STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. v. CAMPBELL et al.

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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
CO. v. CAMPBELL et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of utah
No. 01–1289. Argued December 11, 2002—Decided April 7, 2003
Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell
caused an accident in which one person was killed and another perma-
nently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (State Farm), contested liability, declined to settle
the ensuing claims for the $50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investiga-
tors’ advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife
that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would repre-
sent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. In
fact, a Utah jury returned a judgment for over three times the policy
limit, and State Farm refused to appeal. The Utah Supreme Court
denied Campbell’s own appeal, and State Farm paid the entire judg-
ment. The Campbells then sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court’s initial rul-
ing granting State Farm summary judgment was reversed on appeal.
On remand, the court denied State Farm’s motion to exclude evidence
of dissimilar out-of-state conduct. In the first phase of a bifurcated
trial, the jury found unreasonable State Farm’s decision not to settle.
Before the second phase, this Court refused, in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, to sustain a $2 million punitive damages
award which accompanied a $4,000 compensatory damages award. The
trial court denied State Farm’s renewed motion to exclude dissimilar
out-of-state conduct evidence. In the second phase, which addressed,
inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages, evidence was intro-
duced that pertained to State Farm’s business practices in numerous
States but bore no relation to the type of claims underlying the Camp-
bells’ complaint. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in com-
pensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial
court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. Applying
Gore, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive dam-
ages award.
Held: A punitive damages award of $145 million, where full compensatory
damages are $1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 416–429.
(a) Compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiff ’s con-
crete loss, while punitive damages are aimed at the different purposes

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of deterrence and retribution. The Due Process Clause prohibits the
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeaser.
E. g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S.
424, 433. Punitive damages awards serve the same purpose as criminal
penalties. However, because civil defendants are not accorded the pro-
tections afforded criminal defendants, punitive damages pose an acute
danger of arbitrary deprivation of property, which is heightened when
the decisionmaker is presented with evidence having little bearing on
the amount that should be awarded. Thus, this Court has instructed
courts reviewing punitive damages to consider (1) the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the disparity between
the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed
in comparable cases. Gore, supra, at 575. A trial court’s application
of these guideposts is subject to de novo review. Cooper Industries,
supra, at 424. Pp. 416–418.
(b) Under Gore’s guideposts, this case is neither close nor difficult.
Pp. 418–428.
(1) To determine a defendant’s reprehensibility—the most impor-
tant indicium of a punitive damages award’s reasonableness—a court
must consider whether: the harm was physical rather than economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard
of the health or safety of others; the conduct involved repeated actions
or was an isolated incident; and the harm resulted from intentional mal-
ice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Gore, 517 U. S., at 576–577.
It should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole by com-
pensatory damages, so punitive damages should be awarded only if the
defendant’s culpability is so reprehensible to warrant the imposition
of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence. Id., at 575.
In this case, State Farm’s handling of the claims against the Campbells
merits no praise, but a more modest punishment could have satisfied the
State’s legitimate objectives. Instead, this case was used as a plat-
form to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s
operations throughout the country. However, a State cannot punish
a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred,
id., at 572. Nor does the State have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed
outside of its jurisdiction. The Campbells argue that such evidence was
used merely to demonstrate, generally, State Farm’s motives against its
insured. Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demon-
strates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in
the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to

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410 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Syllabus
the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. More fundamentally, in rely-
ing on such evidence, the Utah courts awarded punitive damages to
punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm.
Due process does not permit courts to adjudicate the merits of other
parties’ hypothetical claims under the guise of the reprehensibility anal-
ysis. Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple pu-
nitive damages awards for the same conduct, for nonparties are not nor-
mally bound by another plaintiff ’s judgment. For the same reasons,
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision cannot be justified on the grounds
that State Farm was a recidivist. To justify punishment based upon
recidivism, courts must ensure the conduct in question replicates the
prior transgressions. There is scant evidence of repeated misconduct
of the sort that injured the Campbells, and a review of the decisions
below does not convince this Court that State Farm was only punished
for its actions toward the Campbells. Because the Campbells have
shown no conduct similar to that which harmed them, the only relevant
conduct to the reprehensibility analysis is that which harmed them.
Pp. 419–424.
(2) With regard to the second Gore guidepost, the Court has been
reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between
harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; but, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages will satisfy due process.
See, e. g., 517 U. S., at 581. Single-digit multipliers are more likely to
comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s deterrence
and retribution goals, than are awards with 145-to-1 ratios, as in this
case. Because there are no rigid benchmarks, ratios greater than those
that this Court has previously upheld may comport with due process
where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages, id., at 582, but when compensatory damages are
substantial, then an even lesser ratio can reach the outermost limit of
the due process guarantee. Here, there is a presumption against an
award with a 145-to-1 ratio; the $1 million compensatory award for a
year and a half of emotional distress was substantial; and the distress
caused by outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered is likely a
component of both the compensatory and punitive damages awards.
The Utah Supreme Court sought to justify the massive award based on
premises bearing no relation to the award’s reasonableness or propor-
tionality to the harm. Pp. 424–428.
(3) The Court need not dwell on the third guidepost. The most
relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the wrong done to the
Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of grand fraud, which

