CLINGMAN, SECRETARY, OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, et al. v. BEAVER et al.

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Syllabus
CLINGMAN, SECRETARY, OKLAHOMA STATE
ELECTION BOARD, et al. v. BEAVER et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 04–37. Argued January 19, 2005—Decided May 23, 2005
Under Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary law, a political party may invite
only its own registered members and voters registered as Independents
to vote in its primary. When the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma (LPO)
notified the State Election Board it wanted to open its upcoming pri-
mary to all registered voters regardless of party affiliation, the board
agreed as to Independents, but not as to other parties’ members. The
LPO and several Oklahomans registered as Republicans and Democrats
then sued for equitable relief, alleging that Oklahoma’s statute unconsti-
tutionally burdens their First Amendment right to freedom of political
association. The District Court upheld the statute on the grounds that
it did not severely burden respondents’ associational rights and that
any burden imposed was justified by Oklahoma’s asserted interests in
preserving parties as viable and identifiable interest groups and in en-
suring that primary results accurately reflect party members’ voting.
Reversing, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the statute imposed a se-
vere burden on respondents’ associational rights and was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
363 F. 3d 1048, reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court except as to
Part II–A, concluding that Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system does
not violate the right to freedom of association. Any burden it imposes
is minor and justified by legitimate state interests. Pp. 586–587,
591–598.
(a) The First Amendment protects citizens’ right “to band together in
promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political
views.” California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574.
Regulations imposing severe burdens on associational rights must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, but when they
impose lesser burdens, “a State’s important regulatory interests will
usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 358. In Tash-
jian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 224, n. 13, the Court

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left open the question whether a State may prevent a political party
from inviting registered voters of other parties to vote in its primary.
Pp. 586–587.
(b) Oklahoma’s system does not severely burden associational rights.
The Court disagrees with respondents’ argument that the burden Okla-
homa imposes is no less severe than the burden at issue in Tashjian,
and thus the Court must apply strict scrutiny as it did in Tashjian.
Tashjian applied strict scrutiny without carefully examining the burden
on associational rights. Not every electoral law burdening associational
rights is subject to strict scrutiny, which is appropriate only if the bur-
den is severe, e. g., Jones, supra, at 582. Requiring voters to register
with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdens vot-
ers’ associational rights. Moreover, Tashjian is distinguishable. Okla-
homa’s semiclosed primary imposes an even less substantial burden than
did the Connecticut closed primary at issue in Tashjian. Unlike that
law, Oklahoma’s system does not require Independent voters to affiliate
publicly with a party to vote in its primary, 479 U. S., at 216, n. 7. Al-
though, like the earlier law, Oklahoma’s statute does not allow parties
to “broaden opportunities for joining . . . by their own act,” but requires
“intervening action by potential voters,” ibid., this burden is not severe,
since many electoral regulations require that voters take some action
to participate in the primary process. Such minor barriers between
voter and party do not compel strict scrutiny. See Bullock v. Carter,
405 U. S. 134, 143. To deem ordinary and widespread burdens like
these severe would subject virtually every electoral regulation to strict
scrutiny, hamper the ability of States to run efficient and equitable elec-
tions, and compel federal courts to rewrite state electoral codes. The
Constitution does not require that result. Pp. 591–593.
(c) Oklahoma’s primary advances a number of regulatory interests
this Court recognizes as important: It “preserv[es] [political] parties as
viable and identifiable interest groups,” Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp.
837, 845 (Conn.), aff ’d, 429 U. S. 989; enhances parties’ electioneering
and party-building efforts, 417 F. Supp., at 848; and guards against party
raiding and “sore loser” candidacies by spurned primary contenders,
Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 735. Pp. 593–597.
(d) The Court declines to consider respondents’ expansion of their
challenge to include several of Oklahoma’s ballot access and voter regis-
tration laws. Those claims were neither raised nor decided below, see,
e. g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 168–
169, and respondents have pointed to no unusual circumstances warrant-
ing their consideration now, see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S.
638, 645–646. Pp. 597–598.

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Justice Thomas, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Kennedy, concluded in Part II–A that a voter unwilling
to disaffiliate from another party in order to vote in the LPO’s primary
forms little “association” with the LPO—nor the LPO with him. See
Tashjian, supra, at 235. But even if Oklahoma’s system burdens an
associational right, the burden is less severe than others this Court has
upheld as constitutional. The reasons underpinning Timmons, supra,
show that Oklahoma’s system burdens the LPO only minimally. As in
Timmons, Oklahoma’s law does not regulate the LPO’s internal proc-
esses, its authority to exclude unwanted members, or its capacity to
communicate with the public. And just as in Timmons, in which a Min-
nesota law conditioned a party’s ability to nominate the candidate of its
choice on the candidate’s willingness to disaffiliate from another party,
Oklahoma conditions a party’s ability to welcome a voter into its pri-
mary on the voter’s willingness to dissociate from his current party of
choice. If a party may be prevented from associating with its desired
standard bearer because he refuses to disaffiliate from another party, it
may also be prevented from associating with a voter who refuses to do
the same. Oklahoma’s system imposes an even slighter burden on vot-
ers than on the LPO. Disaffiliation is not difficult: Other parties’ regis-
tered members who wish to vote in the LPO primary simply need to
file a form changing their registration. Voters are not “locked in” to
an unwanted party affiliation, see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 60–
61, because with only nominal effort they are free to vote in the LPO
primary. Pp. 587–591.
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer except as to Part III,
agreed with most of the Court’s reasoning, but wrote separately to em-
phasize two points. First, the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma (LPO)
and voters registered with another party have constitutionally cogniza-
ble interests in associating with one another through the LPO’s primary,
and these interests should not be minimized to dispose of this case.
Second, while the Court is correct that only Oklahoma’s semiclosed pri-
mary law is properly under review, that standing alone it imposes only
a modest, nondiscriminatory burden on respondents’ associational
rights, and that this burden is justified by the State’s legitimate regula-
tory interests, there are some grounds for concern that other Oklahoma
laws governing party recognition and changes in party affiliation may
unreasonably restrict voters’ ability to participate in the LPO’s primary.
A realistic assessment of regulatory burdens on associational rights
would, in an appropriate case, require examination of the cumulative
effects of the State’s overall primary scheme; and any finding of a more
severe burden would trigger more probing review of the State’s justifi-
cations. Pp. 598–608.

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584 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Opinion of the Court
Thomas, J., delivered an opinion, which was for the Court except as to
Part II–A. Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined that
opinion in full, and O’Connor and Breyer, JJ., joined except as to Part
II–A. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined except as to Part III, post,
p. 598. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined, and in which Souter, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III, post,
p. 608.
Wellon B. Poe, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Okla-
homa, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the
briefs was W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General.
James C. Linger argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, ex-
cept as to Part II–A.
Oklahoma has a semiclosed primary system, in which a
political party may invite only its own party members and
voters registered as Independents to vote in the party’s pri-
mary. The Court of Appeals held that this system violates
the right to freedom of association of the Libertarian Party
of Oklahoma (LPO) and several Oklahomans who are regis-
tered members of the Republican and Democratic Parties.
We hold that it does not.
I
Oklahoma’s election laws provide that only registered
members of a political party may vote in the party’s primary,
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of South
Dakota et al. by Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General of South Dakota,
Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Attorney General, and Gene C. Schaerr, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Kelly A.
Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Roy
Cooper of North Carolina, Mark Shurtleff of Utah, and Darrell V. Mc-
Graw, Jr., of West Virginia.
A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the Coalition
for Free and Open Elections by Richard Shepard.

