LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2004
LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 03–583. Argued October 12, 2004—Decided November 9, 2004
Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded
guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and
causing serious bodily injury in an accident, in violation of Florida law.
While he was serving his prison sentence, the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service initiated removal proceedings pursuant to § 237(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which permits deportation of
an alien convicted of “an aggravated felony.” INA § 101(a)(43)(F) de-
fines “aggravated felony” to include, inter alia, “a crime of violence [as
defined in 18 U. S. C. § 16] for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year.” Title 18 U. S. C. § 16(a), in turn, defines “crime of vio-
lence” as “an offense that has as an element the use . . . of physical force
against the person or property of another,” and § 16(b) defines it as “any
other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substan-
tial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense.” An Immigration
Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered petitioner’s depor-
tation, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review, rely-
ing on its precedent that a conviction under Florida’s DUI statute is a
crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16.
Held: State DUI offenses such as Florida’s, which either do not have a
mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the
1

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2 LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
Syllabus
operation of a vehicle, are not crimes of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16.
Pp. 6–13.
(a) Section 16 requires this Court to look to the elements and nature
of the offense of conviction in determining whether petitioner’s convic-
tion falls within its ambit. Florida’s DUI statute, like similar statutes
in many States, requires proof of causation but not of any mental state;
and some other States appear to require only proof that a person acted
negligently in operating the vehicle. This Court’s analysis begins with
§ 16’s language. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144. Par-
ticularly when interpreting a statute featuring as elastic a word as
“use,” the Court construes language in its context and in light of the
terms surrounding it. See Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 229.
Section 16(a)’s critical aspect is that a crime of violence involves the
“use . . . of physical force against” another’s person or property. That
requires active employment. See Bailey, supra, at 145. While one
may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is
much less natural to say that a person actively employs physical force
against another by accident. When interpreting a statute, words must
be given their “ordinary or natural” meaning, Smith, supra, at 228, and
§ 16(a)’s key phrase most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent
than negligent or merely accidental conduct. Petitioner’s DUI offense
therefore is not a crime of violence under § 16(a). Pp. 6–10.
(b) Nor is it a crime of violence under § 16(b), which sweeps more
broadly than § 16(a), but does not thereby encompass all negligent con-
duct, such as negligent operation of a vehicle. It simply covers offenses
that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physi-
cal force might be used against another in committing an offense. The
classic example is burglary, which, by nature, involves a substantial risk
that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime.
Thus, § 16(b) contains the same formulation found to be determinative
in § 16(a): the use of physical force against another’s person or property.
Accordingly, § 16(b)’s language must be given an identical construction,
requiring a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent
conduct involved in a DUI offense. Pp. 10–11.
(c) The ordinary meaning of the term “crime of violence,” which is
what this Court is ultimately determining, combined with § 16’s empha-
sis on the use of physical force against another (or the risk of having to
use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent,
active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.
This construction is reinforced by INA § 101(h), which includes as alter-
native definitions of “serious criminal offense” a “crime of violence,
as defined in [§ 16],” § 101(h)(2), and a DUI-causing-injury offense,
§ 101(h)(3). Interpreting § 16 to include DUI offenses would leave

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3 Cite as: 543 U. S. 1 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
§ 101(h)(3) practically void of significance, in contravention of the rule
that effect should be given to every word of a statute whenever possible,
see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174. Pp. 11–12.
(d) This case does not present the question whether an offense requir-
ing proof of the reckless use of force against another’s person or prop-
erty qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16. P. 13.
Reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
J. Sedwick Sollers III argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Patricia L. Maher and Michael
J. Ciatti.
Dan Himmel farb argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clem-
ent, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitors
General Dreeben and Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, and Greg
D. Mack.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Petitioner Josue Leocal, a Haitian citizen who is a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in
2000 of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and caus-
ing serious bodily injury, in violation of Florida law. See
Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2003). Classifying this convic-
tion as a “crime of violence” under 18 U. S. C. § 16, and there-
fore an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), an Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered that petitioner be de-
ported pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA. The Court of Ap-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Citizens and Im-
migrants for Equal Justice et al. by Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr.; for the
Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center by Shashank S. Upadhye;
and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by
Paul A. Engelmayer, Douglas F. Curtis, Joshua L. Dratel, Lucas Gutten-
tag, Steven R. Shapiro, Robin L. Goldfaden, Lory Diana Rosenberg,
Jeanne A. Butterfield, Marianne Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas.

