Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT ET AL .
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–171. Argued December 1, 2025—Decided March 25, 2026
Under the Copyright Act, “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.” 17
U. S. C. §501(a). This Court has also recognized two categories of sec-
ondary liability, which means liability for the copyright infringement
of another. Those two categories are “contributory” liability and “vi-
carious” liability. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U. S. 913, 930.
This case concerns contributory liability, which requires that a pro-
vider intended its service to be used for infringement. A copyright
owner can show the requisite intent in two ways. First, it can show
that a party affirmatively induced the infringement. Ibid. Second, it
can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringement. Id., at
942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). These two bases for contributory lia-
bility track patent law. See 35 U. S. C. §§271(b), (c).
Cox Communications, Inc., is an Internet service provider serving
approximately six million subscribers, each associated with a unique
Internet Protocol address. Internet service providers like Cox have
limited knowledge about how their services are used; they know which
IP address corresponds to which subscriber account but cannot distin-
guish individual users or directly control how services are used. Cox
contractually prohibits subscribers from using their connection to post,
copy, transmit, or disseminate content that infringes copyrights.
Sony Music Entertainment and other major music copyright owners
enlisted MarkMonitor to track copyright infringement across the In-
ternet. MarkMonitor’s software detects when copyrighted works are

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2 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Syllabus
illegally uploaded or downloaded and traces the activity to particular
IP addresses. During the roughly two-year period at issue, MarkMon-
itor sent Cox 163,148 notices identifying IP addresses of Cox subscrib-
ers associated with infringement.
Sony sued Cox in Federal District Court, advancing two theories of
secondary copyright liability. First, Sony alleged that Cox contributed
to its users’ infringement by continuing to provide Internet service to
subscribers whose IP addresses Cox knew were associated with in-
fringement. Second, Sony alleged that Cox was vicariously liable for
its users’ infringement. The jury found in favor of Sony on both theo-
ries, found Cox’s infringement willful, and awarded $1 billion in stat-
utory damages. The District Court denied Cox’s post-trial motion for
judgment as a matter of law in relevant part. The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed as to contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a product
with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is
exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for contributory infringe-
ment. The Fourth Circuit reversed as to vicarious liability. This Court
granted Cox’s petition for certiorari as to contributory liability.
Held: The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user’s in-
fringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for in-
fringement, which can be shown only if the party induced the infringe-
ment or the provided service is tailored to that infringement; Cox
neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored
to infringement; accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the in-
fringement of Sony’s copyrights. Pp. 6–10.
(a) “The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another.” Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 434. Ordinarily, when Congress
intends to impose secondary liability, it does so expressly. Central
Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511
U. S. 164, 176–177. The Court’s precedents have recognized specific
forms of secondary copyright liability that predated the Copyright Act,
but the Court is loath to expand such liability beyond those precedents.
Under this Court’s precedents, the intent required for contributory
liability can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the
provided service is tailored to that infringement. See Grokster, 545
U. S., at 930; Sony, 464 U. S., at 440–441.
A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages infringe-
ment through specific acts, as in Grokster, where file-sharing software
companies promoted and marketed their software as a tool to infringe
copyrights. See 545 U. S., at 926. A service is tailored to infringement
if it is “not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ nonin-
fringing uses.” Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For example, in
Sony, the Court held that sale of the Betamax video tape recorder to

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3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
the general public did not constitute contributory infringement. It rea-
soned that the tape recorder was “capable of substantial noninfringing
uses” because it could be used to record copyrighted television pro-
grams for later personal viewing, which would not constitute infringe-
ment—even though it could also be used to reproduce and sell copy-
righted programming, which would constitute infringement. 464
U. S., at 449, 456. The Court has repeatedly made clear—see Kalem
Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, Sony, and Grokster—that mere
knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient to es-
tablish the required intent to infringe. Pp. 6–9.
(b) Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a ser-
vice tailored to infringement. As for inducement, Cox did not “induce”
or “encourage” its subscribers to infringe in any manner, Grokster, 545
U. S., at 930; Sony provided no “evidence of express promotion, mar-
keting, and intent to promote” infringement, id., at 926; and Cox re-
peatedly discouraged copyright infringement by sending warnings,
suspending services, and terminating accounts. As for providing a ser-
vice tailored to infringement, Cox’s Internet service was clearly “capa-
ble of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses,”
id., at 942; Cox simply provided Internet access, which is used for
many purposes other than copyright infringement.
The Fourth Circuit’s holding went beyond the two forms of liability
recognized in Grokster and Sony by holding that “supplying a product
with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is
. . . sufficient for contributory infringement.” 93 F. 4th 222, 236. This
holding went beyond the two bases for contributory liability recognized
in the Court’s precedent and conflicted with the Court’s repeated ad-
monition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a provider’s
knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it. Pp. 9–
10.
(c) Sony argues that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe har-
bor—under which Internet service providers cannot be secondarily li-
able for certain forms of copyright infringement if they have imple-
mented “a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders” who “are repeated
infringers,” 17 U. S. C. §512(i)(1)(A)—would have no effect if Internet
service providers are not liable for providing Internet service to known
infringers. The DMCA does not expressly impose liability for Internet
service providers who serve known infringers; it merely creates new
defenses from liability for such providers. The DMCA itself made clear
that failure to comply with the safe-harbor rules “shall not bear ad-
versely upon . . . a defense by the service provider,” as here, “that the
service provider’s conduct is not infringing.” §512(l). P. 10.
93 F. 4th 222, reversed and remanded.

