SPECTOR et al. v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.

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SPECTOR et al. v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 03–1388. Argued February 28, 2005—Decided June 6, 2005
Respondent NCL is a cruise line operating foreign-flag ships departing
from, and returning to, United States ports. The petitioners, disabled
individuals and their companions who purchased tickets for round-trip
NCL cruises from Houston, sued NCL under Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12181 et seq., which
prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of “public accom
modation,” § 12182(a), and in “specified public transportation services,”
§ 12184(a), and requires covered entities to make “reasonable modifica
tions in policies, practices, or procedures” to accommodate disabled per
sons, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A), and to remove “architectural
barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in nature,”
where such removal is “readily achievable, ” §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),
12184(b)(2)(C). Though holding Title III generally applicable, the Dis
trict Court found that the petitioners’ claims regarding physical barriers
to access could not go forward because the federal agencies charged
with promulgating ADA architectural and structural guidelines had not
done so for cruise ships. The court therefore dismissed the barrier
removal claims, but denied NCL’s motion to dismiss the petitioners’
other claims. The Fifth Circuit held that Title III does not apply to
foreign-flag cruise ships in U. S. waters because of a presumption, which
the court derived from, e. g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A.,
353 U. S. 138, and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10, that absent a clear indication of congressional
intent, general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships. Emphasizing
that Title III does not contain a specific provision mandating its applica
tion to such vessels, the court sustained the dismissal of the petitioners’
barrier-removal claims and reversed on their remaining claims.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
356 F. 3d 641, reversed and remanded.
Justice Kennedy delivered an opinion concluding that except inso
far as Title III regulates a vessel’s internal affairs, the statute is ap
plicable to foreign-flag cruise ships in U. S. waters. Parts II–A–1 and
II–B–2 of that opinion held for the Court:
(a) Although Title III’s “public accommodation” and “specified public
transportation” definitions, §§ 12181(7)(A), (B), (I), (L), 12181(10), do not

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expressly mention cruise ships, there is no doubt that the NCL ships
in question fall within both definitions under conventional principles of
interpretation. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless held Title III inapplica
ble because the statute has no clear statement or explicit text mandating
coverage for foreign-flag ships in U. S. waters. This Court’s cases, par
ticularly Benz and McCulloch, do hold, in some circumstances, that a
general statute will not apply to certain aspects of the internal oper
ations of foreign vessels temporarily in U. S. waters, absent a clear
statement. The broad clear statement rule adopted by the Court of
Appeals, however, would apply to every facet of the business and
operations of foreign-flag ships. That formulation is inconsistent with
the Court’s case law and with sound principles of statutory interpreta
tion. Pp. 128–130.
(b) Title III defines “readily achievable” barrier removal as that
which is “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense,” § 12181(9). The statute does not further define
“difficulty,” but the section’s use of the disjunctive indicates that it ex
tends to considerations in addition to cost. Furthermore, Title III di
rects that the “readily achievable” determination take into account “the
impact . . . upon the [facility’s] operation,” § 12181(9)(B). A Title III
barrier-removal requirement that would bring a vessel into noncompli
ance with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea or
any other international legal obligation would create serious difficulties
for the vessel and would have a substantial impact on its operation,
and thus would not be “readily achievable.” Congress could not have
intended this result. It is logical and proper to conclude, moreover,
that whether a barrier modification is “readily achievable” must take
into consideration the modification’s effect on shipboard safety. Title
III’s nondiscrimination and accommodation requirements do not apply
if disabled individuals would pose “a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures.” § 12182(b)(3). It would be incongruous to
attribute to Congress an intent to require modifications threatening oth
ers’ safety simply because the threat comes not from the disabled person
but from the accommodation itself. Pp. 135–136.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Sou
ter, concluded in Parts II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B:
(a) As a matter of international comity, a clear statement of congres
sional intent is necessary before a general statutory requirement can
interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel’s internal af
fairs and operations. See, e. g., Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 12. In
Benz and McCulloch, the Court held the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) inapplicable to labor relations between a foreign vessel and its

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foreign crew not because foreign ships are generally exempt from the
NLRA, but because that particular application of the NLRA would in
terfere with matters that concern only the ship’s internal operations.
These cases recognized a narrow rule, applicable only to statutory duties
that implicate the foreign vessel’s internal order rather than the welfare
of American citizens. E. g., McCulloch, supra, at 21. In contrast, the
Court later held the NLRA fully applicable to labor relations between
a foreign vessel and American longshoremen because this relationship,
unlike the one between a vessel and its own crew, does not implicate a
foreign ship’s internal order and discipline. Longshoremen v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195, 198–201. This narrow clear statement rule
is supported by sound principles of statutory construction. It is reason
able to presume Congress intends no interference with matters that are
primarily of concern only to the ship and the foreign state in which it is
registered. It is also reasonable, however, to presume Congress does
intend its statutes to apply to entities in U. S. territory that serve, em
ploy, or otherwise affect American citizens, or that affect the peace and
tranquility of the United States, even if those entities happen to be
foreign-flag ships. Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience but
departing from and returning to U. S. ports accommodate and transport
over 7 million U. S. residents annually, including large numbers of
disabled individuals. To hold there is no Title III protection for the
disabled would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation of a statute
designed to provide broad protection for them. Pp. 130–133.
(b) Plainly, most of the Title III violations alleged below—that NCL
required disabled passengers to pay higher fares and special surcharges;
maintained evacuation programs and equipment in locations not accessi
ble to them; required them, but not other passengers, to waive any po
tential medical liability and to travel with companions; reserved the
right to remove them from ships if they endangered other passengers’
comfort; and, more generally, failed to make reasonable modifications
necessary to ensure their full enjoyment of the services offered—have
nothing to do with a ship’s internal affairs. However, the petitioners’
allegations concerning physical barriers to access on board—e. g., their
assertion that most of NCL’s cabins, including the most attractive ones
in the most desirable locations, are not accessible to disabled passen
gers—would appear to involve requirements that might be construed as
relating to internal ship affairs. The clear statement rule would most
likely come into play if Title III were read to require permanent and
significant structural modifications to foreign vessels. Pp. 133–135.
(c) Because Title III does not require structural modifications that
conflict with international legal obligations or pose any real threat to
the safety of the crew or other passengers, it may well follow that Title

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122 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
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III does not require any permanent and significant structural modifica
tions that interfere with cruise ships’ internal affairs. If so, recourse
to the internal affairs clear statement rule would not be necessary.
Cases may arise, however, where it is prudent for a court to invoke that
rule without determining whether Title III actually imposes a particu
lar barrier-removal requirement entailing a permanent and significant
structural modification interfering with a foreign ship’s internal affairs.
Conversely, where it is not obvious that a particular physical modifica
tion relates to a vessel’s basic architecture and construction, but it is
clear the modification would conflict with an international legal obliga
tion, the court may simply hold the modification not readily achievable,
without resort to the clear statement rule. P. 137.
(d) The holding that the clear statement rule operates only when a
ship’s internal affairs are affected does not implicate the Court’s holding
in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 380, that statutory language given
a limiting construction in one context must be interpreted consistently
in other contexts, “even though other of the statute’s applications, stand
ing alone, would not support the same limitation.” Martinez applied
a canon for choosing among plausible meanings of an ambiguous stat
ute, not a clear statement rule that implies a special substantive limit
on the application of an otherwise unambiguous statutory mandate.
Pp. 140–141.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Thomas, concluded in Part III–A that if Title III imposed
a requirement that interfered with a foreign-flag cruise ship’s internal
affairs, the clear statement rule would come into play, but that require
ment would still apply to domestic ships, and Title III requirements
having nothing to do with internal affairs would continue to apply to
domestic and foreign ships alike. This application-by-application ap
proach is consistent with how the clear statement rule has traditionally
operated. If the rule restricts some NLRA applications to foreign
ships (e. g., labor relations with foreign crews in Benz and McCulloch),
but not others (e. g., labor relations with American longshoremen in Ari
adne Shipping), it follows that its case-by-case application is also re
quired under Title III. The clear statement rule, if it is invoked, would
restrict some applications of Title III to foreign ships (e. g., certain
structural barrier modification requirements), but not others (e. g., the
statute’s prohibition on discriminatory ticket pricing). The rule is an
implied limitation on a statute’s otherwise unambiguous general terms.
It operates much like other implied limitation rules, which avoid applica
tions of otherwise unambiguous statutes that would intrude on sensitive
domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to have intended had it
considered the matter. See, e. g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244, 260. An all-or-nothing approach would convert the clear