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is dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award. The Utah Su-
preme Court’s references to a broad fraudulent scheme drawn from out-
of-state and dissimilar conduct evidence were insufficient to justify this
amount. P. 428.
(c) Applying Gore’s guideposts to the facts here, especially in light
of the substantial compensatory damages award, likely would justify a
punitive damages award at or near the compensatory damages amount.
The Utah courts should resolve in the first instance the proper punitive
damages calculation under the principles discussed here. P. 429.
65 P. 3d 1134, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., post, p. 429, Thomas, J., post, p. 429, and Ginsburg, J., post,
p. 430, filed dissenting opinions.
Sheila L. Birnbaum argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Barbara Wrubel, Douglas W.
Dunham, and Ellen P. Quackenbos.
Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Kenneth Chesebro, Jonathan S.
Massey, Roger P. Christensen, and Karra J. Porter.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alliance of
American Insurers et al. by Mark F. Horning, Charles G. Cole, and Ben-
nett Evan Cooper; for the American Council of Life Insurers by William
F. Sheehan and Victoria E. Fimea; for the American Tort Reform Associa-
tion by Roy T. Englert, Jr., and Alan E. Untereiner; for the Business
Roundtable by Malcolm E. Wheeler; for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States by Andrew L. Frey, Andrew H. Schapiro, Evan M. Tager,
and Robin S. Conrad; for Common Good by Philip K. Howard, Robert A.
Long, Jr., and Keith A. Noreika; for the Defense Research Institute by
Patrick Lysaught; for Ford Motor Co. by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Mi-
guel A. Estrada, John M. Thomas, and Michael J. O’Reilly; for the Health
Insurance Association of America et al. by Robert N. Weiner and Nancy
L. Perkins; for the International Mass Retail Association et al. by Daniel
H. Bromberg, Robert J. Verdisco, David F. Zoll, and Donald D. Evans; for
the National Association of Manufacturers by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C.
Schaerr, Richard D. Bernstein, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Jan S. Amundson,
and Quentin Riegel; for the National Conference of Insurance Legislators
by Patrick Lynch; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by

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412 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We address once again the measure of punishment, by
means of punitive damages, a State may impose upon a de-
fendant in a civil case. The question is whether, in the cir-
cumstances we shall recount, an award of $145 million in pu-
nitive damages, where full compensatory damages are $1
million, is excessive and in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.
I
In 1981, Curtis Campbell (Campbell) was driving with his
wife, Inez Preece Campbell, in Cache County, Utah. He de-
cided to pass six vans traveling ahead of them on a two-lane
highway. Todd Ospital was driving a small car approaching
from the opposite direction. To avoid a head-on collision
with Campbell, who by then was driving on the wrong side
of the highway and toward oncoming traffic, Ospital swerved
onto the shoulder, lost control of his automobile, and col-
Victor E. Schwartz and Leah Lorber; for the Washington Legal Founda-
tion et al. by Arvin Maskin, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; and
for A. Mitchell Polinsky et al. by Dan M. Kahan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Minnesota et al. by Mike Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Richard P. Ieyoub
of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore of Missis-
sippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Hardy Myers of Oregon, and Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island; for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the
California Consumer Health Care Council, Inc., by Eugene R. Anderson
and Daniel Healy; for Certain Leading Social Scientists et al. by Paul M.
Simmons and William M. Shernoff; and for Keith N. Hylton by Garry
B. Bryant.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Abbott Laboratories et al. by Wal-
ter Dellinger; for DeKalb Genetics Corp. by Seth P. Waxman and David
W. Ogden; and for the Truck Insurance Exchange et al. by Ellis J. Horvitz,
S. Thomas Todd, and Mary-Christine Sungaila.

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lided with a vehicle driven by Robert G. Slusher. Ospital
was killed, and Slusher was rendered permanently disabled.
The Campbells escaped unscathed.
In the ensuing wrongful death and tort action, Campbell
insisted he was not at fault. Early investigations did sup-
port differing conclusions as to who caused the accident, but
“a consensus was reached early on by the investigators and
witnesses that Mr. Campbell’s unsafe pass had indeed caused
the crash.” 65 P. 3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001). Campbell’s in-
surance company, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (State Farm), nonetheless decided to
contest liability and declined offers by Slusher and Ospital’s
estate (Ospital) to settle the claims for the policy limit of
$50,000 ($25,000 per claimant). State Farm also ignored the
advice of one of its own investigators and took the case to
trial, assuring the Campbells that “their assets were safe,
that they had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm]
would represent their interests, and that they did not need
to procure separate counsel.” Id., at 1142. To the contrary,
a jury determined that Campbell was 100 percent at fault,
and a judgment was returned for $185,849, far more than the
amount offered in settlement.
At first State Farm refused to cover the $135,849 in excess
liability. Its counsel made this clear to the Campbells: “ ‘You
may want to put for sale signs on your property to get things
moving.’ ” Ibid. Nor was State Farm willing to post a su-
persedeas bond to allow Campbell to appeal the judgment
against him. Campbell obtained his own counsel to appeal
the verdict. During the pendency of the appeal, in late 1984,
Slusher, Ospital, and the Campbells reached an agreement
whereby Slusher and Ospital agreed not to seek satisfaction
of their claims against the Campbells. In exchange the
Campbells agreed to pursue a bad-faith action against State
Farm and to be represented by Slusher’s and Ospital’s attor-
neys. The Campbells also agreed that Slusher and Ospital
would have a right to play a part in all major decisions con-

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v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
cerning the bad-faith action. No settlement could be con-
cluded without Slusher’s and Ospital’s approval, and Slusher
and Ospital would receive 90 percent of any verdict against
State Farm.
In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court denied Campbell’s ap-
peal in the wrongful-death and tort actions. Slusher v. Os-
pital, 777 P. 2d 437. State Farm then paid the entire judg-
ment, including the amounts in excess of the policy limits.
The Campbells nonetheless filed a complaint against State
Farm alleging bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court initially granted State
Farm’s motion for summary judgment because State Farm
had paid the excess verdict, but that ruling was reversed on
appeal. 840 P. 2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). On remand State
Farm moved in limine to exclude evidence of alleged con-
duct that occurred in unrelated cases outside of Utah, but
the trial court denied the motion. At State Farm’s request
the trial court bifurcated the trial into two phases conducted
before different juries. In the first phase the jury deter-
mined that State Farm’s decision not to settle was unreason-
able because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess
verdict.
Before the second phase of the action against State Farm
we decided BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S.
559 (1996), and refused to sustain a $2 million punitive dam-
ages award which accompanied a verdict of only $4,000 in
compensatory damages. Based on that decision, State Farm
again moved for the exclusion of evidence of dissimilar out-
of-state conduct. App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a–172a. The
trial court denied State Farm’s motion. Id., at 189a.
The second phase addressed State Farm’s liability for
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well
as compensatory and punitive damages. The Utah Supreme
Court aptly characterized this phase of the trial:
“State Farm argued during phase II that its decision to
take the case to trial was an ‘honest mistake’ that did