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4 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Syllabus
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, KAGAN, G ORSUCH , KAVANAUGH , and BARRETT , JJ., joined.
S OTOMAYOR , J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
JACKSON, J., joined.

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_________________
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1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–171
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ET AL .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[March 25, 2026]
J USTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Countless people use the Internet for legal activities, but
some use it to illegally share copyrighted works, such as
songs and movies. The Copyright Act authorizes copyright
owners to sue these copyright infringers. 17 U. S. C.
§§501(a), 504(a). In this case, however, instead of suing
those infringers, the copyright owners sued petitioners, Cox
Communications, Inc., and its subsidiary, who provided the
Internet connections that the infringers used. They con-
tended that Cox was itself liable for copyright infringement
because it continued to provide known infringers with In-
ternet access.
Based on this theory of infringement, respondents, Sony
Music Entertainment and other major copyright owners,
secured a billion-dollar verdict against Cox. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that
because Cox provided Internet service to known infringers,
it was a willful infringer itself.
Under our precedents, a company is not liable as a copy-
right infringer for merely providing a service to the general
public with knowledge that it will be used by some to in-
fringe copyrights. Accordingly, we reverse.

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2 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Opinion of the Court
I
A
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners have the ex-
clusive rights to copy, distribute, and digitally transmit
their copyrighted works. §106. So, for example, if a musi-
cian has a copyright for a song recording, others generally
cannot copy and share that recording without the musi-
cian’s permission. The Copyright Act provides that “[a]ny-
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.” §501(a). A will-
ful infringer faces statutory damages of up to $150,000 per
work. §504(c)(2).
This Court has also recognized two categories of second-
ary copyright liability, which means liability for the copy-
right infringement of another. Those two categories are
“contributory” liability and “vicarious” liability. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S.
913, 930 (2005). This case concerns contributory liability.
The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a
user’s infringement if it intended its service to be used for
infringement. To establish that a provider intended its ser-
vice to be used for infringement, a copyright owner must
show one of two things. First, it can show that a party af-
firmatively “induc[ed]” the infringement. Ibid. Or, second,
it can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringe-
ment. Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Patent law,
with which copyright law has a “historic kinship,” Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S.
417, 439 (1984), tracks these two requirements. See 35
U. S. C. §§271(b), (c).
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, 17 U. S. C. §1201 et seq., which gave service pro-
viders a safe-harbor defense to secondary copyright liabil-
ity. Under the DMCA safe-harbor defense, service
providers cannot be secondarily liable for certain forms of
copyright infringement if they have implemented “a policy

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3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
that provides for the termination in appropriate circum-
stances of subscribers and account holders” who “are re-
peated infringers.” §512(i)(1)(A). At the same time, the
DMCA specifies that failure to qualify for the safe-harbor
defense “shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of
a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s
conduct is not infringing.” §512(l).
B
Cox Communications, Inc., is an Internet service provider
that serves about 6 million subscribers. Each subscriber’s
account is associated with a unique Internet Protocol, or
“IP,” address. Many users can share a particular IP ad-
dress. For example, a household, coffee shop, or college dor-
mitory ordinarily has one IP address, but has multiple in-
dividual users.
Internet service providers, such as Cox, have limited
knowledge about how their Internet services are used and
who uses them. They do know which IP address corre-
sponds to which subscriber’s account, but they cannot dis-
tinguish one individual user from another. For instance, if
an Internet service provider learns that someone illegally
downloaded music from a coffee shop’s IP address, the In-
ternet service provider cannot determine which individual
at the coffee shop infringed the copyright. And, more gen-
erally, Internet service providers also cannot directly con-
trol how their Internet services are used.
Sony Music Entertainment and the other plaintiffs in
this case are major music copyright owners. They have
struggled to protect their copyrights in the age of online mu-
sic sharing. Today, anyone with an Internet connection and
easily obtained software can upload digital copies of copy-
righted music and make them available for others to down-
load. This practice often infringes the owners’ exclusive
rights to copy and distribute their works. §§106(1), (3).