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statement rule from a principle of interpretive caution into a trap for
an unwary Congress, requiring nullification of the entire statute, or of
some arbitrary set of applications larger than the domain the rule pro
tects. Pp. 137–139.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed that Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 covers cruise ships and
allows them to resist modifications that would conflict with international
legal obligations, but would give no wider berth to the “internal affairs”
clear statement rule in determining Title III’s application to respond
ent’s ships. That rule derives from, and is moored to, the broader guide
that statutes “should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or
conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international
law.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U. S. 764, 815. This
noninterference principle is served here by the Court’s interpretation
of 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)’s “readily achievable” language to avoid
conflict with international legal obligations. The plurality’s further
suggestion that the “internal affairs” clear statement rule may block
Title III-prompted structural modifications, even in the absence of con
flict with international obligations, cuts the rule loose from its founda
tion. Because international relations are not at risk and the United
States has a strong interest in protecting American passengers on for
eign and domestic cruise ships, there is no reason to demand a clearer
congressional statement that Title III reaches the vessels in question.
Pp. 142–145.
Justice Thomas concluded that Title III of the Americans with Disa
bilities Act of 1990, insofar as it could be read to require structural
changes, lacks a sufficiently clear statement that it applies to the inter
nal affairs of foreign vessels. However, the clear statement rule does
not render Title III entirely inapplicable to foreign vessels; instead,
Title III applies to foreign ships only to the extent to which it does not
bear on their internal affairs. Pp. 146–149.
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–2, in which
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, an opinion with
respect to Parts II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B, in which Stevens
and Souter, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III–A, in
which Stevens, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 142. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part, post,
p. 146. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
and O’Connor, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Part I–A,
post, p. 149.

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124 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Counsel
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Amy Howe, Pamela S. Karlan,
Samuel Bagenstos, David George, Brady Edwards, Anne
Edwards, Sandra Thourot Krider, William H. Bruckner,
and Elaine B. Roberts.
David B. Salmons argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Acosta, Dennis J. Dimsey, Jeffrey A.
Rosen, and Paul M. Geier.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Mark E. Warren, Thomas H.
Wilson, Michael J. Muskat, and Michael F. Sturley.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the Commonwealth
of the Bahamas et al. as amici curiae in support of respond
ent. With him on the brief was Christopher T. Handman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas
et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Barry R. McBee, First
Assistant Attorney General, Edward D. Burbach, Deputy Attorney Gen
eral, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, and William L. Davis, Assistant
Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, Lisa
Madigan of Illinois, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W.
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington; for Nine Associations Representing Persons with
Disabilities by Andrew P. Tower, Ira A. Burnim, and Jennifer Mathis; for
Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. by David C. Vladeck, Norman G.
Cooper, and Robert N. Herman; and for Jonathan M. Gutoff by David
M. Zlotnick.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc.,
et al. by David J. Bederman; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Max Huffman, and Robin
S. Conrad; and for the International Council of Cruise Lines by Lawrence
W. Kaye and William J. Tucker.
Samuel Conte filed a brief for the Mediterranean Shipping Company
Crociere, S. p. A., as amicus curiae.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–2, an opinion with respect to Parts
II–A–2, II–B–1, II–B–3, and III–B, in which Justice Ste
vens and Justice Souter join, and an opinion with respect
to Part III–A, in which Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Thomas join.
This case presents the question whether Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 353,
42 U. S. C. § 12181 et seq., applies to foreign-flag cruise ships
in United States waters. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held Title III did not apply because of a presumption,
which it sought to derive from this Court’s case law, that,
absent a clear indication of congressional intent, general
statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships. 356 F. 3d 641,
644–646 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the ADA does apply
to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters. See
Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F. 3d 1237 (2000). We
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 542 U. S. 965
(2004).
Our cases hold that a clear statement of congressional in
tent is necessary before a general statutory requirement can
interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel’s
internal affairs and operations, as contrasted with statutory
requirements that concern the security and well-being of
United States citizens or territory. While the clear state
ment rule could limit Title III’s application to foreign-flag
cruise ships in some instances, when it requires removal of
physical barriers, it would appear the rule is inapplicable to
many other duties Title III might impose. We therefore re
verse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit that the ADA is altogether inapplicable to foreign
vessels, and we remand for further proceedings.

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126 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Opinion of the Court
I
The respondent Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (NCL), a
Bermuda corporation with a principal place of business in
Miami, Florida, operates cruise ships that depart from, and
return to, ports in the United States. The ships are essen
tially floating resorts. They provide passengers with state
rooms or cabins, food, and entertainment. The cruise ships
stop at different ports of call where passengers may disem
bark. Most of the passengers on these cruises are United
States residents; under the terms and conditions of the tick
ets, disputes between passengers and NCL are to be gov
erned by United States law; and NCL relies upon extensive
advertising in the United States to promote its cruises and
increase its revenues.
Despite the fact that the cruises are operated by a com
pany based in the United States, serve predominantly United
States residents, and are in most other respects United
States-centered ventures, almost all of NCL’s cruise ships
are registered in other countries, flying so-called flags of con
venience. The two NCL cruise ships that are the subject of
the present litigation, the Norwegian Sea and the Norwegian
Star, are both registered in the Bahamas.
The petitioners are disabled individuals and their com
panions who purchased tickets in 1998 or 1999 for round-trip
cruises on the Norwegian Sea or the Norwegian Star, with
departures from Houston, Texas. Naming NCL as the de
fendant, the petitioners filed a class action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on
behalf of all persons similarly situated. They sought declar
atory and injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. The peti
tioners asserted that cruise ships are covered both by Title
III’s prohibition on discrimination in places of “public accom
modation,” § 12182(a), and by its prohibition on discrimina
tion in “specified public transportation services,” § 12184(a).
Both provisions require covered entities to make “reason

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able modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” to
accommodate disabled individuals, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii),
12184(b)(2)(A), and require removal of “architectural bar
riers, and communication barriers that are structural in
nature, ” where such removal is “readily achievable, ”
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C).
The District Court held that, as a general matter, Title III
applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States territo
rial waters. Civ. Action No. H–00–2649 (SD Tex., Sept. 10,
2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. The District Court found,
however, that the petitioners’ claims regarding physical bar
riers to access could not go forward because the agencies
charged with promulgating architectural and structural
guidelines for ADA compliance (the Architectural and Trans
portation Barriers Compliance Board, the Department of
Transportation, and the Department of Justice) had not done
so for cruise ships. In these circumstances, the court held,
it is unclear what structural modifications NCL would need
to make. Id., at 36a–42a. The District Court granted
NCL’s motion to dismiss the barrier-removal claims, but de
nied NCL’s motion with respect to all the other claims.
Id., at 47a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part. It reasoned that our cases, particu
larly Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U. S.
138 (1957), and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Mari
neros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), stand for the proposi
tion that general statutes do not apply to foreign-flag vessels
in United States territory absent a clear indication of con
gressional intent. 356 F. 3d, at 644 (“[T]o apply domestic
law to foreign vessels entering United States waters, there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed” (quoting Benz, supra, at 147; internal
quotation marks omitted)); 356 F. 3d, at 646 (Benz and Mc-
Culloch “prohibit United States courts from applying domes
tic statutes to foreign-flagged ships without specific evidence

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of congressional intent”). As Title III does not contain a
specific provision mandating its application to foreign-flag
vessels, the Court of Appeals sustained the District Court’s
dismissal of the petitioners’ barrier-removal claims on this
alternative ground and reversed the District Court on the
remaining Title III claims. 356 F. 3d, at 650–651.
The action was ordered dismissed for failure to state a
claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), before extensive discov
ery. We cannot then discuss the specific allegations in much
detail but must confine our opinion to the relevant general
principles. (On November 24, 2004, the responsible agencies
finally did issue draft guidelines for large passenger vessels
and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See 69 Fed. Reg.
69244, 69249. These developments are not dispositive of the
legal question on which we granted certiorari, and we do not
address how they might affect the ultimate resolution of the
petitioners’ claims.)
II
A
1
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the
disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of public accom
modations, 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a), and public transportation
services, § 12184(a). The general prohibitions are supple
mented by various, more specific requirements. Entities
that provide public accommodations or public transportation:
(1) may not impose “eligibility criteria” that tend to screen
out disabled individuals, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1);
(2) must make “reasonable modifications in policies, prac
tices, or procedures, when such modifications are neces
sary” to provide disabled individuals full and equal enjoy
ment, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A); (3) must provide
auxiliary aids and services to disabled individuals,
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12184(b)(2)(B); and (4) must remove ar
chitectural and structural barriers, or if barrier removal is

