EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC., et al.

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546 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES,
INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 04–70. Argued March 1, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005*
In No. 04–70, Exxon dealers filed a class action against Exxon Corporation,
invoking the Federal District Court’s 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a) diversity juris
diction. After the dealers won a jury verdict, the court certified the
case for interlocutory review on the question whether it had properly
exercised § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class mem
bers who had not met § 1332(a)’s minimum amount-in-controversy re
quirement. The Eleventh Circuit upheld this extension of supplemen
tal jurisdiction. In No. 04–79, a girl and her family sought damages
from Star-Kist Foods, Inc., in a diversity action. The District Court
granted Star-Kist summary judgment, finding that none of the plaintiffs
had met the amount-in-controversy requirement. The First Circuit
ruled that the girl, but not her family, had alleged the requisite amount,
and then held that supplemental jurisdiction over the family’s claims
was improper because original jurisdiction is lacking in a diversity case
if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Held: Where the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least
one named plaintiff in the action satisfies § 1332(a)’s amount-in
controversy requirement, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or contro
versy, even if those claims are for less than the requisite amount.
Pp. 552–572.
(a) Although district courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a
statutory basis, once a court has original jurisdiction over some claims
in an action, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional
claims arising from the same case or controversy. See Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715. This expansive interpretation does not apply to
§ 1332’s complete diversity requirement, for incomplete diversity de
stroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, leaving nothing to
which supplemental claims can adhere. But other statutory prerequi
sites, including the federal-question and amount-in-controversy require
*Together with No. 04–79, del Rosario Ortega et al. v. Star-Kist Foods,
Inc., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.

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Syllabus
ments, can be analyzed claim by claim. Before § 1367 was enacted,
every plaintiff had to separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy re
quirement, Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583; Zahn v. Interna
tional Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291, and the grant of original jurisdiction
over claims involving particular parties did not itself confer supplemen
tal jurisdiction over additional claims involving other parties, Finley v.
United States, 490 U. S. 545, 556. Pp. 552–557.
(b) All parties here agree that § 1367 overturned Finley, but there is
no warrant for assuming that is all it did. To determine § 1367’s scope
requires examination of the statute’s text in light of context, structure,
and related statutory provisions. Section 1367(a) is a broad grant of
supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or con
troversy, as long as the action is one in which district courts would
have original jurisdiction. Its last sentence makes clear that this grant
extends to claims involving joinder or intervention of additional parties.
The question here is whether a diversity case in which the claims of
some, but not all, plaintiffs satisfy the amount-in-controversy require
ment qualifies as a “civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction,” § 1367(a). Pp. 557–558.
(c) The answer must be yes. When a well-pleaded complaint has at
least one claim satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement, and
there are no other relevant jurisdictional defects, the district court, be
yond all question, has original jurisdiction over that claim. A court
with original jurisdiction over a single claim in the complaint has origi
nal jurisdiction over a “civil action” under § 1367(a), even if that action
comprises fewer claims than were included in the complaint. Once a
court has original jurisdiction over the action, it can then decide
whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for exercising supple
mental jurisdiction over other claims in the action. Section 1367(b),
which contains exceptions to § 1367(a)’s broad rule, does not withdraw
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the additional parties here.
In fact, its exceptions support this Court’s conclusion. Pp. 559–560.
(d) The Court cannot accept the alternative view, or its supporting
theories, that a district court lacks original jurisdiction over a civil ac
tion unless it has original jurisdiction over every claim in the complaint.
The “indivisibility theory”—that all claims must stand or fall as a single,
indivisible action—is inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental
jurisdiction and is belied by this Court’s practice of allowing federal
courts to cure jurisdictional defects by dismissing the offending parties
instead of the entire action. And the statute’s broad and general lan
guage does not permit the theory to apply in diversity cases when it
does not apply in federal-question cases. The “contamination theory”—
that inclusion of a claim or party falling outside the district court’s origi

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548 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.
Syllabus
nal jurisdiction contaminates every other claim in the complaint—makes
sense with respect to the complete diversity requirement because a non
diverse party’s presence eliminates the justification for a federal forum.
But it makes little sense with regard to the amount-in-controversy re
quirement, which is meant to ensure that a dispute is sufficiently impor
tant to warrant federal-court attention. It is fallacious to suppose, sim
ply from the proposition that § 1332 imposes both requirements, that the
contamination theory germane to the former also applies to the latter.
This Court has already considered and rejected a virtually identical ar
gument in the closely analogous removal-jurisdiction context. See Chi
cago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156. Pp. 560–566.
(e) In light of the statute’s text and structure, § 1367’s only plausible
reading is that a court has original jurisdiction over a civil action com
prising the claims for which there is no jurisdictional defect. Though
a single nondiverse party can contaminate every other claim in a law
suit, contamination does not occur with respect to jurisdictional defects
going only to the substantive importance of individual claims. Thus,
§ 1367(a)’s threshold requirement is satisfied in cases, such as these,
where some but not all of the plaintiffs in a diversity action allege a
sufficient amount in controversy. Section 1367 by its plain text over
ruled Clark and Zahn and authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all
claims by diverse parties arising out of the same case or controversy,
subject only to enumerated exceptions not applicable here. Pp. 566–
567.
(f) Because § 1367 is not ambiguous, this Court need not examine
other interpretative tools, including legislative history. Even were it
appropriate to do so, the Court would not give the legislative history
significant weight. Pp. 567–571.
(g) The Class Action Fairness Act has no impact on the analysis of
these cases. Pp. 571–572.
No. 04–70, 333 F. 3d 1248, affirmed; and No. 04–79, 370 F. 3d 124, reversed
and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 572. Ginsburg,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer,
JJ., joined, post, p. 577.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner in
No. 04–70. With him on the briefs was Virginia A. Seitz.
Donald B. Ayer argued the cause for petitioners in
No. 04–79. With him on the briefs were Michael S. Fried,

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Christian G. Vergonis, Freddie Perez-Gonzalez, and Robert
H. Klonoff.
Eugene E. Stearns argued the cause for respondents in
No. 04–70. With him on the briefs were Mark P. Dikeman,
Mona E. Markus, Matthew W. Buttrick, and David C. Pol
lack. Robert A. Long, Jr., argued the cause for respondent
in No. 04–79. With him on the brief were Jeremy D. Ker
nodle, Scott T. Rickman, and David J. Herman.†
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases present the question whether a
federal court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not
satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement,
provided the claims are part of the same case or controversy
as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient amount
in controversy. Our decision turns on the correct interpre
tation of 28 U. S. C. § 1367. The question has divided the
Courts of Appeals, and we granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict. 543 U. S. 924 (2004).
We hold that, where the other elements of jurisdiction are
present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies
the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does author
ize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plain
tiffs in the same Article III case or controversy, even if those
claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified
in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals for the Eleventh Circuit in No. 04–70, and we reverse
†A brief of amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 04–79 was filed for the
United States by Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Deanne E. Maynard,
Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 04–70 were filed for the
United States by Mr. Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schif
fer, Mr. Hungar, Ms. Maynard, Mr. Stern, and Ms. Klein; and for the
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Robert N. Weiner.

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Opinion of the Court
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in No. 04–79.
I
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a class-action suit
against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida. The dealers al
leged an intentional and systematic scheme by Exxon under
which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon.
The plaintiffs invoked the District Court’s § 1332(a) diversity
jurisdiction. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocu
tory review, asking whether it had properly exercised § 1367
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members
who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum amount in
controversy.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
District Court’s extension of supplemental jurisdiction to
these class members. Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 333 F. 3d 1248 (2003). “[W]e find,” the court held,
“that § 1367 clearly and unambiguously provides district
courts with the authority in diversity class actions to exer
cise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class mem
bers who do not meet the minimum amount in controversy
as long as the district court has original jurisdiction over the
claims of at least one of the class representatives.” Id., at
1256. This decision accords with the views of the Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See
Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F. 3d 110 (CA4 2001); Olden v.
LaFarge Corp., 383 F. 3d 495 (CA6 2004); Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F. 3d 928 (CA7
1996); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Liti
gation, 123 F. 3d 599 (CA7 1997). The Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, adopting a similar analysis
of the statute, have held that in a diversity class action the
unnamed class members need not meet the amount-in
controversy requirement, provided the named class members

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do. These decisions, however, are unclear on whether all
the named plaintiffs must satisfy this requirement. In re
Abbott Labs., 51 F. 3d 524 (CA5 1995); Gibson v. Chrysler
Corp., 261 F. 3d 927 (CA9 2001).
In the other case now before us the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit took a different position on the meaning of
§ 1367(a). 370 F. 3d 124 (2004). In that case, a 9-year-old
girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking dam
ages for unusually severe injuries she received when she
sliced her finger on a tuna can. Her family joined in the suit,
seeking damages for emotional distress and certain medical
expenses. The District Court granted summary judgment
to Star-Kist, finding that none of the plaintiffs met the mini
mum amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, however, ruled that the injured
girl, but not her family members, had made allegations of
damages in the requisite amount.
The Court of Appeals then addressed whether, in light of
the fact that one plaintiff met the requirements for original
jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
plaintiffs’ claims was proper under § 1367. The court held
that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when
the district court has original jurisdiction over the action,
and that in a diversity case original jurisdiction is lacking if
one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy re
quirement. Although the Court of Appeals claimed to “ex
press no view” on whether the result would be the same in
a class action, id., at 143, n. 19, its analysis is inconsistent
with that of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s view of § 1367
is, however, shared by the Courts of Appeals for the Third,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and the latter two Courts of Ap
peals have expressly applied this rule to class actions. See
Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F. 3d 214
(CA3 1999); Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F. 3d 946 (CA8

