KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH

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Syllabus
KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 03–377. Argued October 5, 2004—Decided November 30, 2004
As enacted in 1968, the Truth in Lending Act’s (TILA) civil-liability provi-
sion, 15 U. S. C. § 1640, authorized statutory damages for violations of
TILA prescriptions governing consumer loans as follows: “(a) [A]ny
creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to
disclose to any person any information required . . . is liable to that
person in an amount . . . of . . . (1) twice the amount of the finance charge
in connection with the transaction, except that liability under this para-
graph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.” In 1974,
Congress added a new paragraph (1) to § 1640(a) to allow for the recov-
ery of actual damages and to provide separate statutory damages for
class actions. Congress simultaneously amended the original statutory
damages provision to limit it to individual actions, moved that provision
from § 1640(a)(1) to § 1640(a)(2)(A), and retained the $100/$1,000 mini-
mum and maximum recoveries. Congress accounted for the statute’s
restructuring by changing the phrase “under this paragraph” to “under
this subparagraph.” A 1976 amendment redesignated § 1640(a)(2)(A)’s
statutory damages provision as § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), inserted a new clause
(ii) setting statutory damages for individual actions relating to con-
sumer leases, and retained the $100/$1,000 brackets on recovery. Fol-
lowing the latter amendment, the lower federal courts consistently held
that the $100/$1,000 brackets remained applicable to all consumer fi-
nancing transactions, whether lease or loan. Finally, in 1995, Congress
added a new clause (iii) at the end of § 1640(a)(2)(A), so that the statute
now authorizes statutory damages equal to “(i) in the case of an individ-
ual action twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to a consumer
lease . . . 25 per centum of the total amount of monthly payments under
the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be
less than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in the case of an individual
action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan
that is secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or
greater than $2,000.”
Respondent Nigh attempted to purchase a used truck from petitioner
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Unable to find a lender to complete the
financing, Koons Buick twice revised the retail installment sales con-

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tract presented to Nigh. After signing the third contract, Nigh discov-
ered that the second contract had contained an improperly documented
charge for a car alarm that Nigh never requested, agreed to accept, or
received. Nigh made no payments on the truck and returned it to
Koons Buick. He then filed suit against Koons Buick alleging, among
other things, a TILA violation and seeking uncapped recovery of twice
the finance charge, $24,192.80, under clause (i) of § 1640(a)(2)(A). The
District Court held that damages were not capped at $1,000, and the
jury awarded Nigh the full uncapped amount. In affirming, the Fourth
Circuit held that the 1995 amendment not only raised the statutory dam-
ages recoverable for TILA violations involving real-property-secured
closed-end loans, it also removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving
loans secured by personal property. The Court of Appeals held that its
previous view that the $1,000 cap applied to both clauses (i) and (ii)
of § 1640(a)(2)(A) was rendered defunct when Congress struck the “or”
preceding clause (ii) and inserted clause (iii) after the “under this sub-
paragraph” phrase. According to the court, the inclusion of the new
$200/$2,000 brackets in clause (iii) shows that the clause (ii) $100/$1,000
brackets can no longer be interpreted to apply to all of subparagraph
(A), but must now apply solely to clause (ii), so as not to render meaning-
less the new minimum and maximum recoveries articulated in clause
(iii). The court therefore allowed Nigh to recover the full uncapped
amount of $24,192.80.
Held: The 1995 amendment left unaltered the $100/$1,000 limits pre-
scribed from the start for TILA violations involving personal-property
loans. Both the conventional meaning of “subparagraph” and standard
interpretive guides point to the same conclusion: The $1,000 cap applies
to recoveries under clause (i). Congress ordinarily adheres to a hierar-
chical scheme in subdividing statutory sections. Under that scheme,
the word “subparagraph” is used to refer to a subdivision preceded by
a capital letter and the word “clause” to a subdivision preceded by a
lower case Roman numeral. Congress followed this scheme in drafting
TILA. For example, § 1640(a)(2)(B), which covers statutory damages
in TILA class actions, states: “[T]he total recovery under this sub-
paragraph . . . shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per
centum of the net worth of the creditor . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Had
Congress meant to repeal the longstanding $100/$1,000 limitation on
§ 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), thereby confining the $100/$1,000 limitation solely to
clause (ii), Congress likely would have stated in clause (ii): “liability
under this clause.” The statutory history resolves any ambiguity
whether the $100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause (i).
Before 1995, clauses (i) and (ii) set statutory damages for the entire

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52 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Syllabus
realm of TILA-regulated consumer credit transactions. Closed-end
mortgages were encompassed by clause (i). The addition of clause (iii)
makes closed-end mortgages subject to a higher floor and ceiling, but
clause (iii) contains no other measure of damages. Clause (i)’s specifi-
cation of statutory damages of twice the finance charge continues to
apply to loans secured by real property as it does to loans secured by
personal property. Clause (iii) removes closed-end mortgages from
clause (i)’s governance only to the extent that clause (iii) prescribes
higher brackets. There is scant indication that Congress meant to alter
the meaning of clause (i) when it added clause (iii). Cf. Church of Sci-
entology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U. S. 9, 17–18. The history demonstrates
that, by adding clause (iii), Congress sought to provide increased recov-
ery when a TILA violation occurs in the context of a loan secured by
real property. It would be passing strange to read the statute to cap
recovery in connection with a closed-end, real-property-secured loan at
an amount substantially lower than the recovery available when a viola-
tion occurs in the context of a personal-property-secured loan or an
open-end, real-property-secured loan. The text does not dictate this
result; the statutory history suggests otherwise; and there is scant indi-
cation Congress meant to change the well-established meaning of clause
(i). Pp. 60–64.
319 F. 3d 119, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J.,
joined, post, p. 65. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 66. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, post, p. 67. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 70.
Donald B. Ayer argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were William K. Shirey II and Arthur
M. Schwartzstein.
A. Hugo Blankingship III argued the cause for respond-
ent. With him on the brief were Allison M. Zieve and
Brian Wolfman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Bankers Association et al. by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Alan E. Untereiner, and
Max Huffman; for the Michigan Bankers Association by John J. Bursch;
for the National Automobile Dealers Association by Paul R. Norman; and