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not readily achievable, must ensure equal access for the dis
abled through alternative methods, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v),
12184(b)(2)(C).
These specific requirements, in turn, are subject to impor
tant exceptions and limitations. Eligibility criteria that
screen out disabled individuals are permitted when “neces
sary for the provision” of the services or facilities being of
fered, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1). Policies, practices,
and procedures need not be modified, and auxiliary aids
need not be provided, if doing so would “fundamentally
alter ” the services or accommodations being offered.
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii). Auxiliary aids are also unneces
sary when they would “result in an undue burden, ”
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). As we have noted, moreover, the
barrier-removal and alternative access requirements do not
apply when these requirements are not “readily achievable,”
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v). Additionally, Title III does not im
pose nondiscrimination or accommodation requirements if, as
a result, disabled individuals would pose “a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by
the provision of auxiliary aids or services,” § 12182(b)(3).
Although the statutory definitions of “public accommoda
tion” and “specified public transportation” do not expressly
mention cruise ships, there can be no serious doubt that
the NCL cruise ships in question fall within both defini
tions under conventional principles of interpretation.
§§ 12181(7)(A)–(B), (I), (L), 12181(10). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, held that Title III does
not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters
because the statute has no clear statement or explicit text
mandating coverage for these ships. This Court’s cases,
particularly Benz and McCulloch, do hold, in some circum
stances, that a general statute will not apply to certain as
pects of the internal operations of foreign vessels temporar
ily in United States waters, absent a clear statement. The

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130 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
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broad clear statement rule adopted by the Court of Appeals,
however, would apply to every facet of the business and op
erations of foreign-flag ships. That formulation is inconsist
ent with the Court’s case law and with sound principles of
statutory interpretation.
2
This Court has long held that general statutes are pre
sumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign
flag vessel in United States territory if the interests of the
United States or its citizens, rather than interests internal
to the ship, are at stake. See Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 100, 127 (1923) (holding that the general terms of
the National Prohibition Act apply to foreign-flag ships in
United States waters because “[t]here is in the act no provi
sion making it [in]applicable” to such ships); Uravic v. F.
Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234, 240 (1931) (holding that “general
words” should be “generally applied” and that therefore
there is “no reason for limiting the liability for torts com
mitted [aboard foreign-flag ships in United States territory]
when they go beyond the scope of discipline and private mat
ters that do not interest the territorial power”). The gen
eral rule that United States statutes apply to foreign-flag
ships in United States territory is subject only to a narrow
exception. Absent a clear statement of congressional in
tent, general statutes may not apply to foreign-flag vessels
insofar as they regulate matters that involve only the inter
nal order and discipline of the vessel, rather than the peace
of the port. This qualification derives from the understand
ing that, as a matter of international comity, “all matters of
discipline and all things done on board which affec[t] only the
vessel or those belonging to her, and [do] not involve the
peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquility of the port,
should be left by the local government to be dealt with by
the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged.”
Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 12 (1887). This exception to
the usual presumption, however, does not extend beyond

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matters of internal order and discipline. “[I]f crimes are
committed on board [a foreign-flag vessel] of a character to
disturb the peace and tranquility of the country to which the
vessel has been brought, the offenders have never by comity
or usage been entitled to any exemption from the operation
of the local laws.” Ibid.
The two cases in recent times in which the presumption
against applying general statutes to foreign vessels’ internal
affairs has been invoked, Benz and McCulloch, concern labor
relations. The Court held that the general terms of the Na
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C.
§ 151 et seq., did not govern the respective rights and duties
of a foreign ship and its crew because the NLRA standards
would interfere with the foreign vessel’s internal affairs in
those circumstances. These cases recognized a narrow rule,
applicable only to statutory duties that implicate the internal
order of the foreign vessel rather than the welfare of Ameri
can citizens. McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 21 (holding that “the
law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs
of a ship” (emphasis added)); see also Benz, 353 U. S., at 146–
147. The Court held the NLRA inapplicable to labor rela
tions between a foreign vessel and its foreign crew not be
cause foreign ships are generally exempt from the NLRA,
but because the particular application of the NLRA would
interfere with matters that concern only the internal opera
tions of the ship. In contrast, the Court held that the
NLRA is fully applicable to labor relations between a foreign
vessel and American longshoremen because this relationship,
unlike the one between a vessel and its own crew, does not
implicate a foreign ship’s internal order and discipline.
Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195, 198–
201 (1970).
This narrow clear statement rule is supported by sound
principles of statutory construction. It is reasonable to pre
sume Congress intends no interference with matters that are
primarily of concern only to the ship and the foreign state

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in which it is registered. It is also reasonable, however, to
presume Congress does intend its statutes to apply to enti
ties in United States territory that serve, employ, or other
wise affect American citizens, or that affect the peace and
tranquility of the United States, even if those entities happen
to be foreign-flag ships.
Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience offer public
accommodations and transportation services to over 7 mil
lion United States residents annually, departing from and
returning to ports located in the United States. Large num
bers of disabled individuals, many of whom have mobility
impairments that make other kinds of vacation travel diffi
cult, take advantage of these cruises or would like to do so.
To hold there is no Title III protection for disabled persons
who seek to use the amenities of foreign cruise ships would
be a harsh and unexpected interpretation of a statute de
signed to provide broad protection for the disabled. § 12101.
The clear statement rule adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, moreover, would imply that other gen
eral federal statutes—including, for example, Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a
et seq.—would not apply aboard foreign cruise ships in
United States waters. A clear statement rule with this
sweeping application is unlikely to reflect congressional
intent.
The relevant category for which the Court demands a clear
congressional statement, then, consists not of all applications
of a statute to foreign-flag vessels but only those applications
that would interfere with the foreign vessel’s internal affairs.
This proposition does not mean the clear statement rule is
irrelevant to the ADA, however. If Title III by its terms
does impose duties that interfere with a foreign-flag cruise
ship’s internal affairs, the lack of a clear congressional state
ment can mean that those specific applications of Title III
are precluded. On remand, the Court of Appeals may need
to consider which, if any, Title III requirements interfere

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with the internal affairs of foreign-flag vessels. As we will
discuss further, however, Title III’s own limitations and
qualifications may make this inquiry unnecessary.
B
1
The precise content of the category “internal affairs” (or,
as it is variously denoted in the case law, “internal order”
or “internal operations”) is difficult to define with precision.
There is, moreover, some ambiguity in our cases as to
whether the relevant category of activities is restricted to
matters that affect only the internal order of the ship when
there is no effect on United States interests, or whether the
clear statement rule further comes into play if the predomi
nant effect of a statutory requirement is on a foreign ship’s
internal affairs but the requirement also promotes the wel
fare of United States residents or territory. We need not
attempt to define the relevant protected category with preci
sion. It suffices to observe that the guiding principles in
determining whether the clear statement rule is triggered
are the desire for international comity and the presumed lack
of interest by the territorial sovereign in matters that bear
no substantial relation to the peace and tranquility of the
port.
It is plain that Title III might impose any number of duties
on cruise ships that have nothing to do with a ship’s inter
nal affairs. The pleadings and briefs in this case illustrate,
but do not exhaust, the ways a cruise ship might offend such
a duty. The petitioners allege NCL charged disabled pas
sengers higher fares and required disabled passengers to
pay special surcharges, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original
Complaint in No. H–00–2649 (SD Tex.), ¶ 32, App. 15 (here
inafter Complaint); Brief for Petitioners 17–20; main
tained evacuation programs and equipment in locations not
accessible to disabled individuals, Complaint ¶ 19, App. 12;
Brief for Petitioners 21; required disabled individuals, but

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not other passengers, to waive any potential medical liability
and to travel with a companion, id., at 8, 17–18; and reserved
the right to remove from the ship any disabled individual
whose presence endangers the “comfort” of other passen
gers, id., at 8, 20. The petitioners also allege more generally
that NCL “failed to make reasonable modifications in poli
cies, practices, and procedures” necessary to ensure the peti
tioners’ full enjoyment of the services NCL offered. Com
plaint ¶ 30, App. 15. These are bare allegations, and their
truth is not conceded. We express no opinion on the factual
support for those claims. We can say, however, that none of
these alleged Title III violations implicate any requirement
that would interfere with the internal affairs and manage
ment of a vessel as our cases have employed that term.
At least one subset of the petitioners’ allegations, however,
would appear to involve requirements that might be con
strued as relating to the internal affairs of foreign-flag cruise
ships. These allegations concern physical barriers to access
on board. For example, according to the petitioners, most
of the cabins on NCL’s cruise ships, including the most at
tractive cabins in the most desirable locations, are not acces
sible to disabled passengers. Brief for Petitioners 17–18;
Complaint ¶ 16, App. 11. The petitioners also allege that
the ships’ coamings—the raised edges around their doors—
make many areas of the ships inaccessible to mobility
impaired passengers who use wheelchairs or scooters. Brief
for Petitioners 24. Removal of these and other access bar
riers, the petitioners suggest, may be required by Title
III’s structural barrier-removal requirement, §§ 12182(b)(2)
(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C).
Although these physical barriers affect the passengers as
well as the ship and its crew, the statutory requirement could
mandate a permanent and significant alteration of a physical
feature of the ship—that is, an element of basic ship design

