Margolin v. NAIJ

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 339–345
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
May 26, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER TERM, 2025 339
Syllabus
MARGOLIN, DIRECTOR OF THE EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
IMMIGRATION JUDGES
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 25–767. Decided May 26, 2026
In October 2021, the Executive Offce for Immigration Review imple-
mented a rule requiring immigration judges to obtain supervisory ap-
proval for public speeches relating to their offcial duties. An associa-
tion of such judges (respondent here) challenged the policy in federal
district court, asserting violations of its members' First and Fifth
Amendment rights. The District Court held that respondent's chal-
lenge must proceed through the administrative review scheme estab-
lished by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 Stat. 1122,
1125, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1205, 1206. But the Fourth Circuit vacated and re-
manded for factfnding into whether that review scheme was functioning
as Congress intended, an issue the parties had not raised.
Held: The Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle when
it decided a question much broader than the one respondent advanced.
Federal courts adhere to the principle of party presentation—the “rule
that points not argued will not be considered.” United States v. Burke,
504 U. S. 229, 246 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). As respondent
conceded below, this Court has held that Congress intended federal em-
ployees to bring most work-related grievances to the Merit Systems
Protection Board and the Special Counsel—not to federal district court.
Respondent argued only that the specifc claims of its members were
not the kind of work-related claims that Congress intended to steer out
of district court. The Fourth Circuit transformed respondent's argu-
ment that the CSRA's claim-channeling scheme did not cover its specifc
claims into one that the CSRA might not channel any claims. And the
court did so without giving either side a chance to address its theory.
That “ `drasti[c]' ” departure from the principle of party presentation
“ `constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.' ” Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U. S. 7,
9–10 (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S.
371, 375).
Certiorari granted; 160 F. 4th 100, reversed and remanded.

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340 MARGOLIN v. NAIJ
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
Af ter the Executive Office for Immigration Review
adopted a policy regulating immigration judges' work-
related speech, an association of such judges (respondent
here) challenged the policy in federal district court. The
District Court held that respondent's challenge must proceed
through the administrative review scheme established by the
Civil Service Reform Act. But the Fourth Circuit vacated
and remanded based on an issue the parties had not raised.
That decision violated the principle of party presentation,
and we reverse.
I
The Executive Offce for Immigration Review sets policies
governing the immigration courts. See 8 CFR § 1003.0
(2024). In October 2021, it implemented a rule requiring im-
migration judges to obtain supervisory approval for public
speeches relating to their offcial duties. Joint App. in No.
23–2235 (CA4), pp. 56–62. The policy was meant to ensure
that employee speech which may be seen as bearing the “im-
primatur” of the Offce is consistent with its offcial positions.
Id., at 57.
Respondent challenged the policy in the Eastern District
of Virginia, asserting violations of its members' First and
Fifth Amendment rights. This Court has held that, under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 Stat. 1122,
1125, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1205, 1206, Congress intended federal em-
ployees to bring most work-related grievances to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Special Coun-
sel—not to federal district court. See United States v.
Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 455 (1988); Elgin v. Department of
Treasury, 567 U. S. 1, 11–12 (2012). Respondent thus ac-
cepted that “the CSRA channels judicial review of chal-
lenges to covered employment actions” to the MSPB. Oppo-
sition to Motion to Dismiss in No. 1:20–cv–731 (ED Va.), ECF
Doc. 72, pp. 2–3. It argued only that its members' constitu-
tional claims were not the kind of work-related claims that
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 339 (2026) 341
Per Curiam
Congress intended to steer out of district court. See id., at
21–30.
The District Court dismissed respondent's claims. The
court, like respondent, acknowledged that “Congress in-
tended to preclude district-court jurisdiction” over “covered
actions” brought by federal employees. National Assn. of
Immigration Judges v. Neal, 693 F. Supp. 3d 549, 569 (ED
Va. 2023). And it held that respondent's claims were indeed
“covered” by the CSRA. Id., at 569–581.