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see Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 1–104(A) (West 1997), unless
the party opens its primary to registered Independents as
well, see § 1–104(B)(1). In May 2000, the LPO notified the
secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board that it
wanted to open its upcoming primary to all registered Okla-
homa voters, without regard to their party affiliation. See
§ 1–104(B)(4) (requiring notice when a party opens its pri-
mary to Independents). Pursuant to § 1–104, the secretary
agreed as to Independent voters, but not as to voters regis-
tered with other political parties. The LPO and several Re-
publican and Democratic voters then sued for declaratory
and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that Oklahoma’s
semiclosed primary law unconstitutionally burdens their
First Amendment right to freedom of political association.
App. 20.
After a hearing, the District Court declined to enjoin
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary law for the 2000 primaries.
After a 2-day bench trial following the primary election, the
District Court found that Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary
system did not severely burden respondents’ associational
rights. Further, it found that any burden imposed by the
system was justified by Oklahoma’s asserted interest in “pre-
serving the political parties as viable and identifiable interest
groups, [and] insuring that the results of a primary election
. . . accurately reflect the voting of the party members.”
Memorandum Opinion, Case No. CIV–00–1071–F (WD Okla.,
Jan. 24, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 55–56 (hereinafter Mem-
orandum Opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
District Court therefore upheld the semiclosed primary stat-
ute as constitutional. Id., at 72–73.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the State’s semiclosed primary stat-
ute imposed a severe burden on respondents’ associational
rights, and thus was constitutional only if the statute was

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narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 363
F. 3d 1048, 1057–1058 (2004). Finding none of Oklahoma’s
interests compelling, the Court of Appeals enjoined Okla-
homa from using its semiclosed primary law. Id., at 1060–
1061. Because the Court of Appeals’ decision not only pro-
hibits Oklahoma from using its primary system but also casts
doubt on the semiclosed primary laws of 23 other States,1 we
granted certiorari. 542 U. S. 965 (2004).
II
The Constitution grants States “broad power to prescribe
the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives,’ Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, which power is
matched by state control over the election process for state
offices.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S.
208, 217 (1986); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U. S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Tashjian). We have held
that the First Amendment, among other things, protects the
right of citizens “to band together in promoting among the
electorate candidates who espouse their political views.”
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574
(2000). Regulations that impose severe burdens on associa-
tional rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. Timmons, 520 U. S., at 358. However,
1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16–241(A) (West 1996); Cal. Elec. Code Ann.
§ 13102 (West 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–3–101(1) (Lexis 2004); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 9–431(a) (2005); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, § 3110 (Lexis 1999); Fla.
Stat. § 101.021 (2003); Iowa Code §§ 43.38, 43.42 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 25–4502 (2000); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 116.055 (Lexis 2004); La. Stat. Ann.
§ 18:1280.25 (West Supp. 2005); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 53, § 37 (West
Supp. 2005); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32–312 (2004); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.287
(2003); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:14 (West 1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23–
45.1 (West Supp. 2004); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 1–12–7 (1995); N. Y. Elec. Law
Ann. § 1–104.9 (West 2004); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163–59 (Lexis 2003); Pa. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 25, § 292 (Purdon 1994); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 17–9.1–24, 17–15–24
(Lexis 2003); S. D. Codified Laws § 12–6–26 (West 2004); W. Va. Code § 3–
1–35 (Lexis 2002); Wyo. Stat. § 22–5–212 (Lexis 1977–2003).

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when regulations impose lesser burdens, “a State’s impor-
tant regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Tashjian, this Court struck down, as inconsistent with
the First Amendment, a closed primary system that pre-
vented a political party from inviting Independent voters to
vote in the party’s primary. 479 U. S., at 225. This case
presents a question that Tashjian left open: whether a State
may prevent a political party from inviting registered voters
of other parties to vote in its primary. Id., at 224, n. 13.
As Tashjian acknowledged, opening a party’s primary “to
all voters, including members of other parties, . . . raise[s]
a different combination of considerations.” Ibid. We are
persuaded that any burden Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary
imposes is minor and justified by legitimate state interests.
A
At the outset, we note that Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary
system is unlike other laws this Court has held to infringe
associational rights. Oklahoma has not sought through its
electoral system to discover the names of the LPO’s mem-
bers, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S.
449, 451 (1958); to interfere with the LPO by restricting ac-
tivities central to its purpose, see NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 895 (1982); NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 423–426 (1963); to disqualify the LPO from
public benefits or privileges, see Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 595–596 (1967);
or to compel the LPO’s association with unwanted members
or voters, see Jones, supra, at 577. The LPO is free to can-
vass the electorate, enroll or exclude potential members,
nominate the candidate of its choice, and engage in the same
electoral activities as every other political party in Okla-
homa. Oklahoma merely prohibits the LPO from leaving
the selection of its candidates to people who are members of

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another political party. Nothing in § 1–104 prevents mem-
bers of other parties from switching their registration to the
LPO or to Independent status.2 The question is whether
the Constitution requires that voters who are registered in
other parties be allowed to vote in the LPO’s primary.
In other words, the Republican and Democratic voters who
have brought this action do not want to associate with the
LPO, at least not in any formal sense. They wish to remain
registered with the Republican, Democratic, or Reform par-
ties, and yet to assist in selecting the Libertarian Party’s
candidates for the general election. Their interest is in cast-
ing a vote for a Libertarian candidate in a particular primary
election,3 rather than in banding together with fellow citizens
committed to the LPO’s political goals and ideas. See Jones,
supra, at 573–574, n. 5 (“As for the associational ‘interest’ in
selecting the candidate of a group to which one does not be-
long, that falls far short of a constitutional right, if indeed it
2 Respondents argue, for the first time before this Court, that Oklahoma
election statutes other than § 1–104 make it difficult for voters to disaffili-
ate from their parties of first choice and register as Libertarians or Inde-
pendents (either of which would allow them to vote in the LPO primary).
Brief for Respondents 13–19. For reasons we explain fully in Part III,
we decline to consider this aspect of respondents’ challenge. See infra,
at 597–598.
3 Respondents who are members of the Republican and Democratic Par-
ties alleged before the District Court that they wished to have the right
to participate in the 2000 LPO primary. See Amended Complaint 4, Rec-
ord Doc. 23; Complaint 3, id., Doc. 1. The only evidence respondents sub-
mitted on this point was a pair of affidavits from respondents Mary Bur-
nett (a registered Republican) and Floyd Turner (a registered Democrat),
asserting that each might have wished to vote in the 2000 LPO primary.
See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id., Doc. 9 (attached af-
fidavits). Based on Turner’s affidavit, the parties stipulated that there
were “a number of voters” “registered in political parties other than the
[LPO] who wish[ed] to vote” in the 2000 LPO primary. See Supplemental
Joint Stipulations of Fact ¶ 32, id., Doc. 17. Respondents have never
claimed that they are prevented from associating with the LPO in any
way, except that they are unable to vote in the LPO’s primary and run-
off elections.

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can even fairly be characterized as an interest”). And the
LPO is happy to have their votes, if not their membership
on the party rolls.
However, a voter who is unwilling to disaffiliate from an-
other party to vote in the LPO’s primary forms little “associ-
ation” with the LPO—nor the LPO with him. See Tash-
jian, supra, at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That same voter
might wish to participate in numerous party primaries, or
cast ballots for several candidates, in any given race. The
issue is not “dual associations,” post, at 601 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but seem-
ingly boundless ones. “If the concept of freedom of asso-
ciation is extended” to a voter’s every desire at the ballot
box, “it ceases to be of any analytic use.” Tashjian, supra,
at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U. S. 107,
130 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[Not] every conflict be-
tween state law and party rules concerning participation in
the nomination process creates a burden on associational
rights”).
But even if Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system bur-
dens an associational right, the burden is less severe than
others this Court has upheld as constitutional. For in-
stance, in Timmons, we considered a Minnesota election law
prohibiting multiparty, or “fusion,” candidacies in which a
candidate appears on the ballot as the nominee of more than
one party. 520 U. S., at 353–354. Minnesota’s law pre-
vented the New Party, a minor party under state law, from
putting forward the same candidate as a major party. The
New Party challenged the law as unconstitutionally burden-
ing its associational rights. Id., at 354–355. This Court
concluded that the burdens imposed by Minnesota’s law—
“though not trivial—[were] not severe.” Id., at 363.
The burdens were not severe because the New Party and
its members remained free to govern themselves internally
and to communicate with the public as they wished. Ibid.