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not warrant punitive damages. In contrast, the Camp-
bells introduced evidence that State Farm’s decision to
take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to
meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims
company wide. This scheme was referred to as State
Farm’s ‘Performance, Planning and Review,’ or PP & R,
policy. To prove the existence of this scheme, the trial
court allowed the Campbells to introduce extensive ex-
pert testimony regarding fraudulent practices by State
Farm in its nation-wide operations. Although State
Farm moved prior to phase II of the trial for the exclu-
sion of such evidence and continued to object to it at
trial, the trial court ruled that such evidence was admis-
sible to determine whether State Farm’s conduct in the
Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently
egregious to warrant punitive damages.” 65 P. 3d, at
1143.
Evidence pertaining to the PP&R policy concerned State
Farm’s business practices for over 20 years in numerous
States. Most of these practices bore no relation to third-
party automobile insurance claims, the type of claim underly-
ing the Campbells’ complaint against the company. The
jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the
trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively.
Both parties appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court sought to apply the three guide-
posts we identified in Gore, supra, at 574–575, and it rein-
stated the $145 million punitive damages award. Relying in
large part on the extensive evidence concerning the PP&R
policy, the court concluded State Farm’s conduct was repre-
hensible. The court also relied upon State Farm’s “massive
wealth” and on testimony indicating that “State Farm’s ac-
tions, because of their clandestine nature, will be punished at
most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical
probability,” 65 P. 3d, at 1153, and concluded that the ratio

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v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
between punitive and compensatory damages was not un-
warranted. Finally, the court noted that the punitive dam-
ages award was not excessive when compared to various civil
and criminal penalties State Farm could have faced, includ-
ing $10,000 for each act of fraud, the suspension of its license
to conduct business in Utah, the disgorgement of profits, and
imprisonment. Id., at 1154–1155. We granted certiorari.
535 U. S. 1111 (2002).
II
We recognized in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424 (2001), that in our judicial
system compensatory and punitive damages, although usu-
ally awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker,
serve different purposes. Id., at 432. Compensatory dam-
ages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plain-
tiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful con-
duct.” Ibid. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903,
pp. 453–454 (1979)). By contrast, punitive damages serve a
broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribu-
tion. Cooper Industries, supra, at 432; see also Gore, supra,
at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to fur-
ther a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful con-
duct and deterring its repetition”); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 19 (1991) (“[P]unitive damages are im-
posed for purposes of retribution and deterrence”).
While States possess discretion over the imposition of pu-
nitive damages, it is well established that there are proce-
dural and substantive constitutional limitations on these
awards. Cooper Industries, supra; Gore, supra, at 559;
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U. S. 415 (1994); TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443 (1993);
Haslip, supra. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. Cooper Industries,
supra, at 433; Gore, 517 U. S., at 562; see also id., at 587
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“This constitutional concern, itself

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harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic
unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property,
through the application, not of law and legal processes, but
of arbitrary coercion”). The reason is that “[e]lementary no-
tions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurispru-
dence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” Id., at
574; Cooper Industries, supra, at 433 (“Despite the broad
discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition
of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution imposes substantive limits on that discretion”). To
the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legiti-
mate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
property. Haslip, supra, at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely
and with restraint, they have the potential to advance legiti-
mate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however,
they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably,
common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall
into the latter category”).
Although these awards serve the same purposes as crimi-
nal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in
civil cases have not been accorded the protections applicable
in a criminal proceeding. This increases our concerns over
the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems
are administered. We have admonished that “[p]unitive
damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of
property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with
wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of
evidence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that
juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses, particularly those without strong local pres-
ences.” Honda Motor, supra, at 432; see also Haslip, supra,
at 59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Due Process Clause

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v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness as a virtue.
Indeed, the point of due process—of the law in general—is
to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State can have
no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbi-
trary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based
solely upon bias or whim”). Our concerns are heightened
when the decisionmaker is presented, as we shall discuss,
with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of
punitive damages that should be awarded. Vague instruc-
tions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid “passion
or prejudice,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a–109a, do little to
aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate
weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tan-
gential or only inflammatory.
In light of these concerns, in Gore, supra, we instructed
courts reviewing punitive damages to consider three guide-
posts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases. Id., at 575. We reiterated
the importance of these three guideposts in Cooper Indus-
tries and mandated appellate courts to conduct de novo re-
view of a trial court’s application of them to the jury’s award.
532 U. S. 424. Exacting appellate review ensures that an
award of punitive damages is based upon an “ ‘application
of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice.’ ” Id., at 436
(quoting Gore, supra, at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
III
Under the principles outlined in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, this case is neither close nor difficult. It was
error to reinstate the jury’s $145 million punitive damages
award. We address each guidepost of Gore in some detail.