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4 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Opinion of the Court
Copyright owners can, and do, sue the individuals who in-
fringe their copyrights in this manner. See, e.g., Sony BMG
Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 660 F. 3d 487, 490
(CA1 2011). However, because online infringement is so
widespread, pursuing each individual infringer does little
to stem the tide.
Given the difficulty of pursuing individual infringers,
Sony attempted to enlist Internet service providers such as
Cox to help it enforce its copyrights. It enlisted the services
of an entity called MarkMonitor to track infringement of its
copyrights across the Internet. MarkMonitor’s software
can detect when copyrighted works are illegally uploaded
or downloaded and trace the infringing activity to a partic-
ular IP address. It can also identify the Internet service
provider for the infringing IP address. When MarkMonitor
detects apparently infringing activity, it sends notices to
the Internet service provider, identifying the IP address at
which the infringement occurred. In the roughly 2-year pe-
riod at issue here, MarkMonitor sent Cox 163,148 such no-
tices.
Cox states that it took steps to limit copyright infringe-
ment by those using its Internet services. According to Cox,
it created a system of responding to the notices that it re-
ceived from MarkMonitor. After the second MarkMonitor
notice for a subscriber’s account, Cox sent a warning to that
subscriber. After additional notices, Cox terminated Inter-
net access to that subscriber’s IP address until the sub-
scriber responded to the warning. If it continued to receive
notices for that IP address, Cox suspended service until the
subscriber called and received a warning over the phone.
After 13 notices, the subscriber was subject to termination
of all Internet service. Cox also contractually prohibits its
subscribers from using their connection “to post, copy,
transmit, or disseminate any content that infringes the pa-
tents, copyrights . . . or proprietary rights of any party.” 2
App. 405.

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5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
The parties disagree about how to characterize Cox’s ef-
forts to protect Sony’s copyrights. Sony points out that Cox
terminated only 32 subscribers for infringement during the
claim period, even as it terminated hundreds of thousands
of subscribers for nonpayment during the same period.
Brief for Respondents 18. Sony also points to statements
from Cox employees expressing frustration with the notices
and an unwillingness to act on them in favor of protecting
revenue from subscriber payments. Id., at 22. Cox resists
this characterization by pointing out that its warning and
suspension system ended 98% of identified infringement.
Brief for Petitioners 10–11.
C
Sony sued Cox in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. It advanced two theories of
secondary copyright liability.
First, Sony alleged that Cox was contributorily liable for
its users’ infringement. Sony argued that Cox contributed
to its users’ infringement by continuing to provide Internet
service to subscribers whose IP addresses it knew were as-
sociated with infringement. Second, Sony alleged that Cox
was vicariously liable for its users’ infringement. On Sony’s
telling, Cox “profit[ed] directly from the infringement and
ha[d] a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer[s],”
Grokster, 545 U. S., at 930, n. 9, because it provided paying
subscribers with Internet service that was then used to in-
fringe. According to Sony’s allegations, Cox was liable for
willfully infringing 10,017 copyrighted works, subjecting it
to up to $1.5 billion in statutory damages.
In the District Court, Sony prevailed as to both contribu-
tory and vicarious liability. The jury found in favor of Sony
on both theories. 464 F. Supp. 3d 795, 807–808 (ED Va.
2020). It also found that Cox’s infringement was willful,

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6 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Opinion of the Court
awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. Ibid. The Dis-
trict Court denied Cox’s post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law in relevant part. Id., at 847.*
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
It affirmed as to contributory liability because Cox contin-
ued to provide Internet service to known infringers. Apply-
ing Circuit precedent, it reasoned that “supplying a product
with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe cop-
yrights is exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for
contributory infringement.” 93 F. 4th 222, 236 (2024) (cit-
ing BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Communications,
Inc., 881 F. 3d 293, 308 (2018)). The Fourth Circuit re-
versed as to vicarious liability because it concluded that Cox
did not “receiv[e] a direct financial benefit from its subscrib-
ers’ infringement.” 93 F. 4th, at 233. The court then va-
cated the damages award and remanded for the jury to re-
assess damages based on contributory liability alone.
We granted Cox’s petition for a writ of certiorari as to con-
tributory liability. 606 U. S. 930 (2025). We denied Sony’s
petition for a writ of certiorari regarding vicarious liability.
606 U. S. 931 (2025).
II
A
“The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone lia-
ble for infringement committed by another.” Sony, 464
U. S., at 434. Ordinarily, when Congress intends to impose
secondary liability, it does so expressly. See Central Bank
of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A.,
511 U. S. 164, 176–177 (1994). Although our precedents
——————
*Cox could not invoke the DMCA safe-harbor defense based on its ef-
forts to reduce infringement because an earlier decision had foreclosed
that defense for the relevant period. 93 F. 4th 222, 228 (CA4 2024) (cit-
ing BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 881 F. 3d
293, 301–305 (CA4 2018)).