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2000); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F. 3d 631 (CA10
1998).
II
A
The district courts of the United States, as we have said
many times, are “courts of limited jurisdiction. They pos
sess only that power authorized by Constitution and stat
ute,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U. S. 375, 377 (1994). In order to provide a federal forum
for plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress
has conferred on the district courts original jurisdiction in
federal-question cases—civil actions that arise under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28
U. S. C. § 1331. In order to provide a neutral forum for what
have come to be known as diversity cases, Congress also has
granted district courts original jurisdiction in civil actions
between citizens of different States, between U. S. citizens
and foreign citizens, or by foreign states against U. S. citi
zens. § 1332. To ensure that diversity jurisdiction does not
flood the federal courts with minor disputes, § 1332(a) re
quires that the matter in controversy in a diversity case ex
ceed a specified amount, currently $75,000.
Although the district courts may not exercise jurisdiction
absent a statutory basis, it is well established—in certain
classes of cases—that, once a court has original jurisdiction
over some claims in the action, it may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over additional claims that are part of the same
case or controversy. The leading modern case for this prin
ciple is Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966). In
Gibbs, the plaintiff alleged the defendant’s conduct violated
both federal and state law. The District Court, Gibbs held,
had original jurisdiction over the action based on the federal
claims. Gibbs confirmed that the District Court had the ad
ditional power (though not the obligation) to exercise supple
mental jurisdiction over related state claims that arose from

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the same Article III case or controversy. Id., at 725 (“The
federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court. . . . [A]ssuming substantial
ity of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole”).
As we later noted, the decision allowing jurisdiction over
pendent state claims in Gibbs did not mention, let alone come
to grips with, the text of the jurisdictional statutes and the
bedrock principle that federal courts have no jurisdiction
without statutory authorization. Finley v. United States,
490 U. S. 545, 548 (1989). In Finley, we nonetheless reaf
firmed and rationalized Gibbs and its progeny by inferring
from it the interpretive principle that, in cases involving sup
plemental jurisdiction over additional claims between parties
properly in federal court, the jurisdictional statutes should
be read broadly, on the assumption that in this context Con
gress intended to authorize courts to exercise their full Arti
cle III power to dispose of an “ ‘entire action before the court
[which] comprises but one constitutional “case. ” ’ ” 490
U. S., at 549 (quoting Gibbs, supra, at 725).
We have not, however, applied Gibbs’ expansive interpre
tive approach to other aspects of the jurisdictional statutes.
For instance, we have consistently interpreted § 1332 as re
quiring complete diversity: In a case with multiple plaintiffs
and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a sin
gle plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant de
prives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction
over the entire action. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267
(1806); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S.
365, 375 (1978). The complete diversity requirement is not
mandated by the Constitution, State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 530–531 (1967), or by the plain
text of § 1332(a). The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to
the complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of the
diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum
for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be

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perceived as favoring, home-state litigants. The presence of
parties from the same State on both sides of a case dispels
this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring
§ 1332 jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action. See
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 389
(1998); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S.
826, 829 (1989). The specific purpose of the complete diver
sity rule explains both why we have not adopted Gibbs’
expansive interpretive approach to this aspect of the juris
dictional statute and why Gibbs does not undermine the com
plete diversity rule. In order for a federal court to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, it must first have
original jurisdiction over at least one claim in the action.
Incomplete diversity destroys original jurisdiction with re
spect to all claims, so there is nothing to which supplemental
jurisdiction can adhere.
In contrast to the diversity requirement, most of the other
statutory prerequisites for federal jurisdiction, including the
federal-question and amount-in-controversy requirements,
can be analyzed claim by claim. True, it does not follow by
necessity from this that a district court has authority to ex
ercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims provided
there is original jurisdiction over just one. Before the en
actment of § 1367, the Court declined in contexts other than
the pendent-claim instance to follow Gibbs’ expansive ap
proach to interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes. The
Court took a more restrictive view of the proper interpreta
tion of these statutes in so-called pendent-party cases involv
ing supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving addi
tional parties—plaintiffs or defendants—where the district
courts would lack original jurisdiction over claims by each of
the parties standing alone.
Thus, with respect to plaintiff-specific jurisdictional re
quirements, the Court held in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U. S. 583 (1939), that every plaintiff must separately satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement. Though Clark was

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a federal-question case, at that time federal-question juris
diction had an amount-in-controversy requirement analogous
to the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity
cases. “Proper practice,” Clark held, “requires that where
each of several plaintiffs is bound to establish the jurisdic
tional amount with respect to his own claim, the suit should
be dismissed as to those who fail to show that the requisite
amount is involved.” Id., at 590. The Court reaffirmed this
rule, in the context of a class action brought invoking
§ 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction, in Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291 (1973). It follows “inescapably”
from Clark, the Court held in Zahn, that “any plaintiff with
out the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the
case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient
claims.” 414 U. S., at 300.
The Court took a similar approach with respect to supple
mental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants
that fall outside the district courts’ original jurisdiction. In
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), the plaintiff brought
a Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, action against county
officials in District Court pursuant to the statutory grant of
jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) (1976 ed.). The plaintiff
further alleged the court had supplemental jurisdiction over
her related state-law claims against the county, even though
the county was not suable under § 1983 and so was not sub
ject to § 1343(3)’s original jurisdiction. The Court held that
supplemental jurisdiction could not be exercised because
Congress, in enacting § 1343(3), had declined (albeit implic
itly) to extend federal jurisdiction over any party who could
not be sued under the federal civil rights statutes. 427
U. S., at 16–19. “Before it can be concluded that [supple
mental] jurisdiction [over additional parties] exists,” Al
dinger held, “a federal court must satisfy itself not only that
Art[icle] III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes
conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication
negated its existence.” Id., at 18.

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In Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989), we con
fronted a similar issue in a different statutory context. The
plaintiff in Finley brought a Federal Tort Claims Act neg
ligence suit against the Federal Aviation Administration
in District Court, which had original jurisdiction under
§ 1346(b). The plaintiff tried to add related claims against
other defendants, invoking the District Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction over so-called pendent parties. We held that
the District Court lacked a sufficient statutory basis for ex
ercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Rely
ing primarily on Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger, we held in Fin
ley that “a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving
particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over ad
ditional claims by or against different parties.” 490 U. S., at
556. While Finley did not “limit or impair” Gibbs’ liberal
approach to interpreting the jurisdictional statutes in the
context of supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims
involving the same parties, 490 U. S., at 556, Finley never
theless declined to extend that interpretive assumption to
claims involving additional parties. Finley held that in the
context of parties, in contrast to claims, “we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally
authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly.”
Id., at 549.
As the jurisdictional statutes existed in 1989, then, here
is how matters stood: First, the diversity requirement in
§ 1332(a) required complete diversity; absent complete diver
sity, the district court lacked original jurisdiction over all of
the claims in the action. Strawbridge, 3 Cranch, at 267–268;
Kroger, 437 U. S., at 373–374. Second, if the district court
had original jurisdiction over at least one claim, the jurisdic
tional statutes implicitly authorized supplemental jurisdic
tion over all other claims between the same parties arising
out of the same Article III case or controversy. Gibbs, 383
U. S., at 725. Third, even when the district court had origi

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nal jurisdiction over one or more claims between particular
parties, the jurisdictional statutes did not authorize supple
mental jurisdiction over additional claims involving other
parties. Clark, 306 U. S., at 590; Zahn, supra, at 300–301;
Finley, supra, at 556.
B
In Finley we emphasized that “[w]hatever we say regard
ing the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute
can of course be changed by Congress.” 490 U. S., at 556.
In 1990, Congress accepted the invitation. It passed the
Judicial Improvements Act, 104 Stat. 5089, which enacted
§ 1367, the provision which controls these cases.
Section 1367 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or
as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in
any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that in
volve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
“(b) In any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332
of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemen
tal jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plain
tiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20,
or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs
under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be in
consistent with the jurisdictional requirements of sec
tion 1332.”