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and construction. If so, these applications of the barrier
removal requirement likely would interfere with the internal
affairs of foreign ships. A permanent and significant modi
fication to a ship’s physical structure goes to fundamental
issues of ship design and construction, and it might be impos
sible for a ship to comply with all the requirements different
jurisdictions might impose. The clear statement rule would
most likely come into play if Title III were read to require
permanent and significant structural modifications to foreign
vessels. It is quite a different question, however, whether
Title III would require this. The Title III requirements
that might impose permanent and substantial changes to a
ship’s architecture and design, are, like all of Title III’s re
quirements, subject to the statute’s own specific limitations
and qualifications. These limitations may make resort to
the clear statement rule unnecessary.
2
Title III requires barrier removal if it is “readily achiev
able,” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The statute defines that term as
“easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense,” § 12181(9). Title III does not
define “difficulty” in § 12181(9), but use of the disjunctive—
“easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense”—indicates that it extends to con
siderations in addition to cost. Furthermore, Title III di
rects that the “readily achievable” determination take into
account “the impact . . . upon the operation of the facility,”
§ 12181(9)(B).
Surely a barrier-removal requirement under Title III that
would bring a vessel into noncompliance with the Interna
tional Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
Nov. 1, 1974, [1979–1980] 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S. No. 9700, or
any other international legal obligation, would create serious
difficulties for the vessel and would have a substantial im

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pact on its operation, and thus would not be “readily achiev
able.” This understanding of the statute, urged by the
United States, is eminently reasonable. Brief as Amicus
Curiae 27–28; ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual
III–1.2000(D) (Supp. 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (as visited May 31, 2005, and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file); 56 Fed. Reg. 45600
(1991). If, moreover, Title III’s “readily achievable” exemp
tion were not to take conflicts with international law into
account, it would lead to the anomalous result that American
cruise ships are obligated to comply with Title III even if
doing so brings them into noncompliance with SOLAS,
whereas foreign ships—which unlike American ships have
the benefit of the internal affairs clear statement rule—
would not be so obligated. Congress could not have in
tended this result.
It is logical and proper to conclude, moreover, that
whether a barrier modification is “readily achievable” under
Title III must take into consideration the modification’s ef
fect on shipboard safety. A separate provision of Title III
mandates that the statute’s nondiscrimination and accommo
dation requirements do not apply if disabled individuals
would pose “a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, prac
tices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services,” § 12182(b)(3). This reference is to a safety threat
posed by a disabled individual, whereas here the question
would be whether the structural modification itself may pose
the safety threat. It would be incongruous, nevertheless, to
attribute to Congress an intent to require modifications that
threaten safety to others simply because the threat comes
not from the disabled person but from the accommodation
itself. The anomaly is avoided by concluding that a struc
tural modification is not readily achievable within the mean
ing of § 12181(9) if it would pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of others.

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3
Because Title III does not require structural modifications
that would conflict with international legal obligations or
pose any real threat to the safety of the crew or other pas
sengers, it may well follow—though we do not decide the
question here—that Title III does not require any perma
nent and significant structural modifications that interfere
with the internal affairs of any cruise ship, foreign flag or
domestic. If that is indeed the case, recourse to the clear
statement rule would not be necessary.
Cases may arise, however, where it is prudent for a court
to turn first to the internal affairs clear statement rule
rather than deciding the precise scope and operation of the
statute. Suppose, for example, it is a difficult question
whether a particular Title III barrier-removal requirement
is readily achievable, but the requirement does entail a per
manent and significant structural modification, interfering
with a foreign ship’s internal affairs. In that case a court
sensibly could invoke the clear statement rule without deter
mining whether Title III actually imposes the requirement.
On the other hand, there may be many cases where it is not
obvious that a particular physical modification relates to a
vessel’s basic architecture and construction, but it is clear
the modification would conflict with SOLAS or some other
international legal obligation. In those cases, a court may
deem it appropriate to hold that the physical barrier modifi
cation in question is not readily achievable, without resort
to the clear statement rule.
III
A
In light of the preceding analysis, it is likely that under a
proper interpretation of “readily achievable” Title III would
impose no requirements that interfere with the internal af
fairs of foreign-flag cruise ships. If Title III did impose a
duty that required cruise ships to make permanent and sig

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nificant structural modifications that did not conflict with in
ternational law or threaten safety, or if the statute otherwise
interfered with a foreign ship’s internal affairs, the clear
statement rule recognized in Benz and McCulloch would
come into play at that point. The Title III requirement in
question, however, would still apply to domestic cruise ships,
and Title III requirements having nothing to do with inter
nal affairs would continue to apply to domestic and foreign
ships alike.
This application-by-application use of the internal affairs
clear statement rule is consistent with how the rule has tra
ditionally operated. In Benz and McCulloch, the Court con
cluded that the NLRA did not apply to labor relations be
tween a foreign-flag ship and its foreign crew because of
interference with the foreign ships’ internal affairs. In Ari
adne Shipping, however, the Court held that the NLRA does
apply to labor relations between a foreign-flag ship and
American longshoremen. Ariadne Shipping acknowledged
the clear statement rule invoked in Benz and McCulloch but
held that the “considerations that informed the Court’s con
struction of the statute in [those cases] are clearly inapplica
ble” to the question whether the statute applies to foreign
ships’ labor relations with American longshoremen. 397
U. S., at 199. Ariadne Shipping held that the longshore
men’s “short-term, irregular and casual connection with the
[foreign] vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part
with the ships’ ‘internal discipline and order.’ ” Id., at 200.
Therefore, application of the NLRA to foreign ships’ rela
tions with American longshoremen “would have threatened
no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships.”
Ibid. If the clear statement rule restricts some applications
of the NLRA to foreign ships (e. g., labor relations with the
foreign crew), but not others (e. g., labor relations with
American longshoremen), it follows that the case-by-case ap
plication is also required under Title III of the ADA. The
rule, where it is even necessary to invoke it, would restrict

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some applications of Title III to foreign ships (e. g., certain
structural barrier-modification requirements), but not others
(e. g., the prohibition on discriminatory ticket pricing).
The internal affairs clear statement rule is an implied limi
tation on otherwise unambiguous general terms of the stat
ute. It operates much like the principle that general stat
utes are construed not to apply extraterritorially, EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 260 (1991), or the
rule that general statutes are presumed not to impose mone
tary liability on nonconsenting States, Atascadero State Hos
pital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985). Implied limitation
rules avoid applications of otherwise unambiguous statutes
that would intrude on sensitive domains in a way that Con
gress is unlikely to have intended had it considered the mat
ter. In these instances, the absence of a clear congressional
statement is, in effect, equivalent to a statutory qualification
saying, for example, “Notwithstanding any general language
of this statute, this statute shall not apply extraterritori
ally”; or “ . . . this statute shall not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of nonconsenting States”; or “ . . . this statute does
not regulate the internal affairs of foreign-flag vessels.”
These clear statement rules ensure Congress does not, by
broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inad
vertently or without due deliberation. An all-or-nothing ap
proach, under which a statute is altogether inapplicable if
but one of its specific applications trenches on the domain
protected by a clear statement rule, would convert the clear
statement rule from a principle of interpretive caution into
a trap for an unwary Congress. If Congress passes broad
legislation that has some applications that implicate a clear
statement rule—say, some extraterritorial applications, or
some applications that would regulate foreign ships’ internal
affairs—an all-or-nothing approach would require that the
entire statute, or some arbitrary set of applications larger
than the domain protected by the clear statement rule,
would be nullified. We decline to adopt that posture.