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Opinion of the Court
A
“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517 U. S., at 575. We have
instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a de-
fendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physi-
cal as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety
of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerabil-
ity; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Id., at 576–577. The
existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a
plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages
award; and the absence of all of them renders any award
suspect. It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made
whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive
damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpabil-
ity, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehen-
sible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to
achieve punishment or deterrence. Id., at 575.
Applying these factors in the instant case, we must ac-
knowledge that State Farm’s handling of the claims against
the Campbells merits no praise. The trial court found that
State Farm’s employees altered the company’s records to
make Campbell appear less culpable. State Farm disre-
garded the overwhelming likelihood of liability and the
near-certain probability that, by taking the case to trial, a
judgment in excess of the policy limits would be awarded.
State Farm amplified the harm by at first assuring the
Campbells their assets would be safe from any verdict and
by later telling them, postjudgment, to put a for-sale sign
on their house. While we do not suggest there was error in
awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm’s conduct
toward the Campbells, a more modest punishment for this

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v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State’s legiti-
mate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no
further.
This case, instead, was used as a platform to expose, and
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s operations
throughout the country. The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion
makes explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its
nationwide policies rather than for the conduct directed to-
ward the Campbells. 65 P. 3d, at 1143 (“[T]he Campbells
introduced evidence that State Farm’s decision to take the
case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet cor-
porate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims company
wide”). This was, as well, an explicit rationale of the trial
court’s decision in approving the award, though reduced from
$145 million to $25 million. App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a
(“[T]he Campbells demonstrated, through the testimony of
State Farm employees who had worked outside of Utah, and
through expert testimony, that this pattern of claims adjust-
ment under the PP&R program was not a local anomaly, but
was a consistent, nationwide feature of State Farm’s busi-
ness operations, orchestrated from the highest levels of cor-
porate management”).
The Campbells contend that State Farm has only itself to
blame for the reliance upon dissimilar and out-of-state con-
duct evidence. The record does not support this contention.
From their opening statements onward the Campbells
framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its
nationwide activities. App. 208 (“You’re going to hear evi-
dence that even the insurance commission in Utah and
around the country are unwilling or inept at protecting peo-
ple against abuses”); id., at 242 (“[T]his is a very important
case. . . . [I]t transcends the Campbell file. It involves a
nationwide practice. And you, here, are going to be evaluat-
ing and assessing, and hopefully requiring State Farm to
stand accountable for what it’s doing across the country,
which is the purpose of punitive damages”). This was a po-

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sition maintained throughout the litigation. In opposing
State Farm’s motion to exclude such evidence under Gore,
the Campbells’ counsel convinced the trial court that there
was no limitation on the scope of evidence that could be con-
sidered under our precedents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a
(“As I read the case [Gore], I was struck with the fact that
a clear message in the case . . . seems to be that courts in
punitive damages cases should receive more evidence, not
less. And that the court seems to be inviting an even
broader area of evidence than the current rulings of the
court would indicate”); id., at 189a (trial court ruling).
A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may
have been lawful where it occurred. Gore, supra, at 572;
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 824 (1975) (“A State does
not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of
another State merely because the welfare and health of its
own citizens may be affected when they travel to that
State”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 161
(1914) (“[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of
Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . .
without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which
all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful
authority and upon the preservation of which the Govern-
ment under the Constitution depends. This is so obviously
the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely
been called in question and hence authorities directly dealing
with it do not abound”); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657,
669 (1892) (“Laws have no force of themselves beyond the
jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and can have
extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States”).
Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern
in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for un-
lawful acts committed outside of the State’s jurisdiction.
Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside
Utah to other persons would require their inclusion, and, to
those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need

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422 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
to apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 821–822 (1985).
Here, the Campbells do not dispute that much of the out-
of-state conduct was lawful where it occurred. They argue,
however, that such evidence was not the primary basis for
the punitive damages award and was relevant to the extent
it demonstrated, in a general sense, State Farm’s motive
against its insured. Brief for Respondents 46–47 (“[E]ven
if the practices described by State Farm were not malum in
se or malum prohibitum, they became relevant to punitive
damages to the extent they were used as tools to implement
State Farm’s wrongful PP&R policy”). This argument
misses the mark. Lawful out-of-state conduct may be pro-
bative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpabil-
ity of the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious,
but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff. A jury must be instructed, further-
more, that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to
punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdic-
tion where it occurred. Gore, 517 U. S., at 572–573 (noting
that a State “does not have the power . . . to punish [a defend-
ant] for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that
had no impact on [the State] or its residents”). A basic prin-
ciple of federalism is that each State may make its own
reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or
proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on
a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction. Id., at 569
(“[T]he States need not, and in fact do not, provide such pro-
tection in a uniform manner”).
For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts
erred in relying upon this and other evidence: The courts
awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that
bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm. A defendant’s dis-
similar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability
was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive dam-

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ages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business. Due process does not permit courts, in the calcu-
lation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other
parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the
guise of the reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt
the Utah Supreme Court did that here. 65 P. 3d, at 1149
(“Even if the harm to the Campbells can be appropriately
characterized as minimal, the trial court’s assessment of the
situation is on target: ‘The harm is minor to the individual
but massive in the aggregate’ ”). Punishment on these
bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages
awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties
are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.
Gore, supra, at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Larger dam-
ages might also ‘double count’ by including in the punitive
damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, dam-
ages that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover”).
The same reasons lead us to conclude the Utah Supreme
Court’s decision cannot be justified on the grounds that State
Farm was a recidivist. Although “[o]ur holdings that a re-
cidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender
recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance,” Gore, supra, at
577, in the context of civil actions courts must ensure the
conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions.
TXO, 509 U. S., at 462, n. 28 (noting that courts should look
to “ ‘the existence and frequency of similar past conduct’ ”
(quoting Haslip, 499 U. S., at 21–22)).
The Campbells have identified scant evidence of repeated
misconduct of the sort that injured them. Nor does our re-
view of the Utah courts’ decisions convince us that State
Farm was only punished for its actions toward the Camp-
bells. Although evidence of other acts need not be identical
to have relevance in the calculation of punitive damages, the
Utah court erred here because evidence pertaining to claims