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7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
have recognized specific forms of secondary copyright liabil-
ity that predated the Copyright Act, we are loath to expand
such liability beyond those precedents.
B
The provider of a service is contributorily liable for the
user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided ser-
vice be used for infringement. The intent required for con-
tributory liability can be shown only if the party induced
the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that
infringement. Grokster, 545 U. S., at 930; Sony, 464 U. S.,
at 440–441.
A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages
infringement through specific acts. Grokster, 545 U. S., at
942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For example, in Grokster,
we held that a jury could find two file-sharing software com-
panies liable for inducement. Id., at 941 (majority opinion).
The companies promoted and marketed their software as a
tool to infringe copyrights. Id., at 926. The “principal ob-
ject” of their business models “was use of their software to
download copyrighted works.” Ibid. Other decisions have
held providers liable for similar conduct. See Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62–63 (1911) (finding liabil-
ity where “[t]he defendant not only expected but invoked by
advertisement the use of its films” for infringement of an
author’s copyright); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 49
(1912) (finding liability because the sale was made “with
the purpose and intent” that the object be used for patent
infringement), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 518
(1917).
A service is tailored to infringement if it is “not capable
of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing
uses.” Grokster, 545 U. S., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting Sony, 464 U. S., at 442). In Sony, copyright owners
sued the maker and the retailers of the Betamax video tape

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8 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
Opinion of the Court
recorder. Id., at 422. The tape recorder could be used to
record copyrighted television programs for later personal
viewing, which would not constitute infringement. Id., at
449. On the other hand, it could also be used to reproduce
and sell copyrighted television programming, which would
constitute infringement. Ibid. The lower court found the
Betamax maker liable because the tape recorder was “not
suitable for any substantial noninfringing use” and in-
fringement “was either the most conspicuous use or the ma-
jor use of the Betamax product.” Id., at 428 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). This Court reversed, concluding
that “[t]he Betamax is . . . capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses”—like personal use—so “sale of such equip-
ment to the general public does not constitute contributory
infringement.” Id., at 456.
These two forms of contributory infringement track pa-
tent law. See Grokster, 545 U. S., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring). Under 35 U. S. C. §271(b), “[w]hoever actively in-
duces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.” Such liability requires that the party express
“an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe.”
Grokster, 545 U. S., at 936. Under §271(c), a party is liable
when it sells a product used for infringement “knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent.”
This Court has repeatedly made clear that mere
knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insuffi-
cient to establish the required intent to infringe. In Kalem
Co., the Court explained that “mere indifferent supposition
or knowledge on the part of the seller” that the buyer will
use the product unlawfully is “not enough” to make the
seller liable for the buyer’s conduct. 222 U. S., at 62. In
Sony, the Court explained that “[t]here is no precedent in
the law of copyright” for liability based only “on the fact that
[the defendant] has sold equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that

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Opinion of the Court
equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted ma-
terial.” 464 U. S., at 439. And, in Grokster, the Court con-
firmed that “a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take af-
firmative steps to prevent infringement.” 545 U. S., at 939,
n. 12.
III
Thus, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement
of Sony’s copyrights. Cox provided Internet service to its
subscribers, but it did not intend for that service to be used
to commit copyright infringement. Holding Cox liable
merely for failing to terminate Internet service to infringing
accounts would expand secondary copyright liability be-
yond our precedents.
Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided
a service tailored to infringement. As for inducement, Cox
did not “induce” or “encourage” its subscribers to infringe in
any manner. Id., at 930. Sony provided no “evidence of ex-
press promotion, marketing, and intent to promote” in-
fringement. Id., at 926. And, Cox repeatedly discouraged
copyright infringement by sending warnings, suspending
services, and terminating accounts. As for providing a ser-
vice tailored to infringement, Cox’s Internet service was
clearly “capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’
noninfringing uses.” Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Cox did not tailor its service to make copyright infringe-
ment easier. Cox simply provided Internet access, which is
used for many purposes other than copyright infringement.
The Fourth Circuit found otherwise based only on its Cir-
cuit precedent establishing a new form of contributory lia-
bility. The court did not suggest that Cox induced its users
to infringe. 93 F. 4th, at 235, n. 4. And, it did not deny that
Cox’s service was “capable of substantial lawful use and not
designed to promote infringement.” Id., at 236. Rather, the
court held that “supplying a product with knowledge that