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B
Our holding that the clear statement rule operates only
when a ship’s internal affairs are affected does not implicate
our holding in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371 (2005). Mar
tinez held that statutory language given a limiting construc
tion in one context must be interpreted consistently in other
contexts, “even though other of the statute’s applications,
standing alone, would not support the same limitation.” Id.,
at 380. This was simply a rule of consistent interpretation
of the statutory words, with no bearing on the implementa
tion of a clear statement rule addressed to particular statu
tory applications.
The statute in Martinez, 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6), authorized
detention of aliens pending their removal. In Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 696–699 (2001), the Court had inter
preted this statute to impose time limits on detention of
aliens held for certain reasons stated in the statute. The
Court held that an alternative interpretation, one allowing
indefinite detention of lawfully admitted aliens, would raise
grave constitutional doubts. Having determined the mean
ing of § 1231(a)(6)’s text in Zadvydas, we were obliged in
Martinez to follow the same interpretation even in a context
where the constitutional concerns were not present. Marti
nez, 543 U. S., at 377–381. As already made clear, the ques
tion was one of textual interpretation, not the scope of some
implied exception. The constitutional avoidance canon sim
ply informed the choice among plausible readings of
§ 1231(a)(6)’s text: “The canon of constitutional avoidance,”
Martinez explained, “comes into play only when, after the
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found
to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the
canon functions as a means of choosing between them.” Id.,
at 385 (emphasis deleted).
Martinez gives full respect to the distinction between
rules for resolving textual ambiguity and implied limitations
on otherwise unambiguous text. Indeed, Martinez relies on

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the distinction to reconcile its holding with two cases which
did involve a clear statement rule, Raygor v. Regents of
Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533 (2002), and Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U. S. 456 (2003). Raygor had held that the toll
ing provision in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U. S. C. § 1367(d), does not apply to nonconsenting States be
cause the statute lacks the required clear statement that
States are within its coverage. Later, in Jinks, we held that
the § 1367(d) tolling provision does apply to suits against
counties. The counties were not protected by a clear state
ment rule analogous to the one applicable to States. See
Martinez, 543 U. S., at 383, and n. 6; see also id., at 393–
394 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “This progression of deci
sions,” we held in Martinez, “does not remotely establish
that § 1367(d) has two different meanings, equivalent to
the unlimited-detention/ limited-detention meanings of
§ 1231(a)(6) urged upon us here. They hold that the single
and unchanging disposition of § 1367(d) . . . does not apply to
claims against States that have not consented to be sued
in federal court.” Id., at 383. The distinction between
Zadvydas and Martinez, on the one hand, and Raygor and
Jinks, on the other, is the distinction between a canon for
choosing among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute
and a clear statement rule that implies a special substan
tive limit on the application of an otherwise unambiguous
mandate.
The internal affairs clear statement rule is an implied limi
tation rule, not a principle for resolving textual ambiguity.
Our cases, then, do not compel or permit the conclusion that
if any one application of Title III might interfere with a
foreign-flag ship’s internal affairs, Title III is inapplicable to
foreign ships in every other instance.
* * *
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that gen
eral statutes do not apply to foreign-flag ships in United

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States waters. This Court’s cases, however, stand only for
the proposition that general statutes are presumed not to
impose requirements that would interfere with the internal
affairs of foreign-flag vessels. Except insofar as Title III
regulates a vessel’s internal affairs—a category that is not
always well defined and that may require further judicial
elaboration—the statute is applicable to foreign ships in
United States waters to the same extent that it is applicable
to American ships in those waters.
Title III’s own limitations and qualifications prevent the
statute from imposing requirements that would conflict with
international obligations or threaten shipboard safety.
These limitations and qualifications, though framed in gen
eral terms, employ a conventional vocabulary for instructing
courts in the interpretation and application of the statute.
If, on remand, it becomes clear that even after these limita
tions are taken into account Title III nonetheless imposes
certain requirements that would interfere with the internal
affairs of foreign ships—perhaps, for example, by requiring
permanent and substantial structural modifications—the
clear statement rule would come into play. It is also open
to the court on remand to consider application of the clear
statement rule at the outset if, as a prudential matter, that
appears to be the more appropriate course.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s holding that Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 covers cruise ships,
ante, at 129, and allows them to resist modifications “that
would conflict with international legal obligations,” ante, at
137 (plurality opinion). I therefore join Parts I, II–A–1,

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and II–B–2 of the Court’s opinion. I would give no wider
berth, however, to the “internal affairs” clear statement rule
in determining Title III’s application to respondent’s cruise
ships, the Norwegian Sea and Norwegian Star. But see
ante, at 137. That rule, as I understand it, derives from,
and is moored to, the broader guide that statutes “should not
be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that
regulation would conflict with principles of international
law.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U. S. 764,
815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id., at 816 (de
scribing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), as applying this principle);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804). Title III is properly read to avoid such conflict, but
should not be hemmed in where there is no potential for
international discord.1
The first of the modern cases to address the application of
a domestic statute to a foreign-flag ship in U. S. waters, Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U. S. 138 (1957),
did not resort to the tag, “internal affairs” rule, to explain
the Court’s decision.2 Benz held that the Labor Manage
ment Relations Act did not reach relations between
“a foreign employer and a foreign crew operating under an
agreement made abroad under the laws of another nation.”
Id., at 142. As we concluded in Benz, before reading our law
to “run interference in such a delicate field of international
relations,” “where the possibilities of international discord
are so evident and retaliative action so certain,” the Court
should await Congress’ clearly expressed instruction. Id.,
at 147.
1 Were a clear statement rule in order, I would agree with the plurality’s
application-by-application approach.
2 Only in a footnote describing a National Labor Relations Board deci
sion did the Court make a synonymous reference to the “internal economy
of a vessel of foreign registry and ownership.” Benz, 353 U. S., at 143,
n. 5.

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Six years later, in McCulloch v. Soci edad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), the Court
relied on Benz to hold that the National Labor Relations Act
does not regulate the representation of alien seamen re
cruited in Honduras to serve aboard vessels under Honduran
flags. Applying our law “to the internal management and
affairs” of the vessels in question, we observed, McCulloch,
372 U. S., at 20, would produce a “head-on collision” with the
regulatory regime installed under the Honduran labor code,
id., at 21. “[S]uch highly charged international circum
stances,” we said, called for adherence to the venerable in
terpretive guide that “ ‘an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Schooner Charming
Betsy, 2 Cranch, at 118). Cf. Longshoremen v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195, 200 (1970) (applying U. S. law to
foreign ships’ labor relations with longshoreworkers em
ployed at U. S. ports is proper because doing so “would
. . . threate[n] no interference in the internal affairs of
foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or
international law”).
The noninterference principle underlying the internal af
fairs clear statement rule is served in this case by the
Court’s interpretation of Title III’s “readily achievable” pro
vision, 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). See ante, at 135–136.
Construing this language to allow ships to resist modifica
tions “that would conflict with international legal obliga
tions,” ante, at 137, the plurality ensures that Title III will
not provoke “international discord” of the kind Benz and Mc-
Culloch sought to avoid. I agree with this interpretation,
but would create no larger space for the internal affairs rule.
The plurality, however, suggests that the clear statement
rule has a further office: It may block structural modifica
tions prompted by Title III that are “readily achievable”—
because they do not conflict with international legal obliga
tions—but nonetheless “interfer[e] with a foreign ship’s

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internal affairs.” Ante, at 137. I disagree with this concep
tion of the rule. In positing an extended application of the
internal affairs rule, the plurality cuts the rule loose from its
foundation. As Benz and McCulloch demonstrate, the clear
statement rule is an interpretive principle counseling against
construction of a statute in a manner productive of interna
tional discord. When international relations are not at risk,
and there is good reason to apply our own law, asserted in
ternal affairs of a ship should hold no greater sway than as
serted management prerogatives of a landlocked enterprise.3
As the plurality rightly notes, Title III is a broad remedial
statute designed to protect persons with disabilities in a va
riety of activities and settings. See ante, at 132; § 12101(b).
The United States has a strong interest in ensuring that
U. S. resident cruise passengers enjoy Title III’s protections
on both domestic and foreign ships. See § 12101; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 10.4 Once conflicts with
international legal obligations are avoided, I see no reason
to demand a clearer congressional statement that Title III
reaches the vessels in question, ships that regularly sail to
and from U. S. ports and derive most of their income from
U. S. passengers. In sum, I agree that § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),
properly read, does not require shipowners to make modifi
cations that would conflict with international legal obliga
tions. But I would attribute to the internal affairs clear
statement rule no further limitation on Title III’s gover
nance in this case.
3 One could hardly anticipate that, absent conflict with international
legal obligations, the application of Title III sought in this case would
generate a “storm of diplomatic protest.” Id., at 146 (noting “storm of
diplomatic protest” against proposal to apply U. S. law to prohibit advance
payments by a foreign vessel to foreign seamen in foreign ports).
4 As the Court notes, the ships at issue here “are operated by a company
based in the United States, serve predominantly United States residents,
and are in most other respects United States-centered ventures.” Ante,
at 126. Merchant ships sailing between U. S. and foreign ports would
present a different question.