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4 LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
Opinion of the Court
peals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, dismissing petitioner’s
petition for review. We disagree and hold that petitioner’s
DUI conviction is not a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C.
§ 16.
Petitioner immigrated to the United States in 1980 and
became a lawful permanent resident in 1987. In January
2000, he was charged with two counts of DUI causing serious
bodily injury under Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2), after he
caused an accident resulting in injury to two people. He
pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 21 ⁄ 2 years
in prison.
In November 2000, while he was serving his sentence, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated re-
moval proceedings against him pursuant to § 237(a) of the
INA. Under that provision, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of
an aggravated felony . . . is deportable” and may be removed
upon an order of the Attorney General. 66 Stat. 201, 8
U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Section 101(a)(43) of the INA
defines “aggravated felony” to include, inter alia, “a crime
of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not includ-
ing a purely political offense) for which the term of imprison-
ment [is] at least one year.” 1 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(footnote omitted). Title 18 U. S. C. § 16, in turn, defines the
term “crime of violence” to mean:
1 Congress first made commission of an aggravated felony grounds for
an alien’s removal in 1988, and it defined the term to include offenses such
as murder, drug trafficking crimes, and firearm trafficking offenses. See
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4469, 4470. Since
then, Congress has frequently amended the definition of aggravated felony,
broadening the scope of offenses which render an alien deportable. See,
e. g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 440(e), 110
Stat. 1277 (adding a number of offenses to § 101(a)(43) of the INA); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
§ 321, 110 Stat. 3009–627 (same). The inclusion of any “crime of violence”
as an aggravated felony came in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501,
104 Stat. 5048.

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Opinion of the Court
“(a) an offense that has as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another, or
“(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense.”
Here, the INS claimed that petitioner’s DUI conviction was a
“crime of violence” under § 16, and therefore an “aggravated
felony” under the INA.
In October 2001, an Immigration Judge found petitioner
removable, relying upon the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Le
v. United States Attorney General, 196 F. 3d 1352 (1999) (per
curiam), which held that a conviction under the Florida DUI
statute qualified as a crime of violence. The BIA affirmed.2
Petitioner completed his sentence and was removed to Haiti
in November 2002. In June 2003, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed petitioner’s petition for re-
view, relying on its previous ruling in Le, supra.3 App. to
2 When petitioner first appealed, the BIA’s position was that a violation
of DUI statutes similar to Florida’s counted as a crime of violence under
18 U. S. C. § 16. See, e. g., Matter of Puente-Salazar, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1006,
1012–1013 (BIA 1999) (en banc). Before petitioner received a decision
from his appeal (due to a clerical error not relevant here), the BIA in
another case reversed its position from Puente-Salazar and held that DUI
offenses that do not have a mens rea of at least recklessness are not crimes
of violence within the meaning of § 16. See Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 336, 346 (BIA 2002) (en banc). However, because the BIA held in
Ramos that it would “follow the law of the circuit in those circuits that
have addressed the question whether driving under the influence is a
crime of violence,” id., at 346–347, and because it found the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Le controlling, it affirmed the Immigration Judge’s removal
order. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a–4a.
3 Pursuant to the IIRIRA, the Eleventh Circuit was without jurisdiction
to review the BIA’s removal order in this case if petitioner was “removable
by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses, including those
covered as an “aggravated felony.” See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Be-
cause the Eleventh Circuit held that petitioner’s conviction was such an