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All parties to this litigation and all courts to consider the
question agree that § 1367 overturned the result in Finley.
There is no warrant, however, for assuming that § 1367 did
no more than to overrule Finley and otherwise to codify the
existing state of the law of supplemental jurisdiction. We
must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive inter
pretation than their text warrants, 490 U. S., at 549, 556; but
it is just as important not to adopt an artificial construction
that is narrower than what the text provides. No sound
canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak with ex
traordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal
jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordi
nary principles of statutory construction apply. In order to
determine the scope of supplemental jurisdiction authorized
by § 1367, then, we must examine the statute’s text in light
of context, structure, and related statutory provisions.
Section 1367(a) is a broad grant of supplemental jurisdic
tion over other claims within the same case or controversy,
as long as the action is one in which the district courts would
have original jurisdiction. The last sentence of § 1367(a)
makes it clear that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
extends to claims involving joinder or intervention of addi
tional parties. The single question before us, therefore, is
whether a diversity case in which the claims of some plain
tiffs satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the
claims of other plaintiffs do not, presents a “civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction.” If the
answer is yes, § 1367(a) confers supplemental jurisdiction
over all claims, including those that do not independently
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, if the claims
are part of the same Article III case or controversy. If the
answer is no, § 1367(a) is inapplicable and, in light of our hold
ings in Clark and Zahn, the district court has no statutory
basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the addi
tional claims.

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We now conclude the answer must be yes. When the
well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satis
fies the amount-in-controversy requirement, and there are
no other relevant jurisdictional defects, the district court,
beyond all question, has original jurisdiction over that claim.
The presence of other claims in the complaint, over which
the district court may lack original jurisdiction, is of no mo
ment. If the court has original jurisdiction over a single
claim in the complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a
“civil action” within the meaning of § 1367(a), even if the civil
action over which it has jurisdiction comprises fewer claims
than were included in the complaint. Once the court deter
mines it has original jurisdiction over the civil action, it can
turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and stat
utory basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the
other claims in the action.
Section 1367(a) commences with the direction that
§§ 1367(b) and (c), or other relevant statutes, may provide
specific exceptions, but otherwise § 1367(a) is a broad juris
dictional grant, with no distinction drawn between pendent
claim and pendent-party cases. In fact, the last sentence of
§ 1367(a) makes clear that the provision grants supplemental
jurisdiction over claims involving joinder or intervention of
additional parties. The terms of § 1367 do not acknowledge
any distinction between pendent jurisdiction and the doc
trine of so-called ancillary jurisdiction. Though the doc
trines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed sepa
rately as a historical matter, the Court has recognized that
the doctrines are “two species of the same generic problem,”
Kroger, 437 U. S., at 370. Nothing in § 1367 indicates a con
gressional intent to recognize, preserve, or create some
meaningful, substantive distinction between the jurisdic
tional categories we have historically labeled pendent and
ancillary.
If § 1367(a) were the sum total of the relevant statutory
language, our holding would rest on that language alone.

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The statute, of course, instructs us to examine § 1367(b) to
determine if any of its exceptions apply, so we proceed to
that section. While § 1367(b) qualifies the broad rule of
§ 1367(a), it does not withdraw supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of the additional parties at issue here. The
specific exceptions to § 1367(a) contained in § 1367(b), more
over, provide additional support for our conclusion that
§ 1367(a) confers supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.
Section 1367(b), which applies only to diversity cases, with
holds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs
proposed to be joined as indispensable parties under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, or who seek to intervene pursu
ant to Rule 24. Nothing in the text of § 1367(b), however,
withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plain
tiffs permissively joined under Rule 20 (like the additional
plaintiffs in No. 04–79) or certified as class-action mem
bers pursuant to Rule 23 (like the additional plaintiffs in
No. 04–70). The natural, indeed the necessary, inference is
that § 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over claims by
Rule 20 and Rule 23 plaintiffs. This inference, at least with
respect to Rule 20 plaintiffs, is strengthened by the fact that
§ 1367(b) explicitly excludes supplemental jurisdiction over
claims against defendants joined under Rule 20.
We cannot accept the view, urged by some of the parties,
commentators, and Courts of Appeals, that a district court
lacks original jurisdiction over a civil action unless the court
has original jurisdiction over every claim in the complaint.
As we understand this position, it requires assuming either
that all claims in the complaint must stand or fall as a single,
indivisible “civil action” as a matter of definitional neces
sity—what we will refer to as the “indivisibility theory”—or
else that the inclusion of a claim or party falling outside the
district court’s original jurisdiction somehow contaminates
every other claim in the complaint, depriving the court of
original jurisdiction over any of these claims—what we will
refer to as the “contamination theory.”

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The indivisibility theory is easily dismissed, as it is incon
sistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction.
If a district court must have original jurisdiction over every
claim in the complaint in order to have “original jurisdiction”
over a “civil action,” then in Gibbs there was no civil action
of which the district court could assume original jurisdiction
under § 1331, and so no basis for exercising supplemental ju
risdiction over any of the claims. The indivisibility theory
is further belied by our practice—in both federal-question
and diversity cases—of allowing federal courts to cure juris
dictional defects by dismissing the offending parties rather
than dismissing the entire action. Clark, for example,
makes clear that claims that are jurisdictionally defective as
to amount in controversy do not destroy original jurisdiction
over other claims. 306 U. S., at 590 (dismissing parties who
failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement but
retaining jurisdiction over the remaining party). If the
presence of jurisdictionally problematic claims in the com
plaint meant the district court was without original jurisdic
tion over the single, indivisible civil action before it, then the
district court would have to dismiss the whole action rather
than particular parties.
We also find it unconvincing to say that the definitional
indivisibility theory applies in the context of diversity cases
but not in the context of federal-question cases. The broad
and general language of the statute does not permit this re
sult. The contention is premised on the notion that the
phrase “original jurisdiction of all civil actions” means differ
ent things in §§ 1331 and 1332. It is implausible, however,
to say that the identical phrase means one thing (original
jurisdiction in all actions where at least one claim in the com
plaint meets the following requirements) in § 1331 and some
thing else (original jurisdiction in all actions where every
claim in the complaint meets the following requirements) in
§ 1332.

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The contamination theory, as we have noted, can make
some sense in the special context of the complete diversity
requirement because the presence of nondiverse parties on
both sides of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for provid
ing a federal forum. The theory, however, makes little
sense with respect to the amount-in-controversy require
ment, which is meant to ensure that a dispute is sufficiently
important to warrant federal-court attention. The presence
of a single nondiverse party may eliminate the fear of bias
with respect to all claims, but the presence of a claim that
falls short of the minimum amount in controversy does noth
ing to reduce the importance of the claims that do meet
this requirement.
It is fallacious to suppose, simply from the proposition that
§ 1332 imposes both the diversity requirement and the
amount-in-controversy requirement, that the contamination
theory germane to the former is also relevant to the latter.
There is no inherent logical connection between the amount
in-controversy requirement and § 1332 diversity jurisdic
tion. After all, federal-question jurisdiction once had an
amount-in-controversy requirement as well. If such a re
quirement were revived under § 1331, it is clear beyond per
adventure that § 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction
over federal-question cases where some, but not all, of the
federal-law claims involve a sufficient amount in controversy.
In other words, § 1367(a) unambiguously overrules the hold
ing and the result in Clark. If that is so, however, it would
be quite extraordinary to say that § 1367 did not also over
rule Zahn, a case that was premised in substantial part on
the holding in Clark.
In addition to the theoretical difficulties with the argu
ment that a district court has original jurisdiction over a
civil action only if it has original jurisdiction over each indi
vidual claim in the complaint, we have already considered
and rejected a virtually identical argument in the closely
analogous context of removal jurisdiction. In Chicago v. In

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ternational College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156 (1997), the
plaintiff brought federal- and state-law claims in state court.
The defendant removed to federal court. The plaintiff ob
jected to removal, citing the text of the removal statute,
§ 1441(a). That statutory provision, which bears a striking
similarity to the relevant portion of § 1367, authorizes re
moval of “any civil action . . . of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction . . . .” The Col
lege of Surgeons plaintiff urged that, because its state-law
claims were not within the District Court’s original jurisdic
tion, § 1441(a) did not authorize removal. We disagreed.
The federal-law claims, we held, “suffice to make the actions
‘civil actions’ within the ‘original jurisdiction’ of the district
courts . . . . Nothing in the jurisdictional statutes suggests
that the presence of related state law claims somehow alters
the fact that [the plaintiff ’s] complaints, by virtue of their
federal claims, were ‘civil actions’ within the federal courts’
‘original jurisdiction.’ ” Id., at 166. Once the case was re
moved, the District Court had original jurisdiction over
the federal-law claims and supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(a) over the state-law claims. Id., at 165.
The dissent in College of Surgeons argued that because
the plaintiff sought on-the-record review of a local adminis
trative agency decision, the review it sought was outside the
scope of the District Court’s jurisdiction. Id., at 177 (opin
ion of Ginsburg, J.). We rejected both the suggestion that
state-law claims involving administrative appeals are beyond
the scope of § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction, id., at 168–172
(opinion of the Court), and the claim that the administrative
review posture of the case deprived the District Court of
original jurisdiction over the federal-law claims in the case,
id., at 163–168. More importantly for present purposes,
College of Surgeons stressed that a district court has origi
nal jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of § 1441(a) as
long as it has original jurisdiction over a subset of the claims
constituting the action. Even the College of Surgeons dis

