PRICE, WARDEN v. VINCENT

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
634 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
PRICE, WARDEN v. VINCENT
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 02–524. Argued April 21, 2003—Decided May 19, 2003
At respondent’s trial on an open murder charge, defense counsel moved,
at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief and outside the jury’s hear-
ing, for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. The
trial judge stated that second-degree murder was “ ‘an appropriate
charge,’ ” 292 F. 3d 506, 508, but agreed to hear the prosecutor’s state-
ment on first-degree murder the next morning. When the prosecution
made the statement, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court
had granted its directed verdict motion the previous day, and that fur-
ther prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but
had not directed a verdict, and noted that the jury had not been told
of his statement. He subsequently submitted the first-degree murder
charge to the jury, which convicted respondent on that charge. The
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause prevented respondent’s prosecution for first-degree murder.
Reversing in turn, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial
judge’s comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Re-
spondent then notified the court of a docket sheet entry stating: “ ‘1
open murder to 2nd degree murder,’ ” id., at 512. The Michigan Su-
preme Court refused to reconsider its decision. Respondent filed a fed-
eral habeas petition, and the Federal District Court granted the petition
after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Respondent did not meet the statutory requirements for habeas re-
lief. The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, and respondent is
therefore entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state
court’s adjudication of his claim was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application of ” this Court’s clearly established precedents. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1). The Sixth Circuit recited this standard but then forgot to
apply it, reviewing the double jeopardy question de novo. This was
error. A state-court decision is “contrary to” this Court’s clearly estab-
lished law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in [the Court’s] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and neverthe-

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
635 Cite as: 538 U. S. 634 (2003)
Syllabus
less arrives at” a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362,
405–406. Here, the Michigan Supreme Court identified, and reaffirmed
the principles articulated in, the applicable precedents of United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, and Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
476 U. S. 140. Nowhere did it apply a legal standard contrary to those
set forth in this Court’s cases, nor did it confront a set of facts materially
indistinguishable from those in any case decided by this Court. The
state court’s decision therefore was not “contrary to” this Court’s prece-
dents. Nor was the state court’s decision an “unreasonable application”
of clearly established law. That court applied both Martin Linen and
Smalis to conclude that the judge’s comments were not sufficiently final
to terminate jeopardy. In reaching this conclusion, in addition to re-
viewing the context and substance of the trial judge’s comments at
length, the court observed that there was no formal judgment or order
entered on the record. While it noted that formal motions or rulings
were not required to demonstrate finality as a matter of Michigan law,
it cautioned that a judgment must bear sufficient indicia of finality and
it concluded that sufficient indicia were not present here. This was not
an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court law. Indeed, numerous courts have refused to find double jeop-
ardy violations under similar circumstances. Even if this Court agreed
with the Sixth Circuit that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read
to prevent continued prosecution under these circumstances, it was at
least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise. Pp. 638–643.
292 F. 3d 506, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Arthur A. Busch argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of
Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Janet A. Van
Cleve, Assistant Attorney General, Donald A. Kuebler, John
C. Schlinker, Dale A. DeGarmo, and Michael A. Tesner.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solici-
tor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff,
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Sri Srinivasan, and Joel
M. Gershowitz.

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
636 PRICE v. VINCENT
Opinion of the Court
David A. Moran, by appointment of the Court, 537 U. S.
1186, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief was Randy E. Davidson.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
granted habeas relief to respondent Duyonn Andre Vincent
after concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment, barred his conviction for first-degree
murder. Vincent v. Jones, 292 F. 3d 506 (2002). Because
this decision exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas
review by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we granted the petition for
certiorari, 537 U. S. 1099 (2002), and now reverse.
I
In an altercation between two groups of youths in front of
a high school in Flint, Michigan, Markeis Jones was shot and
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas
et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Barry R. McBee, First
Assistant Attorney General, Jay Kimbrough, Deputy Attorney General,
R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Idolina Garcia, Assistant Solicitor Gen-
eral, and Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut,
and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Wil-
liam H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Bill Lockyer
of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thur-
bert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden
of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Mc-
Grath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Wayne Stenehjem of North
Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Henry Dargan Mc-
Master of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, and Mark L.
Shurtleff of Utah; for Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney by Timothy
A. Baughman; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S.
Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson.
A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Peter J. Henning, Robert
Weisberg, and Lisa B. Kemler.