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6 LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
Opinion of the Court
Pet. for Cert. 5a–7a. We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1176
(2004), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on
the question whether state DUI offenses similar to the one
in Florida, which either do not have a mens rea component
or require only a showing of negligence in the operation of a
vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence. Compare Le, supra,
at 1354; and Omar v. INS, 298 F. 3d 710, 715–718 (CA8 2002),
with United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F. 3d 1140, 1145–
1146 (CA9 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F. 3d 200, 205–206
(CA2 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609–611 (CA7
2001); and United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F. 3d 921, 926–
927 (CA5), amended, 262 F. 3d 479 (CA5 2001) (per curiam);
see also Ursu v. INS, 20 Fed. Appx. 702 (CA9 2001) (follow-
ing Trinidad-Aquino, supra, and ruling that a violation of
the Florida DUI statute at issue here and in Le does not
count as a “crime of violence”). We now reverse the Elev-
enth Circuit.
* * *
Title 18 U. S. C. § 16 was enacted as part of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which broadly reformed
the federal criminal code in such areas as sentencing, bail,
and drug enforcement, and which added a variety of new
violent and nonviolent offenses. § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136.
Congress employed the term “crime of violence” in numer-
ous places in the Act, such as for defining the elements of
particular offenses, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1959 (prohibiting
threats to commit crimes of violence in aid of racketeering
activity), or for directing when a hearing is required before
a charged individual can be released on bail, see § 3142(f)
(requiring a pretrial detention hearing for those alleged to
have committed a crime of violence). Congress therefore
provided in § 16 a general definition of the term “crime
of violence” to be used throughout the Act. See § 1001(a),
offense, it concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider the removal
order.

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Opinion of the Court
98 Stat. 2136. Section 16 has since been incorporated into
a variety of statutory provisions, both criminal and
noncriminal.4
Here, pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA, the Court of Ap-
peals applied § 16 to find that petitioner’s DUI conviction
rendered him deportable. In determining whether petition-
er’s conviction falls within the ambit of § 16, the statute di-
rects our focus to the “offense” of conviction. See § 16(a)
(defining a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an
element the use . . . of physical force against the person or
property of another” (emphasis added)); § 16(b) (defining the
term as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense” (emphasis added)). This lan-
guage requires us to look to the elements and the nature of
the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts
relating to petitioner’s crime.
Florida Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) makes it a third-degree fel-
ony for a person to operate a vehicle while under the influ-
ence and, “by reason of such operation, caus[e] . . . [s]erious
bodily injury to another.” The Florida statute, while it re-
quires proof of causation of injury, does not require proof of
any particular mental state. See State v. Hubbard, 751
So. 2d 552, 562–564 (Fla. 1999) (holding, in the context of a
DUI manslaughter conviction under § 316.193, that the stat-
4 For instance, a number of statutes criminalize conduct that has as an
element the commission of a crime of violence under § 16. See, e. g., 18
U. S. C. § 842(p) (prohibiting the distribution of information relating to ex-
plosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction in relation
to a crime of violence). Other statutory provisions make classification of
an offense as a crime of violence consequential for purposes of, inter alia,
extradition and restitution. See §§ 3181(b), 3663A(c). And the term
“crime of violence” under § 16 has been incorporated into a number of
noncriminal enactments. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (render-
ing an alien deportable for committing a crime of violence, as petitioner is
charged here).