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The meaning of a subparagraph in a section of the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA or Act), 15 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq., is at
issue in this case. As originally enacted in 1968, the provi-
sion in question bracketed statutory damages for violations
of TILA prescriptions governing consumer loans: $100 was
made the minimum recovery and $1,000, the maximum
award. In 1995, Congress added a new clause increasing re-
covery for TILA violations relating to closed-end loans “se-
cured by real property or a dwelling.” § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iii).
In lieu of the $100/$1,000 minimum and maximum recoveries,
Congress substituted $200/$2,000 as the floor and ceiling.
Less-than-meticulous drafting of the 1995 amendment cre-
ated an ambiguity. A divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 1995
amendment not only raised the statutory damages recover-
able for TILA violations involving real-property-secured
loans, it also removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving
loans secured by personal property. We reverse that deter-
mination and hold that the 1995 amendment left unaltered
the $100/$1,000 limits prescribed from the start for TILA
violations involving personal-property loans. The purpose
of the 1995 amendment is not in doubt: Congress meant to
raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end
loans secured by real property. There is scant indication
that Congress simultaneously sought to remove the $1,000
cap on loans secured by personal property.
I
Congress enacted TILA in 1968, as part of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90–321, 82 Stat. 146, as
for the Virginia Automobile Dealers Association et al. by Michael G.
Charapp, Brad D. Weiss, and Allen Jones, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commercial
Law League of America by Manuel H. Newburger and Barbara M. Bar-
ron; and for the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. by
Richard J. Rubin and Joanne S. Faulkner.

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54 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Opinion of the Court
amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq., to “assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able
to compare more readily the various credit terms available
to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,” § 102, codified
in 15 U. S. C. § 1601(a). The Act requires a creditor to dis-
close information relating to such things as finance charges,
annual percentage rates of interest, and borrowers’ rights,
see §§ 1631–1632, 1635, 1637–1639, and it prescribes civil lia-
bility for any creditor who fails to do so, see § 1640. As orig-
inally enacted in 1968, the Act provided for statutory dam-
ages of twice the finance charge in connection with the
transaction, except that recovery could not be less than $100
or greater than $1,000.1 The original civil-liability provi-
sion stated:
“(a) [A]ny creditor who fails in connection with any
consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person
any information required under this chapter to be dis-
closed to that person is liable to that person in an
amount . . . of
“(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connec-
tion with the transaction, except that liability under this
paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1,000 . . . .” Pub. L. 90–321, § 130, 82 Stat. 157.
In 1974, Congress amended TILA’s civil-liability provision,
15 U. S. C. § 1640(a), to allow for the recovery of actual dam-
ages in addition to statutory damages and to provide sepa-
rate statutory damages for class actions. Pub. L. 93–495,
§ 408(a), 88 Stat. 1518. Congress reworded the original stat-
utory damages provision to limit it to individual actions,
moved the provision from § 1640(a)(1) to § 1640(a)(2)(A), and
retained the $100/$1,000 brackets on recovery. In order
to account for the restructuring of the statute, Congress
1 The finance charge is determined, with certain exceptions, by “the sum
of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as
an incident to the extension of credit.” 15 U. S. C. § 1605(a).

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changed the phrase “under this paragraph” to “under this
subparagraph.” The amended statute provided for damages
in individual actions as follows:
“(a) [A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any re-
quirement imposed under this chapter . . . is liable to
such person in an amount equal to the sum of—
“(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a
result of the failure;
“(2)(A) in the case of an individual action twice the
amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, except that the liability under this subpara-
graph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1,000 . . . .” § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1518.
A further TILA amendment in 1976 applied truth-in-
lending protections to consumer leases. Consumer Leasing
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 257. Congress inserted a clause into
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) setting statutory damages for individual ac-
tions relating to consumer leases at 25% of the total amount
of monthly payments under the lease. Again, Congress re-
tained the $100/$1,000 brackets on statutory damages. The
amended § 1640(a)(2)(A) provided for statutory damages
equal to
“(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the
amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action re-
lating to a consumer lease . . . 25 per centum of the total
amount of monthly payments under the lease, except
that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be
less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 . . . .” Pub. L.
94–240, § 4(2), 90 Stat. 260, codified in 15 U. S. C.
§ 1640(a) (1976 ed.).
Following the insertion of the consumer lease provision,
courts consistently held that the $100/$1,000 limitation re-
mained applicable to all consumer financing transactions,

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whether lease or loan. See, e. g., Purtle v. Eldridge Auto
Sales, Inc., 91 F. 3d 797, 800 (CA6 1996); Cowen v. Bank
United of Tex., FSB, 70 F. 3d 937, 941 (CA7 1995); Mars v.
Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F. 2d 65, 67 (CA4
1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Finance Co., 661 F. 2d
1186, 1191, n. 7 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Williams v. Public
Finance Corp., 598 F. 2d 349, 358, 359, n. 17 (CA5 1979).
In 1995, Congress amended TILA’s statutory damages pro-
vision once more. The 1995 amendment, which gave rise to
the dispute in this case, added a new clause (iii) at the end
of § 1640(a)(2)(A), setting a $200 floor and $2,000 ceiling for
statutory damages in an individual action relating to a
closed-end credit transaction “secured by real property or a
dwelling.” Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub.
L. 104–29, § 6, 109 Stat. 274. These closed-end real estate
loans, formerly encompassed by clause (i), had earlier been
held subject to the $100/$1,000 limitation. See, e. g., May-
field v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Assn., 710 F. Supp. 143, 146
(ED Pa. 1989) (ordering “the maximum statutory award of
$1,000” for each TILA violation concerning a secured real
estate loan). Section 1640(a), as amended in 1995, thus pro-
vides for statutory damages equal to
“(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the
amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual action relat-
ing to a consumer lease . . . 25 per centum of the total
amount of monthly payments under the lease, except
that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be
less than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in the case
of an individual action relating to a credit transaction
not under an open end credit plan that is secured by real
property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater
than $2,000 . . . .”