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10 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
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Opinion of the Court
the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is . . . suffi-
cient for contributory infringement.” Ibid.; see also BMG,
881 F. 3d, at 311–312. The Fourth Circuit’s holding thus
went beyond the two forms of liability recognized in Grok-
ster and Sony. It also conflicted with this Court’s repeated
admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient ac-
tion to prevent it. See Kalem Co., 222 U. S., at 62; Sony,
464 U. S., at 439; Grokster, 545 U. S., at 939, n. 12.
IV
Finally, Sony argues that the DMCA safe harbor would
have no effect if Internet service providers are not liable for
providing Internet service to known infringers. Brief for
Respondents 38. The DMCA safe harbor protects Internet
service providers that terminate repeat infringers “in ap-
propriate circumstances.” 17 U. S. C. §512(i)(1)(A). Sony
argues that Congress must have enacted the DMCA on the
presumption that Internet service providers could be held
liable in cases such as these.
Sony overreads the DMCA. Sony does not contend that
the DMCA expressly imposes liability for Internet service
providers who serve known infringers. It does not. The
DMCA merely creates new defenses from liability for such
providers. And, the DMCA made clear that failure to com-
ply with the safe-harbor rules “shall not bear adversely
upon . . . a defense by the service provider that the service
provider’s conduct is not infringing.” §512(l).
V
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–171
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ET AL .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[March 25, 2026]
J USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE J ACKSON joins,
concurring in the judgment.
Cox Communications, an internet service provider, re-
ceives thousands of notices every day that specific Cox-sup-
plied internet connections have been used to infringe copy-
rights. The Court granted certiorari to decide whether Cox
can be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement
committed by others on its network because Cox knowingly
continues to service specific internet connections that have
been, and will continue to be, used to commit that infringe-
ment.
The majority holds that Cox is not liable solely because
its conduct does not fit within the two theories of secondary
liability previously applied by this Court. In so doing, the
majority, without any meaningful explanation, unneces-
sarily limits secondary liability even though this Court’s
precedents have left open the possibility that other com-
mon-law theories of such liability, like aiding and abetting,
could apply in the copyright context. By ignoring those past
decisions, the majority also upends the statutory incentive
structure that Congress created.
I nonetheless agree with the majority that Cox cannot be
held liable here for a different reason. Plaintiffs cannot
prove that Cox had the requisite intent to aid copyright

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2 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
infringement for Cox to be liable on a common-law aiding-
and-abetting theory. I therefore concur in the judgment.
I
The Copyright Act does not expressly provide for second-
ary liability. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 434 (1984). Still, this Court
has recognized that there are two types of secondary liabil-
ity under the Copyright Act: vicarious and contributory lia-
bility. See ibid. The former attaches when a party has con-
trol over another’s infringing activity and fails to stop it,
and the latter attaches when a party materially contributes
in some way to another’s infringement. See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S.
913, 930 (2005); see also Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971)
(discussing vicarious and contributory liability). This case
comes to the Court with only contributory liability remain-
ing at issue.
As the majority explains, this Court’s cases have held
that contributory liability for copyright infringement may
attach in at least two circumstances. The first is when a
defendant distributes or provides a product or service that
is incapable of “commercially significant noninfringing
uses.” Sony, 464 U. S., at 442. In other words, the product
or service must be “ ‘good for nothing else’ but infringe-
ment.” Grokster, 545 U. S., at 932. The Court applied that
doctrine in Sony, 464 U. S. 417, and held that Sony was not
liable for copyright infringement for selling the Betamax, a
tape-recorder device that enabled users to record television
shows for later watching. Id., at 442. Regardless of
whether the Betamax could be used to commit infringe-
ment, the Court reasoned, it was also capable of “commer-
cially significant noninfringing uses,” such as recording a
show for personal viewing at home after it aired. Ibid.

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S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
The second circumstance in which contributory liability
may attach is when a party induces another to commit in-
fringement. The Court applied this rule in Grokster, 545
U. S. 913. There, the defendants distributed peer-to-peer
file sharing software that had lawful uses but also enabled
massive amounts of copyright infringement as users shared
copyrighted materials with one another without authoriza-
tion. Id., at 919–922. Drawing from the common law, the
Court held that a party can be liable for the infringements
of another if it takes “ ‘active steps . . . to encourage direct
infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or in-
structing how to engage in an infringing use.” Id., at 936
(citation omitted). The Court found that the software dis-
tributors had done just that by advertising their software
to users of previous infringing services, declining to imple-
ment filters or other policies to weed out infringing content,
and relying on a revenue model tied to high-volume use of
their software. Id., at 939–940.
II
I agree with the majority that neither of the two prior
theories of secondary liability applied by this Court covers
Cox’s conduct. See ante, at 9–10. The majority is wrong,
however, that those are or should be the only two forms of
secondary liability for copyright infringement. The major-
ity’s artificial limiting of secondary liability is supported by
neither precedent nor statute.
A
To determine whether Cox may be held liable, the major-
ity starts by correctly explaining that “[t]he provider of a
service is contributorily liable for the user’s infringement
only if it intended that the provided service be used for in-
fringement.” Ante, at 7; see infra, at 7–12. The majority,
however, errs in the very next sentence. It asserts, with no
meaningful explanation, that “[t]he intent required for