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8 LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
Opinion of the Court
ute does not contain a mens rea requirement). Many States
have enacted similar statutes, criminalizing DUI causing se-
rious bodily injury or death without requiring proof of any
mental state,5 or, in some States, appearing to require only
proof that the person acted negligently in operating the vehi-
cle.6 The question here is whether § 16 can be interpreted
to include such offenses.
Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. See
Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144 (1995). The plain
text of § 16(a) states that an offense, to qualify as a crime of
violence, must have “as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” We do not deal here with an at-
5 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 13A–6–20(a)(5) (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–
3–205(1)(b)(I) (Lexis 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–60d(a) (2003); Ga.
Code Ann. § 40–6–394 (Lexis 2004); Idaho Code § 18–8006(1) (Lexis 2004);
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 625, § 5/11–501(d)(1)(C) (West 2002); Ind. Code
§ 9–30–5–4 (1993); Iowa Code § 707.6A(4) (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 189A.010(1) and (11)(c) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit.
29–A, § 2411(1–A)(D)(1) (West Supp. 2003); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 257.625(5) (West Supp. 2004); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60–6,198(1) (2002 Cum.
Supp.); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 265:82–a(I)(b) and (II)(b) (West 2004); N. J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:12–1(c) (West Supp. 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 66–8–101(B)
and (C) (2004); N. D. Cent. Code § 39–09–01.1 (Lexis 1997); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2903.08(A)(1)(a) (Lexis 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47, § 11–
904(B)(1) (West 2001); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3804(b) (Supp. 2003); R. I. Gen.
Laws § 31–27–2.6(a) (Lexis 2002); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07(a)(1) (West
2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 1210(f) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 46.61.522(1)(b) (1994); Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1) (1999–2000); Wyo. Stat. § 31–
5–233(h) (Lexis 2003).
6 See, e. g., Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23153 (West 2000); Del. Code Ann., Tit.
11, §§ 628(2), 629 (Lexis 1995); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:39.1(A), 14:39.2(A)
(West 1997 and Supp. 2004); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§ 3–211(c) and (d)
(Lexis 2004); Miss. Code Ann. § 63–11–30(5) (Lexis 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 565.060.1(4) (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–205(1) (2003); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 484.3795(1) (2003); S. C. Code Ann. § 56–5–2945(A)(1) (2003); S. D.
Codified Laws § 22–16–42 (West Supp. 2003); Utah Code Ann. §§ 41–6–
44(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (3)(b) (Lexis Supp. 2004); W. Va. Code § 17C–5–2(c)
(Lexis 2004).

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tempted or threatened use of force. Petitioner contends that
his conviction did not require the “use” of force against an-
other person because the most common employment of the
word “use” connotes the intentional availment of force,
which is not required under the Florida DUI statute. The
Government counters that the “use” of force does not incor-
porate any mens rea component, and that petitioner’s DUI
conviction necessarily includes the use of force. To support
its position, the Government dissects the meaning of the
word “use,” employing dictionaries, legislation, and our own
case law in contending that a use of force may be negligent
or even inadvertent.
Whether or not the word “use” alone supplies a mens rea
element, the parties’ primary focus on that word is too nar-
row. Particularly when interpreting a statute that features
as elastic a word as “use,” we construe language in its con-
text and in light of the terms surrounding it. See Smith v.
United States, 508 U. S. 223, 229 (1993); Bailey, supra, at 143.
The critical aspect of § 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one
involving the “use . . . of physical force against the person
or property of another.” (Emphasis added.) As we said in
a similar context in Bailey, “use” requires active employ-
ment. 516 U. S., at 145. While one may, in theory, actively
employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less
natural to say that a person actively employs physical force
against another person by accident. Thus, a person would
“use . . . physical force against” another when pushing him;
however, we would not ordinarily say a person “use[s] . . .
physical force against” another by stumbling and falling into
him. When interpreting a statute, we must give words
their “ordinary or natural” meaning. Smith, supra, at 228.
The key phrase in § 16(a)—the “use . . . of physical force
against the person or property of another”—most naturally
suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino,
259 F. 3d, at 1145; Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d, at 609.

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Opinion of the Court
Petitioner’s DUI offense therefore is not a crime of violence
under § 16(a).
Neither is petitioner’s DUI conviction a crime of violence
under § 16(b). Section 16(b) sweeps more broadly than
§ 16(a), defining a crime of violence as including “any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.” But § 16(b) does not thereby encompass all
negligent misconduct, such as the negligent operation of a
vehicle. It simply covers offenses that naturally involve a
person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force
might be used against another in committing an offense.
The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general con-
duct or to the possibility that harm will result from a per-
son’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force
against another might be required in committing a crime.7
The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be cov-
ered under § 16(b) not because the offense can be committed
in a generally reckless way or because someone may be in-
jured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim
in completing the crime.
7 Thus, § 16(b) plainly does not encompass all offenses which create a
“substantial risk” that injury will result from a person’s conduct. The
“substantial risk” in § 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible
effect of a person’s conduct. Compare § 16(b) (requiring a “substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used”) with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2003) (in the context of a career-offender sentencing
enhancement, defining “crime of violence” as meaning, inter alia, “conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). The
risk that an accident may occur when an individual drives while intoxi-
cated is simply not the same thing as the risk that the individual may
“use” physical force against another in committing the DUI offense. See,
e. g., United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205–1207 (CA10 2003);
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609–610 (CA7 2001).