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Shortly after the passage of the 1995 TILA amendments,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued an offi-
cial policy announcement describing the changes. With re-
spect to changes in TILA’s civil-liability provisions, the an-
nouncement stated only that “[p]unitive damages have been
increased for transactions secured by real property or a
dwelling from a maximum of $1,000 to a maximum of $2,000
(closed-end credit only).” Administrator of National Banks,
Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, OCC Bulletin
96–1, p. 2 (Jan. 5, 1996).
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit, in Strange v. Monogram
Credit Card Bank of Ga., 129 F. 3d 943, held that the mean-
ing of clauses (i) and (ii) remained untouched by the addition
of clause (iii). The Seventh Circuit observed that prior to
the addition of clause (iii) in 1995, “[c]ourts uniformly inter-
preted the final clause, which established the $100 minimum
and the $1,000 maximum, as applying to both (A)(i) and
(A)(ii).” Id., at 947. The 1995 amendment, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned, “was designed simply to establish a more
generous minimum and maximum for certain secured trans-
actions, without changing the general rule on minimum and
maximum damage awards for the other two parts of
§ 1640(a)(2)(A).” Ibid. As Strange illustrates, TILA viola-
tions may involve finance charges that, when doubled, are
less than $100. There, double-the-finance-charge liability
was $54.27, entitling the plaintiff to the $100 minimum. Id.,
at 945, 947.
II
On February 4, 2000, respondent Bradley Nigh attempted
to purchase a used 1997 Chevrolet Blazer truck from peti-
tioner Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh traded in his old
vehicle and signed a buyer’s order and a retail installment
sales contract reflecting financing to be provided by Koons
Buick. 319 F. 3d 119, 121–122 (CA4 2003). Koons Buick
could not find a lender to purchase an assignment of the pay-

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ments owed under the sales contract and consequently re-
structured the deal to require a larger downpayment. Id.,
at 122. On February 25, after Koons Buick falsely told Nigh
that his trade-in vehicle had been sold, Nigh signed a new
retail installment sales contract. Ibid. Once again, how-
ever, Koons Buick was unable to find a willing lender. Ibid.
Nigh ultimately signed, under protest, a third retail install-
ment sales contract. Ibid.
Nigh later discovered one reason why Koons Buick had
been unable to find an assignee for the installment payments
due under the second contract: That contract contained an
improperly documented charge of $965 for a Silencer car
alarm Nigh never requested, agreed to accept, or received.
Ibid. Nigh made no payments on the Blazer and returned
the truck to Koons Buick. Id., at 123.
On October 3, 2000, Nigh filed suit against Koons Buick
alleging, among other things, a violation of TILA. Nigh
sought uncapped recovery of twice the finance charge, an
amount equal to $24,192.80. Koons Buick urged a $1,000
limitation on statutory damages under § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i).
The District Court held that damages were not capped at
$1,000, and the jury awarded Nigh $24,192.80 (twice the
amount of the finance charge). Id., at 121; App. in
No. 01–2201 etc. (CA4), pp. 653–655, 670, 756–757, 764.
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 319 F. 3d,
at 126–129. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it had
previously interpreted the $1,000 cap to apply to clauses
(i) and (ii). Id., at 126; see Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 713 F. 2d, at 67. But the majority held that
“by striking the ‘or’ preceding (ii), and inserting (iii) after
the ‘under this subparagraph’ phrase,” Congress had “ren-
dered Mars’ interpretation defunct.” 319 F. 3d, at 126. Ac-
cording to the majority: “The inclusion of the new maximum
and minimum in (iii) shows that the clause previously inter-
preted to apply to all of (A), can no longer apply to (A), but
must now apply solely to (ii), so as not to render meaningless

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the maximum and minimum articulated in (iii).” Id., at 127.2
The Court of Appeals therefore allowed Nigh to recover the
full uncapped amount of $24,192.80 under clause (i).
Judge Gregory dissented. The new clause (iii), he stated,
operates as a specific “carve-out” for real estate transactions
from the general rule establishing the $100/$1,000 liability
limitation. Id., at 130, 132. Both parties acknowledged,
and it was Fourth Circuit law under Mars, 713 F. 2d 65, that,
before 1995, the $100/$1,000 brackets applied to the entire
subparagraph. 319 F. 3d, at 130. Judge Gregory found “no
evidence that Congress intended to override the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s long-standing application of the $1,000 cap to both
(2)(A)(i) and (2)(A)(ii).” Id., at 131. If the $1,000 cap ap-
plied only to clause (ii), the dissent reasoned, the phrase
“under this subparagraph” in clause (ii) would be “superflu-
ous,” because “the meaning of (ii) would be unchanged by
its deletion.” Id., at 132. Moreover, Judge Gregory added,
limiting the $1,000 cap to recoveries for consumer leases
under clause (ii) would create an inconsistency within the
statute: The damages cap in clause (ii) would include the
“under this subparagraph” modifier, but the cap in clause (iii)
would not. Ibid.3
We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1148 (2004), to resolve the
division between the Fourth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
on the question whether the $100 floor and $1,000 ceiling
apply to recoveries under § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i). We now re-
2 The dissent adopts a similar structural argument to justify its conclu-
sion that the $100/$1,000 brackets apply only to recoveries under clause
(ii). See post, at 70–71.
3 Judge Gregory noted that the phrase “under this subparagraph,” as
it appears in § 1640(a)(2)(B), covering statutory damages in class actions,
“indisputably applies to all of subparagraph (B).” 319 F. 3d 119, 132 (CA4
2003). “[T]he most logical interpretation of the statute,” he concluded,
“is to read the phrase ‘under this subparagraph’ as applying generally to
an entire subparagraph, either (A) or (B), and to read (2)(A)(iii) as creating
a specific carve-out from that general rule for real-estate transactions.”
Ibid.