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146 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Opinion of Thomas, J.
Justice Thomas, concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment in part.
When a law regulates the internal order of ships, Congress
must clearly express its intent to apply the law to foreign
flag ships. Ante, at 130–132 (plurality opinion); post, at 149–
150 (Scalia, J., dissenting). I agree with Justice Scalia
that this rule applies to any structural changes to a ship that
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) might require, for such changes to a ship’s physical
structure pertain to its internal affairs. Post, at 151 (dis
senting opinion); see ante, at 134–135 (plurality opinion).
I further agree with Justice Scalia that this clear state
ment rule applies once the possibility, rather than the cer
tainty, of international discord arises; and that the clear
statement rule therefore does not require or permit the kind
of express conflicts-of-law analysis that the plurality de
mands. Post, at 153–155 (dissenting opinion); ante, at 135–
136 (majority opinion), 137 (plurality opinion). Moreover,
I do not think that courts should (as the plurality permits)
employ the rule selectively, applying it when “prudent” but
declining to apply it when “appropriate.” Ante, at 137 (plu
rality opinion); see also post, at 158, n. 8 (Scalia, J., dissent
ing); Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 385, 405 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the utility of canons as
guides to congressional intent, they are useless when modi
fied in ways that Congress could never have imagined”).
For those reasons, I join Part I–A of Justice Scalia’s dis
sent. While I conclude that the rule applies to certain as
pects of Title III, I agree with the plurality that it does not
require an “all-or-nothing approach.” Ante, at 139. Conse
quently, those applications of Title III that do not pertain to
internal affairs apply to foreign-flag vessels. For that rea
son, I join Part III–A of the plurality opinion.
I reach this result, however, only because I continue to
reject the “lowest common denominator” principle the Court
articulated for the first time in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S.

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147 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
371 (2005). See id., at 395–397 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The plurality, by contrast, accepts Clark. Moreover, it
claims that applying Title III of the ADA to matters that
are not within the realm of a ship’s internal order is consist
ent with Clark. The plurality’s efforts to distinguish Clark
are implausible.
The plurality says that today’s case differs from Clark be
cause it invokes a clear statement rule to interpret unambig
uous text. According to the plurality, Clark concerned the
application of a previously adopted limiting construction of
ambiguous text, which this Court imposed to ameliorate un
related constitutional doubts. Ante, at 140–141. As an ini
tial matter, however, the statute at issue in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), and Clark was not ambiguous.
Clark, supra, at 402–403 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Even as
suming for the sake of argument that it was ambiguous, the
distinction the plurality draws has no basis in Clark. In
Clark, this Court addressed the period of detention 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(a)(6) authorized for inadmissible aliens. This was a
question left open by Zadvydas, supra, which had addressed
the period of detention under the same statute but with re
spect to a different class of aliens—those who had been ad
mitted into the country. In Zadvydas, this Court had con
cluded that the possibility of indefinite detention of admitted
aliens raised significant constitutional doubts and, in light of
those doubts, it limited the Attorney General’s power to de
tain admitted aliens. 533 U. S., at 689–690, 699. Section
1231(a)(6) does not distinguish between the two classes of
aliens. Thus, this Court in Clark concluded it was com
pelled to apply that same construction, which was warranted
only by the specific constitutional concerns arising for ad
mitted aliens, to the unadmitted aliens before it. 543 U. S.,
at 378. Clark’s conclusion stemmed from the narrowing
construction adopted in Zadvydas, not the type of rule or
canon that gave rise to that construction. 543 U. S., at
377–378.

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148 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Opinion of Thomas, J.
The plurality’s reasoning cannot be squared with Clark’s
“lowest common denominator” principle. Under Clark,
“[t]he lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”
Id., at 380. Just as in Zadvydas and Clark, this Court is
called upon to interpret the same statutory text with respect
to two different classes of cases—those that implicate the
internal affairs of a vessel and those that do not. And just
like the statute at issue in Zadvydas and Clark, Title III
“applies without differentiation” to the internal and external
affairs of foreign-flag vessels, as well as the internal and ex
ternal affairs of domestic-flag ships. 543 U. S., at 378.
Thus, the limiting construction of Title III’s definitions ex
cluding foreign cruise ships from those definitions must gov
ern all applications of the statute, not just those applications
that pertain to internal affairs. According to Clark, the
Court may not narrow Title III on a case-by-case basis, de
pending on whether a particular application of Title III in
terferes with a ship’s internal order. In fact, it may not
apply Title III to any ship or, for that matter, any entity at
all, because Title III does not distinguish between any of
the covered entities. This demonstrates why the principle
Clark established is flawed.
Today’s decision, then, cabins the Clark principle to apply
only when the canon of constitutional avoidance is invoked
to choose among ambiguous readings of a statute. But even
here Clark will continue to make mischief. As I explained
in Clark, the lowest common denominator principle requires
courts to search out a single hypothetical constitutionally
doubtful case to limit a statute’s terms in the wholly different
case actually before the court, lest the court fail to adopt a
reading of the statute that reflects the lowest common de
nominator. Id., at 400 (dissenting opinion). This requires
a reverse-Salerno analysis that upends our facial challenge
requirements. See Clark, supra, at 381–382; see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (for a facial
challenge to succeed, there must be no circumstance in which

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149 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Scalia, J., dissenting
the statute is constitutional). For this and other reasons I
have explained, the Clark analysis allows much havoc to be
wrought from the canon of constitutional avoidance. See
Clark, supra, at 395–401 (dissenting opinion).
In sum, I believe that Title III of the ADA, insofar as it
requires structural changes, lacks a sufficiently clear state
ment that it applies to the internal affairs of foreign vessels.
In my view the clear statement rule does not render Title
III entirely inapplicable to foreign vessels; instead, Title III
applies to foreign ships only to the extent to which it does
not bear on their internal affairs. I therefore would remand
for consideration of those Title III claims that do not pertain
to the structure of the ship. Accordingly, I concur in Part
III–A of the plurality opinion, join Part I–A of Justice
Scalia’s dissent, and concur in the judgment in part.
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice and Jus
tice O’Connor join, and with whom Justice Thomas joins
as to Part I–A, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The plurality correctly recognizes
that Congress must clearly express its intent to apply its
laws to foreign-flag ships when those laws interfere with the
ship’s internal order. Its attempt to place Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) outside this
rule through creative statutory interpretation and piecemeal
application of its provisions is unsupported by our case law.
Title III plainly affects the internal order of foreign-flag
cruise ships, subjecting them to the possibility of conflicting
international obligations. I would hold that, since there is
no clear statement of coverage, Title III does not apply to
foreign-flag cruise ships.
I
A
As the plurality explains, where a law would interfere
with the regulation of a ship’s internal order, we require a
clear statement that Congress intended such a result. See

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150 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Scalia, J., dissenting
ante, at 130. This rule is predicated on the “rule of inter
national law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs
the internal affairs of a ship,” McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10, 21 (1963),
and is designed to avoid “the possibilit[y] of international
discord,” Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353
U. S. 138, 147 (1957); see also McCulloch, supra, at 19.
The clear-statement rule finds support not only in Benz
and McCulloch, but in cases like Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 100, 128–129 (1923), where we held that the Na
tional Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305, forbade foreign-flag ships
from carrying or serving alcohol in United States territorial
waters. Though we did not say so expressly in that case,
prohibiting the carrying and serving of alcohol in United
States waters cannot be said to affect the “internal order”
of the ship, because it does not in any way affect the opera
tion or functioning of the craft.1 Similarly, in Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 (1953), and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rho
ditis, 398 U. S. 306 (1970), we did not employ a clear
statement rule in determining whether foreign seamen in
jured aboard foreign-flag ships could recover under the Jones
Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688. We distinguished
these cases in McCulloch, explaining that a clear statement
is not required “in different contexts, such as the Jones Act
. . . where the pervasive regulation of the internal order of
a ship may not be present.” 372 U. S., at 19, n. 9 (empha
sis added).2
1 The plurality also appears to have found that the National Prohibition
Act contained a clear statement of intent to reach foreign-flag vessels,
because the Act had been amended to state that it applied to “all territory
subject to [the] jurisdiction” of the United States. Cunard S. S. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 127 (1923) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 The plurality intimates that the clear-statement rule might be inappli
cable in situations where, as here, the foreign-flag ships have a number of
contacts with the United States. See ante, at 131–132. McCulloch, 372
U. S., at 19, expressly rejected this approach, explaining that any attempt
to weigh the ship’s contacts with the United States “would inevitably lead

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151 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Scalia, J., dissenting
As the plurality concedes, ante, at 134, the structural mod
ifications that Title III of the ADA requires under its
barrier-removal provisions, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 12182(b)(2)
(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C), would plainly affect the ship’s “in
ternal order.” Rendering exterior cabins handicapped ac
cessible, changing the levels of coamings, and adding public
restrooms—the types of modifications petitioners request—
would require alteration of core physical aspects of the ship,
some of which relate to safety. (Safety has, under interna
tional law, traditionally been the province of a ship’s flag
state.) This is quite different from prohibiting alcohol in
United States waters or imposing tort liability for injuries
sustained on foreign ships in port—the laws at issue in Cu
nard and the Jones Act cases. Those restrictions affected
the ship only in limited circumstances, and in ways ancillary
to its operation at sea. A ship’s design and construction, by
contrast, are at least as integral to the ship’s operation and
functioning as the bargaining relationship between ship
owner and crew at issue in Benz and McCulloch.
Moreover, the structural changes petitioners request
would be permanent. Whereas a ship precluded from serv
ing or carrying alcohol in United States waters may cer
tainly carry and serve alcohol on its next trip from Italy to
Greece, structural modifications made to comply with Ameri
can laws cannot readily be removed once the ship leaves our
waters and ceases to carry American passengers. This is
again much like the situation presented in Benz and McCul
loch, where the application of American labor laws would
have continued to govern contracts between foreign ship
owners and their foreign crews well beyond their time in
our waters.
The purpose of the “internal order” clear-statement re
quirement is to avoid casually subjecting oceangoing vessels
to laws that pose obvious risks of conflict with the laws of the
to embarrassment in foreign affairs and [would] be entirely infeasible in
actual practice.”

