
Robert D. Cook, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Clyde H. Jones, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Mary Frances G. Jowers, Assistant Attorney
General Kristin M. Simons, and Assistant Attorney
General Rebecca M. Hartner, all of Columbia; and
Stephen Lynwood Brown and C. Michael Branham, both
of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston; all for
Respondent South Carolina Attorney General.

PER CURIAM: Minnie Lee Newman Mevers (Widow) appeals the circuit court's
affirmance of the probate court's orders (1) granting the South Carolina Attorney
General's (the AG's) motions for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
temporary injunction restraining Widow from disposing of assets passing through
the residuary clause of the will of Widow's husband Roy E. Mevers (Mevers); (2)
appointing James Duggan as Special Administrator of Mevers's estate; (3) denying
Widow's motion to alter, amend or vacate the temporary injunction order; and (3)
granting Widow's motion to remove the action to circuit court. We vacate the
circuit court's order.

Pursuant to the general appealability statute, section 14-3-330 of the South
Carolina Code (2017), interlocutory appeals of orders involving injunctions are
immediately appealable. See § 14-3-330 (4) (providing the supreme court has
appellate jurisdiction of "[a]n interlocutory order or decree in a court of common
pleas granting, continuing, modifying, or refusing an injunction or granting,
continuing, modifying, or refusing the appointment of a receiver"). The South
Carolina Probate Code, however, governs appeals from the probate court. Swiger
by & through DeHaven v. Smith, 426 S.C. 408, 415, 827 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Ct. App.
2019); see Dorn v. Cohen, 421 S.C. 517, 520, 809 S.E.2d 53, 54 (2017) (holding
this court "erred in applying section 14-3-330 in determining whether the probate
court order was immediately appealable"). The Probate Code's appeals provision
provides, "A person interested in a final order, sentence, or decree of a probate
court may appeal to the circuit court in the same county . . . ." S.C. Code Ann.
§ 62-1-308(a) (2022). Thus, only final orders from the probate court are
appealable pursuant to section 62-1-308. Dorn, 421 S.C. at 520, 809 S.E.2d at 54.
"Any judgment or decree, leaving some further act to be done by the court before
the rights of the parties are determined, is interlocutory and not final." Ex parte
Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 12, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005).

The probate court's orders granting the TRO, granting the temporary injunction,
and appointing the special administrator are not final orders. The circuit court did
not have appellate jurisdiction to consider Widow's appeal of these orders.
Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's order affirming the probate court's
rulings. Because this issue is dispositive, we do not address Widow's arguments.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining
issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

VACATED. 1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.