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Minnesota had neither regulated the New Party’s internal
decisionmaking process, nor compelled it to associate with
voters of any political persuasion, see Jones, 530 U. S., at 577.
The New Party and its members simply could not nominate
as their candidate any of “those few individuals who both
have already agreed to be another party’s candidate and also,
if forced to choose, themselves prefer that other party.”
Timmons, supra, at 363.
The same reasons underpinning our decision in Timmons
show that Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system burdens
the LPO only minimally. As in Timmons, Oklahoma’s law
does not regulate the LPO’s internal processes, its authority
to exclude unwanted members, or its capacity to communi-
cate with the public. And just as in Timmons, in which
Minnesota conditioned the party’s ability to nominate the
candidate of its choice on the candidate’s willingness to disaf-
filiate from another political party, Oklahoma conditions the
party’s ability to welcome a voter into its primary on the
voter’s willingness to dissociate from his current party of
choice. If anything, it is “[t]he moment of choosing the par-
ty’s nominee” that matters far more, Jones, 530 U. S., at 575,
for that is “ ‘the crucial juncture at which the appeal to com-
mon principles may be translated into concerted action, and
hence to political power in the community,’ ” ibid. (quoting
Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 216). If a party may be prevented
from associating with the candidate of its choice—its desired
“ ‘standard bearer,’ ” Timmons, supra, at 359; Jones, supra,
at 575—because that candidate refuses to disaffiliate from
another political party, a party may also be prevented from
associating with a voter who refuses to do the same.
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system imposes an even
slighter burden on voters than on the LPO. Disaffiliation is
not difficult: In general, “anyone can ‘join’ a political party
merely by asking for the appropriate ballot at the appro-
priate time or (at most) by registering within a state-defined
reasonable period of time before an election.” Jones, supra,

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at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Oklahoma, registered
members of the Republican, Democratic, and Reform Parties
who wish to vote in the LPO primary simply need to file a
form with the county election board secretary to change
their registration. See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 4–119
(West Supp. 2005). Voters are not “locked in” to an un-
wanted party affiliation, see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51,
60–61 (1973), because with only nominal effort they are free
to vote in the LPO primary. For this reason, too, the regis-
tration requirement does not unduly hinder the LPO from
associating with members of other parties. To attract mem-
bers of other parties, the LPO need only persuade voters to
make the minimal effort necessary to switch parties.
B
Respondents argue that this case is no different from
Tashjian. According to respondents, the burden imposed
by Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system is no less severe
than the burden at issue in Tashjian, and hence we must
apply strict scrutiny as we did in Tashjian. We disagree.
At issue in Tashjian was a Connecticut election statute that
required voters to register with a political party before par-
ticipating in its primary. 479 U. S., at 210–211. The State’s
Republican Party, having adopted a rule that allowed Inde-
pendent voters to participate in its primary, contended that
Connecticut’s closed primary infringed its right to associate
with Independent voters. Ibid. Applying strict scrutiny,
this Court found that the interests Connecticut advanced to
justify its ban were not compelling, and thus that the State
could not constitutionally prevent the Republican Party from
inviting into its primary willing Independent voters. Id.,
at 217–225.
Respondents’ reliance on Tashjian is unavailing. As an
initial matter, Tashjian applied strict scrutiny with little dis-
cussion of the magnitude of the burdens imposed by Con-
necticut’s closed primary on parties’ and voters’ associational

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rights. Post, at 605 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). But not every electoral law that
burdens associational rights is subject to strict scrutiny.
See, e. g., Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 849 (Conn.)
(“There must be more than a minimal infringement on the
rights to vote and of association . . . before strict judicial
review is warranted”), aff ’d, 429 U. S. 989 (1976). Instead,
as our cases since Tashjian have clarified, strict scrutiny is
appropriate only if the burden is severe. Jones, supra, at
582; Timmons, 520 U. S., at 358. In Tashjian itself, Inde-
pendent voters could join the Connecticut Republican Party
as late as the day before the primary. 479 U. S., at 219. As
explained above, supra, at 590–591, requiring voters to reg-
ister with a party prior to participating in the party’s pri-
mary minimally burdens voters’ associational rights.
Nevertheless, Tashjian is distinguishable. Oklahoma’s
semiclosed primary imposes an even less substantial burden
than did the Connecticut closed primary at issue in Tashjian.
In Tashjian, this Court identified two ways in which Con-
necticut’s closed primary limited citizens’ freedom of political
association. The first and most important was that it re-
quired Independent voters to affiliate publicly with a party
to vote in its primary. 479 U. S., at 216, n. 7. That is not
true in this case. At issue here are voters who have already
affiliated publicly with one of Oklahoma’s political parties.
These voters need not register as Libertarians to vote in the
LPO’s primary; they need only declare themselves Independ-
ents, which would leave them free to participate in any party
primary that is open to registered Independents. See Okla.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 1–104(B)(1) (West 1997).
The second and less important burden imposed by Con-
necticut’s closed primary system was that political parties
could not “broaden opportunities for joining . . . by their own
act, without any intervening action by potential voters.”
Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 216, n. 7. Voters also had to act by
registering themselves in a particular party. Ibid. That is

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equally true of Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system: Vot-
ers must register as Libertarians or Independents to partici-
pate in the LPO’s primary. However, Tashjian did not char-
acterize this burden alone as severe, and with good reason.
Many electoral regulations, including voter registration gen-
erally, require that voters take some action to participate in
the primary process. See, e. g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U. S. 752, 760–762 (1973) (upholding requirement that voters
change party registration 11 months in advance of the pri-
mary election). Election laws invariably “affec[t]—at least
to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right
to associate with others for political ends.” Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788 (1983).
These minor barriers between voter and party do not com-
pel strict scrutiny. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 143
(1972). To deem ordinary and widespread burdens like
these severe would subject virtually every electoral regula-
tion to strict scrutiny, hamper the ability of States to run
efficient and equitable elections, and compel federal courts
to rewrite state electoral codes. The Constitution does not
require that result, for it is beyond question “that States
may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of
parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and
campaign-related disorder. ” Timmons, supra, at 358;
Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730 (1974). Oklahoma’s
semiclosed primary system does not severely burden the as-
sociational rights of the State’s citizenry.
C
When a state electoral provision places no heavy burden
on associational rights, “a State’s important regulatory inter-
ests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscrim-
inatory restrictions.” Timmons, supra, at 358 (internal
quotation marks omitted); Anderson, supra, at 788. Here,
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary advances a number of regu-
latory interests that this Court recognizes as important: It

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“preserv[es] [political] parties as viable and identifiable inter-
est groups,” Nader, 417 F. Supp., at 845; enhances parties’
electioneering and party-building efforts, id., at 848; and
guards against party raiding and “sore loser” candidacies by
spurned primary contenders, Storer, supra, at 735.
First, as Oklahoma asserts, its semiclosed primary “pre-
serv[es] the political parties as viable and identifiable inter-
est groups, insuring that the results of a primary election,
in a broad sense, accurately reflec[t] the voting of the party
members.” Amended and Supplemental Trial Brief of De-
fendants 10, Record Doc. 63 (quoting without attribution
Nader, supra, at 845). The LPO wishes to open its primary
to registered Republicans and Democrats, who may well vote
in numbers that dwarf the roughly 300 registered LPO vot-
ers in Oklahoma. See Memorandum Opinion 31–32 (at least
95% of voters in LPO’s 1996 primary were independents, not
Libertarians). If the LPO is permitted to open its primary
to all registered voters regardless of party affiliation, the
candidate who emerges from the LPO primary may be “un-
concerned with, if not . . . hostile to,” the political preferences
of the majority of the LPO’s members. Nader, supra, at
846. It does not matter that the LPO is willing to risk the
surrender of its identity in exchange for electoral success.
Oklahoma’s interest is independent and concerns the integ-
rity of its primary system. The State wants to “avoid pri-
mary election outcomes which would tend to confuse or mis-
lead the general voting population to the extent [it] relies on
party labels as representative of certain ideologies.” Brief
for Petitioners 12 (quoting without attribution Nader, supra,
at 845); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 228 (1989).
Moreover, this Court has found that “ ‘[i]n facilitating the
effective operation of [a] democratic government, a state
might reasonably classify voters or candidates according to
political affiliations.’ ” Nader, supra, at 845–846 (quoting
Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214, 226, n. 14 (1952)). But for that