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sent, which took issue with the Court’s interpretation of
§ 1367, did not appear to contest this view of § 1441(a).
Although College of Surgeons involved additional claims
between the same parties, its interpretation of § 1441(a) ap
plies equally to cases involving additional parties whose
claims fall short of the jurisdictional amount. If we were to
adopt the contrary view that the presence of additional par
ties means there is no “civil action . . . of which the district
courts . . . have original jurisdiction,” those cases simply
would not be removable. To our knowledge, no court has
issued a reasoned opinion adopting this view of the removal
statute. It is settled, of course, that absent complete diver
sity a case is not removable because the district court would
lack original jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519
U. S. 61, 73 (1996). This, however, is altogether consist
ent with our view of § 1441(a). A failure of complete diver
sity, unlike the failure of some claims to meet the requi
site amount in controversy, contaminates every claim in the
action.
We also reject the argument, similar to the attempted dis
tinction of College of Surgeons discussed above, that while
the presence of additional claims over which the district
court lacks jurisdiction does not mean the civil action is out
side the purview of § 1367(a), the presence of additional par
ties does. The basis for this distinction is not altogether
clear, and it is in considerable tension with statutory text.
Section 1367(a) applies by its terms to any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, and the
last sentence of § 1367(a) expressly contemplates that the
court may have supplemental jurisdiction over additional
parties. So it cannot be the case that the presence of those
parties destroys the court’s original jurisdiction, within the
meaning of § 1367(a), over a civil action otherwise properly
before it. Also, § 1367(b) expressly withholds supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases over claims by plaintiffs joined
as indispensable parties under Rule 19. If joinder of such

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parties were sufficient to deprive the district court of origi
nal jurisdiction over the civil action within the meaning of
§ 1367(a), this specific limitation on supplemental jurisdiction
in § 1367(b) would be superfluous. The argument that the
presence of additional parties removes the civil action from
the scope of § 1367(a) also would mean that § 1367 left the
Finley result undisturbed. Finley, after all, involved a Fed
eral Tort Claims Act suit against a federal defendant and
state-law claims against additional defendants not otherwise
subject to federal jurisdiction. Yet all concede that one pur
pose of § 1367 was to change the result reached in Finley.
Finally, it is suggested that our interpretation of § 1367(a)
creates an anomaly regarding the exceptions listed in
§ 1367(b): It is not immediately obvious why Congress would
withhold supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs joined as
parties “needed for just adjudication” under Rule 19 but
would allow supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs permis
sively joined under Rule 20. The omission of Rule 20 plain
tiffs from the list of exceptions in § 1367(b) may have been
an “unintentional drafting gap,” Meritcare, 166 F. 3d, at 221,
and n. 6. If that is the case, it is up to Congress rather than
the courts to fix it. The omission may seem odd, but it is
not absurd. An alternative explanation for the different
treatment of Rules 19 and 20 is that Congress was concerned
that extending supplemental jurisdiction to Rule 19 plaintiffs
would allow circumvention of the complete diversity rule: A
nondiverse plaintiff might be omitted intentionally from the
original action, but joined later under Rule 19 as a necessary
party. See Stromberg Metal Works, 77 F. 3d, at 932. The
contamination theory described above, if applicable, means
this ruse would fail, but Congress may have wanted to make
assurance double sure. More generally, Congress may have
concluded that federal jurisdiction is only appropriate if the
district court would have original jurisdiction over the
claims of all those plaintiffs who are so essential to the action
that they could be joined under Rule 19.

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To the extent that the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs from
the list of § 1367(b) exceptions is anomalous, moreover, it is
no more anomalous than the inclusion of Rule 19 plaintiffs in
that list would be if the alternative view of § 1367(a) were to
prevail. If the district court lacks original jurisdiction over
a civil diversity action where any plaintiff ’s claims fail to
comply with all the requirements of § 1332, there is no need
for a special § 1367(b) exception for Rule 19 plaintiffs who do
not meet these requirements. Though the omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b) presents something of a puzzle on
our view of the statute, the inclusion of Rule 19 plaintiffs
in this section is at least as difficult to explain under the
alternative view.
And so we circle back to the original question. When the
well-pleaded complaint in district court includes multiple
claims, all part of the same case or controversy, and some,
but not all, of the claims are within the court’s original juris
diction, does the court have before it “any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction”? It
does. Under § 1367, the court has original jurisdiction over
the civil action comprising the claims for which there is no
jurisdictional defect. No other reading of § 1367 is plausible
in light of the text and structure of the jurisdictional statute.
Though the special nature and purpose of the diversity re
quirement mean that a single nondiverse party can contami
nate every other claim in the lawsuit, the contamination does
not occur with respect to jurisdictional defects that go only
to the substantive importance of individual claims.
It follows from this conclusion that the threshold require
ment of § 1367(a) is satisfied in cases, like those now before
us, where some, but not all, of the plaintiffs in a diversity
action allege a sufficient amount in controversy. We hold
that § 1367 by its plain text overruled Clark and Zahn and
authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims by di
verse parties arising out of the same Article III case or con

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troversy, subject only to enumerated exceptions not applica
ble in the cases now before us.
C
The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that
the statute is at least ambiguous and that we should look to
other interpretive tools, including the legislative history of
§ 1367, which supposedly demonstrate Congress did not in
tend § 1367 to overrule Zahn. We can reject this argument
at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous.
For the reasons elaborated above, interpreting § 1367 to fore
close supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs in diversity
cases who do not meet the minimum amount in controversy
is inconsistent with the text, read in light of other statutory
provisions and our established jurisprudence. Even if we
were to stipulate, however, that the reading these propo
nents urge upon us is textually plausible, the legislative his
tory cited to support it would not alter our view as to the
best interpretation of § 1367.
Those who urge that the legislative history refutes our
interpretation rely primarily on the House Judiciary Com
mittee Report on the Judicial Improvements Act. H. R.
Rep. No. 101–734 (1990) (House Report or Report). This
Report explained that § 1367 would “authorize jurisdiction in
a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the pre-
Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction.” Id., at 28. The
Report stated that § 1367(a) “generally authorizes the dis
trict court to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim
whenever it forms part of the same constitutional case or
controversy as the claim or claims that provide the basis of
the district court’s original jurisdiction,” and in so doing cod
ifies Gibbs and fills the statutory gap recognized in Finley.
House Report, at 28–29, and n. 15. The Report then
remarked that § 1367(b) “is not intended to affect the juris
dictional requirements of [§ 1332] in diversity-only class

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actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to
Finley,” citing, without further elaboration, Zahn and Su
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921).
House Report, at 29, and n. 17. The Report noted that the
“net effect” of § 1367(b) was to implement the “principal ra
tionale” of Kroger, House Report, at 29, and n. 16, effecting
only “one small change” in pre-Finley practice with respect
to diversity actions: § 1367(b) would exclude “Rule 23(a)
plaintiff-intervenors to the same extent as those sought to
be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19.” House Report, at 29.
(It is evident that the report here meant to refer to Rule 24,
not Rule 23.)
As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement
is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other
extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statu
tory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable
light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of other
wise ambiguous terms. Not all extrinsic materials are reli
able sources of insight into legislative understandings, how
ever, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two
serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself often
murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. Judicial investigation
of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow
Judge Leventhal’s memorable phrase, an exercise in “ ‘look
ing over a crowd and picking out your friends.’ ” See Wald,
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 214 (1983).
Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like commit
tee reports, which are not themselves subject to the require
ments of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee
members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—
both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manip
ulations of legislative history to secure results they were un
able to achieve through the statutory text. We need not
comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently
prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable

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in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court
have disagreed. It is clear, however, that in this instance
both criticisms are right on the mark.
First of all, the legislative history of § 1367 is far murkier
than selective quotation from the House Report would sug
gest. The text of § 1367 is based substantially on a draft
proposal contained in a Federal Court Study Committee
working paper, which was drafted by a Subcommittee
chaired by Judge Posner. Report of the Subcommittee on
the Role of the Federal Courts and Their Relationship to
the States 567–568 (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1 Judicial
Conference of the United States, Federal Courts Study Com
mittee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports (July 1,
1990) (Subcommittee Working Paper). See also Judicial
Conference of the United States, Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee 47–48 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Study Com
mittee Report) (echoing, in brief summary form, the Subcom
mittee Working Paper proposal and noting that the Subcom
mittee Working Paper “contains additional material on this
subject”); House Report, at 27 (“[Section 1367] implements a
recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee
found on pages 47 and 48 of its Report”). While the Sub
committee explained, in language echoed by the House Re
port, that its proposal “basically restores the law as it ex
isted prior to Finley,” Subcommittee Working Paper, at 561,
it observed in a footnote that its proposal would overrule
Zahn and that this would be a good idea, Subcommittee
Working Paper, at 561, n. 33. Although the Federal Courts
Study Committee did not expressly adopt the Subcommit
tee’s specific reference to Zahn, it neither explicitly dis
agreed with the Subcommittee’s conclusion that this was the
best reading of the proposed text nor substantially modified
the proposal to avoid this result. Study Committee Report,
at 47–48. Therefore, even if the House Report could fairly
be read to reflect an understanding that the text of § 1367
did not overrule Zahn, the Subcommittee Working Paper on

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which § 1367 was based reflected the opposite understanding.
The House Report is no more authoritative than the Subcom
mittee Working Paper. The utility of either can extend no
further than the light it sheds on how the enacting Legisla
ture understood the statutory text. Trying to figure out
how to square the Subcommittee Working Paper’s under
standing with the House Report’s understanding, or which is
more reflective of the understanding of the enacting legisla
tors, is a hopeless task.
Second, the worst fears of critics who argue legislative his
tory will be used to circumvent the Article I process were
realized in this case. The telltale evidence is the statement,
by three law professors who participated in drafting § 1367,
see House Report, at 27, n. 13, that § 1367 “on its face” per
mits “supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members
that do not satisfy section 1332’s jurisdictional amount re
quirement, which would overrule [Zahn]. [There is] a dis
claimer of intent to accomplish this result in the legislative
history. . . . It would have been better had the statute dealt
explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was
an attempt to correct the oversight.” Rowe, Burbank, &
Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supple
mental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory
L. J. 943, 960, n. 90 (1991). The professors were frank to
concede that if one refuses to consider the legislative history,
one has no choice but to “conclude that section 1367 has
wiped Zahn off the books.” Ibid. So there exists an ac
knowledgment, by parties who have detailed, specific knowl
edge of the statute and the drafting process, both that the
plain text of § 1367 overruled Zahn and that language to the
contrary in the House Report was a post hoc attempt to alter
that result. One need not subscribe to the wholesale con
demnation of legislative history to refuse to give any effect
to such a deliberate effort to amend a statute through a com
mittee report.