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424 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
that had nothing to do with a third-party lawsuit was intro-
duced at length. Other evidence concerning reprehensibil-
ity was even more tangential. For example, the Utah Su-
preme Court criticized State Farm’s investigation into the
personal life of one of its employees and, in a broader ap-
proach, the manner in which State Farm’s policies corrupted
its employees. 65 P. 3d, at 1148, 1150. The Campbells at-
tempt to justify the courts’ reliance upon this unrelated testi-
mony on the theory that each dollar of profit made by under-
paying a third-party claimant is the same as a dollar made
by underpaying a first-party one. Brief for Respondents 45;
see also 65 P. 3d, at 1150 (“State Farm’s continuing illicit
practice created market disadvantages for other honest in-
surance companies because these practices increased profits.
As plaintiffs’ expert witnesses established, such wrongfully
obtained competitive advantages have the potential to pres-
sure other companies to adopt similar fraudulent tactics, or
to force them out of business. Thus, such actions cause dis-
tortions throughout the insurance market and ultimately
hurt all consumers”). For the reasons already stated, this
argument is unconvincing. The reprehensibility guidepost
does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so
that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which
in this case extended for a 20-year period. In this case, be-
cause the Campbells have shown no conduct by State Farm
similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed
them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility
analysis.
B
Turning to the second Gore guidepost, we have been reluc-
tant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio
between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award. 517 U. S., at 582 (“[W]e have con-
sistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is
marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that
compares actual and potential damages to the punitive

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Opinion of the Court
award”); TXO, supra, at 458. We decline again to impose
a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy
due process. In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages
award, we concluded that an award of more than four times
the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the
line of constitutional impropriety. 499 U. S., at 23–24. We
cited that 4-to-1 ratio again in Gore. 517 U. S., at 581. The
Court further referenced a long legislative history, dating
back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing
for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to
deter and punish. Id., at 581, and n. 33. While these ratios
are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate
what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more
likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with
ratios in range of 500 to 1, id., at 582, or, in this case, of
145 to 1.
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that
a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater
than those we have previously upheld may comport with due
process where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages.” Ibid.; see also
ibid. (positing that a higher ratio might be necessary where
“the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of non-
economic harm might have been difficult to determine”).
The converse is also true, however. When compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in
any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff.

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426 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
In sum, courts must ensure that the measure of punish-
ment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of
harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.
In the context of this case, we have no doubt that there
is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio.
The compensatory award in this case was substantial; the
Campbells were awarded $1 million for a year and a half of
emotional distress. This was complete compensation. The
harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not
from some physical assault or trauma; there were no physical
injuries; and State Farm paid the excess verdict before the
complaint was filed, so the Campbells suffered only minor
economic injuries for the 18-month period in which State
Farm refused to resolve the claim against them. The com-
pensatory damages for the injury suffered here, moreover,
likely were based on a component which was duplicated in
the punitive award. Much of the distress was caused by the
outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered at the ac-
tions of their insurer; and it is a major role of punitive dam-
ages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages,
however, already contain this punitive element. See Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c, p. 466 (1977)
(“In many cases in which compensatory damages include an
amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indig-
nation aroused by the defendant’s act, there is no clear line
of demarcation between punishment and compensation and a
verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements
of both”).
The Utah Supreme Court sought to justify the massive
award by pointing to State Farm’s purported failure to re-
port a prior $100 million punitive damages award in Texas
to its corporate headquarters; the fact that State Farm’s poli-
cies have affected numerous Utah consumers; the fact that
State Farm will only be punished in one out of every 50,000
cases as a matter of statistical probability; and State Farm’s
enormous wealth. 65 P. 3d, at 1153. Since the Supreme

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Court of Utah discussed the Texas award when applying the
ratio guidepost, we discuss it here. The Texas award, how-
ever, should have been analyzed in the context of the repre-
hensibility guidepost only. The failure of the company to
report the Texas award is out-of-state conduct that, if the
conduct were similar, might have had some bearing on the
degree of reprehensibility, subject to the limitations we have
described. Here, it was dissimilar, and of such marginal rel-
evance that it should have been accorded little or no weight.
The award was rendered in a first-party lawsuit; no judg-
ment was entered in the case; and it was later settled for a
fraction of the verdict. With respect to the Utah Supreme
Court’s second justification, the Campbells’ inability to direct
us to testimony demonstrating harm to the people of Utah
(other than those directly involved in this case) indicates that
the adverse effect on the State’s general population was in
fact minor.
The remaining premises for the Utah Supreme Court’s de-
cision bear no relation to the award’s reasonableness or pro-
portionality to the harm. They are, rather, arguments that
seek to defend a departure from well-established constraints
on punitive damages. While States enjoy considerable dis-
cretion in deducing when punitive damages are warranted,
each award must comport with the principles set forth in
Gore. Here the argument that State Farm will be punished
in only the rare case, coupled with reference to its assets
(which, of course, are what other insured parties in Utah and
other States must rely upon for payment of claims) had little
to do with the actual harm sustained by the Campbells. The
wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitu-
tional punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U. S., at 585
(“The fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an
impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to
fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on
the conduct of its business”); see also id., at 591 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“[Wealth] provides an open-ended basis for