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classification to mean much, Oklahoma must be allowed to
limit voters’ ability to roam among parties’ primaries. The
purpose of party registration is to provide “a minimal dem-
onstration by the voter that he has some ‘commitment’ to the
party in whose primary he wishes to participate.” Nader,
supra, at 847. That commitment is lessened if party mem-
bers may retain their registration in one party while voting
in another party’s primary. Opening the LPO’s primary to
all voters not only would render the LPO’s imprimatur an
unreliable index of its candidate’s actual political philosophy,
but it also “would make registered party affiliations signifi-
cantly less meaningful in the Oklahoma primary election sys-
tem.” Memorandum Opinion 59. Oklahoma reasonably has
concluded that opening the LPO’s primary to all voters re-
gardless of party affiliation would undermine the crucial role
of political parties in the primary process. Cf. Jones, 530
U. S., at 574.
Second, Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system, by retain-
ing the importance of party affiliation, aids in parties’ elec-
tioneering and party-building efforts. “It is common expe-
rience that direct solicitation of party members—by mail,
telephone, or face-to-face contact, and by the candidates
themselves or by their active supporters—is part of any pri-
mary election campaign.” Nader, supra, at 848. Yet par-
ties’ voter turnout efforts depend in large part on accurate
voter registration rolls. See, e. g., Council of Alternative
Political Parties v. State Div. of Elections, 344 N. J. Super.
225, 231–232, 781 A. 2d 1041, 1045 (2001) (“It is undisputed
that the voter registration lists, with voter affiliation infor-
mation, . . . provide essential information to the [party state
committees] for other campaign and party-building activities,
including canvassing and fundraising”).
When voters are no longer required to disaffiliate before
participating in other parties’ primaries, voter registration
rolls cease to be an accurate reflection of voters’ political
preferences. And without registration rolls that accurately

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reflect likely or potential primary voters, parties risk ex-
pending precious resources to turn out party members who
may have decided to cast their votes elsewhere. See Brief
for State of South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae 20–21. If
encouraging citizens to vote is an important state interest,
see Jones, supra, at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring), then
Oklahoma is entitled to protect parties’ ability to plan their
primaries for a stable group of voters. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26.
Third, Oklahoma has an interest in preventing party raid-
ing, or “the organized switching of blocs of voters from one
party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the
other party’s primary election.” Anderson, 460 U. S., at
788–789, n. 9; Jones, supra, at 572. For example, if the out-
come of the Democratic Party primary were not in doubt,
Democrats might vote in the LPO primary for the candidate
most likely to siphon off votes from the Republican candidate
in the general election. Or a Democratic primary contender
who senses defeat might launch a “sore loser” candidacy by
defecting to the LPO primary, taking with him loyal Demo-
cratic voters, and thus undermining the Democratic Party in
the general election.4 Storer, 415 U. S., at 735. Oklahoma
has an interest in “temper[ing] the destabilizing effects” of
precisely this sort of “party splintering and excessive fac-
4 To be most effective, a spurned candidate would have to defect in ad-
vance of the primary election. Before a candidate may file for nomination
by a political party to any state or county office in Oklahoma, generally
the candidate must have been a registered member of the party for six
months prior to filing. See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 5–105(A) (West
1997). However, the registration period is only 15 days for candidates
from parties, like the LPO, whose lack of electoral support means that
they must regularly petition to be recognized as political parties. Ibid.;
see also §§ 1–108, 1–109 (West Supp. 2005) (Oklahoma’s ballot access re-
quirements). But even though candidates may defect up to two weeks
before the primary, registered Republican and Democratic voters may not
change their party affiliation after June 1, roughly eight weeks before the
primary. See § 4–119; see also § 1–102 (setting primary on last Tuesday
of July).

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tionalism.” Timmons, 520 U. S., at 367; cf. Davis v. Ban-
demer, 478 U. S. 109, 144–145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment). Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system
serves that interest by discouraging voters from temporarily
defecting from another party to vote in the LPO primary.
While the State’s interest will not justify “unreasonably ex-
clusionary restrictions,” Timmons, 520 U. S., at 367, we have
“repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regula-
tions” like Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary law, id., at 369
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Beyond their challenge to Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary
law, § 1–104, respondents have expanded their challenge be-
fore this Court to include other Oklahoma election laws.
Respondents contend that several of the State’s ballot access
and voter registration laws, taken together, severely burden
their associational rights by effectively preventing them
from changing their party affiliations in advance of a primary
election. Brief for Respondents 15–18 (discussing the joint
operation of Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, §§ 1–108, 1–109, 1–110,
4–112, and 4–119 (West Supp. 2005)).
Though the LPO has unsuccessfully challenged one of
these provisions before, see Rainbow Coalition of Okla. v.
Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F. 2d 740 (CA10 1988)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge by LPO and other po-
litical parties to Oklahoma’s ballot access provision, § 1–108
(West 1981 and Supp. 1987)), respondents raise this argu-
ment for the first time in their brief on the merits to this
Court. Before the District Court and the Court of Appeals,
the only associational burden of which respondents com-
plained was that imposed by § 1–104 (West 1997), i. e., the
need to disaffiliate from one party in order to vote in another
party’s primary. See, e. g., Appellants’ Opening Brief in
No. 03–6058 (CA10), pp. 5, 8–10, 30 (challenging only § 1–104
as applied to respondents); Plaintiffs’ Amended Trial Brief

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9–25, Record Doc. 65 (same); Amended Complaint 6–9, id.,
Doc. 23 (same). As a result, there is virtually no evidence
in the record on how other electoral regulations operate in
tandem with § 1–104, whether these other laws actually bur-
den respondents’ associational rights, and whether these
laws advance important or even compelling state interests.
We ordinarily do not consider claims neither raised nor de-
cided below, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,
543 U. S. 157, 168–169 (2004) (citing Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U. S. 103, 109 (2001) (per curiam)), and
respondents have pointed to no unusual circumstances that
would warrant considering other portions of Oklahoma’s
electoral code this late in the day, see Taylor v. Freeland &
Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 645–646 (1992). We therefore decline
to consider this aspect of their challenge.
* * *
Oklahoma remains free to allow the LPO to invite regis-
tered voters of other parties to vote in its primary. But the
Constitution leaves that choice to the democratic process, not
to the courts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joins ex-
cept as to Part III, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join the Court’s opinion except for Part II–A. Although
I agree with most of the Court’s reasoning, I write sepa-
rately to emphasize two points. First, I think respondents’
claim implicates important associational interests, and I see
no reason to minimize those interests to dispose of this case.
Second, I agree with the Court that only Oklahoma’s semi-
closed primary law is properly before us, that standing alone
it imposes only a modest, nondiscriminatory burden on re-
spondents’ associational rights, and that this burden is justi-

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fied by the State’s legitimate regulatory interests. I note,
however, that there are some grounds for concern that other
state laws may unreasonably restrict voters’ ability to
change party registration so as to participate in the Lib-
ertarian Party of Oklahoma’s (LPO) primary. A realistic
assessment of regulatory burdens on associational rights
would, in an appropriate case, require examination of the
cumulative effects of the State’s overall scheme governing
primary elections; and any finding of a more severe burden
would trigger more probing review of the justifications of-
fered by the State.
I
Nearly every State in the Nation now mandates that polit-
ical parties select their candidates for national or statewide
office by means of primary elections. See Galderisi & Ezra,
Congressional Primaries in Historical and Theoretical Con-
text, in Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Repre-
sentation 11, 17, and n. 34 (P. Galderisi, M. Ezra, & M. Lyons
eds. 2001). Primaries constitute both a “ ‘crucial juncture’ ”
in the electoral process, California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 575 (2000) (quoting Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 216 (1986)), and a vital
forum for expressive association among voters and political
parties, see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 58 (1973) (“[A]
basic function of a political party is to select the candidates
for public office to be offered to the voters at general elec-
tions[, and a] prime objective of most voters in associating
themselves with a particular party must surely be to gain a
voice in that selection process”). It is here that the parties
invite voters to join in selecting their standard bearers.
The outcome is pivotal, of course, for it dictates the range of
choices available at—and often the presumptive winner of—
the general election.
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live,” Wesberry v.