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In sum, even if we believed resort to legislative history
were appropriate in these cases—a point we do not con
cede—we would not give significant weight to the House Re
port. The distinguished jurists who drafted the Subcommit
tee Working Paper, along with three of the participants in
the drafting of § 1367, agree that this provision, on its face,
overrules Zahn. This accords with the best reading of the
statute’s text, and nothing in the legislative history indicates
directly and explicitly that Congress understood the phrase
“civil action of which the district courts have original ju
risdiction” to exclude cases in which some but not all of
the diversity plaintiffs meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement.
No credence, moreover, can be given to the claim that, if
Congress understood § 1367 to overrule Zahn, the proposal
would have been more controversial. We have little sense
whether any Member of Congress would have been particu
larly upset by this result. This is not a case where one can
plausibly say that concerned legislators might not have real
ized the possible effect of the text they were adopting. Cer
tainly, any competent legislative aide who studied the matter
would have flagged this issue if it were a matter of impor
tance to his or her boss, especially in light of the Subcommit
tee Working Paper. There are any number of reasons why
legislators did not spend more time arguing over § 1367, none
of which are relevant to our interpretation of what the words
of the statute mean.
D
Finally, we note that the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA), Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4, enacted this year, has no
bearing on our analysis of these cases. Subject to certain
limitations, the CAFA confers federal diversity jurisdiction
over class actions where the aggregate amount in contro
versy exceeds $5 million. It abrogates the rule against ag
gregating claims, a rule this Court recognized in Ben-Hur
and reaffirmed in Zahn. The CAFA, however, is not retro

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572 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.
Stevens, J., dissenting
active, and the views of the 2005 Congress are not relevant
to our interpretation of a text enacted by Congress in 1990.
The CAFA, moreover, does not moot the significance of
our interpretation of § 1367, as many proposed exercises of
supplemental jurisdiction, even in the class-action context,
might not fall within the CAFA’s ambit. The CAFA, then,
has no impact, one way or the other, on our interpretation
of § 1367.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
Justice Ginsburg’s carefully reasoned opinion, post, at
577 (dissenting opinion), demonstrates the error in the
Court’s rather ambitious reading of this opaque jurisdictional
statute. She also has demonstrated that “ambiguity” is a
term that may have different meanings for different judges,
for the Court has made the remarkable declaration that its
reading of the statute is so obviously correct—and Justice
Ginsburg’s so obviously wrong—that the text does not even
qualify as “ambiguous.” See ante, at 567. Because ambi
guity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain con
vinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of
a statute as determinative of whether legislative history is
consulted. Indeed, I believe that we as judges are more,
rather than less, constrained when we make ourselves ac
countable to all reliable evidence of legislative intent. See
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 65–66,
and n. 1 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
The legislative history of 28 U. S. C. § 1367 provides pow
erful confirmation of Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of
that statute. It is helpful to consider in full the relevant
portion of the House Report, which was also adopted by
the Senate:
“This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case like
Finley [v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989)], as well
as essentially restore the pre-Finley understandings of
the authorization for and limits on other forms of
supplemental jurisdiction. In federal question cases, it
broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise sup
plemental jurisdiction over additional claims, including
claims involving the joinder of additional parties. In di
versity cases, the district courts may exercise supple
mental jurisdiction, except when doing so would be in
consistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the
diversity statute.
. . . . .
“Subsection 114(b) [§ 1367(b)] prohibits a district court
in a case over which it has jurisdiction founded solely on
the general diversity provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, from
exercising supplemental jurisdiction in specified circum
stances. [Footnote 16: ‘The net effect of subsection
(b) is to implement the principal rationale of Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365
(1978)’.] In diversity-only actions the district courts
may not hear plaintiffs’ supplemental claims when exer
cising supplemental jurisdiction would encourage plain
tiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirement of 28
U. S. C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming ini
tially only those defendants whose joinder satisfies sec
tion 1332’s requirements and later adding claims not
within original federal jurisdiction against other defend
ants who have intervened or been joined on a supple
mental basis. In accord with case law, the subsection

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also prohibits the joinder or intervention of persons or
plaintiffs if adding them is inconsistent with section
1332’s requirements. The section is not intended to af
fect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1332
in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements
were interpreted prior to Finley. [Footnote 17: ‘See
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356
(1921); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291
(1973)’.]
“Subsection (b) makes one small change in pre-Finley
practice. Anomalously, under current practice, the
same party might intervene as of right under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and take advantage of
supplemental jurisdiction, but not come within supple
mental jurisdiction if parties already in the action
sought to effect the joinder under Rule 19. Subsection
(b) would eliminate this anomaly, excluding Rule 23(a)
plaintiff-intervenors to the same extent as those sought
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19.” H. R. Rep.
No. 101–734, pp. 28–29 (1990) (footnote omitted) (herein
after House Report or Report).1
Not only does the House Report specifically say that § 1367
was not intended to upset Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U. S. 291 (1973), but its entire explanation of the statute
demonstrates that Congress had in mind a very specific and
relatively modest task—undoing this Court’s 5-to-4 decision
in Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989). In addition
to overturning that unfortunate and much-criticized deci
sion,2 the statute, according to the Report, codifies and pre
serves “the pre-Finley understandings of the authorization
1 The last quoted paragraph was intended to refer to Rule 24, not Rule
23. See ante, at 568.
2 As I pointed out in my dissent in Finley, the majority’s decision was
“not faithful to our precedents,” 490 U. S., at 558, and casually dismissed
the accumulated wisdom of judges such as Henry Friendly, who had “spe
cial learning and expertise in matters of federal jurisdiction,” id., at 565.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
for and limits on other forms of supplemental jurisdiction,”
House Report, at 28, with the exception of making “one small
change in pre-Finley practice,” id., at 29, which is not rele
vant here.
The sweeping purpose that the Court’s decision imputes
to Congress bears no resemblance to the House Report’s de
scription of the statute. But this does not seem to trouble
the Court, for its decision today treats statutory interpreta
tion as a pedantic exercise, divorced from any serious at
tempt at ascertaining congressional intent. Of course, there
are situations in which we do not honor Congress’ apparent
intent unless that intent is made “clear” in the text of a stat
ute—in this way, we can be certain that Congress considered
the issue and intended a disfavored outcome, see, e. g., Land
graf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 (1994) (requiring
clear statement for retroactive civil legislation). But that
principle provides no basis for discounting the House Report,
given that our cases have never recognized a presumption in
favor of expansive diversity jurisdiction.
The Court’s reasons for ignoring this virtual billboard of
congressional intent are unpersuasive. That a subcommit
tee of the Federal Courts Study Committee believed that an
earlier, substantially similar version of the statute overruled
Zahn, see ante, at 569, only highlights the fact that the stat
ute is ambiguous. What is determinative is that the House
Report explicitly rejected that broad reading of the statu
tory text. Such a report has special significance as an indi
cator of legislative intent. In Congress, committee reports
are normally considered the authoritative explication of a
statute’s text and purposes, and busy legislators and their
assistants rely on that explication in casting their votes.
Cf. Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In sur
veying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the
authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the
considered and collective understanding of those Congress

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Stevens, J., dissenting
men involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation’ ”
(quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 186 (1969); brackets
in original)).
The Court’s second reason—its comment on the three law
professors who participated in drafting § 1367, see ante, at
570—is similarly off the mark. In the law review article
that the Court refers to, the professors were merely saying
that the text of the statute was susceptible to an overly
broad (and simplistic) reading, and that clarification in the
House Report was therefore appropriate. See Rowe, Bur
bank, & Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion
About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor
Freer, 40 Emory L. J. 943, 960, n. 90 (1991).3 Significantly,
the reference to Zahn in the House Report does not at all
appear to be tacked on or out of place; indeed, it is wholly
consistent with the Report’s broader explanation of Con
gress’ goal of overruling Finley and preserving pre-Finley
law. To suggest that these professors participated in a “de
liberate effort to amend a statute through a committee re
port,” ante, at 570, reveals an unrealistic view of the legis
lative process, not to mention disrespect for three law
professors who acted in the role of public servants. To be
sure, legislative history can be manipulated. But, in the sit
3 The professors’ account of the challenges they faced in drafting § 1367
gives some sense, I think, of why that statute has proved difficult to inter
pret: “More broadly, codifying a complex area like supplemental jurisdic
tion—as Professor Freer’s discussion illustrates—is itself complex busi
ness. A danger is that the result of the effort to deal with all the
foreseeables will be a statute too prolix and baroque for everyday use and
application by practitioners and judges. Section 1367 reflects an effort to
provide sufficient detail without overdoing it. The statute is concededly
not perfect. What it accomplishes, however, is to change the direction
taken by the Supreme Court in Finley, to provide basic guidance (in par
ticular the legislative history’s general approval of pre-Finley case law,
which has treated some specific issues Professor Freer raises), and then
to trust the federal courts under the changed direction to interpret the
statute sensibly . . . .” 40 Emory L. J., at 961.

