Sylvia Lockaby v. City of Simpsonville

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sylvia Lockaby, Appellant,

v.

City of Simpsonville, Janice Curtis, and Adam Randolph,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001449

Appeal From Greenville County
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5993
Heard September 13, 2022 – Filed June 21, 2023

AFFIRMED

Andrew Sims Radeker and Taylor Meriwether Smith, IV,
both of Harrison, Radeker & Smith, P.A., of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Boyd Benjamin Nicholson, Jr. and Sarah P. Spruill, both
of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of Greenville; and
Daniel Roper Hughes, of Duggan & Hughes, LLC, of
Greer, all for Respondents.
GEATHERS, J.: In this civil rights action, former Simpsonville City
Councilmember Sylvia Lockaby (Lockaby) challenges a grant of summary judgment
to the City of Simpsonville (the City), former Mayor Janice Curtis (Curtis), and Sgt.
Adam Randolph (Sgt. Randolph) (collectively, Respondents). Lockaby alleges the
circuit court erred in (1) finding that she should have pursued "internal remedies"
before bringing suit; (2) concluding that her claims were barred by legislative
immunity; and (3) finding there were no genuine issues of material fact. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 9, 2016, the Simpsonville City Council began its regular business
meeting. After the call to order, pledge of allegiance, and a few other agenda items,
the conversation eventually turned to the matter of a proposed curb replacement in
the town. During discussion of the topic, Lockaby began asking the city
administrator questions. What happened next is revealed in a transcript provided in
the meeting minutes. We quote at length because of the centrality of the events to
the issues before us:

Councilmember Lockaby: Are we opening a can of
worms? Cause if we fix this . . .

Mayor Curtis: Who are you talking to?

Councilmember Lockaby: I'm looking at Mr. [Dyrhaug]. 1

Mayor Curtis: Well you didn't identify anyone . . . excuse
me.

Councilmember Lockaby: Mr. [Dyrhaug], I'm looking
straight at you. Are we opening a can of worms when we
do this? I'm just asking the question.

Mr. Dyrhaug: I don't have an answer for that, but I . . .

Councilmember Lockaby: Well.

1
The city administrator's name is rendered two different ways in the minutes. We
are not certain which is correct but have chosen the one used to designate him while
he was speaking.
Mr. Dyrhaug: The issue is that[,] so when this road was
resurfaced[,] that the reveal on the curb was diminished
and that's caused an issue of storm water coming from the
road onto private properties.

Councilmember Lockaby: And we have storm water
issues all over the city.

Mayor Curtis: [Not intelligible]

Councilmember Lockaby: I'm still speaking, please.

Mayor Curtis: Yes, but you're arguing the point and this
isn't a time for argument. You can ask questions, but this
isn't argument.

Councilmember Lockaby: I'm not arguing. I'm, I'm stating
a fact that we have storm water issues all over the city. Is
this opening a can of worms?

Mayor Curtis: Well, ask our attorney.

Councilmember Lockaby: I was asking Mr. [Dyrhaug;] I
haven't even gotten to the attorney yet.

Mayor Curtis: Well, okay, that's fine. Mr. Holmes, 2 could
you . . .

Councilmember Lockaby: I'm not finished.

Mayor Curtis: You are now. [Gavels] Thank you. Mr.
Holmes . . .

Councilmember Lockaby: I am not.

Mayor Curtis: Yes, you are. Mr. Holmes, could you . . .

2
This appears to be a reference to the city attorney.
Councilmember Lockaby: [talks over, not intelligible] . . .
we had to do . . .

Mayor Curtis: [Gavels 3 times] Order. Order. Order.

Councilmember Lockaby: You going to throw me out? 3

Mayor Curtis: [Gavels] Order.

Councilmember Lockaby: You going to threaten to throw
me out?

Mayor Curtis: Keep it up and you'll find out.

Councilmember Lockaby: I guess I will.

Mayor Curtis: Okay.

Councilmember Lockaby: I'm keeping it up.

Mayor Curtis: [Gavels] Mr. Holmes[,] will you please
answer her question? Thank you.