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Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964), and “[t]he right to associate
with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of
this basic constitutional freedom,” Kusper, supra, at 57.
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments protect the rights of voters and parties
to associate through primary elections. See, e. g., Califor-
nia Democratic Party, supra, at 574–575; Tashjian, supra,
at 214; Kusper, supra, at 56–57. Indeed, constitutional pro-
tection of associational rights is especially important in this
context because the aggregation of votes is, in some sense,
the essence of the electoral process. To have a meaningful
voice in this process, the individual voter must join together
with like-minded others at the polls. And the choice of who
will participate in selecting a party’s candidate obviously
plays a critical role in determining both the party’s message
and its prospects of success in the electoral contest. See
California Democratic Party, supra, at 575; see also Demo-
cratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Fol-
lette, 450 U. S. 107, 122 (1981) (“[T]he freedom to associate
for the ‘common advancement of political beliefs’ necessarily
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who consti-
tute the association” (quoting Kusper, supra, at 56)).
The plurality questions whether the LPO and voters regis-
tered with another party have any constitutionally cogniza-
ble interest in associating with one another through the
LPO’s primary. See ante, at 588–589. Its doubts on this
point appear to stem from two implicit premises: first, that
a voter forms a cognizable association with a political party
only by registering with that party; and second, that a voter
can only form a cognizable association with one party at a
time. Neither of these premises is sound, in my view. As
to the first, registration with a political party surely may
signify an important personal commitment, which may be
accompanied by faithful voting and even activism beyond the
polls. But for many voters, registration serves principally
as a mandatory (and perhaps even ministerial) prerequisite

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to participation in the party’s primaries. The act of casting
a ballot in a given primary may, for both the voter and the
party, constitute a form of association that is at least as im-
portant as the act of registering. See La Follette, supra, at
130, n. 2 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he act of voting in the
Democratic primary fairly can be described as an act of affil-
iation with the Democratic Party”). The fact that voting is
episodic does not, in my judgment, undermine its associa-
tional significance; it simply reflects the special character of
the electoral process, which allows citizens to join together
at regular intervals to shape government through the choice
of public officials.
As to the question of dual associations, I fail to see why
registration with one party should negate a voter’s First
Amendment interest in associating with a second party. We
surely would not say, for instance, that a registered Republi-
can or Democrat has no protected interest in associating with
the Libertarian Party by attending meetings or making po-
litical contributions. The validity of voters’ and parties’ in-
terests in dual associations seems particularly clear where
minor parties are concerned. For example, a voter may
have a longstanding affiliation with a major party that she
wishes to maintain, but she may nevertheless have a sub-
stantial interest in associating with a minor party during
particular election cycles or in elections for particular offices.
The voter’s refusal to disaffiliate from the major party may
reflect her abiding commitment to that party (which is not
necessarily inconsistent with her desire to associate with a
second party), the objective costs of disaffiliation, see, e. g.,
infra, at 606–607, or both. The minor party, for its part,
may have a significant interest in augmenting its voice in the
political process by associating with sympathetic members of
the major parties.
None of this is to suggest that the State does not have a
superseding interest in restricting certain forms of associa-
tion. We have never questioned, for example, the States’

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authority to restrict voters’ public registration to a single
party or to limit each voter to participating in a single par-
ty’s primary. But the fact that a State’s regulatory author-
ity may ultimately trump voters’ or parties’ associational in-
terests in a particular context is no reason to dismiss the
validity of those interests. As a more general matter,
I question whether judicial inquiry into the genuineness, in-
tensity, or duration of a given voter’s association with a
given party is a fruitful way to approach constitutional chal-
lenges to regulations like the one at issue here. Primary
voting is an episodic and sometimes isolated act of associa-
tion, but it is a vitally important one and should be entitled
to some level of constitutional protection. Accordingly,
where a party invites a voter to participate in its primary
and the voter seeks to do so, we should begin with the prem-
ise that there are significant associational interests at stake.
From this starting point, we can then ask to what extent and
in what manner the State may justifiably restrict those
interests.
II
As to the remainder of the constitutional analysis, I am
substantially in accord with the Court’s reasoning. Our con-
stitutional system assigns the States broad authority to reg-
ulate the electoral process, and we have recognized that, “as
a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort
of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes,” Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730 (1974). We
have sought to balance the associational interests of parties
and voters against the States’ regulatory interests through
the flexible standard of review reaffirmed by the Court
today. See ante, at 586–587. Under that standard, “the
rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state elec-
tion law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regu-
lation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 434 (1992). Regulations

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imposing severe burdens on associational rights must be nar-
rowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 358
(1997). Regulations imposing lesser burdens are subject to
less intensive scrutiny, and reasonable, nondiscriminatory re-
strictions ordinarily will be sustained if they serve impor-
tant regulatory interests. Ibid.
This regime reflects the limited but important role of
courts in reviewing electoral regulation. Although the
State has a legitimate—and indeed critical—role to play in
regulating elections, it must be recognized that it is not a
wholly independent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is
itself controlled by the political party or parties in power,
which presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of
the electoral game to their own benefit. Recognition of that
basic reality need not render suspect most electoral regula-
tions. Where the State imposes only reasonable and genu-
inely neutral restrictions on associational rights, there is no
threat to the integrity of the electoral process and no appar-
ent reason for judicial intervention. As such restrictions
become more severe, however, and particularly where they
have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for
concern that those in power may be using electoral rules
to erect barriers to electoral competition. In such cases,
applying heightened scrutiny helps to ensure that such
limitations are truly justified and that the State’s asserted
interests are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anti-
competitive restrictions.
Throughout the proceedings in the lower courts, respond-
ents framed their suit as a facial challenge to Oklahoma’s
semiclosed primary law. The sum of their argument was
that, by requiring voters to register either as Libertarians
or Independents in order to participate in the LPO’s primary,
state law imposes a severe and unjustified burden on the
LPO’s and Oklahoma voters’ associational rights. For the
reasons explained by the Court, ante, at 597–598, that is the

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only claim properly before us. Assuming (as I believe we
must under the circumstances) that Oklahoma provides rea-
sonable avenues for voters to reregister as Independents or
Libertarians, I agree with the Court that the semiclosed pri-
mary law imposes only a modest and politically neutral bur-
den on associational rights. The burden is not altogether
trivial: A voter with a significant commitment to a major
party (for example) must forfeit registration with that party
in order to participate in the LPO primary in any given elec-
tion cycle, and the LPO cannot define the bounds of the asso-
ciation as broadly as it would like. See post, at 610, and n. 1
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra, at 601 (discussing
the interest in dual associations). But neither is it severe
or discriminatory.
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary law simply requires that
voters wishing to participate in the LPO’s primary do what
they would have to do in order to participate in any other
party’s primary. By providing a reasonably fixed party-
related electoral base from the close of registration until the
date of the vote, this requirement facilitates campaign plan-
ning. And assuming the availability of reasonable reregis-
tration procedures, a party’s inability to persuade a voter to
disaffiliate from a rival party would suggest not the presence
of anticompetitive regulatory restrictions, but rather the
party’s failure to win the voter’s allegiance. The semiclosed
primary law, standing alone, does not impose a significant
obstacle to participation in the LPO’s primary, nor does it
indicate partisan self dealing or a lockup of the political proc-
ess that would warrant heightened judicial scrutiny.
For essentially the reasons explained by the Court, see
ante, at 593–597, I agree that Oklahoma has a legitimate in-
terest in requiring voters to disaffiliate from one party be-
fore participating in another party’s primary. On the record
before us, I also agree that the State’s regulatory interests
are adequate to justify the limited burden the semiclosed
primary law imposes on respondents’ freedom of association.

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And finally, I agree that this case is distinguishable from
Tashjian. See ante, at 591–593. I joined the dissent in
that case, and I think the Court’s application of strict scru-
tiny there is difficult to square with the flexible standard of
review articulated in our more recent cases, see supra, at
602–603. But Tashjian is entitled to respect under princi-
ples of stare decisis, and it can be fairly distinguished on the
grounds that the closed primary law in that case imposed a
greater burden on associational interests than does Oklaho-
ma’s semiclosed primary law, see ante, at 592, while the
State’s regulatory interests in Tashjian were weaker than
they are here, compare ante, at 593–597, with Tashjian, 479
U. S., at 217–225.
III
In briefing and oral argument before this Court, respond-
ents raise for the first time the claim that Oklahoma’s
semiclosed primary law severely burdens their associational
rights not through the law’s own operation, but rather be-
cause other state laws make it quite difficult for voters to
reregister as Independents or Libertarians so as to partici-
pate in the LPO primary. See Brief for Respondents 12–24.
Respondents characterize Oklahoma’s regulatory scheme as
follows.
Partisan primaries in Oklahoma are held on the last Tues-
day in July of each even-numbered year. Okla. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 26, § 1–102 (West Supp. 2005). To field a party candidate
in an election, the LPO must obtain “recognized” party sta-
tus. See ibid.; see also §§ 1–107, 5–104 (West 1997 and Supp.
2005). This requires it to submit, no later than May 1 of any
even-numbered year (i. e., any election year), a petition with
the signatures of registered voters equal to at least five per-
cent of the total votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial
or Presidential election. § 1–108 (West Supp. 2005). The
State Election Board then has 30 days to determine whether
the petition is sufficient. § 1–108(3). The LPO has attained
recognized party status in this fashion in every Presidential