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uation before us, there is little reason to fear that an unholy
conspiracy of “unrepresentative committee members,” ante,
at 568, law professors, and “unelected staffers and lobbyists,”
ibid., endeavored to torpedo Congress’ attempt to overrule
(without discussion) two longstanding features of this Court’s
diversity jurisprudence.
After nearly 20 pages of complicated analysis, which ex
plores subtle doctrinal nuances and coins various neologisms,
the Court announces that § 1367 could not reasonably be read
another way. See ante, at 567. That conclusion is difficult
to accept. Given Justice Ginsburg’s persuasive account of
the statutory text and its jurisprudential backdrop, and
given the uncommonly clear legislative history, I am confi
dent that the majority’s interpretation of § 1367 is mistaken.
I respectfully dissent.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus
tice O’Connor, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
These cases present the question whether Congress, by
enacting 28 U. S. C. § 1367, overruled this Court’s decisions
in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 589 (1939) (reaf
firming the holding of Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co.,
222 U. S. 39, 40 (1911)), and Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U. S. 291 (1973). Clark held that, when federal-court
jurisdiction is predicated on a specified amount in contro
versy, each plaintiff joined in the litigation must independ
ently meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn
confirmed that in class actions governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), “[e]ach [class member] . . . must sat
isfy the jurisdictional amount, and any [class member] who
does not must be dismissed from the case.” 414 U. S., at 301.
Section 1367, all agree, was designed to overturn this
Court’s decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545
(1989). Finley concerned not diversity-of-citizenship juris
diction (28 U. S. C. § 1332), but original federal-court jurisdic
tion in cases arising under federal law (28 U. S. C. § 1331).

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The plaintiff in Finley sued the United States under the Fed
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), to recover
for the death of her husband and children in an airplane
crash. She alleged that the Federal Aviation Administra
tion’s negligence contributed to the fatal accident. She later
amended her complaint to add state-law tort claims against
two other defendants, a municipality and a utility company.
490 U. S., at 546–547. No independent basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction existed over the state-law claims.
The plaintiff could not have brought her entire action in state
court, because federal jurisdiction in FTCA actions is exclu
sive. § 1346(b). Hence, absent federal jurisdiction embrac
ing the state-law claims, she would be obliged to pursue two
discrete actions, one in federal court, the other in state court.
This Court held, nevertheless, that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over the “pendent-party” state-law claims. Id.,
at 555–556. In so holding, the Court stressed that Congress
held the control rein. Id., at 547–549. Congress could re
verse the result in Finley, and permit pendent jurisdiction
over state-law claims against additional defendants, if it so
chose. Id., at 556. Congress did so in § 1367.
What more § 1367 wrought is an issue on which courts of
appeals have sharply divided. Compare Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F. 3d 928, 930 (CA7
1996) (§ 1367 “supersedes Clark and allows pendent-party ju
risdiction when the additional parties have claims worth less
than [the jurisdictional minimum]”), and In re Abbott Labs.,
51 F. 3d 524, 529 (CA5 1995) (“[U]nder § 1367 a district court
can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a
class, although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement, as did the class representatives.”), with Merit
care Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F. 3d 214, 222
(CA3 1999) (§ 1367 “preserves the prohibition against aggre
gation outlined in [Zahn and Clark]”), and Leonhardt v.
Western Sugar Co., 160 F. 3d 631, 641 (CA10 1998) (§ 1367
does not alter “the historical rules prohibiting aggregation

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
of claims, including Zahn’s prohibition of such aggregation in
diversity class actions”). The Court today holds that § 1367,
although prompted by Finley, a case in which original access
to federal court was predicated on a federal question, notably
enlarges federal diversity jurisdiction. The Court reads
§ 1367 to overrule Clark and Zahn, thereby allowing access
to federal court by coplaintiffs or class members who do not
meet the now in excess of $75,000 amount-in-controversy re
quirement, so long as at least one coplaintiff, or the named
class representative, has a jurisdictionally sufficient claim.
Ante, at 549.
The Court adopts a plausibly broad reading of § 1367, a
measure that is hardly a model of the careful drafter’s art.
There is another plausible reading, however, one less disrup
tive of our jurisprudence regarding supplemental jurisdic
tion. If one reads § 1367(a) to instruct, as the statute’s text
suggests, that the district court must first have “original ju
risdiction” over a “civil action” before supplemental juris
diction can attach, then Clark and Zahn are preserved, and
supplemental jurisdiction does not open the way for joinder
of plaintiffs, or inclusion of class members, who do not in
dependently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that this narrower
construction is the better reading of § 1367.
I
A
Section 1367, captioned “Supplemental jurisdiction,” codi
fies court-recognized doctrines formerly labeled “pendent”
and “ancillary” jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction involved
the enlargement of federal-question litigation to include re
lated state-law claims. Ancillary jurisdiction evolved pri
marily to protect defending parties, or others whose rights
might be adversely affected if they could not air their claims
in an ongoing federal-court action. Given jurisdiction over
the principal action, federal courts entertained certain mat

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ters deemed ancillary regardless of the citizenship of the par
ties or the amount in controversy.
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), the leading
pendent jurisdiction case, involved a claim against a union
for wrongfully inducing the plaintiff ’s discharge. The plain
tiff stated a federal claim under the Taft-Hartley Act, and
an allied state-law claim of unlawful conspiracy to interfere
with his employment contract. This Court upheld the join
der of federal and state claims. “[T]here is power in federal
courts to hear the whole,” the Court said, when the state
and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of opera
tive fact” and are so linked that the plaintiff “would ordi
narily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”
Id., at 725.
Gibbs involved the linkage of federal and state claims
against the same defendant. In Finley v. United States, 490
U. S. 545, the Court contained Gibbs. Without congressional
authorization, the Court admonished, the pendent jurisdic
tion umbrella could not be stretched to cover the joinder
of additional parties. Gibbs had departed from earlier de
cisions recognizing that “jurisdiction [must] be explicitly
conferred,” the Court said. 490 U. S., at 556. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), the Court observed, although
resting “on a much narrower basis,” R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, &
D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 925 (5th ed. 2003) (hereinafter Hart &
Wechsler), had already signaled that “the Gibbs approach
would not be extended to the pendent-party field,” Finley,
490 U. S., at 556. While the Finley Court did not “limit or
impair” Gibbs itself, 490 U. S., at 556, for further develop
ment of pendent jurisdiction, the Court made it plain, the
initiative would lie in Congress’ domain, id., at 555–556.1
1 “[B]oth the Finley result and its implications” sparked “considerable
criticism.” Hart & Wechsler 926; see also 13B C. Wright, A. Miller,
E. Cooper, & R. Freer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567.2, p. 91 (2d

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Ancillary jurisdiction, which evolved as a more sprawling
doctrine than pendent jurisdiction, was originally rooted in
“the notion that [when] federal jurisdiction in [a] principal
suit effectively controls the property or fund under dispute,
other claimants thereto should be allowed to intervene in
order to protect their interests, without regard to juris
diction.” Aldinger, 427 U. S., at 11; see, e. g., Freeman v.
Howe, 24 How. 450 (1861). In Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365 (1978), the Court addressed the
permissible scope of the doctrine in relation to the liberal
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for joinder
of parties and claims.
Kroger commenced as a suit between a citizen of Iowa and
a Nebraska corporation. When the Nebraska defendant im
pleaded an Iowa corporation as a third-party defendant
under Rule 14(a), the plaintiff asserted state-law claims
against the impleaded party. No independent basis of fed
eral jurisdiction existed over the newly asserted claims, for
both plaintiff and impleaded defendant were citizens of Iowa.
437 U. S., at 370. The Court held that the plaintiff could not
draw in a co-citizen defendant in this manner. Id., at 377.
Federal courts, by the time of Kroger, were routinely exer
cising ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims,
impleader claims, cross-claims among defendants, and claims
of parties who intervened “of right.” See id., at 375, n. 18
(collecting cases). In Kroger, however,
“the nonfederal claim . . . was asserted by the plaintiff,
who voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law
claim in a federal court. By contrast, ancillary jurisdic
tion typically involve[d] claims by a defending party
haled into court against his will, or by another person
whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could
ed., Supp. 2005) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (characterizing the Finley
decision as “surprising”).