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60 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
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verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
III
Statutory construction is a “holistic endeavor.” United
Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988); accord United States Nat.
Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc.,
508 U. S. 439, 455 (1993); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S.
223, 233 (1993). “A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one
of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect
that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav.
Assn. of Tex., 484 U. S., at 371 (citations omitted); see also
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136, 139 (1991) (statutory
language must be read in its proper context and not viewed
in isolation). In this case, both the conventional meaning of
“subparagraph” and standard interpretive guides point to
the same conclusion: The $1,000 cap applies to recoveries
under clause (i).
Congress ordinarily adheres to a hierarchical scheme in
subdividing statutory sections. See L. Filson, The Legisla-
tive Drafter’s Desk Reference 222 (1992) (hereinafter Desk
Reference). This hierarchy is set forth in drafting manuals
prepared by the legislative counsel’s offices in the House and
the Senate. The House manual provides:
“To the maximum extent practicable, a section should
be broken into—
“(A) subsections (starting with (a));
“(B) paragraphs (starting with (1));
“(C) subparagraphs (starting with (A));
“(D) clauses (starting with (i)) . . . .” House Leg-
islative Counsel’s Manual on Draf ting Style, HLC
No. 104–1, p. 24 (1995).

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The Senate manual similarly provides:
“A section is subdivided and indented as follows:
“(a) Subsection.—
“(1) Paragraph.—
“(A) Subparagraph.—
“(i) Clause.—” Senate Office of the Legisla-
tive Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual 10 (1997).4
Congress followed this hierarchical scheme in drafting
TILA. The word “subparagraph” is generally used to refer
to a subdivision preceded by a capital letter,5 and the word
“clause” is generally used to refer to a subdivision preceded
by a lower case Roman numeral.6 Congress applied this hi-
erarchy in § 1640(a)(2)(B), which covers statutory damages in
TILA class actions and states: “[T]he total recovery under
this subparagraph . . . shall not be more than the lesser
4 These congressional drafting manuals, both postdating the 1995 TILA
amendment, are consistent with earlier guides. See, e. g., Desk Reference
222 (“Federal statutes . . . are always broken down successively into . . .
subparagraphs (starting with subparagraph (A)), [and] clauses (starting
with clause (i)) . . . .”); D. Hirsch, Drafting Federal Law § 3.8, p. 27 (2d ed.
1989) (“Paragraphs are divided into tabulated lettered subparagraphs
(‘(A)’, ‘(B)’, etc.) . . . . Subparagraphs are divided into clauses bearing
small roman numerals (‘(i)’, ‘(ii)’, ‘(iii)’, ‘(iv)’) . . . .”); R. Dickerson, The
Fundamentals of Legal Drafting § 8.25, p. 197 (2d ed. 1986) (“For divisions
of a paragraph (called ‘subparagraphs’), use ‘(A),’ ‘(B),’ ‘(C),’ etc. . . . When
an additional designated breakdown is necessary, use ‘(i),’ ‘(ii),’ ‘(iii),’
etc.”); J. Peacock, Notes on Legislative Drafting 12 (1961) (paragraphs di-
vided into “sub-paragraphs designated (A), (B), (C),” and subparagraphs
further divided into “clauses (i), (ii), (iii)”).
5 E. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1602(aa)(2)(A) (“under this subparagraph”);
§ 1602(aa)(2)(B) (“under subparagraph (A)”); § 1605(f)(2)(A) (“except as
provided in subparagraph (B)”); § 1615(c)(1)(B) (“pursuant to subpara-
graph (A)”); § 1637(c)(4)(D) (“in subparagraphs (A) and (B)”). But see
§ 1637a(a)(6)(C) (“subparagraph” appears not to refer to a capital-letter
subdivision).
6 E. g., § 1637(a)(6)(B)(ii) (“described in clause (i)”); § 1637a(a)(8)(B) (“de-
scribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A)”); § 1640(i)(1)(B)(ii) (“de-
scribed in clause (i)”).

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62 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Opinion of the Court
of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
creditor . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In 1995, Congress
plainly meant “to establish a more generous minimum and
maximum” for closed-end mortgages. Strange, 129 F. 3d, at
947. On that point, there is no disagreement. Had Con-
gress simultaneously meant to repeal the longstanding $100/
$1,000 limitation on § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), thereby confining the
$100/$1,000 limitation solely to clause (ii), Congress likely
would have flagged that substantial change. At the very
least, a Congress so minded might have stated in clause (ii):
“liability under this clause.”
The statutory history resolves any ambiguity whether the
$100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause (i).7
Before 1995, clauses (i) and (ii) set statutory damages for the
entire realm of TILA-regulated consumer credit transac-
tions. Closed-end mortgages were encompassed by clause
(i). See, e. g., Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Assn., 710
F. Supp., at 146. As a result of the addition of clause (iii),
closed-end mortgages are subject to a higher floor and ceil-
ing. But clause (iii) contains no other measure of damages.
The specification of statutory damages in clause (i) of twice
the finance charge continues to apply to loans secured by real
property as it does to loans secured by personal property.8
Clause (iii) removes closed-end mortgages from clause (i)’s
governance only to the extent that clause (iii) prescribes
$200/$2,000 brackets in lieu of $100/$1,000.9
7 The five separate writings this Court has produced demonstrate that
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) is hardly a model of the careful drafter’s art.
8 In consumer credit transactions in which a security interest is taken
in the borrower’s principal dwelling, the borrower also has a right to re-
scission under certain circumstances. § 1635.
9 The dissent’s reading, we note, hinges on an assumed alteration in Con-
gress’ design, assertedly effected by the bare addition of “(iii)” and the
transposition of “or.” See post, at 71–72, and n. 1. If Congress had not
added “(iii)” when it raised the cap on recovery for closed-end mortgages,
the meaning of the amended text would be beyond debate. The limita-
tions provision would read: “except that the liability under this subpara-