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election year since 1980. However, unless the party’s candi-
date receives at least 10 percent of the total votes cast for
Governor or President in the general election (which no
minor party has been able to do in any State in recent his-
tory), it loses recognized party status. § 1–109. To regain
party status, the group must go through the petition process
again. Ibid.
When a party loses its recognized status, as the LPO has
after every general election in which it has participated, the
affiliation of any voter registered with the party is changed
to Independent. § 1–110. As the District Court noted, “it
is highly likely that the ranks of independents, and, indeed,
of registered Republicans and Democrats, contain numerous
voters who sympathize with the LPO but who simply do not
wish to go through the motions of re-registering every time
they are purged from the rolls.” Memorandum Opinion,
Case No. CIV–00–1071–F (WD Okla., Jan. 24, 2003), App. to
Pet. for Cert. A–48. And the Republican and Democratic
Parties in Oklahoma, as it turns out, do not permit voters
registered as Independents to participate in their primaries.
Most importantly, according to respondents, the deadline
for changing party affiliation makes it quite difficult for the
LPO to invite voters to reregister in order to participate
in its primary. Assuming the LPO submits its petition for
recognized party status on the May 1 deadline, the State
has until May 31 to determine whether party status will be
conferred. See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 1–108 (West Supp.
2005). But in order to participate in the LPO primary, a
voter registered with another party must change her party
affiliation to Independent or Libertarian no later than June
1. See § 4–119. Moreover, no candidate for office is permit-
ted officially to declare her candidacy with the State Election
Board until the period between the first Monday in June and
the next succeeding Wednesday. § 5–110.
If this characterization of state law is accurate, a regis-
tered Democrat or Republican sympathetic to the LPO or to

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an LPO candidate in a given election year would seem to
face a genuine dilemma. On the one hand, she may stick
with her major party registration and forfeit the opportunity
to participate in the LPO primary. Alternatively, she may
reregister as a Libertarian or Independent, thus forfeiting
her opportunity to participate in the major party primary,
though no candidate will have officially declared yet and the
voter may not yet know whether the LPO will even be per-
mitted to conduct a primary. Moreover, she must make this
choice roughly eight weeks before the primaries, at a time
when most voters have not yet even tuned in to the election,
much less decided upon a candidate. See California Demo-
cratic Party, 530 U. S., at 586 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
That might pose a special difficulty for voters attracted to
minor party candidates, for whom support may not coalesce
until comparatively late in the election cycle. See Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 791–792 (1983) (discussing emer-
gence of independent candidacies late in the election cycle).
Throughout the proceedings in the lower courts, which in-
cluded a full bench trial before the District Court, respond-
ents made no attempt to challenge these other electoral
requirements or to argue that they were relevant to respond-
ents’ challenge to the semiclosed primary law. The lower
courts, accordingly, gave little or no consideration to how
these various regulations interrelate or operate in practice,
nor did the State seek to justify them. Given this posture,
I agree with the Court that it would be neither proper nor
prudent for us to rule on the reformulated claim that re-
spondents now urge. See ante, at 597–598.
Nevertheless, respondents’ allegations are troubling, and,
if they had been properly raised, the Court would want to
examine the cumulative burdens imposed by the overall
scheme of electoral regulations upon the rights of voters and
parties to associate through primary elections. A panoply
of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered
alone, may nevertheless have the combined effect of severely

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608 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
restricting participation and competition. Even if each part
of a regulatory regime might be upheld if challenged sepa-
rately, one or another of these parts might have to fall if the
overall scheme unreasonably curtails associational freedoms.
Oklahoma’s requirement that a voter register as an Inde-
pendent or a Libertarian in order to participate in the LPO’s
primary is not itself unduly onerous; but that is true only
to the extent that the State provides reasonable avenues
through which a voter can change her registration status.
The State’s regulations governing changes in party affiliation
are not properly before us now. But if it were shown, in an
appropriate case, that such regulations imposed a weighty or
discriminatory restriction on voters’ ability to participate in
the LPO’s or some other party’s primary, then more probing
scrutiny of the State’s justifications would be required.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
and with whom Justice Souter joins as to Parts I, II, and
III, dissenting.
The Court’s decision today diminishes the value of two im-
portant rights protected by the First Amendment: the indi-
vidual citizen’s right to vote for the candidate of her choice
and a political party’s right to define its own mission. No
one would contend that a citizen’s membership in either the
Republican or the Democratic Party could disqualify her
from attending political functions sponsored by another
party, or from voting for a third party’s candidate in a gen-
eral election. If a third party invites her to participate in
its primary election, her right to support the candidate of
her choice merits constitutional protection, whether she
elects to make a speech, to donate funds, or to cast a ballot.
The importance of vindicating that individual right far out-
weighs any public interest in punishing registered Repub-
licans or Democrats for acts of disloyalty. The balance
becomes even more lopsided when the individual right is

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Stevens, J., dissenting
reinforced by the right of the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma
(LPO) to associate with willing voters.
In concluding that the State’s interests override those im-
portant values, the Court focuses on interests that are not
legitimate. States do not have a valid interest in manipulat-
ing the outcome of elections, in protecting the major parties
from competition, or in stunting the growth of new parties.
While States do have a valid interest in conducting orderly
elections and in encouraging the maximum participation of
voters, neither of these interests overrides (or, indeed, even
conflicts with) the valid interests of both the LPO and the
voters who wish to participate in its primary.
In the final analysis, this case is simple. Occasionally, a
political party’s interest in defining its platform and its pro-
cedures for selecting and supporting its candidates conflicts
with the voters’ interest in participating in the selection of
their elected representatives. If those values do conflict, we
may be faced with difficult choices. But when, as in this
case, those values reinforce one another a decision should be
easy. Oklahoma has enacted a statute that impairs both; it
denies a party the right to invite willing voters to participate
in its primary elections. I would therefore affirm the Court
of Appeals’ judgment.
I
In rejecting the individual respondents’ claims, the major-
ity focuses on their associational interests. While the vot-
ers in this case certainly have an interest in associating with
the LPO, they are primarily interested in voting for a par-
ticular candidate, who happens to be in the LPO. Indeed,
I think we have lost sight of the principal purpose of a
primary: to nominate a candidate for office. Cf. Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 445 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he purpose of casting, counting, and recording votes is
to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for
political expression”).

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610 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
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Because our recent cases have focused on the associational
interest of voters, rather than the right to vote itself, it is
important to identify three basic precepts. First, it is clear
that the right to vote includes the right to vote in a primary
election. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 318
(1941); Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953). When the
State makes the primary an “integral part of the procedure
of choice,” every eligible citizen’s right to vote should receive
the same protection as in the general election. Classic, 313
U. S., at 318; see also, e. g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368
(1963) (invalidating primary system that diluted individual’s
vote in a primary). Second, the right to vote, whether
in the primary or the general election, is the right to vote
“for the candidate of one’s choice.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U. S. 533, 555 (1964). Finally, in assessing burdens on that
right—burdens that are not limited to absolute denial of the
right—we should focus on the realities of the situation, not
on empty formalism. See Classic, 313 U. S., at 313 (identi-
fying “the practical operation of the primary law”); Terry,
345 U. S., at 469–470 (noting that the Jaybird primary is “the
only effective part” of the election process and examining
“[t]he effect of the whole procedure” in determining whether
the scheme violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
Here, the impact of the Oklahoma statute on the voters’
right to vote for the candidate of their choosing is not a mere
“burden”; it is a prohibition.1 By virtue of the fact that
their preferred candidate is a member of a different party,
respondents are absolutely precluded from voting for him or
her in the primary election. It is not an answer that the
1 It is not enough that registered members of other parties may sim-
ply change their registration. See ante, at 590–591 (plurality opinion).
Changing one’s political party is not simply a matter of filing a form with
the State; for many individuals it can be a significant decision. A view
that party membership is merely a label demeans for many the personal
significance of party identification and illustrates what little weight the
majority actually gives to the associational interests in this case.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
voters could participate in another primary (i. e., the primary
for the party with which they are registered) since the indi-
vidual for whom they wish to vote is not a candidate in that
primary. If the so-called “white primary” cases make any-
thing clear, it is that the denial of the right to vote cannot
be cured by the ability to participate in a subsequent or dif-
ferent election. Just as the “only election that has counted”
in Terry, 345 U. S., at 469, was the Jaybird primary, since it
was there that the public official was selected in any mean-
ingful sense, the only primary that counts here is the one in
which the candidate respondents want to vote for is actually
running. See Burdick, 504 U. S., at 442 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (“Because [petitioner] could not write in the name
of a candidate he preferred, he had no way to cast a meaning-
ful vote”).
This is not to say that voters have an absolute right to
participate in whatever primary they desire. For instance,
the parties themselves have a strong associational interest
in determining which individuals may vote in their pri-
maries, and that interest will normally outweigh the interest
of the uninvited voter.2 But in the ordinary case the State
simply has no interest in classifying voters by their political
party and in limiting the elections in which voters may par-
ticipate as a result of that classification. Just as we held in
Reynolds that all voters of a State stand in the same relation
to the State regardless of where they live, and that the State
must thus not make their vote count more or less depending
2 The voters’ interest may still prevail if, as was the case in Terry v.
Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944),
the party primary is the de facto election. In part because of this Court’s
refusal to intervene in political gerrymandering cases, Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U. S. 109 (1986), an increasing number of districts are becoming “safe
districts” in which one party effectively controls the outcome of the elec-
tion. See, e. g., Courtney, Redistricting: What the United States Can
Learn from Canada, 3 Election L. J. 488 (2004) (concluding that 400 of the
435 Members of the House of Representatives were elected in safe dis-
tricts in the 2002 election, 81 of whom ran unopposed).