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428 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy . . . . That
does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply
means that this factor cannot make up for the failure of other
factors, such as ‘reprehensibility,’ to constrain significantly
an award that purports to punish a defendant’s conduct”).
The principles set forth in Gore must be implemented with
care, to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality.
C
The third guidepost in Gore is the disparity between the
punitive damages award and the “civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases.” Id., at 575. We note
that, in the past, we have also looked to criminal penalties
that could be imposed. Id., at 583; Haslip, 499 U. S., at 23.
The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the
seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action.
When used to determine the dollar amount of the award,
however, the criminal penalty has less utility. Great care
must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess crim-
inal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened
protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including,
of course, its higher standards of proof. Punitive damages
are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote
possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sus-
tain a punitive damages award.
Here, we need not dwell long on this guidepost. The most
relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the wrong
done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act
of fraud, 65 P. 3d, at 1154, an amount dwarfed by the $145
million punitive damages award. The Supreme Court of
Utah speculated about the loss of State Farm’s business li-
cense, the disgorgement of profits, and possible imprison-
ment, but here again its references were to the broad fraud-
ulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and
dissimilar conduct. This analysis was insufficient to justify
the award.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
IV
An application of the Gore guideposts to the facts of this
case, especially in light of the substantial compensatory dam-
ages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive ele-
ment), likely would justify a punitive damages award at or
near the amount of compensatory damages. The punitive
award of $145 million, therefore, was neither reasonable nor
proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irratio-
nal and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defend-
ant. The proper calculation of punitive damages under the
principles we have discussed should be resolved, in the first
instance, by the Utah courts.
The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, dissenting.
I adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 598–
599 (1996), that the Due Process Clause provides no substan-
tive protections against “excessive” or “ ‘unreasonable’ ”
awards of punitive damages. I am also of the view that the
punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from
BMW v. Gore is insusceptible of principled application; ac-
cordingly, I do not feel justified in giving the case stare deci-
sis effect. See id., at 599. I would affirm the judgment of
the Utah Supreme Court.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment below because “I continue
to believe that the Constitution does not constrain the size
of punitive damages awards.” Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424, 443 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BMW of North America,

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430 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined
by Thomas, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.
Not long ago, this Court was hesitant to impose a federal
check on state-court judgments awarding punitive damages.
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U. S. 257 (1989), the Court held that neither the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment nor fed-
eral common law circumscribed awards of punitive damages
in civil cases between private parties. Id., at 262–276, 277–
280. Two years later, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U. S. 1 (1991), the Court observed that “unlimited jury
[or judicial] discretion . . . in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensi-
bilities,” id., at 18; the Due Process Clause, the Court sug-
gested, would attend to those sensibilities and guard against
unreasonable awards, id., at 17–24. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld a punitive damages award in Haslip “more than 4
times the amount of compensatory damages, . . . more than
200 times [the plaintiff ’s] out-of-pocket expenses,” and “much
in excess of the fine that could be imposed.” Id., at 23.
And in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U. S. 443 (1993), the Court affirmed a state-court award
“526 times greater than the actual damages awarded by the
jury.” Id., at 453; 1 cf. Browning-Ferris, 492 U. S., at 262
(ratio of punitive to compensatory damages over 100 to 1).
It was not until 1996, in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U. S. 559, that the Court, for the first time, in-
validated a state-court punitive damages assessment as un-
1 By switching the focus from the ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
ages to the potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant succeeded in
its illicit scheme, the Court could describe the relevant ratio in TXO as 10
to 1. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 581, and
n. 34 (1996).

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
reasonably large. See id., at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If
our activity in this domain is now “well established,” see
ante, at 416, 427, it takes place on ground not long held.
In Gore, I stated why I resisted the Court’s foray into
punitive damages “territory traditionally within the States’
domain.” 517 U. S., at 612 (dissenting opinion). I adhere to
those views, and note again that, unlike federal habeas cor-
pus review of state-court convictions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254,
the Court “work[s] at this business [of checking state courts]
alone,” unaided by the participation of federal district courts
and courts of appeals. 517 U. S., at 613. It was once rec-
ognized that “the laws of the particular State must suffice
[to superintend punitive damages awards] until judges or leg-
islators authorized to do so initiate system-wide change.”
Haslip, 499 U. S., at 42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judg-
ment). I would adhere to that traditional view.
I
The large size of the award upheld by the Utah Supreme
Court in this case indicates why damages-capping legislation
may be altogether fitting and proper. Neither the amount of
the award nor the trial record, however, justifies this Court’s
substitution of its judgment for that of Utah’s competent de-
cisionmakers. In this regard, I count it significant that, on
the key criterion “reprehensibility,” there is a good deal
more to the story than the Court’s abbreviated account tells.
Ample evidence allowed the jury to find that State Farm’s
treatment of the Campbells typified its “Performance, Plan-
ning and Review” (PP&R) program; implemented by top
management in 1979, the program had “the explicit objective
of using the claims-adjustment process as a profit center.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a. “[T]he Campbells presented
considerable evidence,” the trial court noted, documenting
“that the PP&R program . . . has functioned, and continues
to function, as an unlawful scheme . . . to deny benefits owed
consumers by paying out less than fair value in order to meet