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63 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
There is scant indication that Congress meant to alter the
meaning of clause (i) when it added clause (iii). Cf. Church
of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U. S. 9, 17–18 (1987) (“All
in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests,
by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t
bark,’ that an amendment having the effect petitioner as-
cribes to it would have been differently described by its
sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor man-
ager of the bill.”). By adding clause (iii), Congress sought
to provide increased recovery when a TILA violation occurs
in the context of a loan secured by real property. See, e. g.,
H. R. Rep. No. 104–193, p. 99 (1995) (“[T]his amendment in-
creases the statutory damages available in closed end credit
transactions secured by real property or a dwelling . . . .”).
But cf. post, at 75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (hypothesizing that
far from focusing on raising damages recoverable for closed-
end mortgage transactions, Congress may have “focus[ed]
more intently on limiting damages” for that category of
loans). “[T]here is no canon against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339 (1929) (Holmes, J.). It
would be passing strange to read the statute to cap recovery
in connection with a closed-end, real-property-secured loan
at an amount substantially lower than the recovery avail-
able when a violation occurs in the context of a personal-
property-secured loan or an open-end, real-property-secured
loan.10 The text does not dictate this result; the statutory
graph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or in the case of
an individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end
credit plan that is secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than
$200 or greater than $2,000.”
10 This reading would lead to the anomalous result of double-the-
finance-charge liability, uncapped by the fixed dollar limit, under clause
(i) for an open-end loan secured by real property, while liability would be
capped by clause (iii) at $2,000 for a closed-end loan secured by the same
real property. TILA does not in general apply to credit transactions in
which the total amount financed exceeds $25,000, but this limit does not

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64 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Opinion of the Court
history suggests otherwise; and there is scant indication
Congress meant to change the well-established meaning of
clause (i).
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
apply to loans “secured by real property or a dwelling.” 15 U. S. C. § 1603.
Double-the-finance-charge liability under clause (i) for a TILA violation in
connection with an open-end, real-property-secured loan (e. g., a home eq-
uity line of credit), could far exceed the $2,000 liability cap under clause
(iii) for a TILA violation in connection with a standard closed-end home
mortgage.
The dissent states that fixed mortgages are more prevalent than home
equity lines of credit and that the mean home equity line of credit balance
is considerably smaller than the mean first mortgage balance. Post, at
74–75. But even under the dissent’s reading, a borrower stands to collect
greater statutory damages if a TILA violation occurs in connection with
a home equity line of credit than if it occurs in connection with a home
mortgage acquisition loan. According to figures compiled by the Con-
sumer Bankers Association and the Federal Reserve Board, in 2004 the
average new home equity line of credit was $77,526, see Consumer Bank-
ers Assn., CBA news release, Home Equity Lines Adjust on Prime Rate
Change, Nov. 10, 2004, available at http://www.cbanet.org/news/press%
20releases/home_equity/prime_rate_adjust.htm (as visited Nov. 15, 2004,
and available in Clerk of Court’s case file), and about a third of extended
credit lines are mostly or fully in use, see G. Canner, T. Durkin, & C.
Luckett, Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 Fed. Res.
Bull. 241, 247 (Apr. 1998) (30% of home equity lines of credit 75%–100% in
use in 1997). Assuming, as the dissent does, a 10% annual interest rate,
the annual finance charge could easily surpass $7,000, and double-the-
finance-charge liability would substantially exceed the $2,000 cap pre-
scribed for home mortgage loans. Additionally, the dissent’s observation
does not address the anomaly, illustrated by the facts of this case, of pro-
viding full double-the-finance-charge liability for recoveries under clause
(i), while capping recoveries under clause (iii). Nigh was awarded over
$24,000 in damages for a violation involving a car loan. Had similar mis-
conduct occurred in connection with a home mortgage, he would have re-
ceived no more than $2,000 in statutory damages.

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65 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Stevens, J., concurring
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring.
If an unambiguous text describing a plausible policy deci-
sion were a sufficient basis for determining the meaning of a
statute, we would have to affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. The ordinary reader would think that 15
U. S. C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) is a paragraph including three sub-
paragraphs identified as (i), (ii), and (iii). There is nothing
implausible about a scheme that uses a formula to measure
the maximum recovery under (i) without designating a ceil-
ing or floor. Thus we cannot escape this unambiguous statu-
tory command by proclaiming that it would produce an ab-
surd result.
We can, however, escape by using common sense. The
history of the provision makes it perfectly clear that Con-
gress did not intend its 1995 amendment adding (iii) to repeal
the pre-existing interpretation of (i) as being limited by the
ceiling contained in (ii). Thus, the Court unquestionably de-
cides this case correctly. It has demonstrated that a busy
Congress is fully capable of enacting a scrivener’s error
into law.
In recent years the Court has suggested that we should
only look at legislative history for the purpose of resolving
textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be
wiser to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to con-
sider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when
interpreting its work product.1 Common sense is often
1 See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 611, n. 4
(1991) (“[C]ommon sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing
additional information rather than from ignoring it”); United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543–544 (1940) (“When aid
to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’ ” (footnote omitted));
United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C. J.) (“Where
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every
thing from which aid can be derived”). We execute our duty as judges

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66 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Kennedy, J., concurring
more reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory con-
struction.2 It is unfortunate that wooden reliance on those
canons has led to unjust results from time to time.3 Fortu-
nately, today the Court has provided us with a lucid opinion
that reflects the sound application of common sense.
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice
joins, concurring.
In the case before us, there is a respectable argument that
the statutory text, 15 U. S. C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii), provides un-
ambiguous instruction in resolving the issue: The word “sub-
paragraph” directs that the $1,000 cap applies to recoveries
under both clause (A)(i) and clause (A)(ii), as both fall under
subparagraph (A). Were we to adopt that analysis, our
holdings in cases such as Lamie v. United States Trustee,
540 U. S. 526, 533–535 (2004), Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Ger-
main, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992), and United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241–242 (1989), would
be applicable, absent a showing that the result made little or
no sense.
The Court properly chooses not to rest its holding solely
on the words of the statute. That is because of a counter-
argument that “subparagraph” cannot be read straightfor-
wardly to apply to all of subparagraph (A) in light of the
different recovery cap of $2,000 for recoveries under clause
(A)(iii). I agree with the Court’s decision to proceed on the
premise that the text is not altogether clear. That means
that examination of other interpretive resources, including
most faithfully when we arrive at an interpretation only after “seek[ing]
guidance from every reliable source.” A. Barak, Judicial Discretion 62 (Y.
Kaufmann transl. 1989).
2 See Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1373, 1383 (1992).
3 See, e. g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438 (2002); United
States v. James, 478 U. S. 597 (1986); United States v. Locke, 471 U. S.
84 (1985).