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assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court.”
Id., at 376.
Having “chosen the federal rather than the state forum,” the
Court said, the plaintiff had to “accept its limitations.” Ibid.
In sum, in federal-question cases before § 1367’s enact
ment, the Court recognized pendent-claim jurisdiction,
Gibbs, 383 U. S., at 725, but not pendent-party jurisdiction,
Finley, 490 U. S., at 555–556. As to ancillary jurisdiction,
the Court adhered to the limitation that in diversity cases,
throughout the litigation, all plaintiffs must remain diverse
from all defendants. See Kroger, 437 U. S., at 374.
Although pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction
evolved discretely,2 the Court has recognized that they are
“two species of the same generic problem: Under what cir
cumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law
claim arising between citizens of the same State?” Id., at
370. Finley regarded that question as one properly ad
dressed to Congress. See 490 U. S., at 549, 556; 13 Wright &
Miller § 3523, p. 127 (2d ed., Supp. 2005); Hart & Wechsler
924–926.
B
Shortly before the Court decided Finley, Congress had es
tablished the Federal Courts Study Committee to take up
issues relating to “the federal courts’ congestion, delay, ex
pense, and expansion.” Judicial Conference of the United
States, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 3
(Apr. 2, 1990) (hereinafter Committee Report). The Com
mittee’s charge was to conduct a study addressing the “cri
sis” in federal courts caused by the “rapidly growing” case
load. Id., at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 See generally 13B Wright & Miller §§ 3567, 3567.1, 3567.2 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing pendent jurisdiction); 13 id., § 3523 (discussing ancillary juris
diction); Hart & Wechsler 922–926 (discussing pendent jurisdiction); id., at
1488–1490 (discussing ancillary jurisdiction).

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Among recommendations, the Committee urged Congress
to “authorize federal courts to assert pendent jurisdic
tion over parties without an independent federal jurisdic
tional base.” Id., at 47. If adopted, this recommendation
would overrule Finley. Earlier, a Subcommittee had rec
ommended that Congress overrule both Finley and Zahn.
Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal
Courts and Their Relationship to the States 547, 561, n. 33
(Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1 Judicial Conference of the
United States, Federal Courts Study Committee, Working
Papers and Subcommittee Reports (July 1, 1990) (hereinafter
Subcommittee Report). In the Subcommittee’s view,
“[f]rom a policy standpoint,” Zahn “ma[de] little sense.”
Subcommittee Report, at 561, n. 33.3 The full Committee,
however, urged only the overruling of Finley and did not
adopt the recommendation to overrule Zahn. Committee
Report, at 47–48.
As a separate matter, a substantial majority of the Com
mittee “strongly recommend[ed]” the elimination of diversity
jurisdiction, save for “complex multi-state litigation, inter
pleader, and suits involving aliens.” Id., at 38–39; accord
Subcommittee Report, at 454–458. “[N]o other step,” the
Committee’s Report maintained, “will do anywhere nearly as
much to reduce federal caseload pressures and contain the
growth of the federal judiciary.” Committee Report, at 39.
Congress responded by adopting, as part of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089,4 recommendations
3 Anomalously, in holding that each class member “must satisfy the juris
dictional amount,” Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291, 301
(1973), the Zahn Court did not refer to Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 366 (1921), which established that in a class action,
the citizenship of the named plaintiff is controlling. But see Zahn, 414
U. S., at 309–310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging Zahn’s inconsistency
with Ben-Hur).
4 The omnibus Act encompassed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
(Title I), the creation of new judgeships (Title II), the Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 (Title III), and the estab

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
of the Federal Courts Study Committee ranked by the House
Committee on the Judiciary as “modest” and “noncontrover
sial.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–734, pp. 15–16 (1990) (hereinafter
H. R. Rep.); see also 136 Cong. Rec. 36288 (1990). Congress
did not take up the Study Committee’s immodest proposal to
curtail diversity jurisdiction. It did, however, enact a sup
plemental jurisdiction statute, codified as 28 U. S. C. § 1367.
II
A
Section 1367, by its terms, operates only in civil actions
“of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.”
The “original jurisdiction” relevant here is diversity-of
citizenship jurisdiction, conferred by § 1332. The character
of that jurisdiction is the essential backdrop for comprehen
sion of § 1367.
The Constitution broadly provides for federal-court ju
risdiction in controversies “between Citizens of different
States.” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This Court has read that provi
sion to demand no more than “minimal diversity,” i. e., so
long as one party on the plaintiffs’ side and one party on
the defendants’ side are of diverse citizenship, Congress may
authorize federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction.
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S.
523, 530–531 (1967). Further, the Constitution includes no
amount-in-controversy limitation on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. But from the start, Congress, as its measures
have been construed by this Court, has limited federal-court
exercise of diversity jurisdiction in two principal ways.
First, unless Congress specifies otherwise, diversity must be
“complete,” i. e., all parties on plaintiffs’ side must be diverse
from all parties on defendants’ side. Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
3 Cranch 267 (1806); see 13B Wright & Miller § 3605 (2d ed.
lishment of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
(Title IV).

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1984). Second, each plaintiff ’s stake must independently
meet the amount-in-controversy specification: “When two or
more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite
for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential
that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional
amount.” Troy Bank, 222 U. S., at 40.
The statute today governing federal-court exercise of di
versity jurisdiction in the generality of cases, § 1332, like all
its predecessors, incorporates both a diverse-citizenship re
quirement and an amount-in-controversy specification.5 As
to the latter, the statute reads: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction [in diversity-of-citizenship cases]
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum . . . of
$75,000.” § 1332(a). This Court has long held that, in de
termining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement
has been satisfied, a single plaintiff may aggregate two or
more claims against a single defendant, even if the claims
are unrelated. See, e. g., Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. S.
269, 273 (1896). But in multiparty cases, including class ac
tions, we have unyieldingly adhered to the nonaggregation
5 Endeavoring to preserve the “complete diversity” rule first stated in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806), the Court’s opinion drives
a wedge between the two components of 28 U. S. C. § 1332, treating
the diversity-of-citizenship requirement as essential, the amount-in
controversy requirement as more readily disposable. See ante, at 553,
562. Section 1332 itself, however, does not rank order the two require
ments. What “[o]rdinary principl[e] of statutory construction” or “sound
canon of interpretation,” ante, at 558, allows the Court to slice up § 1332
this way? In partial explanation, the Court asserts that amount in con
troversy can be analyzed claim by claim, but the diversity requirement
cannot. See ante, at 554. It is not altogether clear why that should be
so. The cure for improper joinder of a nondiverse party is the same as
the cure for improper joinder of a plaintiff who does not satisfy the juris
dictional amount. In both cases, original jurisdiction can be preserved by
dismissing the nonqualifying party. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519
U. S. 61, 64 (1996) (diversity); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U. S. 826, 836–838 (1989) (same); Zahn, 414 U. S., at 295, 300 (amount
in controversy); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 590 (1939) (same).

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rule stated in Troy Bank. See Clark, 306 U. S., at 589 (reaf
firming the “familiar rule that when several plaintiffs assert
separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount
involved in each separate controversy must be of the requi
site amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court,
and that those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy
jurisdictional requirements”); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S.
332, 339–340 (1969) (abandonment of the nonaggregation
rule in class actions would undercut the congressional
“purpose . . . to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of
the federal courts”).
This Court most recently addressed “[t]he meaning of
[§ 1332’s] ‘matter in controversy’ language” in Zahn, 414
U. S., at 298. Zahn, like Snyder decided four years earlier,
was a class action. In Snyder, no class member had a claim
large enough to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. But in
Zahn, the named plaintiffs had such claims. 414 U. S., at
292. Nevertheless, the Court declined to depart from its
“longstanding construction of the ‘matter in controversy’ re
quirement of § 1332.” Id., at 301. The Zahn Court stated:
“Snyder invoked the well-established rule that each of
several plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims
must satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement if his
claim is to survive a motion to dismiss. This rule
plainly mandates not only that there may be no aggrega
tion and that the entire case must be dismissed where
none of the plaintiffs claims [meets the amount-in
controversy requirement] but also requires that any
plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dis
missed from the case, even though others allege jurisdic
tionally sufficient claims.” Id., at 300.
The rule that each plaintiff must independently satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, unless Congress ex
pressly orders otherwise, was thus the solidly established

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reading of § 1332 when Congress enacted the Judicial Im
provements Act of 1990, which added § 1367 to Title 28.
B
These cases present the question whether Congress abro
gated the nonaggregation rule long tied to § 1332 when
it enacted § 1367. In answering that question, “context
[should provide] a crucial guide.” Rosario Ortega v. Star-
Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 124, 135 (CA1 2004). The Court
should assume, as it ordinarily does, that Congress legislated
against a background of law already in place and the histori
cal development of that law. See National Archives and
Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U. S. 157, 169 (2004). Here,
that background is the statutory grant of diversity jurisdic
tion, the amount-in-controversy condition that Congress,
from the start, has tied to the grant, and the nonaggregation
rule this Court has long applied to the determination of the
“matter in controversy.”
Section 1367(a) provides:
“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as
expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any
civil action of which the district courts have original ju
risdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental ju
risdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that in
volve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
The Court is unanimous in reading § 1367(a) to permit
pendent-party jurisdiction in federal-question cases, and
thus, to overrule Finley. The basic jurisdictional grant,
§ 1331, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