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432 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
preset, arbitrary payout targets designed to enhance corpo-
rate profits.” Id., at 118a–119a. That policy, the trial court
observed, was encompassing in scope; it “applied equally to
the handling of both third-party and first-party claims.”
Id., at 119a. But cf. ante, at 423–424, 427 (suggesting that
State Farm’s handling of first-party claims has “nothing to
do with a third-party lawsuit”).
Evidence the jury could credit demonstrated that the
PP&R program regularly and adversely affected Utah resi-
dents. Ray Summers, “the adjuster who handled the Camp-
bell case and who was a State Farm employee in Utah for
almost twenty years,” described several methods used by
State Farm to deny claimants fair benefits, for example, “fal-
sifying or withholding of evidence in claim files.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 121a. A common tactic, Summers recounted,
was to “unjustly attac[k] the character, reputation and credi-
bility of a claimant and mak[e] notations to that effect in the
claim file to create prejudice in the event the claim ever came
before a jury.” Id., at 130a (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). State Farm manager Bob Noxon, Summers testified,
resorted to a tactic of this order in the Campbell case when
he “instruct[ed] Summers to write in the file that Todd Os-
pital (who was killed in the accident) was speeding because
he was on his way to see a pregnant girlfriend.” Ibid. In
truth, “[t]here was no pregnant girlfriend.” Ibid. Expert
testimony noted by the trial court described these tactics as
“completely improper.” Ibid.
The trial court also noted the testimony of two Utah State
Farm employees, Felix Jensen and Samantha Bird, both of
whom recalled “intolerable” and “recurrent” pressure to re-
duce payouts below fair value. Id., at 119a (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). When Jensen complained to top man-
agers, he was told to “get out of the kitchen” if he could not
take the heat; Bird was told she should be “more of a team
player.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). At
times, Bird said, she “was forced to commit dishonest acts

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
and to knowingly underpay claims.” Id., at 120a. Eventu-
ally, Bird quit. Ibid. Utah managers superior to Bird,
the evidence indicated, were improperly influenced by the
PP&R program to encourage insurance underpayments.
For example, several documents evaluating the performance
of managers Noxon and Brown “contained explicit preset av-
erage payout goals.” Ibid.
Regarding liability for verdicts in excess of policy limits,
the trial court referred to a State Farm document titled the
“Excess Liability Handbook”; written before the Campbell
accident, the handbook instructed adjusters to pad files with
“self-serving” documents, and to leave critical items out of
files, for example, evaluations of the insured’s exposure. Id.,
at 127a–128a (internal quotation marks omitted). Divisional
superintendent Bill Brown used the handbook to train Utah
employees. Id., at 134a. While overseeing the Campbell
case, Brown ordered adjuster Summers to change the por-
tions of his report indicating that Mr. Campbell was likely at
fault and that the settlement cost was correspondingly high.
Id., at 3a. The Campbells’ case, according to expert testi-
mony the trial court recited, “was a classic example of State
Farm’s application of the improper practices taught in the
Excess Liability Handbook.” Id., at 128a.
The trial court further determined that the jury could find
State Farm’s policy “deliberately crafted” to prey on con-
sumers who would be unlikely to defend themselves. Id., at
122a. In this regard, the trial court noted the testimony of
several former State Farm employees affirming that they
were trained to target “the weakest of the herd”—“the el-
derly, the poor, and other consumers who are least knowl-
edgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to
trickery or deceit, or who have little money and hence have
no real alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to settle
a claim at much less than fair value.” Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).

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434 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
The Campbells themselves could be placed within the
“weakest of the herd” category. The couple appeared eco-
nomically vulnerable and emotionally fragile. App. 3360a–
3361a (Order Denying State Farm’s Motion for Judgment
NOV and New Trial Regarding Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress). At the time of State Farm’s wrongful
conduct, “Mr. Campbell had residuary effects from a stroke
and Parkinson’s disease.” Id., at 3360a.
To further insulate itself from liability, trial evidence indi-
cated, State Farm made “systematic” efforts to destroy in-
ternal company documents that might reveal its scheme,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a, efforts that directly affected the
Campbells, id., at 124a. For example, State Farm had
“a special historical department that contained a copy of all
past manuals on claim-handling practices and the dates on
which each section of each manual was changed.” Ibid.
Yet in discovery proceedings, State Farm failed to produce
any claim-handling practice manuals for the years relevant
to the Campbells’ bad-faith case. Id., at 124a–125a.
State Farm’s inability to produce the manuals, it appeared
from the evidence, was not accidental. Documents retained
by former State Farm employee Samantha Bird, as well as
Bird’s testimony, showed that while the Campbells’ case was
pending, Janet Cammack, “an in-house attorney sent by top
State Farm management, conducted a meeting . . . in Utah
during which she instructed Utah claims management to
search their offices and destroy a wide range of material of
the sort that had proved damaging in bad-faith litigation in
the past—in particular, old claim-handling manuals, memos,
claim school notes, procedure guides and other similar docu-
ments.” Id., at 125a. “These orders were followed even
though at least one meeting participant, Paul Short, was per-
sonally aware that these kinds of materials had been re-
quested by the Campbells in this very case.” Ibid.
Consistent with Bird’s testimony, State Farm admitted
that it destroyed every single copy of claim-handling manu-

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
als on file in its historical department as of 1988, even though
these documents could have been preserved at minimal
expense. Ibid. Fortuitously, the Campbells obtained a
copy of the 1979 PP&R manual by subpoena from a former
employee. Id., at 132a. Although that manual has been re-
quested in other cases, State Farm has never itself produced
the document. Ibid.
“As a final, related tactic,” the trial court stated, the jury
could reasonably find that “in recent years State Farm has
gone to extraordinary lengths to stop damaging documents
from being created in the first place.” Id., at 126a. State
Farm kept no records at all on excess verdicts in third-party
cases, or on bad-faith claims or attendant verdicts. Ibid.
State Farm alleged “that it has no record of its punitive dam-
age payments, even though such payments must be reported
to the [Internal Revenue Service] and in some states may
not be used to justify rate increases.” Ibid. Regional Vice
President Buck Moskalski testified that “he would not report
a punitive damage verdict in [the Campbells’] case to higher
management, as such reporting was not set out as part of
State Farm’s management practices.” Ibid.
State Farm’s “wrongful profit and evasion schemes,” the
trial court underscored, were directly relevant to the Camp-
bells’ case, id., at 132a:
“The record fully supports the conclusion that the bad-
faith claim handling that exposed the Campbells to an
excess verdict in 1983, and resulted in severe damages
to them, was a product of the unlawful profit scheme
that had been put in place by top management at State
Farm years earlier. The Campbells presented substan-
tial evidence showing how State Farm’s improper insist-
ence on claims-handling employees’ reducing their claim
payouts . . . regardless of the merits of each claim, mani-
fested itself . . . in the Utah claims operations during
the period when the decisions were made not to offer to
settle the Campbell case for the $50,000 policy limits—