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
637 Cite as: 538 U. S. 634 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
killed. Respondent was arrested in connection with the
shooting and was charged with open murder. At the close
of the prosecution’s case in chief and outside the hearing of
the jury, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of ac-
quittal as to first-degree murder, arguing that there was in-
sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The
trial judge stated:
“ ‘[M]y impression at this time is that there’s not been
shown premeditation or planning in the, in the alleged
slaying. That what we have at the very best is Second
Degree Murder. . . . I think that Second Degree Murder
is an appropriate charge as to the defendants. Okay.’ ”
292 F. 3d, at 508.
Before court adjourned, the prosecutor asked to make a brief
statement regarding first-degree murder the following morn-
ing. Ibid. The trial judge agreed to hear it.
When the prosecution made the statement, however, de-
fense counsel objected. The defense argued that the court
had granted its motion for a directed verdict as to first-
degree murder the previous day, and that further prose-
cution on that charge would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Ibid. The judge responded, “ ‘Oh, I granted a mo-
tion but I have not directed a verdict.’ ” Id., at 509. He
noted that the jury had not been informed of his statements,
and said that he would reserve a ruling on the matter. Sub-
sequently, he decided to permit the charge of first-degree
murder to be submitted to the jury. Ibid.
The jury convicted respondent of first-degree murder, and
respondent appealed. Ibid. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals reversed, concluding that the trial judge had directed
a verdict on the charge and that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevented respondent’s prosecution for first-degree murder.
People v. Vincent, 215 Mich. App. 458, 546 N. W. 2d 662
(1996). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It noted
that “a judge’s characterization of a ruling and the form of

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
638 PRICE v. VINCENT
Opinion of the Court
the ruling may not be controlling” for purposes of determin-
ing whether a ruling terminated jeopardy. People v. Vin-
cent, 455 Mich. 110, 119, 565 N. W. 2d 629, 632 (1997) (citing
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571,
n. 9 (1977)). The State Supreme Court then reviewed the
context and substance of the trial judge’s comments, and con-
cluded that the comments were not sufficiently final to con-
stitute a judgment of acquittal terminating jeopardy. After
the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision, respondent discov-
ered that the Clerk had made the following entry on the
docket sheet: “ ‘Motions by all atts for directed verdict.
Court amended c[oun]t: 1 open murder to 2nd degree mur-
der.’ ” 292 F. 3d, at 512; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Re-
spondent moved the State Supreme Court to reconsider its
judgment in light of this statement. The motion was denied
without opinion. Judgt. order reported at 456 Mich. 1201,
568 N. W. 2d 670 (1997).
Respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. That court determined that respondent’s prose-
cution for first-degree murder violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and it granted his petition. App. to Pet. for Cert.
78a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed, 292 F. 3d 506 (2002), and this petition ensued.
II
A habeas petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the
merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court
unless he meets the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
The double jeopardy claim in respondent’s habeas petition
arises out of the same set of facts upon which he based his
direct appeal, and the State Supreme Court’s holding that
no double jeopardy violation occurred therefore constituted
an adjudication of this claim on the merits. Thus, under
§ 2254(d), respondent is not entitled to relief unless he can
demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
639 Cite as: 538 U. S. 634 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Although the Court of Appeals recited this standard, 292
F. 3d, at 510, it proceeded to evaluate respondent’s claim de
novo rather than through the lens of § 2254(d), apparently
because it “agree[d] with the district court that whether the
state trial judge acquitted [respondent] of first-degree mur-
der is a question of law and not one of fact.” Id., at 511.
The Court of Appeals did not consider whether the Michigan
Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary to” or an “unreason-
able application of ” our clearly established precedents, or
whether it was “based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts.” Instead, the Court of Appeals declared:
“ ‘[W]e are not bound by the holding of the Michigan
Supreme Court that the trial judge’s statements did
not constitute a directed verdict under Michigan law.
Instead, we must examine the state trial judge’s com-
ments to determine whether he made a ruling which
resolved the factual elements of the first-degree murder
charge.’ ” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals then concluded that, in its judgment,
the state trial court’s actions “constituted a grant of an ac-
quittal on the first-degree murder charge such that jeopardy
attached,” id., at 512, and affirmed.
This was error. As noted above, under § 2254(d) it must
be shown that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was
either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this
Court’s clearly established precedents, or was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts. The parties do not
dispute the underlying facts, and respondent is therefore