Respondent appealed. It did “no[t] dispute that the
CSRA provides the exclusive avenue for review of certain
employment-related claims.” Brief for Appellant in No. 23–
2235 (CA4), ECF Doc. 11–1, p. 18; see also id., at 21–22
(“Congress's intent to preclude district court jurisdiction is
. . . manifest in the CSRA” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). It again argued only that its specifc claims were not
covered under the CSRA's claim-channeling scheme. See
id., at 21–39.
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. National
Assn. of Immigration Judges v. Owen, 139 F. 4th 293 (2025).
Like the District Court, it held that respondent's claims were
covered by the CSRA. Id., at 308–313. And the court rec-
ognized our precedent holding that “Congress designed the
CSRA to divest district courts of jurisdiction to review legal
challenges” like respondent's. Id., at 313. Nonetheless, it
held that factual circumstances had “called into question”
whether the CSRA was “functioning as Congress intended.”
Id., at 304. Specifcally, the court believed that legal chal-
lenges to the tenure protection afforded MSPB members and
the Special Counsel, and the MSPB's lack of a quorum, may
require a “new examination of Congressional intent” to chan-
nel covered claims out of district court. Id., at 308. The
court thus remanded for factfnding into the current opera-
tion of the MSPB. Id., at 305, 313.
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc. Na-
tional Assn. of Immigration Judges v. Owen, 160 F. 4th 100
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342 MARGOLIN v. NAIJ
Per Curiam
(CA4 2025). Judge Quattlebaum, joined by three judges,
dissented.* He criticized the panel for “shirk[ing] party
presentation principles” by deciding the case on a novel
ground “without any party raising the issue and without re-
questing supplemental briefng.” Id., at 107–108, 118.
II
Federal courts adhere to the principle of party presenta-
tion. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U. S. 7, 9–10 (2025) (per
curiam). That principle—the “rule that points not argued
will not be considered”—distinguishes our adversarial sys-
tem of justice from an inquisitorial one. United States v.
Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment). Because courts are “essentially passive instruments
of government,” we rely on the parties to “frame the issues
for decision” and decide “only [the] questions presented.”
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. 371, 375–376
(2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We recently reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating this
party-presentation principle. In Clark, a state prisoner
seeking federal habeas relief argued that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the entire
jury had been tainted by one juror's unauthorized crime-
scene visit. 607 U. S., at 8–9. The District Court denied
relief, but the Fourth Circuit reversed and granted a new
trial. It did so based not on the prisoner's ineffective-
assistance claim, but instead on “a combination of extraordi-
nary failures from juror to judge to attorney” that deprived
the prisoner of his confrontation and impartial-jury rights.
Id., at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). We summarily
reversed. By “granting relief ” based on a claim that the
prisoner “never asserted and that the State never had the
chance to address,” the Fourth Circuit “transgressed the
party-presentation principle.” Ibid.
*Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Niemeyer voted to grant rehearing en
banc but did not join Judge Quattlebaum's dissent.
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 339 (2026) 343
Thomas, J., concurring
So too here. The Fourth Circuit violated the party-
presentation principle when it decided “a case different from
the one [respondent] advanced.” 160 F. 4th, at 118 (Quat-
tlebaum, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
As respondent conceded below, our precedent establishes that
Congress, through the CSRA, intended to channel covered
claims to the MSPB. ECF Doc. 72, pp. 8–9; ECF Doc. 11–1, p.
18. The parties thus confned their arguments to the narrow
question whether respondent's claims were, in fact, covered.
Unsatisfed with rejecting respondent's arguments on that
question, however, the Fourth Circuit sua sponte addressed
a much broader one and remanded for further proceedings
on that question. The court transformed respondent's argu-
ment that the CSRA did not channel its claims into one that
the CSRA might not—in light of current conditions—channel
any claims. And the court did so without giving either side
a chance to address its theory. See Clark, 607 U. S., at 9.