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436 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
indeed, not to make any offer to settle at a lower
amount. This evidence established that high-level man-
ager Bill Brown was under heavy pressure from the
PP&R scheme to control indemnity payouts during the
time period in question. In particular, when Brown de-
clined to pay the excess verdict against Curtis Camp-
bell, or even post a bond, he had a special need to keep
his year-end numbers down, since the State Farm incen-
tive scheme meant that keeping those numbers down
was important to helping Brown get a much-desired
transfer to Colorado. . . . There was ample evidence that
the concepts taught in the Excess Liability Handbook,
including the dishonest alteration and manipulation of
claim files and the policy against posting any superse-
deas bond for the full amount of an excess verdict, were
dutifully carried out in this case. . . . There was ample
basis for the jury to find that everything that had hap-
pened to the Campbells—when State Farm repeatedly
refused in bad-faith to settle for the $50,000 policy lim-
its and went to trial, and then failed to pay the
‘excess’ verdict, or at least post a bond, after trial—was
a direct application of State Farm’s overall profit
scheme, operating through Brown and others.” Id., at
133a–134a.
State Farm’s “policies and practices,” the trial evidence
thus bore out, were “responsible for the injuries suffered by
the Campbells,” and the means used to implement those poli-
cies could be found “callous, clandestine, fraudulent, and dis-
honest.” Id., at 136a; see id., at 113a (finding “ample evi-
dence” that State Farm’s reprehensible corporate policies
were responsible for injuring “many other Utah consumers
during the past two decades”). The Utah Supreme Court,
relying on the trial court’s record-based recitations, under-
standably characterized State Farm’s behavior as “egregious
and malicious.” Id., at 18a.

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
II
The Court dismisses the evidence describing and docu-
menting State Farm’s PP&R policy and practices as essen-
tially irrelevant, bearing “no relation to the Campbells’
harm.” Ante, at 422; see ante, at 424 (“conduct that harmed
[the Campbells] is the only conduct relevant to the reprehen-
sibility analysis”). It is hardly apparent why that should be
so. What is infirm about the Campbells’ theory that their
experience with State Farm exemplifies and reflects an over-
arching underpayment scheme, one that caused “repeated
misconduct of the sort that injured them,” ante, at 423?
The Court’s silence on that score is revealing: Once one rec-
ognizes that the Campbells did show “conduct by State Farm
similar to that which harmed them,” ante, at 424, it becomes
impossible to shrink the reprehensibility analysis to this sole
case, or to maintain, at odds with the determination of the
trial court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a, that “the adverse
effect on the State’s general population was in fact minor,”
ante, at 427.
Evidence of out-of-state conduct, the Court acknowledges,
may be “probative [even if the conduct is lawful in the State
where it occurred] when it demonstrates the deliberateness
and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State where
it is tortious. . . .” Ante, at 422; cf. ante, at 419 (reiterating
this Court’s instruction that trial courts assess whether “the
harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,
or mere accident”). “Other acts” evidence concerning prac-
tices both in and out of State was introduced in this case
to show just such “deliberateness” and “culpability.” The
evidence was admissible, the trial court ruled: (1) to docu-
ment State Farm’s “reprehensible” PP&R program; and
(2) to “rebut [State Farm’s] assertion that [its] actions to-
ward the Campbells were inadvertent errors or mistakes in
judgment.” App. 3329a (Order Denying Various Motions of
State Farm to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Evidence). Viewed in this
light, there surely was “a nexus” between much of the “other

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438 STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
v. CAMPBELL
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
acts” evidence and “the specific harm suffered by [the Camp-
bells].” Ante, at 422.
III
When the Court first ventured to override state-court pu-
nitive damages awards, it did so moderately. The Court re-
called that “[i]n our federal system, States necessarily have
considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive
damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and
in any particular case.” Gore, 517 U. S., at 568. Today’s de-
cision exhibits no such respect and restraint. No longer
content to accord state-court judgments “a strong presump-
tion of validity,” TXO, 509 U. S., at 457, the Court announces
that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between pu-
nitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process.” Ante, at 425.2 Moreover, the
Court adds, when compensatory damages are substantial,
doubling those damages “can reach the outermost limit of
the due process guarantee.” Ibid.; see ante, at 429 (“facts
of this case . . . likely would justify a punitive damages award
at or near the amount of compensatory damages”). In a leg-
islative scheme or a state high court’s design to cap punitive
damages, the handiwork in setting single-digit and 1-to-1
benchmarks could hardly be questioned; in a judicial decree
imposed on the States by this Court under the banner of
substantive due process, the numerical controls today’s deci-
sion installs seem to me boldly out of order.
* * *
I remain of the view that this Court has no warrant to
reform state law governing awards of punitive damages.
2 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 462,
n. 8 (1993), noted that “[u]nder well-settled law,” a defendant’s “wrongdo-
ing in other parts of the country” and its “impressive net worth” are fac-
tors “typically considered in assessing punitive damages.” It remains to
be seen whether, or the extent to which, today’s decision will unsettle
that law.

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Gore, 517 U. S., at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even if I
were prepared to accept the flexible guides prescribed in
Gore, I would not join the Court’s swift conversion of those
guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching or-
ders. For the reasons stated, I would leave the judgment
of the Utah Supreme Court undisturbed.