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67 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
predecessor statutes, is necessary for a full and complete un-
derstanding of the congressional intent. This approach is
fully consistent with cases in which, because the statutory
provision at issue had only one plausible textual reading, we
did not rely on such sources. In the instant case, the Court
consults extratextual sources and, in my view, looking to
these materials confirms the usual interpretation of the
word “subparagraph.”
With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed. I write separately, however,
because I believe that it is unnecessary to rely on inferences
from silence in the legislative history or the perceived anom-
alous results posed by an alternative interpretation to an-
swer the question presented in this case. See ante, at 63,
and n. 10. Instead, in my view, the text of 15 U. S. C.
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) prior to Congress’ 1995 amendment to it, the
consistent interpretation that the Courts of Appeals had
given to the statutory language prior to the amendment, and
the text of the amendment itself make clear that Congress
tacked on a provision addressing a very specific set of trans-
actions otherwise covered by the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) but not materially altering the provisions at issue
here.
If the text in this case were clear, resort to anything
else would be unwarranted. See Lamie v. United States
Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 532–533 (2004). But I agree with the
Court that § 1640(a)(2)(A) is ambiguous, ante, at 53, rather
than unambiguous as Justice Stevens contends, ante, at 65
(concurring opinion), because on its face it is susceptible of
several plausible interpretations. Congress, as the Court
points out, used “ ‘subparagraph’ ” consistently in TILA, al-
beit not with perfect consistency, to refer to a third-level
division introduced by a capital letter. See ante, at 60–62,

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68 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
and n. 4. This consistent usage points toward the view that
“subparagraph” here refers to the whole of subdivision (A).
But other textual evidence is in tension with that reading.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out and Justice
Scalia notes, post, at 72 (dissenting opinion), if “subpara-
graph” refers to the whole of subdivision (A), the limit of
$100–$1,000 for liability set forth in clause (ii) is in direct
conflict with the $200–$2,000 limit on liability found in clause
(iii). 319 F. 3d 119, 126–127 (CA4 2003). Still other textual
clues point away from the Court of Appeals’ reading. It is
possible, for example, to read the $100–$1,000 limit in clause
(ii) to be an exception that applies only to the liability set
forth in clauses (i) and (ii), since it comes after clauses (i) and
(ii) but before clause (iii). These conflicting textual indica-
tors show that, whatever the practices suggested in the
manuals relied upon by the Court, ante, at 60–61, and n. 4,
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) is not a model of the best practices in legisla-
tive drafting.
The statutory history of § 1640(a)(2)(A) resolves this ambi-
guity. Prior to the 1995 amendment, the meaning of subdi-
visions (A)(i) and (ii) was clear. As the Court recounts,
after the 1976 amendment and prior to 1995, § 1640(a) pro-
vided for statutory damages equal to
“(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the
amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action re-
lating to a consumer lease . . . 25 per centum of the total
amount of monthly payments under the lease, except
that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be
less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.” 15 U. S. C.
§ 1640(a) (1976 ed.).
See ante, at 55. There is no doubt that under this version
of the statute the phrase “under this subparagraph” ex-
tended the liability limits to subdivision (A)(i) as well as sub-
division (A)(ii). As noted above, “subparagraph” is gener-

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69 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
ally used in TILA to refer to a section’s third-level sub-
division introduced by a capital letter. By virtue of the
phrase “under this subparagraph,” the liability extended to
the whole of subdivision (A). The placement of this clause
at the end of subdivision (A) further indicated that it was
meant to refer to the whole of subdivision (A). The clarity
of the meaning is borne out by the Courts of Appeals’ con-
sistent application of the limit to both clauses (i) and (ii) as
they stood before the 1995 amendment. Purtle v. Eldridge
Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F. 3d 797, 800 (CA6 1996); Cowen v. Bank
United of Tex., FSB, 70 F. 3d 937, 941 (CA7 1995); Mars v.
Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F. 2d 65, 67, and
n. 6 (CA4 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Finance Co.,
661 F. 2d 1186, 1191, n. 7 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Williams
v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F. 2d 349, 359, and n. 17 (CA5
1979).
Congress’ 1995 amendment did not materially alter the
text of § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) or (ii). It removed “or” between
clauses (i) and (ii) and placed it between clause (ii) and the
new clause (iii). Pub. L. 104–29, § 6, 109 Stat. 274. Apart
from this change, it neither deleted any language from clause
(i) or clause (ii) nor added any language to these clauses.
The only substantive change that amendment wrought was
the creation of clause (iii), which established a higher $2,000
cap on damages for a very specific set of credit transac-
tions—closed-end credit transactions secured by real prop-
erty or a dwelling—that had previously been covered by
§ 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and subject to the lower $1,000 cap. Ibid.
By so structuring the amendment, Congress evinced its in-
tent to address only the creation of a different limit for a
specific set of transactions.
In light of this history, as well as the text’s clear meaning
prior to the 1995 amendment and the lower courts’ consistent
application of the limit in clause (ii) to clause (i) prior to the
1995 amendment, the limit in clause (ii) remains best read as
applying also to clause (i).

