District of Columbia v. R.W.

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 25–248. Decided April 20, 2026
PER CURIAM .
In the wee hours of a winter morning in Washington,
D. C., District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer
Clifford Vanterpool received a radio dispatch call directing
him to check out a suspicious vehicle at a specific address.
Officer Vanterpool reached the apartment building at that
address around 2:00 a.m. As he turned his marked police
vehicle into the parking lot, he saw two people immediately
flee from a car, “unprovoked,” after “[p]olice had not done
anything other than simply pull up.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
48a. The runners left open at least one of the car doors.
The driver then began to back out of the parking space, rear
door still open. Officer Vanterpool decided to investigate.
He parked directly behind the car, left his own vehicle, or-
dered the driver, R. W., to put his hands up, and drew his
service weapon.
R. W. raised a “single argument” on appeal—that Officer
Vanterpool lacked reasonable articulable suspicion suffi-
cient to justify the seizure. In re R.W., 334 A. 3d 593, 599
(D. C. 2025). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that Officer Vanterpool, by stopping R. W. without rea-
sonable suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment. We
disagree.
When an officer makes a “brief investigatory stop[ ] of per-
sons or vehicles that fall[s] short of [a] traditional arrest,”
the Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officer’s action is
supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity ‘ “may be afoot.” ’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S.
266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S.

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2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Per Curiam
1, 7 (1989)). In assessing whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ of each case”—an analysis that precludes
the “evaluation and rejection” of “factors in isolation from
each other.” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273–274. Because the
D. C. Court of Appeals departed from these principles—and
because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspi-
cion to stop R. W.—we reverse.
I
Largely based on evidence found after Officer Vanterpool
told R. W. to put his hands up, the District of Columbia
charged R. W. (a minor at the time) with unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle, felony receipt of stolen property, unlaw-
ful entry of a motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle in the
District of Columbia without a permit. Before trial, R. W.
moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was
stopped. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court
denied R. W.’s motion, relying on four facts to conclude that
the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.: (1) the
officer had received a radio dispatch call regarding a suspi-
cious vehicle at a specified address, (2) the officer saw “ ‘two
persons fleeing from a vehicle’ ” upon his arrival, (3) “ ‘[i]t
was almost 2 a.m.,’ ” and (4) as the officer approached the
car, it began “ ‘backing out of the parking space . . . while
the rear driver’s side door [was] still open.’ ” 334 A. 3d, at
599. After a bench trial, the trial court adjudicated R. W.
delinquent on all counts and assigned R. W. to one year of
probation with conditions.
On appeal, the D. C. Court of Appeals reversed the denial
of the motion to suppress and vacated the delinquency ad-
judication.* The court “first assess[ed] the legitimacy and
——————
*The District of Columbia conceded that “Officer Vanterpool seized
R. W. when he first asked R. W. to put his hands up,” so the D. C. Court
of Appeals decided only “whether the facts then known by Officer

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3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
weight of each of the factors bearing on reasonable suspi-
cion” before “weigh[ing] that information all together.” Id.,
at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the first step
of this analysis, it held that the trial court had erred by con-
sidering two factors: the radio dispatch call and the flight
of R. W.’s companions. It “excis[ed]” those factors from the
analysis. Id., at 597. It then concluded that, without more,
the remaining facts—the late hour and the car’s move-
ment—did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. After the
D. C. Court of Appeals ruled, the District of Columbia
sought certiorari.
II
The question is whether the facts available to Officer
Vanterpool—before he ordered R. W. to put his hands up—
warranted the stop. In other words, we ask whether Officer
Vanterpool had a reasonable suspicion that R. W. was en-
gaged in criminal wrongdoing. Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7–8.
Such reasonable suspicion arises when, based on the “ ‘to-
tality of the circumstances,’ ” the detaining officer had a
“ ‘particularized and objective basis’ ” for suspecting crimi-
nal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273 (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable sus-
picion “ ‘depends on the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.’ ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U. S. 376,
380 (2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S.
393, 402 (2014)). It permits officers to make “ ‘commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior.’ ” Glover,
589 U. S., at 380–381 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U. S. 119, 125 (2000)).
On the facts of this case, Officer Vanterpool clearly had
reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. Already on alert from
——————
Vanterpool created an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity was afoot.” 334 A. 3d, at 599 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21
(1968)).