Councilmember Lockaby: I know if you want to answer
her question[;] I haven't asked one.

Mayor Curtis: Can I get the police officer from the back to
enter the front, please?

Officer: Need her out?

Mayor Curtis: I need her out.

Officer: Councilmember Lockaby, will you come with me,
please?

3
Apparently, Mayor Curtis had threatened to throw out another member of the
council earlier in the meeting. Mayor Curtis had taken office about a month earlier.
She testified in a deposition that restoring civility to the council was one of her goals.
Mayor Curtis: We'll take a five[-]minute recess. [Gavels.]

Accounts differ as to precisely what happened next. According to Lockaby,
she did not believe she said anything as the recess got underway. Instead, she
"gathered [her] stuff and . . . walked out." Sgt. Randolph, who was serving as
sergeant-at-arms, made sure she left the building. In her deposition, Lockaby
testified, "I'm sure if I had not gone willingly, then I would have been physically
escorted out." Lockaby also testified that during the exchange at the city council
meeting, she never raised her voice.

Others remember Lockaby's exit from the meeting slightly differently. In an
affidavit, Sgt. Randolph recalled that "Councilmember Lockaby said something to
the effect of[,] 'That's fine. I was leaving anyway.'" The city clerk remembered a
similar statement.

At the time, the Simpsonville Code of Ordinances provided, relevant to this
action:

The mayor shall be recognized as the head of the city
government for all ceremonial purposes and by the
governor for purposes of military law. He or she shall
preside over the meetings of the city council, but shall
have no regular administrative duties. The mayor shall
provide the city council with information, guidance[,] and
leadership in matters of policy determination.

The ordinances additionally stated: "Except as otherwise required by state law
or ordinance, all proceedings of council shall be governed by the latest edition of
'Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised,' and the city attorney shall act as
parliamentarian."

Finally, Rule 2-67 stated:

(a) Any person who speaks at a city council meeting shall
conduct himself or herself in a manner appropriate to the
decorum of the meeting and shall not use any profane,
abusive or obscene language nor any fighting [words] or
otherwise engage in disorderly conduct. Any person who
makes such remarks or otherwise engages in disorderly
conduct which disrupts or otherwise impedes the orderly
conduct of a city council meeting shall, at the discretion of
the presiding officer, be barred from further audience
before city council during that meeting and may be
removed from the building.

(b) Any law enforcement officer who is serving as
sergeant-at-arms of city council shall carry out all orders
and instructions given by the presiding officer for the
purpose of maintaining order and decorum at the city
council meeting. Upon instruction of the presiding officer,
it shall be the duty of such law enforcement officer to
remove from the city council meeting any person who is
disturbing the proceedings of the city council.

In February 2018, Lockaby filed an action against the City, Mayor Curtis, and
Sgt. Randolph. In her suit, Lockaby brought three claims: (1) violation of her civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, specifically with regard to her First Amendment and
Fourth Amendment rights; (2) gross negligence; and (3) false imprisonment.

In February 2019, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. 4 The
circuit court conducted a hearing on April 25, 2019, and took the matter under
advisement for 15 days to allow for more discovery. On July 1, 2019, the court
granted summary judgment, finding that (1) Lockaby failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies by not appealing Curtis's decision to the full council; and
(2) her claims were "barred by legislative immunity." Subsequently, the circuit court
denied Lockaby's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases
which do not require the services of a fact finder." Englert, Inc. v. LeafGuard USA,
Inc., 377 S.C. 129, 134, 659 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2008) (quoting George v. Fabri, 345
S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001)). "When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard applied by the [circuit] court
. . . ." Id. at 133–34, 659 S.E.2d at 498. "Summary judgment is appropriate when
'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

4
At some point, the circuit court found there were "no claims under the [South
Carolina Tort Claims] Act against the individual defendants." The order to this
effect does not appear in the record.
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"
Id. at 134, 659 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP). "When determining if
any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.