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152 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Scalia, J., dissenting
ship’s flag state, the laws of other nations, and international
obligations to which the vessels are subject. That struc
tural modifications required under Title III qualify as mat
ters of “internal order” is confirmed by the fact that they
may already conflict with the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, [1979–1980]
32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S. No. 9700. That treaty, which estab
lishes the safety standards governing the design and main
tenance of oceangoing ships, has been ratified by 155 coun
tries. See International Maritime Organization, Summary
of Status of Conventions, http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 (all Internet materials as visited
June 2, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The
ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) Review Advisory
Committee—the Government body Congress has charged
with formulating the Title III barrier-removal guidelines—
has promulgated rules requiring at least one accessible
means of egress to be an elevator, whereas SOLAS, which
requires at least two means of escape, does not allow eleva
tors to be one of them. See Passenger Vessel Access Advi
sory Committee, Final Report: Recommendations for Acces
sibility Guidelines for Passenger Vehicles, ch. 13, pt. I (Dec.
2000), http://www.access-board.gov/news/pvaac-rept.htm
(hereinafter PVAAC Report) (explaining potential conflicts
between ADAAG regulations and SOLAS). The ADAAG
rules set coaming heights for doors required to be accessible
at one-half inch; SOLAS sets coaming heights for some exte
rior doors at three to six inches to ensure that those doors
will be watertight. Ibid.
Similar inconsistencies may exist between Title III’s
structural requirements and the disability laws of other
countries. The United Kingdom, for example, is considering
the promulgation of rules to govern handicapped accessibil
ity to passenger vehicles, including cruise ships. The rules
being considered currently include exact specifications, down
to the centimeter, for the height of handrails, beds, and elec

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153 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Scalia, J., dissenting
trical switches, and the width of door openings. See Dis
abled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, The design of
large passenger ships and passenger infrastructure: Guid
ance on meeting the needs of disabled people (Nov. 2000),
http://www.dptac.gov.uk/pubs/guideship/pdf/dptacbroch.pdf.
Though many of these regulations may be compatible with
Title III, it is easy to imagine conflicts arising, given the
detailed nature of ADAAG’s regulations. See PVAAC Re
port, chs. 1–11. As we have previously noted, even this
“possibility of international discord” with regard to a sea
going vessel’s internal order, McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 21
(emphasis added), gives rise to the presumption of noncover
age absent clear statement to the contrary.
The Court asserts that Title III would not produce con
flicts with the requirements of SOLAS and would not
compromise safety concerns. This argument comes at the
expense of an expansive en passant interpretation of the
exceptions to the barrier-removal requirements of Title
III—which interpretation will likely have more significant
nationwide effects than the Court’s holding concerning Title
III’s application to foreign-flag vessels. Assuming, how
ever, that the argument is even correct,3 it is entirely beside
the point. It has never been a condition for application of
the foreign-flag clear-statement rule that an actual conflict
with foreign or international law be established—any more
than that has been a condition for application of the clear
statement rule regarding extraterritorial effect of congres
3 This is by no means clear. Title III defines “readily achievable” as
“easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty
or expense.” 42 U. S. C. § 12181(9). It is, at best, ambiguous whether a
barrier removal can be rendered not “easily accomplishable” or not “able
to be carried out without much difficulty” by factors extrinsic to the re
moval itself. Conflict of an easily altered structure with foreign laws
seems to me not much different from the tendency of an easily altered
structure to deter customers. That is why, as suggested in text, the
Court’s unexpected Title III holding may be the most significant aspect of
today’s foreign-flag decision.

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154 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
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sional enactments. The reason to apply the rule here is that
the structure of a ship pertains to the ship’s internal order,
which is a matter presumably left to the flag state unless
Congress indicates otherwise. The basis for that presump
tion of congressional intent is principally (though perhaps
not exclusively) that subjecting such matters to the com
mands of various jurisdictions raises the possibility (not nec
essarily the certainty) of conflict among jurisdictions and
with international treaties. Even if the Court could, by an
imaginative interpretation of Title III, demonstrate that
in this particular instance there would be no conflict with
the laws of other nations or with international treaties,4 it
would remain true that a ship’s structure is preeminently
part of its internal order; and it would remain true that sub
jecting ship structure to multiple national requirements
invites conflict. That is what triggers application of the
clear-statement rule.
Safety concerns—and specifically safety as related to ship
structure—are traditionally the responsibility of the flag
state. Which is to say they are regarded as part of the
ship’s internal order. And even if Title III makes ample
provision for a safety exception to the barrier-removal re
quirements, what it considers necessary for safety is not nec
essarily what other nations or international treaties con
sider necessary.
The foregoing renders quite unnecessary the Court’s
worry that Title III might require American cruise ships to
adhere to Congress’s prescription in violation of SOLAS.
See ante, at 135–136. If and when that possibility presents
itself, the Court remains free to do what it does here: to
interpret Title III so as to avoid any conflict. But the avail
4 The Court, of course, has not even shown that Title III is consistent
with the laws of the cruise ships’ flag state; much less has it undertaken
the Herculean task—which its theory of presumed coverage by domestic
law would require—of showing Title III consistent with the laws of all the
cruise ships’ ports of call.

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155 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Scalia, J., dissenting
ability of such an interpretation has no bearing upon
whether the structural features of an oceangoing vessel are
part of its internal order. (I must observe, however, that it
seems much more plausible that Congress intended to re
quire American cruise ships to adhere to Title III regardless
of SOLAS, than that—what the Court apparently believes—
Congress intended Title III to be interpreted with an eye to
SOLAS.) In any event, the application of Title III to ocean
going vessels under American flag is not at issue here.
I would therefore hold that, because Title III’s barrier
removal provisions clearly have the possibility of subjecting
foreign-flag ships to conflicting international obligations, no
reading of Title III—no matter how creative—can alter the
presumption that Title III does not apply to foreign-flag
ships without a clear statement from Congress.5
B
The plurality holds that, even “[i]f Title III did impose a
duty that required [foreign-flag] cruise ships to make perma
nent and significant structural modifications[,] or . . . other
wise interfered with a foreign ship’s internal affairs, . . . Title
III requirements having nothing to do with internal affairs
would continue to apply to domestic and foreign ships alike.”
Ante, at 137–138. I disagree. Whether or not Title III’s
prescriptions regarding such matters implicate the “internal
order” of the ship, they still relate to the ships’ maritime
operations and are part of the same Title III.6 The require
ments of that enactment either apply to foreign-flag ships or
5 Of course this clear-statement rule would not apply to the onshore
operations of foreign cruise companies, which would be treated no differ
ently from the operations of other foreign companies on American soil.
6 This includes the pricing and ticketing policies, which are intimately
related to the ships’ maritime operations (and perhaps to internal order)
because they are designed to defray the added cost and provide the added
protection that the cruise-ship companies deem necessary for safe trans
port of disabled passengers.