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Thus, while § 16(b) is broader than § 16(a) in the sense that
physical force need not actually be applied, it contains the
same formulation we found to be determinative in § 16(a):
the use of physical force against the person or property of
another. Accordingly, we must give the language in § 16(b)
an identical construction, requiring a higher mens rea than
the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI
offense. This is particularly true in light of § 16(b)’s require-
ment that the “substantial risk” be a risk of using physical
force against another person “in the course of committing
the offense.” In no “ordinary or natural” sense can it be
said that a person risks having to “use” physical force against
another person in the course of operating a vehicle while
intoxicated and causing injury.
In construing both parts of § 16, we cannot forget that we
ultimately are determining the meaning of the term “crime
of violence.” The ordinary meaning of this term, combined
with § 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against an-
other person (or the risk of having to use such force in com-
mitting a crime), suggests a category of violent, active
crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.
Cf. United States v. Doe, 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992)
(Breyer, C. J.) (observing that the term “violent felony” in 18
U. S. C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) “calls to mind a tradi-
tion of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely
related, active violence”). Interpreting § 16 to encompass
accidental or negligent conduct would blur the distinction
between the “violent” crimes Congress sought to distinguish
for heightened punishment and other crimes. See United
States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205–1206 (CA10 2003).
Section 16 therefore cannot be read to include petitioner’s
conviction for DUI causing serious bodily injury under Flor-
ida law.8 This construction is reinforced by Congress’ use
8 Even if § 16 lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to
interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor. Although
here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute,

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12 LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
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of the term “crime of violence” in § 101(h) of the INA, which
was enacted in 1990. See Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, § 131, 104 Stat. 31 (herein-
after FRAA). Section 212(a)(2)(E) of the INA renders inad-
missible any alien who has previously exercised diplomatic
immunity from criminal jurisdiction in the United States
after committing a “serious criminal offense.” 8 U. S. C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(E). Section 101(h) defines the term “serious
criminal offense” to mean:
“(1) any felony;
“(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of
title 18; or
“(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while
intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or of prohib-
ited substances if such crime involves personal injury to
another.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(h) (emphasis added).
Congress’ separate listing of the DUI-causing-injury offense
from the definition of “crime of violence” in § 16 is revealing.
Interpreting § 16 to include DUI offenses, as the Govern-
ment urges, would leave § 101(h)(3) practically devoid of sig-
nificance. As we must give effect to every word of a statute
wherever possible, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174
(2001), the distinct provision for these offenses under § 101(h)
bolsters our conclusion that § 16 does not itself encompass
DUI offenses.9
and it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must
interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in
a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies. Cf. United
States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517–518 (1992) (plural-
ity opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting,
because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be inter-
preted consistently with its criminal applications).
9 This point carries significant weight in the particular context of this
case. Congress incorporated § 16 as an aggravated felony under
§ 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501,
104 Stat. 5048 (Nov. 29, 1990). Congress enacted § 101(h), with its incor-

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13 Cite as: 543 U. S. 1 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
This case does not present us with the question whether a
state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless
use of force against the person or property of another quali-
fies as a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. DUI stat-
utes such as Florida’s do not require any mental state with
respect to the use of force against another person, thus
reaching individuals who were negligent or less. Drunk
driving is a nationwide problem, as evidenced by the efforts
of legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose appro-
priate penalties. But this fact does not warrant our shoe-
horning it into statutory sections where it does not fit. The
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
poration of § 16 and a separate provision covering DUI-causing-injury of-
fenses, just nine months earlier. See FRAA, § 131, 104 Stat. 31 (Feb.
16, 1990). That Congress distinguished between a crime of violence and
DUI-causing-injury offenses (and included both) in § 101(h), but did not do
so shortly thereafter in making only a crime of violence an aggravated
felony under § 101(a)(43)(F), strongly supports our construction of § 16.