"[I]n cases requiring a heightened burden of proof or in cases applying federal
law . . . the non-moving party must submit more than a mere scintilla of evidence to
withstand a motion for summary judgment." Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., 381
S.C. 326, 330–31, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) (footnote omitted). Even in cases in
which the non-moving party faces the lower burden of proof involved in state claims,
our courts have noted that "a scintilla is a perceptible amount. There still must be a
verifiable spark, not something conjured by shadows." Gibson v. Epting, 426 S.C.
346, 352, 827 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ct. App. 2019).

Any disagreements over evidence or its meaning must be material, in addition
to being both genuine and concerning an issue of fact. See id. ("Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment." (alteration in original) (quoting, in parenthetical, Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Lockaby argues the circuit court erred in finding that her action was barred by
legislative immunity because the decision to eject her from the council meeting was
not legislative in nature. We disagree.

For nearly 25 years, the legislative immunity of local lawmakers in civil rights
actions has been openly acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Bogan v.
Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53–54 (1998) ("[W]e now make explicit what was
implicit in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from §
1983 liability for their legislative activities."). Similarly, our Tort Claims Act and
our state supreme court recognize the doctrine of legislative immunity. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-78-60(1) (2005) (providing that a "governmental entity is not liable
for a loss resulting from . . . legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial action or
inaction"); Richardson v. McGill, 273 S.C. 142, 146, 255 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1979).

In those contexts, our state and federal courts have occasionally wrestled with
what constitutes a "legislative act." For example, in a case dealing with the
constitutional immunity of Congress, 5 the U.S. Supreme Court discussed at some
length the boundaries of the immunity. See generally Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972). Both parties cite Gravel in their briefs, and we find some portions
of the decision instructive:

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the
[Speech and Debate] Clause is speech or debate in either
House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other
matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative
and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with
respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of
proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which
the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House. As the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have
extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or
debate in either House, but "only when necessary to
prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations."

Id. at 625 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st
Cir. 1972)). See also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) ("[W]e examine
the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has
been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular
forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.").

We have little trouble concluding that disciplinary actions targeted at a council
member for the sake of keeping order during a meeting is a legislative function.
While other jurisdictions are split on this question, we consider our conclusion as
the better view. See Whitener v. McWatters, 112 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 1997)
("[B]ecause citizens may not sue legislators for their legislative acts, legislative
bodies are left to police their own members. Absent truly exceptional circumstances,
it would be strange to hold that such self-policing is itself actionable in a court.");
id. ("This history and long practice confirm that the disciplinary action taken by the
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors against one of its members was legislative in

5
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 (providing that members of Congress "shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place." (emphasis added)).
nature. . . . As legislative speech and voting is protected by absolute immunity, the
exercise of self-disciplinary power is likewise protected."); see also Shields v.
Charter Twp. of Comstock, 617 F. Supp. 2d 606, 618 (W.D. Mich. 2009).

Nor do we think the fact that the action was taken by Mayor Curtis alone,
rather than the council as a whole, removes it from the realm of legislative action.
The Bogan court and other federal authority repeatedly stress that legislative
immunity does not depend on who carries out the act—or even why—but on what
act they carry out. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54 ("Whether an act is legislative turns
on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing
it."); see also Chase v. Senate of Virginia, 539 F. Supp. 3d 562, 571 (E.D. Va. 2021)
("Because legislators generally cannot perform their legislative roles without the
assistance of aides, legislative immunity extends to the agents of legislators. Lower
[federal] courts have extended that premise to find that even legislative employees
in administrative roles can be entitled to legislative immunity." (citation omitted));
cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978) (holding, in a case concerning
federal administrative judges: "Judges have absolute immunity not because of their
particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their
responsibilities.").

In sum, the decision to eject Lockaby from the council meeting was a
legislative act. Whether we believe the decision was rash and ill-advised is
immaterial. Therefore, we uphold the circuit court's ruling that Lockaby's suit is
barred by legislative immunity. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive,
we decline to address Lockaby's remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (recognizing
that an appellate court need not address the remaining issues when resolution of a
prior issue is dispositive).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order.

AFFIRMED.

MCDONALD, J., and HILL, A.J., concur.