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156 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Scalia, J., dissenting
they do not. It is not within our power to design a statute
some of whose provisions apply to foreign-flag ships and
other of whose provisions do not—any more than it is within
our power to prescribe that the statute applies to foreign
flag cruise ships 60% of whose passengers are United States
citizens and does not apply to other foreign-flag cruise ships.
The plurality’s assertion that those portions of Title III
that do not implicate a ship’s internal order apply to foreign
flag ships displays a confusion between a principle of inter
pretation based upon a true-to-fact presumption of congres
sional intent, and a court-made rule. The plurality seems to
forget that it is a matter of determining whether Congress
in fact intended that its enactment cover foreign-flag ships.
To believe that there was any such intent section-by-section
and paragraph-by-paragraph is delusional. Either Congress
enacted Title III only with domestic entities (and not
foreign-flag ships) in mind, or it intended Title III to apply
across-the-board. It could not possibly be the real congres
sional intent that foreign-flag cruise ships be considered
“place[s] of public accommodation” or “specified public trans
portation” for purposes of certain provisions but not for oth
ers. That Congress had separate foreign-flag intent with
respect to each requirement—and would presumably adopt
a clear statement provision-by-provision—is utterly implau
sible. And far from its being the case that this creates
“a trap for an unwary Congress,” ante, at 139, it is the plu
rality’s disposition that, in piecemeal fashion, applies to
foreign-flag ships provisions never enacted with foreign-flag
vessels in mind.7 We recently addressed a similar question
7 The plurality’s discussion of Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,
397 U. S. 195 (1970), is misleading. Although Ariadne clearly recognized
the existence of an internal-order rule in our case law, see id., at 200,
Ariadne did not hold, similarly to what the plurality holds here, that appli
cation of the foreign-flag clear-statement rule prevented some provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) from being applied to
foreign-flag ships but allowed others to be applied. Rather, it held that
the clear-statement rule did not apply at all to activities that were not
“within the ‘maritime operations of foreign-flag ships.’ ” Ibid. The case

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Scalia, J., dissenting
in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371 (2005), where we ex
plained that a statutory provision must be interpreted con
sistently from case to case. “It is not at all unusual to give
a statut[e] . . . a limiting construction called for by one of
the statute’s applications, even though other of the statute’s
applications, standing alone, would not support the same lim
itation.” Id., at 380. That principle should apply here.
Since some applications of Title III plainly affect the internal
order of foreign-flag ships, the absence of a clear statement
renders the statute inapplicable—even though some appli
cations of the statute, if severed from the rest, would not
require clear statement.
This does not mean that a clear statement is required
whenever a court applies Title III to any entity—only that
a clear statement is required to apply any part of Title III
to foreign-flag ships. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
534 U. S. 533 (2002), and Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U. S.
456 (2003), do not dictate otherwise. Raygor held that 28
U. S. C. § 1367(d) does not include, in its tolling of the limita
tions period, claims against States, because it contains no
clear statement that States are covered. Jinks held that
§ 1367(d)’s tolling provision does apply to claims against polit
ical subdivisions of States, because no clear-statement re
quirement applies to those entities. In other words, a clear
statement is required to apply § 1367(d) to States, just as a
clear statement is required to apply Title III to foreign-flag
ships. A clear statement is not required to apply § 1367(d)
to political subdivisions of States, just as a clear statement
is not required to apply Title III to domestic ships or other
domestic entities. The question in each of these cases is
whether the statute at issue covers certain entities, not
whether some provisions of a statute cover a given entity.
is relevant only to questions the Court does not decide here—namely, ap
plication of Title III to onshore operations of the foreign-flag ships. It is
not relevant to the question whether all maritime activities are exempt
from Title III for lack of a clear statement.

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158 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
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The fine tuning of legislation that the plurality requires
would be better left to Congress. To attempt it through the
process of case-by-case adjudication is a recipe for endless
litigation and confusion. The plurality’s resolution of today’s
case proves the point. It requires this Title III claimant
(and every other one who brings a claim against a foreign
shipowner) to show that each particular remedy he seeks
does not implicate the internal order of the ship. That
showing, where structural modification is involved, would
not only require the district court to determine what is
“readily achievable,” ante, at 135–136 (majority opinion), and
what would “pose ‘a significant risk to the health or safety
of others, ’ ” ante, at 136 (majority opinion) (quoting
§ 12182(b)(3)), but would also require it to determine the obli
gations imposed by foreign law and international treaties.8
All this to establish the preliminary point that Title III ap
plies and the claim can proceed to adjudication. If Congress
desires to impose this time-consuming and intricate process,
it is certainly able to do so—though I think it would likely
prefer some more manageable solution.9 But for the plural
8 The plurality attempts to simplify this inquiry by explaining that, if
it is “a difficult question whether a particular Title III barrier-removal
requirement is readily achievable, but the requirement does entail a per
manent and significant structural modification, interfering with a foreign
ship’s internal affairs[,] a court sensibly could invoke the clear statement
rule without determining whether Title III actually imposes the require
ment.” Ante, at 137. It is impossible to reconcile this with the plural
ity’s rationale, which excludes the clear-statement rule when there is no
actual conflict with foreign law. On the plurality’s own analysis, signifi
cant structural modifications are least likely to pose an actual conflict with
foreign law, since they are most likely to be regarded as (under the plural
ity’s new Title III jurisprudence) not “readily achievable” and hence not
required. I am at a loss to understand what the plurality has in mind.
9 After this Court concluded, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244, 260 (1991) (ARAMCO), that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 does not protect American citizens working for American em
ployers in foreign countries, Congress amended Title VII. Unlike what
would have been this Court’s only available resolution of the issue had it

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159 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
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ity to impose it as a novel consequence of the venerable
clear-statement rule seems to me unreasonable. I would
therefore decline to apply all of Title III to foreign-flag ships
without a clear statement from Congress.
II
As the Court appears to concede, neither the “public ac
commodation” provision nor the “specified public transporta
tion” provision of Title III clearly covers foreign-flag cruise
ships. The former prohibits discrimination “on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, serv
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommo
dation.” 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a). Though Congress gave a
seemingly exhaustive list of entities constituting “public ac
commodation[s]”—including inns, hotels, restaurants, the
aters, banks, zoos, and laundromats—it failed to mention
ships, much less foreign-flag ships. See § 12181(7). Partic
ularly where Congress has provided such detailed specifica
tion, this is not a clear statement that foreign-flag ships are
covered. Petitioners also claim that, because cruise ships
are essentially floating hotels that contain restaurants and
other facilities explicitly named in § 12181(7), they should be
covered. While this may support the argument that cruise
ships are “public accommodations,” it does not support the
position that Congress intended to reach foreign-flag cruise
ships.
The “specified public transportation” provision prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal
come to the opposite conclusion in ARAMCO—that Title VII applies to
all American employers operating abroad—Congress was able to craft a
more nuanced solution by exempting employers if compliance with Title
VII would run afoul of the law in the country where the workplace was
located. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–1(b); cf. § 12112(c)(1) (same disposition for
Title I of the ADA).

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160 SPECTOR v. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Scalia, J., dissenting
enjoyment of specified public transportation services pro
vided by a private entity that is primarily engaged in the
business of transporting people and whose operations affect
commerce.” § 12184(a). The definition of “specified public
transportation” includes “transportation by bus, rail, or any
other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides
the general public with general or special service (includ
ing charter service) on a regular and continuing basis.”
§ 12181(10). “[A]ny other conveyance” clearly covers ships.
But even if the statute specifically mentioned ships, that
would not be a clear statement that foreign-flag ships are
included—any more than the reference to “employer” in the
NLRA constituted a clear statement that foreign-flag ship
employers were covered, see McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 19–21.
Title III of the ADA stands in contrast to other statutes
in which Congress has made clear its intent to extend its
laws to foreign ships. For example, the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, 94 Stat. 1159, 46 U. S. C. App. § 1901
et seq., which permits the inspection and apprehension of
vessels suspected of possessing controlled substances, ap
plies to “vessel[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States,” § 1903(a), which includes vessels “located within the
customs waters of the United States,” § 1903(c)(1)(D), and
“vessel[s] registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation
has consented or waived objection” to United States jurisdic
tion, § 1903(c)(1)(C). Section 5 of the Johnson Act, 64 Stat.
1135, as amended, 106 Stat. 61, 15 U. S. C. § 1175(a), restricts
the use of gambling devices “on a vessel . . . documented
under the laws of a foreign country.” See also 14 U. S. C.
§ 89(a) (Coast Guard may engage in searches on “waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction” of “any vessel sub
ject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the
United States”); 18 U. S. C. § 2274 (making it unlawful for
“the owner, master or person in charge or command of
any private vessel, foreign or domestic . . . within the ter
ritorial waters of the United States” willfully to cause or

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161 Cite as: 545 U. S. 119 (2005)
Scalia, J., dissenting
permit the destruction or injury of their vessel in certain
circumstances).
That the Department of Justice and the Department of
Transportation—the executive agencies charged with enforc
ing the ADA—appear to have concluded that Congress in
tended Title III to apply to foreign-flag cruise ships does not
change my view. We “accept only those agency interpreta
tions that are reasonable in light of the principles of con
struction courts normally employ.” ARAMCO, 499 U. S.
244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (declining to adopt the Equal Employment Op
portunity Commission’s determination that Title VII applied
to employers abroad); see also id., at 257–258 (opinion of the
Court) (same). In light of our longstanding clear-statement
rule, it is not reasonable to apply Title III here.
I would therefore affirm the Fifth Circuit’s judgment that
Title III of the ADA does not apply to foreign-flag cruise
ships in United States territorial waters.