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4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Per Curiam
the late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle, the
officer observed every person in R. W.’s car respond
strangely to an approaching police car. Two people took off
running. We have observed that “unprovoked flight upon
noticing the police . . . . is certainly suggestive” of wrongdo-
ing. Id., at 124. The driver, R. W., did not run from the car,
but his companions’ flight cast his presence in a suspicious
light. After all, we have observed that “ ‘a car passenger . . .
will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the
driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits
or the evidence of their wrongdoing.’ ” Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U. S. 366, 373 (2003) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U. S. 295, 304–305 (1999)).
We need not determine whether that connection alone
supported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the
driver’s seat and—after the passengers fled from the car—
began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car’s
open back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising
event for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run
headlong away from them. But we doubt that most would
respond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to
drive away without at least checking whether the doors
were closed. R. W.’s own actions—combined with the pan-
icked flight of his companions—strongly suggested that he
was (like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to
hide from police. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66
(1968) (recognizing that “deliberately furtive actions and
flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia
of mens rea”).
III
The D. C. Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion
by “excis[ing]” the radio dispatch and the conduct of R. W.’s
companions from the analysis, and considering only “the
lateness of the hour and the slight movement of the car.”
334 A. 3d, at 597. The totality-of-the-circumstances test,

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5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
however, “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analy-
sis.” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. As our precedents have rec-
ognized, “the whole is often greater than the sum of its
parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation.”
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 60–61 (2018).
Indeed, this case reveals the perils of reviewing facts
piecemeal and without context. Take the passengers’ flight
from the car. We have little doubt that, in some circum-
stances, an officer could not reasonably attribute his suspi-
cion of a fleeing individual to bystanders milling nearby.
Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979) (recognizing
that “a person’s mere propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person”). But the
“whole picture” here tells a different story. Cortez, 449
U. S., at 417.
After watching two people flee from a suspicious car, a
reasonable officer surely would question the driver’s next
move. Why would the driver hurriedly back up the car
without even closing a car door left open by his fleeing com-
panions? Perhaps one could imagine an innocent explana-
tion for such unusual behavior—the court below, for exam-
ple, surmised that R. W. “may not even have noticed that
his companions left the door open.” 334 A. 3d, at 605. “But
we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion
‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’ ”
Navarette, 572 U. S., at 403 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U. S., at
277). Based on everything the officer observed on the night
in question, he drew the “commonsense inference” that all
three people in the car—including the driver—were trying
to hide wrongdoing from the police. Glover, 589 U. S., at
381.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires . . . that a court ‘slosh
[its] way through’ a ‘factbound morass.’ ” Barnes v. Felix,
605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S.
372, 383 (2007)). There may be no “ ‘easy-to-apply legal