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70 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Scalia, J., dissenting
Justice Scalia, dissenting.
The Court views this case as a dispute about the meaning
of “subparagraph” in 15 U. S. C. § 1640(a)(2)(A). I think it
involves more than that. For while I agree with the con-
struction of that word adopted by the Court, see ante, at
60–62, by Justice Kennedy, see ante, at 66–67 (concurring
opinion), and by Justice Thomas, see ante, at 67–68 (opinion
concurring in judgment), I disagree with the conclusion that
the Court believes follows. The ultimate question here is
not the meaning of “subparagraph,” but the scope of the ex-
ception which contains that term. When is “liability under
this subparagraph” limited by the $100/$1,000 brackets? In
answering that question, I would give dispositive weight to
the structure of § 1640(a)(2)(A), which indicates that the ex-
ception is part of clause (ii) and thus does not apply to
clause (i).
After establishing the fact that “subparagraph” refers to
a third-level subdivision within a section, denominated by a
capital letter (here subparagraph (A)), see ante, at 60–62,
the Court’s analysis proceeds in five steps. First, the Court
presumes that this fact determines the scope of the excep-
tion. See ante, at 62. It does not. In context, the refer-
ence to “liability under this subparagraph” is indeterminate.
Since it is not a freestanding limitation, but an exception to
the liability imposed by clause (ii), it is quite possible to read
it as saying that, in the consumer-lease cases covered by
clause (ii), “the liability under this subparagraph” would be
subject to the $100/$1,000 brackets. Using “subparagraph”
in that way would hardly be nonsensical, since the only lia-
bility under subparagraph (A) that applies to consumer-lease
cases is the amount of damages specified by clause (ii). In
other words, if the exception is part of clause (ii), then “lia-
bility under this subparagraph” is actually synonymous with
“liability under this clause,” cf. ibid., in the sense that either
phrase would have the same effect were it to appear in clause

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71 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Scalia, J., dissenting
(ii). As a result, the term “subparagraph” cannot end our
inquiry.
The structure of subparagraph (A) provides the best indi-
cation of whether the exception is part of clause (ii). In sim-
plified form, the subparagraph reads: “(i) . . . , (ii) . . . , or
(iii) . . . .” Clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) are separated by commas,
and an “or” appears before clause (iii). It is reasonable to
conclude that the exception—which appears between “(ii)”
and the comma that precedes “or (iii)”—is part of clause (ii).
In fact, the Court admits in passing that the exception ap-
pears “in clause (ii).” Ibid. (emphasis added); see also ante,
at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to “the ceiling con-
tained in (ii)” (emphasis added)). Yet the Court’s holding
necessarily assumes that the exception somehow stands out-
side of clause (ii)—someplace where its reference to “subpar-
agraph” can have a different effect than “clause” would.
The Court effectively requires the exception to be either
part of clauses (i) and (ii) simultaneously, or a part of subpar-
agraph (A) that is not within any of the individual clauses.
The legislative drafting manuals cited by the Court, see ante,
at 60–61, and n. 4, reveal how unnatural such an unanchored
subdivision would be. See L. Filson, The Legislative Draft-
er’s Desk Reference 223 (1992) (“If a section or other statu-
tory unit contains subdivisions of any kind, it should never
contain subdivisions of any other kind unless they are parts
of one of those subdivisions” (emphasis added)); House Leg-
islative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 104–1,
p. 24 (1995) (“If there is a subdivision of the text of a unit,
there should not be a different kind of subdivision of that
unit unless the latter is part of the 1st subdivision” (empha-
sis added)); Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legisla-
tive Drafting Manual 10–11 (1997) (explaining how to avoid
“using a cut-in followed by flush language,” that is, inserting
a clause that is supposed to apply to (a)(1) and (a)(2) after
(2) rather than between (a) and (a)(1)).

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72 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Scalia, J., dissenting
In its second step, the Court notes that, before 1995, the
exception was generally read as applying to both clauses
(i) and (ii). See ante, at 62. But the prior meaning is insuf-
ficient to reveal the meaning of the current version. As
Justice Thomas points out, the placement of the exception
“at the end of subdivision (A)” used to “indicat[e] that it was
meant to refer to the whole of subdivision (A).” Ante, at
69. That inference, however, is no longer available, since
Congress eliminated the “or” between clauses (i) and (ii) and
added clause (iii). If the “or” were still there, it might just
be possible to conceive of clauses (i) and (ii) as a sublist to
which the exception attached as a whole. But one simply
does not find a purportedly universal exception at the end of
the second item in a three-item list.
The Court’s third step addresses clause (iii), which is not
directly implicated by the facts of this case. The Court con-
cludes that the underlying measure of damages in clause
(i) (twice the finance charge) “continues to apply” to actions
governed by the newly created clause (iii). Ante, at 62.
That conclusion does not follow from merely reading the ex-
ception in clause (ii) to apply to clause (i), but it is necessary
because, by reading “subparagraph” in the exception to have
the effect of extending the exception to all of subparagraph
(A), the Court has caused that exception to conflict with the
higher limit in clause (iii). To remedy this, the Court pro-
ceeds (see ante, at 62–63, n. 9) to do further violence to
§ 1640(a)(2)(A), simply reading out its division into clauses
(i), (ii), and (iii) entirely.1 It is not sound statutory construc-
1 In footnote 9, the Court asserts that its new reading merely requires
one to pretend that “Congress had not added ‘(iii)’ when it raised the cap
on recovery.” That is not so—not, at least, if the Court adheres to the
sound drafting principles that supposedly form the basis for its opinion.
See supra, at 71. To adhere to those and also to apply both the limitation
of clause (ii) and the limitation of clause (iii) to clause (i), one must “pre-
tend” that Congress not only had not added “(iii)” but also had eliminated
“(i)” and “(ii).” Otherwise, those limits which are recited in clause (ii)
would apply only to that clause.