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
640 PRICE v. VINCENT
Opinion of the Court
entitled to habeas relief only if he can meet one of the two
bases for relief provided in § 2254(d)(1). We will address
these bases in turn.
First, we have explained that a decision by a state court
is “contrary to” our clearly established law if it “applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our
cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and neverthe-
less arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 405–406 (2000). See also
Early v. Packer, 537 U. S. 3, 7–8 (2002) (per curiam). Here,
the Michigan Supreme Court identified the applicable Su-
preme Court precedents, United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977), and Smalis v. Pennsylva-
nia, 476 U. S. 140 (1986), and “reaffirm[ed] the principles ar-
ticulated” in those decisions. People v. Vincent, 455 Mich.,
at 121, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633. Moreover, the Michigan Su-
preme Court properly followed Martin Linen by recognizing
that the trial judge’s characterization of his own ruling is not
controlling for purposes of double jeopardy, and by inquiring
into “ ‘whether the ruling of the [trial] judge, whatever its
label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ ” 455
Mich., at 119, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633 (citing Martin Linen,
supra, at 571). Nowhere did the Michigan Supreme Court
apply a legal standard contrary to those set forth in our
cases. Nor did that court confront a set of facts materially
indistinguishable from those presented in any of this Court’s
clearly established precedents. In Smalis and Martin
Linen, unlike in the present case, the trial courts not only
rendered statements of clarity and finality but also entered
formal orders from which appeals were taken. 476 U. S., at
142; 430 U. S., at 566.
Second, respondent can satisfy § 2254(d) if he can demon-
strate that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision involved

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
641 Cite as: 538 U. S. 634 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law. As
we have explained:
“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply
because that court concludes in its independent judg-
ment that the state-court decision applied [a Supreme
Court case] incorrectly. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685,
698–699 (2002); Williams, supra, at 411. Rather, it is
the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state
court applied [that case] to the facts of his case in an
objectively unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visci-
otti, 537 U. S. 19, 24–25 (2002) (per curiam).
Here, having recognized that, under Martin Linen, the trial
judge’s characterization of his own ruling was not controlling
for purposes of double jeopardy, the court went on to ex-
amine the substance of the judge’s actions, to determine
whether “further proceedings would violate the defendant’s
double jeopardy rights.” People v. Vincent, 455 Mich., at
119, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633. In doing so, the court noted the
goal of the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent against a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. Id., at
120, n. 5, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633, n. 5; see also Martin Linen,
supra, at 569 (noting controlling constitutional principle mo-
tivating Double Jeopardy Clause is prohibition against multi-
ple trials and corresponding prevention of oppression by the
Government); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U. S. 33, 42 (1988).
The Michigan Supreme Court also considered Smalis, in
which this Court stated:
“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a postacquittal ap-
peal by the prosecution not only when it might result
in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate
into ‘further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the
offense charged.’ ” 476 U. S., at 145–146 (quoting Mar-
tin Linen, supra, at 570).