That “ `drasti[c]' ” departure from the principle of party pres-
entation “ `constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.' ” Id., at 10
(quoting Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S., at 375).
Federal courts are not “roving commissions,” Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611 (1973), licensed to “ `sally forth
each day looking for wrongs to right,' ” Sineneng-Smith, 590
U. S., at 376 (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F. 2d
1298, 1301 (CA8 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of re-
hearing en banc)). The Court of Appeals lost sight of those
principles here.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judg-
ment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Barrett joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuit erred by
disregarding traditional party-presentation principles. I
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344 MARGOLIN v. NAIJ
Thomas, J., concurring
write separately to explain why the Fourth Circuit's decision
was also wrong on the merits.
As the Fourth Circuit seemed to acknowledge, this Court's
precedent establishes that the District Court lacked jurisdic-
tion over this challenge to a federal workplace policy. The
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq.,
provides a statutory review scheme through which certain
federal employees must raise certain workplace complaints.
The scheme authorizes judicial review only after the employ-
ees have had their claims heard by the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board (and sometimes the Offce of the Special Coun-
sel). §§ 1214, 7512, 7703; 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9). In Elgin v.
Department of Treasury, 567 U. S. 1 (2012), this Court held
that “covered employees appealing covered agency actions”
must “proceed exclusively through the statutory review
scheme.” Id., at 10. Respondent concedes that its mem-
bers are covered employees. The Fourth Circuit agreed
that the workplace policy at issue is a covered agency action.
National Assn. of Immigration Judges v. Owen, 139 F. 4th
293, 308–313 (2025). Thus, the Fourth Circuit had to ac-
knowledge that, under Elgin, “the National Association of
Immigration Judges would be required to bring its case
through [this] administrative scheme,” which would require
the dismissal of this case. 139 F. 4th, at 299; see also id.,
at 305.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit strained to avoid dis-
missal of the case based on its belief that new political con-
siderations changed the governing law. The court explained
that it would not allow its “black robes to insulate [it] from
taking notice of items in the public record.” Id., at 313.
Specifcally, the Fourth Circuit worried that because “the
President removed the Special Counsel” and “two members
of the MSPB,” there were now “serious questions as to
whether the CSRA's adjudicatory scheme continues to func-
tion as intended.” Id., at 305. Congress designed the
CSRA to rely on MSPB independence, the Fourth Circuit
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 339 (2026) 345
Thomas, J., concurring
claimed, so now that “the Government has questioned the
constitutionality of the removal protections enshrined in the
CSRA,” it was no longer clear that the statutory scheme was
functioning as Congress intended. Id., at 308. If it were
not, the court reasoned, Congress might not have intended
for such claims to be channeled to the MSPB any longer.
The Fourth Circuit thus remanded to the District Court for
factfnding as to how the CSRA scheme is functioning and
whether a “new examination of Congressional intent may be
required in light of changing circumstances.” Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis bears little resemblance to
legal interpretation. Neither the President's view that he
can remove federal executive offcials, see Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), nor his having done so, change the
meaning of the statute or the binding nature of this Court's
interpretation of it. “Conditions may have changed, but the
statute has not.” United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U. S. 537, 547 (1943). Courts may not “rewrite the statutory
scheme in order to approximate what we think Congress
might have wanted had it known that” the President or
courts may conclude that its removal restrictions were “be-
yond its authority.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U. S. 44, 76 (1996). Statutes change only when Congress
changes them, not when judges decide that they no longer
vindicate Congress's purposes. See U. S. Const., Art. I,
§§ 1, 7.
As Judge Quattlebaum wrote in dissent, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision below “undermines important principles of our
system of justice,” including that law remains law despite
the “political controversies of the day.” National Assn. of
Immigration Judges v. Owen, 160 F. 4th 100, 118 (2025) (en
banc).
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None

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