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73 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Scalia, J., dissenting
tion to create a conflict by ignoring one feature of a statute
and then to solve the problem by ignoring yet another. My
construction of the exception in clause (ii) avoids the con-
flict altogether.
In its fourth step, the Court returns to the application of
the $100/$1,000 brackets to clause (i). The Court finds
“scant indication that Congress meant to alter the meaning
of clause (i)” in 1995 and compares this to “ ‘Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle’s “dog that didn’t bark.” ’ ” Ante, at 63 (quoting
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U. S. 9, 17–18
(1987)). I hardly think it “scant indication” of intent to alter
that Congress amended the text of the statute by moving the
exception from the end of the list to the middle, making it
impossible, without doing violence to the text, to read the
exception as applying to the entire list. Needless to say,
I also disagree with the Court’s reliance on things that the
sponsors and floor managers of the 1995 amendment failed
to say.2 I have often criticized the Court’s use of legislative
history because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism.
The Congressional Record or committee reports are used to
make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which
were spoken or written by others (individual Members of
Congress, congressional aides, or even enterprising lobby-
ists). The Canon of Canine Silence that the Court invokes
today introduces a reverse—and at least equally danger-
ous—phenomenon, under which courts may refuse to believe
2 The things that were said about the 1995 amendment are characteristi-
cally unhelpful. Rep. McCollum said: “[T]he bill raises the statutory dam-
ages for individual actions from $1,000 to $2,000.” 141 Cong. Rec. 26576
(1995); see also id., at 26898 (remarks of Sen. Mack) (same). Two weeks
later, he “clarif[ied]” his remarks by specifying that the amendments
“apply solely to loans secured by real estate.” Id., at 27703 (statement of
Reps. McCollum and Gonzalez). Taken literally, these floor statements
could mean that the new $2,000 limit applies either to all “individual ac-
tions” under subparagraph (A), or to all “loans secured by real estate”
under clauses (i) and (iii). Neither option is consistent with the Court’s
conclusion that there is a $1,000 limit under clause (i).

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74 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Scalia, J., dissenting
Congress’s own words unless they can see the lips of others
moving in unison. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 385, n. 2 (1992) (“[L]egislative history
need not confirm the details of changes in the law effected
by statutory language before we will interpret that language
according to its natural meaning”).
In its fifth and final step, the Court asserts that it would
be “anomalous” for liability to be “uncapped by the [$1,000]
limit” when real property secures an open-end loan but
capped by the $2,000 limit when it secures a closed-end loan,
and that it would be “passing strange” for damages to be
“substantially lower” under clause (iii) than under clause (i).
Ante, at 63, and n. 10. The lack of a $1,000 limit does not, of
course, make liability under clause (i) limitless. In all cases
under clause (i), the damages are twice the finance charge,
and the 1-year statute of limitations, 15 U. S. C. § 1640(e),
naturally limits the amount of damages that can be sought.
More importantly, Congress would have expected the
amounts financed (and thus the finance charges) under clause
(i) to be generally much lower than those under clause (iii).
In cases (like this one) where loans are not secured by real
property, the amount financed can be no greater than
$25,000. § 1603(3). Where loans are secured by real prop-
erty, clause (iii) includes both first mortgages and second
mortgages (or home equity loans), which are far more com-
mon and significantly larger than the open-end home equity
lines of credit (HELOCs) that are still covered by clause (i).
In 1994, 64% of home-owning households had first or second
mortgages, but only 7% had HELOCs with outstanding bal-
ances. Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Na-
tional Survey of Home Equity Loans 25 (Oct. 1998) (Table
1) (hereinafter National Survey). The mean first mortgage
balance was $66,884; the mean second mortgage balance was
$16,199; and the mean HELOC outstanding balance was

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75 Cite as: 543 U. S. 50 (2004)
Scalia, J., dissenting
$18,459. Ibid.3 Assuming a 10% interest rate (which would
have been higher than a typical HELOC in 1994, see G. Can-
ner & C. Luckett, Home Equity Lending: Evidence from
Recent Surveys, 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 571, 582 (1994)), a year of
finance charges on the mean HELOC would still have been
less than $2,000—which, when doubled, would still be less
than two times the maximum damages under clause (iii), a
disproportion no greater than what Congress has explicitly
prescribed between clauses (ii) and (iii). In addition, very
large outstanding balances on HELOCs are comparatively
rare. In 2001, roughly 94% of them were less than the me-
dian outstanding mortgage principal of $69,227. See U. S.
Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United
States: 2001, pp. 150, 152 (Oct. 2002) (Table 3–15) (herein-
after American Housing Survey).4 Approximately 2% of
HELOC balances were $100,000 or more (compared with
approximately 32% of mortgages). See ibid. Because
closed-end loans are many times more common, and typically
much larger, than open-end ones, the finance charges would
generally be much higher under clause (iii) than under clause
(i), providing a reason for Congress to focus more intently
on limiting damages in clause (iii). As for the difference be-
tween clause (i) and the $1,000 cap in clause (ii): Consumer
leases (principally car leases) are obviously a distinctive cat-
egory and a special damages cap (which differs from clause
(iii) as well as from clause (i)) no more demands an explana-
3 The medians were, of course, lower than the means: $49,000 for first
mortgages, $11,000 for second mortgages, and $15,000 for HELOCs. Na-
tional Survey 25 (Table 1).
4 The 1994 survey did not report on the range of amounts owed on
HELOCs. In 2001, however, the Census Bureau’s Housing Survey began
reporting detailed data about HELOCs—in figures presumably compara-
ble to the 1994 data recited above, since the median outstanding balance
and median interest rate for HELOCs had not dramatically changed.
(The 2001 medians were $17,517 and 8%. See American Housing Survey
152, 154 (Table 3–15).)

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76 KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. v. NIGH
Scalia, J., dissenting
tion than does the fact that damages for those leases are tied
to monthly payments rather than to finance charges. As
Justice Stevens acknowledges, applying the $1,000 cap to
clause (ii) but not clause (i) is a “plausible policy decision.”
Ante, at 65. The Court should not fight the current struc-
ture of the statute merely to vindicate the suspicion that
Congress actually made—but neglected to explain clearly—
a different policy decision.
As the Court noted earlier this year: “If Congress enacted
into law something different from what it intended, then it
should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. It is
beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting
errors, and to provide for what we might think is the pre-
ferred result.” Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S.
526, 542 (2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). I would apply the exception only to the clause
with which it is associated and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.