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612 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
upon that factor, 377 U. S., at 565, so too do citizens stand in
the same relation to the State regardless of the political party
to which they belong. The State may thus not deny them
participation in a primary of a party that seeks their partici-
pation absent a state interest of overriding importance.
II
In addition to burdening the individual respondent’s right
to vote, the Oklahoma scheme places a heavy burden on the
LPO’s associational rights. While Oklahoma permits inde-
pendent voters to participate in the LPO’s primary elections,
it refuses to allow registered Republicans or Democrats to
do so. That refusal has a direct impact on the LPO’s selec-
tion of candidates for public office, the importance of which
cannot be overstated. A primary election plays a critical
role in enabling a party to disseminate its message to the
public. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S.
567, 575 (2000). It is through its candidates that a party is
able to give voice to its political views, to engage other candi-
dates on important issues of the day, and to affect change in
the government of our society. Our cases “vigorously affirm
the special place the First Amendment reserves for, and the
special protection it accords, the process by which a political
party ‘select[s] a standard bearer who best represents the
party’s ideologies and preferences.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Eu v.
San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S.
214, 224 (1989)).
The Oklahoma statute prohibits the LPO from associating
with all of the voters it believes will best enable it to select
a viable candidate. The ability to select those individuals
with whom to associate is, of course, at the core of the First
Amendment and goes to the heart of the associational inter-
est itself. “Freedom of association means not only that an
individual voter has the right to associate with the political
party of her choice, but also that a political party has a right
to identify the people who constitute the association . . . .”

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Stevens, J., dissenting
Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See
also Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
La Follette, 450 U. S. 107, 122 (1981). While Libertarians
can undoubtedly associate with Democrats and Republicans
in other ways and at other times, the Oklahoma statute “lim-
its the Party’s associational opportunities at the crucial junc-
ture at which the appeal to common principles may be trans-
lated into concerted action, and hence to political power in
the community.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U. S. 208, 216 (1986).
In concluding that the Oklahoma statute is constitutional,
the majority argues that associational interests between the
LPO and registered members of other parties are either non-
existent or not heavily burdened by the Oklahoma scheme.
The plurality relies on a single footnote in Jones to show that
there are no associational interests between the LPO and
registered Republicans and Democrats. See ante, at 588–
589 (citing 530 U. S., at 573–574, n. 5). In Jones, of course,
the political parties did not want voters of other parties par-
ticipating in their primaries; the putative associational inter-
est in this case, in which the LPO is actively courting voters
of other parties, simply did not exist. More importantly, our
decision in Tashjian rejected these arguments.
In Tashjian we held that the State could not prohibit Re-
publicans from inviting voters who were not registered with
a political party to participate in the Republican primary.
We recognized that “[t]he Party’s attempt to broaden the
base of public participation in and support for its activities
is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of
association.” 479 U. S., at 214. Importantly, we rejected
the notion that the associational interest was somehow di-
minished because the voters the party sought to include
were not formally registered as Republicans. Id., at 215
(“[C]onsidered from the standpoint of the Party itself, the
act of formal enrollment or public affiliation with the Party
is merely one element in the continuum of participation in

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614 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
Party affairs, and need not be in any sense the most impor-
tant”). We reasoned that a State could not prohibit inde-
pendents from contributing financial support to a Republican
candidate or from participating in the party’s events; it
would be anomalous if it were able to prohibit participation
by independents in the “ ‘basic function’ ” of the party. Id.,
at 216. Because of the importance of those interests, we
carefully examined the interests asserted by the State, and
finding them lacking, struck down the prohibition on inde-
pendents’ participation in the Republican primary.
Virtually identical interests are at stake in this case. It
is the LPO’s belief that attracting a more diverse group of
voters in its primary would enable it to select a more main-
stream candidate who would be more viable in the general
election. Like the Republicans in Tashjian, the LPO is cog-
nizant of the fact that in order to enjoy success at the voting
booth it must have support from voters who identify them-
selves as independents, Republicans, or Democrats.
The LPO’s desire to include Democrats and Republicans is
undoubtedly informed by the fact that, given the stringent
requirements of Oklahoma law, the LPO ceases to become a
formally recognized party after each election cycle, and its
members automatically revert to being independents.3 Be-
cause the LPO routinely loses its status as a recognized
party, many voters who might otherwise register as Lib-
ertarians instead register as Democrats or Republicans.4
Thus, the LPO’s interest in inviting registered Republicans
3 See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 1–109 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring that
a party’s nominee for Governor, President, or Vice President receive 10%
of the vote in a general election for the party to maintain its status).
4 See App. to Pet. for Cert. A–48 (District Court recognizing that “it is
highly likely that the ranks of independents and, indeed, of registered
Republicans and Democrats, contain numerous voters who sympathize
with the LPO but who simply do not wish to go through the motions of
re-registering every time they are purged from the rolls”).

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615 Cite as: 544 U. S. 581 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
and Democrats to participate in the selection of its standard
bearer has even greater force than did the Republican Par-
ty’s desire to invite independents to associate with it in
Tashjian.
III
As justification for the State’s abridgment of the constitu-
tionally protected interests asserted by the LPO and the vot-
ers, the majority relies on countervailing state interests that
are either irrelevant or insignificant. Neither separately
nor in the aggregate do these interests support the Court’s
decision.
First, the Court makes the remarkable suggestion that by
opening up its primary to Democrats and Republicans, the
LPO will be saddled with so many nonlibertarian voters that
the ultimate candidate will not be, in any sense, “libertar-
ian.” See ante, at 594.5 But the LPO is seeking the cross-
over voting of Republicans and Democrats. Rightly or
wrongly, the LPO feels that the best way to produce a viable
candidate is to invite voters from other parties to participate
in its primary. That may dilute what the Court believes to
be the core of the Libertarian philosophy, but it is no busi-
ness of the State to tell a political party what its message
should be, how it should select its candidates, or how it
should form coalitions to ensure electoral success. See
Jones, 530 U. S., at 581–582 (rejecting state interests in pro-
ducing candidates that are more centrist than the nominee
the party would have selected absent the blanket primary).6
5 Of course, as the majority recognizes, ante, at 594, since the number
of independent voters overwhelms the number of registered-LPO voters,
that is already the case.
6 See also Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U. S. 107, 123–124 (1981) (State may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the party); Jones, 530 U. S., at 587 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“A political party might be better served by allowing blanket
primaries as a means of nominating candidates with broader appeal.
Under the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech through free associa-