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4 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
contributory liability can be shown only if the party induced
the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that
infringement.” Ante, at 7. Because plaintiffs do not satisfy
those theories of contributory liability, according to the ma-
jority, their claims cannot succeed.
The inflexible limit the majority imposes is nowhere to be
found in either Sony or Grokster, the only authorities that
the majority cites, see ante, at 7. Beginning with Sony, alt-
hough that case acknowledged that the Copyright Act does
not expressly provide for secondary liability, it also clarified
that “[t]he absence of such express language in the copy-
right statute does not preclude the imposition of” secondary
liability, such as vicarious and contributory liability, be-
cause both forms of liability are “imposed in virtually all
areas of the law.” 464 U. S., at 434–435; see id., at 436
(Contributory liability principles are “ ‘recognized in every
part of the law’ ”). Far from supporting the majority’s limi-
tation of secondary liability, Sony teaches that the scope of
secondary liability for copyright infringement should be de-
fined by reference to other areas of the law. Id., at 435–437.
The Court reinforced this point in Grokster. In that case,
the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit contributory liability
to the circumstances Sony confronted. This Court reversed,
explaining that Sony neither “displace[d] other theories of
secondary liability” nor “foreclose[d] rules of fault-based li-
ability derived from the common law.” 545 U. S., at 934–
935. Instead, all Sony did was “limi[t] imputing culpable
intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of
a distributed product.” 545 U. S., at 934. “[N]othing in
Sony,” the Court said, “requires courts to ignore evidence of
intent if there is such evidence.” Ibid.
Properly understood, Sony and Grokster preserved other
forms of secondary liability derived from the common law.
The majority, however, does not even mention that Grokster
expressly held the door open to other common-law liability
rules. Instead, all the majority offers is that it is “loath to

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5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
expand [secondary] liability” further based on the general
principle that “[o]rdinarily, when Congress intends to im-
pose secondary liability, it does so expressly.” Ante, at 6–7.
That principle, however, is irrelevant here because this
Court held over 40 years ago that the Copyright Act im-
pliedly provides for secondary liability. See Sony, 464 U. S.,
at 434–435. Stare decisis requires this Court to apply that
holding fairly, not ignore or artificially constrain it. Indeed,
“stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . in-
terprets a statute.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Whatever the majority may
think of Sony and Grokster, those decisions have “effectively
become part of the [copyright] statutory scheme.” Kimble,
576 U. S., at 456. Whether that statutory scheme imposes
liability under these circumstances must be decided accord-
ing to what those cases said, not what the majority might
wish they had said. Adhering to precedent is even more
important where, as here, Congress has legislated based on
this Court’s decisions.
B
The majority’s limiting of secondary liability here dis-
mantles the statutory incentive structure that Congress
created. Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (DMCA) in 1998, 14 years after this Court held in
Sony that the Copyright Act impliedly provided for second-
ary liability. At the time, the internet was exploding in pop-
ularity. Without knowing more about the outer bounds of
secondary liability for copyright infringement, and faced
with a rapidly changing technological landscape, Congress
included in the DMCA a safe harbor that shields internet
service providers (ISPs) like Cox from secondary liability for
copyright infringement. To gain that protection, they must
“adop[t] and reasonably implemen[t] . . . a policy that pro-
vides for the termination in appropriate circumstances” of
subscribers who repeatedly infringe copyrights using the

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6 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
ISP’s network. 17 U. S. C. §§512(a) and (i)(1)(A). Im-
portantly, Congress did not provide that ISPs could never
be secondarily liable for copyright infringement. Instead, it
struck a balance by creating incentives for ISPs to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent copyright infringement on their
networks, while also assuring ISPs that they do not need to
take on the impossible task of responding to every instance
of infringement on their networks.
The majority’s new rule completely upends that balance
and consigns the safe harbor provision to obsolescence.
Typically, this Court tries “ ‘ “to give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute.” ’ ” TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001). After today, however, ISPs no
longer face any realistic probability of secondary liability
for copyright infringement, regardless of whether they take
steps to address infringement on their networks and re-
gardless of what they know about their users’ activity. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (counsel for Cox agreeing that it “would
have no liability risk” based on knowledge alone). For ex-
ample, under the majority’s rule, an ISP faces no liability if
it sells an internet connection to a company that the ISP
knows runs a website that exclusively hosts illegally ob-
tained copyrighted material. That ISP also faces no liabil-
ity even if it sells a connection to a customer who walks into
the store and says that he needs a new internet connection
because the other, more scrupulous ISP in town cut his con-
nection after years of unabated piracy.
The majority’s decision thus permits ISPs to sell an inter-
net connection to every single infringer who wants one
without fear of liability and without lifting a finger to pre-
vent infringement. It also means that Cox is free to aban-
don its current policy of responding to copyright infringe-
ment. As Cox’s counsel conceded at oral argument, under
the rule the majority adopts today, the safe harbor provi-
sion will not “d[o] anything at all” going forward, id., at 28–