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
642 PRICE v. VINCENT
Opinion of the Court
Applying Martin Linen and Smalis, the State Supreme
Court concluded that the judge’s comments simply were not
sufficiently final as to terminate jeopardy. People v. Vin-
cent, 455 Mich., at 120, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633 (“[F]urther pro-
ceedings were not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause”);
id., at 120, n. 5, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633, n. 5 (“[T]he principles
embodied within [double jeopardy] protections were not vio-
lated”); id., at 127, 565 N. W. 2d, at 636 (Because “the judge’s
comments . . . lacked the requisite degree of clarity and speci-
ficity,” “the continuation of the trial . . . did not prejudice or
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights”).
In reaching this conclusion, in addition to reviewing the
context and substance of the trial judge’s comments at
length, the Michigan Supreme Court observed that “there
was no formal judgment or order entered on the record.”
Ibid.1 The Michigan Supreme Court noted that formal mo-
tions or rulings were not required to demonstrate finality as
a matter of Michigan law, but cautioned that “the judgment
must bear sufficient indicia of finality to survive an appeal.”
Id., at 126, n. 9, 565 N. W. 2d, at 636, n. 9. The court listed
factors that might be considered in evaluating finality as in-
cluding “a clear statement in the record or a signed order,”
“an instruction to the jury that a charge or element of the
charge has been dismissed by the judge,” or “a docket entry.”
Ibid. “[E]ach case,” the court said, “will turn on its own
particular circumstances.” Ibid. Even after the docket
entry was brought to its attention, the State Supreme Court
adhered to its original decision that, in this case, the trial
1 The Michigan Supreme Court noted that the comments at issue were
never discussed in front of the jury, People v. Vincent, 455 Mich., at 114–
115, n. 1, 565 N. W. 2d, at 631, n. 1, and that the jury was never discharged,
id., at 121, n. 6, 565 N. W. 2d, at 633, n. 6. Moreover, the State Supreme
Court noted, no trial proceedings took place with respondent laboring
under the mistaken impression that he was not facing the possibility of
conviction for first-degree murder. Id., at 114–115, n. 1, 565 N. W. 2d, at
631, n. 1.

538US2 Unit: $U51 [10-27-04 14:49:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
643 Cite as: 538 U. S. 634 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
judge’s comments were not sufficiently final to terminate
jeopardy. This was not an objectively unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established law as defined by this Court. In-
deed, numerous other courts have refused to find double
jeopardy violations under similar circumstances.2 Even if
we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution
of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least rea-
sonable for the state court to conclude otherwise.
Because respondent did not meet the statutory require-
ments for habeas relief, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
2 In United States v. LoRusso, 695 F. 2d 45, 54 (1982), for example, the
Second Circuit held that double jeopardy did not bar continued prosecution
on a charge when the judge withdrew an oral grant of a motion to dismiss
a count “[w]here no judgment has been entered . . . and there has been no
dismissal of the jury.” In United States v. Byrne, 203 F. 3d 671 (2000),
the Ninth Circuit found no double jeopardy violation where a trial judge
orally granted a motion for acquittal, then agreed to consider an additional
transcript. Id., at 674 (“[T]here was no announcement of the court’s deci-
sion to the jury, and the trial did not resume until” after the court had
denied the defendant’s motion). See also United States v. Baggett, 251
F. 3d 1087, 1095 (CA6 2001) (“Byrne and LoRusso stand for the proposition
that an oral grant of a Rule 29 motion outside of the jury’s presence does
not terminate jeopardy, inasmuch as a court is free to change its mind
prior to the entry of judgment”); State v. Iovino, 524 A. 2d 556, 559 (R. I.
1987) (distinguishing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S.
564 (1977), on the grounds that in the case before it, “the jury remained
impaneled to adjudicate lesser included charges, and that defendant was
not faced with any threat of reprosecution beyond the jury already assem-
bled to hear his case”); State v. Sperry, 149 Ore. App. 690, 696, 945 P. 2d
546, 550 (1997) (“[U]nder the circumstances presented here, the trial court
could reconsider [its oral grant of a motion for a judgment of acquittal]
and withdraw its ruling without violating” the Double Jeopardy Clause).