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616 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
Second, the majority expresses concern that crossover vot-
ing may create voter confusion. This paternalistic concern
is belied by the District Court’s finding that no significant
voter confusion would occur. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–43
(noting that “very simple rules for voting eligibility can be
posted at polling places when the primary and runoff elec-
tions are conducted”).
Third, the majority suggests that crossover voting will im-
pair the State’s interest in properly classifying candidates
and voters. As an empirical matter, a crossover voter may
have a lesser commitment to the party with which he is
registered if he votes in another party’s primary. Never-
theless, the State does not have a valid interest in defining
what it means to be a Republican or a Democrat, or in at-
tempting to ensure the political orthodoxy of party members
simply for the convenience of those parties. Cf. West Vir-
ginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion . . . ”). Even if participation in the LPO’s primary
causes a voter to be a less committed “Democrat” or “Repub-
lican” (a proposition I reject 7 ), the dilution of that commit-
ment does not justify abridgment of the fundamental rights
at issue in this case. While party identity is important in
tion, however, this is an issue for the party to resolve, not for the State”
(emphasis added)). Such coalition building, and reaching out to other
groups to ensure a candidate gets elected, is a vital part of the political
process. Cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 622–623 (1996) (citing W. Keefe, Parties,
Politics, and Public Policy in America 59–74 (5th ed. 1988)).
7 Allowing a potential crossover voter to vote in the LPO primary would
not change the level of commitment he has toward his party of registra-
tion; it would simply give him an outlet to express the views he already
holds.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
our political system, it should not be immunized from the
risk of change.8
Fourth, the majority argues that opening up the LPO pri-
mary to members of the Republican and Democratic Parties
might interfere with electioneering and party-building ef-
forts. It is clear, of course, that the majority here is con-
cerned only with the Democratic and Republican Parties,
since party building is precisely what the LPO is attempt-
ing to accomplish. Nevertheless, that concern is misplaced.
Even if, as the majority claims, the Republican and Demo-
cratic voter rolls, mailing lists, and phone banks are not as
accurate as they would otherwise be,9 the administrative in-
convenience of the major parties does not outweigh the right
to vote or the associational interests of those voters and the
LPO. At its core, this argument is based on a fear that the
LPO might be successful in convincing Democratic or Re-
publican voters to participate more fully in the LPO. Far
from being a compelling interest, it is an impermissible one.
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 367
8 If, of course, States were able to protect the incumbent parties in the
name of protecting the stability of the two-party system in general, we
might still have the Federalists, the Anti-federalists, or the Whigs. See
generally J. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Po-
litical Parties in America (1995). In any event, we would not have the
evolution of thought or policies that are occasioned through the change of
political parties. While no such change has occurred in recent memory,
that is no reason to ossify the status quo.
9 The majority’s argument is that voters who would otherwise vote in
the Republican or Democratic primaries would vote in the LPO primary,
and that the Democratic and Republican lists would not be an accurate
indicator of who is likely to vote in those primaries, and of which voters
to spend party resources on. First, I find it doubtful that those voters
who vote in the LPO primary would have voted in the Democratic or
Republican primary; rather, they probably would not have been suffi-
ciently motivated to vote at all. Further, this would actually give Repub-
licans and Democrats additional information as to which of their voters
have Libertarian leanings.

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618 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
(1997) (State may not “completely insulate the two-party
system from minor parties’ or independent candidates’ com-
petition and influence”).
Finally, the majority warns against the possibility of raid-
ing, ante, at 596, by which voters of another party mali-
ciously vote in a primary in order to change the outcome of
the primary, either to nominate a particularly weak candi-
date, a “sore-loser” candidate, or a candidate who would si-
phon votes from another party. The District Court, whose
factual findings are entitled to substantial deference, found
as a factual and legal matter that the State’s argument con-
cerning raiding was “unpersuasive.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
A–61.
Even if raiding were a possibility, however, the state inter-
ests are remote. The possibility of harm to the LPO itself
is insufficient to overcome the LPO’s associational rights.
See Eu, 489 U. S., at 227–228 (“[E]ven if a ban on endorse-
ments saves a political party from pursuing self-destructive
acts, that would not justify a State substituting its judgment
for that of the party”). If the LPO is willing to take the
risk that its party may be “hijacked” by individuals who hold
views opposite to their own, the State has little interest in
second-guessing the LPO’s decision.
With respect to the possibility that Democratic or Republi-
can voters might raid the LPO to the detriment of their own
or another party, neither the State nor the majority has iden-
tified any evidence that voters are sufficiently organized to
achieve such a targeted result.10 Such speculation is not, in
10 To change the outcome of an election in a way that would benefit their
own party, voters would have to be relatively certain that their preferred
candidate in their own primary would win that primary and to vote in the
LPO primary for a previously agreed-on candidate who is opposed to their
own ideological preferences. Given that voters typically do not focus on
an election until several days or weeks before an election, this prospect is
unlikely. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 586
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further, one would have expected to
see some evidence of this in States where it is relatively easy to switch
parties close to a primary.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
my view, sufficient to override the real and acknowledged
interest of the LPO and the voters who wish to participate
in its primary. See Timmons, 520 U. S., at 375 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Eu, 489 U. S., at 226; Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U. S. 780, 789 (1983); and Norman v. Reed, 502
U. S. 279, 288–289 (1992)).11
In the end, the balance of interests clearly favors the LPO
and those voters who wish to participate in its primary. The
associational interests asserted—the right to select a stand-
ard bearer that the party thinks has the best chance of suc-
cess, the ability to associate at the crucial juncture of select-
ing a candidate, and the desire to reach out to voters of other
parties—are substantial and undoubtedly burdened by Okla-
homa’s statutory scheme. Any doubt about that fact is
clearly answered by Tashjian. On the other side, the inter-
ests asserted by the State are either entirely speculative or
simply protectionist measures that benefit the parties in
power. No matter what the standard, they simply do not
outweigh the interests of the LPO and its voters.
IV
The Libertarian Party of Oklahoma is not the only loser
in this litigation. Other minor parties and voters who have
primary allegiance to one party but sometimes switch their
support to rival candidates are also harmed by this decision.
In my judgment, however, the real losers include all partici-
pants in the political market. Decisions that give undue def-
11 The flimsy character of the state interests in this case confirms my
view that today’s decision rests primarily on a desire to protect the two-
party system. In Jones, the Court concluded that the associational inter-
ests of the parties trumped state interests that were much more compel-
ling than those asserted in this case. Here, by contrast, where the
associational interests are being asserted by a minor party rather than by
one of the dominant parties, the Court has reversed course and rejected
those associational interests as insubstantial compared to the interests
asserted by the State.

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620 CLINGMAN v. BEAVER
Stevens, J., dissenting
erence to the interest in preserving the two-party system,12
like decisions that encourage partisan gerrymandering,13 en-
hance the likelihood that so-called “safe districts” will play
an increasingly predominant role in the electoral process.
Primary elections are already replacing general elections as
the most common method of actually determining the compo-
sition of our legislative bodies. The trend can only increase
the bitter partisanship that has already poisoned some of
those bodies that once provided inspiring examples of courte-
ous adversary debate and deliberation.
The decision in this case, like the misguided decisions in
Timmons, 520 U. S. 351, and Jones, 530 U. S. 567, attaches
overriding importance to the interest in preserving the two-
party system. In my view, there is over a century of experi-
ence demonstrating that the two major parties are fully ca-
pable of maintaining their own positions of dominance in the
political marketplace without any special assistance from the
state governments that they dominate or from this Court.
Whenever they receive special advantages, the offsetting
harm to independent voters may be far more significant than
the majority recognizes.
In Anderson, 460 U. S. 780, we considered the impact of
early filing dates on small political parties and independent
candidates. Commenting on election laws that disadvan-
tage independents, we noted:
“By limiting the opportunities of independent-minded
voters to associate in the electoral arena to enhance
their political effectiveness as a group, such restrictions
threaten to reduce diversity and competition in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Historically political figures outside
12 Examples are cases permitting lengthy registration periods, Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752 (1973), and cases approving bans on fusion
candidates, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351 (1997),
and write-in candidates, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 (1992).
13 See, e. g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U. S. 109 (1986).

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621 Cite as: 544 U. S. 581 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
the two major parties have been fertile sources of new
ideas and new programs; many of their challenges to the
status quo have in time made their way into the political
mainstream. In short, the primary values protected by
the First Amendment—‘a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’—are served
when election campaigns are not monopolized by the ex-
isting political parties.” Id., at 794 (citations omitted).
Because the Court’s holding today has little to support it
other than a naked interest in protecting the two major par-
ties, I respectfully dissent.