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S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
29. Congress did not enact the safe harbor just so that this
Court could eviscerate it.*
III
Instead of artificially limiting secondary liability, the
Court should have examined whether some other “rul[e] of
fault-based liability derived from the common law” might
hold Cox liable for copyright infringement committed on its
network. Grokster, 545 U. S., at 934–935. Plaintiffs argue
that Cox is liable because it materially contributed to in-
fringement by servicing internet connections that it knew
would be used to commit infringement. That argument is
rooted in the common-law doctrine of aiding and abetting.
That doctrine, however, requires plaintiffs to show that Cox
intended to aid infringement, and the facts of this case fore-
close that inference.
A
This Court has addressed common-law civil aiding-and-
abetting liability twice in recent years. In both cases, it
held that aiding-and-betting liability requires proof that
the defendant aided another with the intent of helping that
other person succeed in committing wrongful conduct.
The first of this Court’s recent cases is Twitter, Inc. v.
Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023). There, the plaintiff alleged
that social media platforms had aided and abetted a terror-
ist attack by ISIS because they knowingly hosted content,
posted by ISIS and its followers, that was intended to
spread ISIS propaganda, recruit members, and raise funds.
Id., at 481. The platforms also allegedly promoted that con-
tent via their algorithms. Ibid. The plaintiffs asserted that
——————
*Under the majority’s view, ISPs could still face secondary liability if
they design their service to facilitate infringement or if they promote
their service as infringement friendly. The safe harbor, however, is not
intended to help an ISP facing liability on either of those two theories
because it requires that an anti-infringement policy be “reasonably im-
plemented.” 17 U. S. C. §512(i)(1)(A).

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8 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
the platforms had not done enough to “detect and remove a
substantial number of ISIS-related accounts, posts, and
videos.” Ibid.
This Court held that the platforms could not be held lia-
ble as aiders and abettors based on the complaint’s allega-
tions. After surveying lower court cases and common-law
sources, the Court identified the “conceptual core that has
animated aiding-and-abetting liability for centuries: that
the defendant consciously and culpably ‘participate[s]’ in a
wrongful act so as to help ‘make it succeed.’ ” Id., at 493
(quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 619
(1949)). Put another way, “the defendant has to take some
‘affirmative act’ ‘with the intent of facilitating the offense’s
commission.’” 598 U. S., at 490 (quoting Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U. S. 65, 71 (2014)). The plaintiffs’
claims did not plausibly meet this standard, however, be-
cause they failed to allege that pro-ISIS accounts or content
received “any special treatment.” 598 U. S., at 498. Nor did
they allege any other facts sufficient to overcome the “at-
tenuated . . . nexus” between the platforms’ actions and the
ISIS attack or establish that the platforms intended to aid
that attack. Id., at 506.
Importantly, Twitter emphasized that “the concep[t] of
aiding and abetting” does not “lend [itself] to crisp, bright-
line distinctions,” ibid., but rather “should be understood in
light of the common law,” id., at 497. The common law, in
turn, recognizes that intent can sometimes be inferred from
what the defendant knew when he acted. The Second Re-
statement of Torts explains that this kind of knowledge-
based intent can be found where “the actor knows that the
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result
from his act, and still goes ahead.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts §8A, Comment b (1963–1964). In these circum-
stances, the actor “is treated by the law as if he had in fact
desired to produce the result.” Ibid. For example, someone
who gives a gun to another, knowing with certainty that the

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9 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
other person will shoot someone with it, could be found to
have intentionally aided a shooting even if he did not desire
for anyone to be shot. If the recipient shoots someone with
that gun, then under the common law, the person who gave
the shooter the gun could be held liable for aiding and abet-
ting the shooting. See id., §876(b) and Comment d (1977);
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm
§28, Comment c (2018).
This theory of intent requires a sufficiently specific show-
ing of knowledge. In Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Esta-
dos Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U. S. 280 (2025), this Court re-
jected secondary liability for gun manufacturers whose
guns were used by Mexican drug cartels to commit violence
in Mexico due to insufficient allegations of intent. Id., at
291. There, Mexico alleged that the gun manufacturers had
aided and abetted the unlawful gun sales that routed guns
to those cartels. Id., at 287–289. As the Court observed,
there was “little doubt that, as the complaint asserts, some
[unlawful] sales take place—and that the manufacturers
know they do.” Id., at 294. Nonetheless, applying the prin-
ciples of aiding-and-abetting liability discussed in Twitter,
the Court concluded that Mexico had not plausibly alleged
that the gun manufacturers had “ ‘participate[d] in’ ” the il-
licit sale of guns to the cartels such that they sought “ ‘by
[their] action to make’ ” those sales succeed. 605 U. S., at
294 (second alteration in original). It observed that Mexico
had “se[t] for itself a high bar” to clear because it did not
“pinpoint, as most aiding-and-abetting claims do, any spe-
cific criminal transactions.” Ibid. Instead, Mexico
“level[ed] a more general accusation: that all the manufac-
turers assist some number of unidentified rogue gun deal-
ers in making a host of firearm sales in violation of various
legal bars.” Ibid. The “systemic nature” of those more gen-
eralized allegations, the Court explained, required “plausi-
ble allegations of ‘pervasive, systemic, and culpable assis-
tance.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Twitter, 598 U. S., at 502).