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6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Per Curiam
test’ ” or “ ‘on/off switch’ ” in this context, Barnes, 605 U. S.,
at 80 (quoting Scott, 550 U. S., at 382–383), but one thing
is clear: “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ requires courts
to consider ‘the whole picture,’ ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 60
(quoting Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417). The D. C. Court of Ap-
peals expressly declined to do that. 334 A. 3d, at 599. It
instead considered only the observations that “(1) it was
2:00 a.m. and (2) R. W. reversed a few feet in a parking spot
while the vehicle’s rear door was open.” Id., at 605. Ex-
pressly “excis[ed]” from its analysis was, for example, the
compelling fact that two individuals fled the vehicle as soon
as they spotted the police car. Pretending that the most
revealing aspect of the encounter did not happen is incom-
patible with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach re-
quired by our precedents.
* * *
The petition for certiorari and R. W.’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
J USTICE SOTOMAYOR would deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
JACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 25–248. Decided April 20, 2026
J USTICE J ACKSON, dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment may require courts to “slosh . . .
through a factbound morass.” Ante, at 5 (internal quotation
marks omitted). It does not require readers of judicial opin-
ions to do the same. Any readable analysis will, of neces-
sity, tick through factors, finding some weighty, others less
so, and still others not at all, before piling them on a scale
and assessing the result. That is what the court below did
here, and it was right to do so. Announcing a conclusion
without providing reasoning along the way is not helpful to
the parties, the public, or the development of the law.
To its credit, the Court applies a similar, factor-by-factor
approach here. That the Court’s analysis is comprehensible
shows as much. Like the court below, the per curiam takes
account of the facts in turn: a “late-night dispatch call about
a suspicious vehicle”; R. W.’s companions’ “unprovoked
flight”; R. W.’s shift into reverse with a car door still ajar.
Ante, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). And like the
court below, the per curiam explains how much weight it
assigns to each. Unprovoked flight, the Court says, is “cer-
tainly suggestive” of wrongdoing. Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[C]ombined” with the flight, the Court
continues, R. W.’s abrupt reversal “strongly suggested”
wrongdoing. Ibid. This is how courts write opinions.
So I am not sure why our Court sees fit to intervene in
this case, let alone to do so summarily. If the intervention
reflects a worry that the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals (DCCA) misunderstands the Fourth Amendment’s to-
tality-of-the-circumstances analysis, that worry seems

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2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
JACKSON, J., dissenting
unfounded. The DCCA has grasped the correct inquiry. Its
precedents rightly observe that “[t]he issue is not whether
any one factor individually justifies a stop, but rather
whether ‘collectively’ the totality of the circumstances sup-
ports a determination that the officers had reasonable sus-
picion for an investigatory stop.” Parker v. United States,
333 A. 3d 1162, 1175 (2025) (citing Mayo v. United States,
315 A. 3d 606, 637 (2024) (en banc)); see also, e.g., Maye v.
United States, 260 A. 3d 638, 647 (2021); Golden v. United
States, 248 A. 3d 925, 941 (2021).
If today’s decision instead reflects dissatisfaction with the
DCCA’s comment that it “ ‘excis[ed]’ ” certain factors from
its analysis, ante, at 4–5, I do not contest that this was poor
word choice, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 274
(2002) (rejecting a “divide-and-conquer analysis”). But I do
not think that word choice reflects a methodological error.
Courts excise facts from their analyses every day. Opinion-
writing is an exercise in culling the irrelevant; in applica-
tion, no “totality-of-the-circumstances” test really lives up
to its name. Indeed, today’s per curiam necessarily omits a
number of facts the Court finds insignificant—e.g., the
make and model of the car, the precise location of the stop,
the color of R. W.’s friends’ clothing. Though it does not say
so, the Court “excises” those facts, too. It does not thereby
misapply the Fourth Amendment.
If, finally, the Court’s decision to intervene reflects disap-
proval of the DCCA’s assessment of which particular facts
to weigh and to what extent, I cannot fathom why that kind
of factbound determination warranted correction by this
Court. The DCCA assigned no weight to two facts—the dis-
patch call and the unprovoked flight. The Court does not
seem to take issue with the first. For good reason: The
DCCA reasonably applied our decisions explaining that an
officer may not obtain reasonable suspicion by relying on
the unsupported hunch of a fellow officer. See Whiteley v.
Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971);

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3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
JACKSON, J., dissenting
United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 232 (1985). The
Court may be right that the second—the unprovoked
flight—should have borne some rather than no weight. But
if this context-specific adjustment is all the per curiam
seeks to achieve, it does not merit the use of our summary
discretion.
Even if I would have assigned more heft to a particular
fact in my own first-instance assessment, I would not word-
smith a lower court in this fashion. In my view, this is not
a worthy accomplishment for the unusual step of summary
reversal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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