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10 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
Mexico’s allegations failed to clear that high bar. To
start, Mexico did not allege that the gun manufacturers had
treated unlawful actors any differently from lawful actors.
605 U. S., at 295. Mexico also failed to account for the fact
that gun manufacturers sold the guns to middlemen dis-
tributors, whom the manufacturers did not control, who
then sold the guns to illicit dealers. Id., at 295–296. Even
if the gun manufacturers knew everything the distributors
did, the Court continued, Mexico failed to allege plausibly
that the manufacturers knew, or even could learn, which
dealers were selling guns to the cartels. Id., at 296–297.
Without that knowledge, or further evidence of the manu-
facturers’ intent, the Court held that Mexico’s allegations
did not satisfy the standards necessary to impose aiding
and abetting on the manufacturers because those allega-
tions did not plausibly show that they had participated in
the unlawful sales to make them succeed. Id., at 296–299.
B
These principles of aiding-and-abetting liability and in-
tent resolve this case. Plaintiffs must prove that Cox in-
tended to aid, and therefore help make succeed, copyright
infringement committed by those who use its network. To
do so, plaintiffs point out that Cox, having received copy-
right-violation notices, knew that specific connections it
services have been, and will continue to be, used to infringe
copyrights. Because Cox nonetheless continued to service
those connections, plaintiffs argue that the jury could have
found that Cox intended to facilitate infringement commit-
ted using those connections.
This record, however, cannot support finding the neces-
sary intent for aiding-and-abetting liability to attach. To
begin, Cox is merely supplying internet service to its cus-
tomers. Nothing about that conduct is inherently culpable:
Most internet traffic is lawful, and supplying an internet
connection is just as consistent with lawful purposes as it is

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11 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
with unlawful purposes. See id., at 292 (“[R]outine and gen-
eral activity that happens on occasion to assist in a crime
. . . is unlikely to count as aiding and abetting”).
Nor have plaintiffs shown that Cox intended to aid spe-
cific instances of infringement. That is because, based on
plaintiffs’ evidence, Cox does not actually know that specific
users will commit infringement using Cox’s network. Cox
supplies internet connections to a wide range of customers,
ranging from single users all the way to smaller regional
ISPs. When Cox receives a copyright violation notice, how-
ever, the notice specifies only which connection was used to
infringe, not who used it to commit infringement.
That informational gap is fatal here. As Smith & Wesson
explained, aiding-and-abetting liability most commonly at-
taches where the defendant aided a specific instance of un-
lawful conduct. Id., at 294. Often, that requires the plain-
tiff to show that the defendant, at a minimum, knew who
the “principals” in the alleged unlawful acts were. Id., at
295–296. Here, however, plaintiffs have not shown that
Cox had specific knowledge of who committed the infringing
conduct. Take, for example, a connection sold to a single-
family home. Cox, after receiving three notices of copyright
violations, would know only that that home’s connection is
substantially certain to be used again in the future to com-
mit infringement. Yet Cox would have no knowledge (in-
deed, plaintiffs have not shown that Cox has any way of
knowing) who within the household committed infringe-
ment. Nor, for that matter, have plaintiffs shown any way
for Cox to know if the infringer was a neighbor who might
have the Wi-Fi password. Without that knowledge, it is not
reasonable to infer that Cox intended to aid infringement
committed by another person just because it provided an
internet connection to some unknown infringer.
This problem is even more glaring when it comes to con-
nections that serve hundreds or thousands of users. For
instance, Cox provides internet service to regional ISPs who

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12 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT
S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
in turn supply internet service to thousands of users. Given
the numbers involved, it is hardly surprising that Cox has
received many copyright-violation notices as to connections
supplied to regional ISPs. Still, Cox does not know who
among a regional ISP’s thousands of customers is commit-
ting infringement, even if it knows that someone has in-
fringed in the past and that someone will infringe in the
future.
In this scenario, the regional ISP is akin to the middle-
men in Smith & Wesson: Like the middlemen who pur-
chased lawful firearms and then redirected them to a mix
of lawful and unlawful dealers, the regional ISP is purchas-
ing lawful internet service and redirecting it to a range of
users, some of whom will use the service lawfully and some
who will use it unlawfully. See id., at 294–296. Further-
more, just as the gun manufacturers in Smith & Wesson did
not have control over the middlemen, Cox similarly does not
have control over the regional ISP. Id., at 295–296. Given
this degree of removal from the infringing activity and Cox’s
incomplete knowledge, Cox cannot be found to have in-
tended to aid in any specific instance of infringement com-
mitted using the connection that Cox provides to the re-
gional ISP. The same is true for connections Cox provides
to university housing, hospitals, military bases, and other
places that are likely to have many different users.
Without proof that Cox knew more about individual in-
stances of infringement, and without evidence of “perva-
sive, systemic, and culpable assistance” needed to support
a more generalized theory of liability, see Twitter, 598 U. S.,
at 502, plaintiffs have at most shown that Cox was “indif-
ferent” to infringement conducted via the connections it
sells. Id., at 500. Mere indifference, however, is not enough
for aiding and abetting liability to attach. Smith & Wesson,
605 U. S., at 297.

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S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment
* * *
The facts of this case do not establish the requisite intent
needed to hold Cox liable for infringement that occurred on
its network. Because the majority needlessly curtails sec-
ondary liability in a manner inconsistent with both prece-
dent and statute, I concur only in the judgment.

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