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588 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
laws, or treaties of the United States.” Since 1980, § 1331
has contained no amount-in-controversy requirement. See
94 Stat. 2369 (eliminating § 1331’s amount-in-controversy re
quirement). Once there is a civil action presenting a quali
fying claim arising under federal law, § 1331’s sole require
ment is met. District courts, we have held, may then
adjudicate, additionally, state-law claims “deriv[ing] from a
common nucleus of operative fact.” Gibbs, 383 U. S., at 725.
Section 1367(a) enlarges that category to include not only
state-law claims against the defendant named in the federal
claim, but also “[state-law] claims that involve the joinder or
intervention of additional parties.” 6
The Court divides, however, on the impact of § 1367(a) on
diversity cases controlled by § 1332. Under the majority’s
reading, § 1367(a) permits the joinder of related claims cut
loose from the nonaggregation rule that has long attended
actions under § 1332. Only the claims specified in § 1367(b) 7
would be excluded from § 1367(a)’s expansion of § 1332’s grant
6 The Court noted in Zahn, 414 U. S., at 302, n. 11, that when the exer
cise of § 1331 federal-question jurisdiction and § 1332 diversity jurisdic
tion were conditioned on the same jurisdictional-amount limitation, the
same nonaggregation rule applied under both heads of federal jurisdic
tion. But cf. ante, at 562. The Court added, however, that “Con
gress ha[d] exempted major areas of federal-question jurisdiction from
any jurisdictional-amount requirements,” thus diminishing the impact of
§ 1331’s “matter in controversy” specification in cases arising under federal
law. Zahn, 414 U. S., at 302, n. 11.
7 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367(b) provides:
“In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plain
tiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene
as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.”

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589 Cite as: 545 U. S. 546 (2005)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
of diversity jurisdiction. And because § 1367(b) contains no
exception for joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20 or class ac
tions under Rule 23, the Court concludes, Clark and Zahn
have been overruled.8
The Court’s reading is surely plausible, especially if one
detaches § 1367(a) from its context and attempts no recon
ciliation with prior interpretations of § 1332’s amount-in
controversy requirement. But § 1367(a)’s text, as the First
Circuit held, can be read another way, one that would involve
no rejection of Clark and Zahn.
As explained by the First Circuit in Ortega, and applied to
class actions by the Tenth Circuit in Leonhardt, see supra,
at 578–579, § 1367(a) addresses “civil action[s] of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction,” a formulation that,
in diversity cases, is sensibly read to incorporate the rules
on joinder and aggregation tightly tied to § 1332 at the time
of § 1367’s enactment. On this reading, a complaint must
first meet that “original jurisdiction” measurement. If it
does not, no supplemental jurisdiction is authorized. If it
does, § 1367(a) authorizes “supplemental jurisdiction” over
related claims. In other words, § 1367(a) would preserve un
diminished, as part and parcel of § 1332 “original jurisdic
tion” determinations, both the “complete diversity” rule and
8 Under the Court’s construction of § 1367, see ante, at 560, 566–567,
Beatriz Ortega’s family members can remain in the action because their
joinder is merely permissive, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 20. If, however,
their presence was “needed for just adjudication,” Rule 19, their dismissal
would be required. The inclusion of those who may join, and exclusion of
those who should or must join, defies rational explanation, but cf. ante, at
565, and others adopting the interpretation the Court embraces have so
acknowledged, see Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,
77 F. 3d 928, 932 (CA7 1996) (recognizing the anomaly and inquiring:
“What sense can this make?”); cf. 14B Wright & Miller § 3704, p. 168 (3d
ed. 1998) (distinction between Rule 19 and Rule 20 “seems incongruous,
and serves no apparent public policy purpose”).

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590 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
the decisions restricting aggregation to arrive at the amount
in controversy.9 Section 1367(b)’s office, then, would be “to
prevent the erosion of the complete diversity [and amount
in-controversy] requirement[s] that might otherwise result
from an expansive application of what was once termed the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.” See Pfander, Supple
mental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympa
thetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 114 (1999); infra,
at 593–594. In contrast to the Court’s construction of
§ 1367, which draws a sharp line between the diversity and
amount-in-controversy components of § 1332, see ante, at
554; supra, at 585, n. 5, the interpretation presented here
does not sever the two jurisdictional requirements.
The more restrained reading of § 1367 just outlined would
yield affirmance of the First Circuit’s judgment in Ortega,
and reversal of the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment in Exxon.
It would not discard entirely, as the Court does, the judicially
developed doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as
they existed when Finley was decided.10 Instead, it would
recognize § 1367 essentially as a codification of those doc
trines, placing them under a single heading, but largely re
taining their substance, with overriding Finley the only
basic change: Supplemental jurisdiction, once the district
court has original jurisdiction, would now include “claims
that involve the joinder or intervention of additional par
ties.” § 1367(a).
Pendent jurisdiction, as earlier explained, see supra, at
579–580, applied only in federal-question cases and allowed
9 On this reading of § 1367(a), it is immaterial that § 1367(b) “does not
withdraw supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the additional par
ties at issue here.” Ante, at 560. Because those claims would not come
within § 1367(a) in the first place, Congress would have had no reason to
list them in § 1367(b). See infra, at 592–593.
10 The Court’s opinion blends the two doctrines, according no significance
to their discrete development. See ante, at 552–557.

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
plaintiffs to attach nonfederal claims to their jurisdiction
qualifying claims. Ancillary jurisdiction applied primarily,
although not exclusively, in diversity cases and “typically in
volve[d] claims by a defending party haled into court against
his will.” Kroger, 437 U. S., at 376 (emphasis added); see
also id., at 375, n. 18; supra, at 581–582. As the First Circuit
observed, neither doctrine permitted a plaintiff to circum
vent the dual requirements of § 1332 (diversity of citizenship
and amount in controversy) “simply by joining her [jurisdic
tionally inadequate] claim in an action brought by [a] ju
risdictionally competent diversity plaintiff.” Ortega, 370
F. 3d, at 138.
Not only would the reading I find persuasive “alig[n] statu
tory supplemental jurisdiction with the judicially developed
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,” ibid., it
would also synchronize § 1367 with the removal statute, 28
U. S. C. § 1441. As the First Circuit carefully explained:
“Section 1441, like § 1367, applies only if the ‘civil action’
in question is one ‘of which the district courts . . . have
original jurisdiction.’ § 1441(a). Relying on that lan
guage, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1441 to pro
hibit removal unless the entire action, as it stands at the
time of removal, could have been filed in federal court
in the first instance. See, e. g., Syngenta Crop Protec
tion, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 33 (2002); Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U. S. 838, 840 (1989) (per cu
riam). Section 1441 has thus been held to incorporate
the well-pleaded complaint rule, see City of Chicago [v.
International College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156, 163
(1997)]; 11 the complete diversity rule, see Caterpillar,
11 The point of the Court’s extended discussion of Chicago v. Inter
national College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156 (1997), in the instant cases,
see ante, at 562–564, slips from my grasp. There was no disagreement in
that case, and there is none now, that 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a) is properly
read to authorize the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in removed

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592 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 73 (1996); and rules for calcu
lating the amount in controversy, see St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 291–292 (1938).”
370 F. 3d, at 138 (citations omitted and footnote added).
The less disruptive view I take of § 1367 also accounts for
the omission of Rule 20 plaintiffs and Rule 23 class actions
in § 1367(b)’s text. If one reads § 1367(a) as a plenary grant
of supplemental jurisdiction to federal courts sitting in diver
sity, one would indeed look for exceptions in § 1367(b).
Finding none for permissive joinder of parties or class ac
tions, one would conclude that Congress effectively, even if
unintentionally, overruled Clark and Zahn. But if one rec
ognizes that the nonaggregation rule delineated in Clark and
Zahn forms part of the determination whether “original ju
risdiction” exists in a diversity case, see supra, at 590, then
plaintiffs who do not meet the amount-in-controversy re
quirement would fail at the § 1367(a) threshold. Congress
would have no reason to resort to a § 1367(b) exception to
turn such plaintiffs away from federal court, given that their
claims, from the start, would fall outside the court’s § 1332
jurisdiction. See Pfander, supra, at 148.
Nor does the more moderate reading assign different
meanings to “original jurisdiction” in diversity and federal
question cases. See ante, at 561. As the First Circuit
stated:
“ ‘[O]riginal jurisdiction’ in § 1367(a) has the same mean
ing in every case: [An] underlying statutory grant of
original jurisdiction must be satisfied. What differs be
cases. International College of Surgeons was unusual in that the federal
court there was asked to review a decision of a local administrative agency.
Such review, it was unsuccessfully argued, was “appellate” in character,
and therefore outside the ken of a court empowered to exercise “original”
jurisdiction. Compare 522 U. S., at 166–168, with id., at 176–177 (Gins
burg, J., dissenting).

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
tween federal question and diversity cases is not the
meaning of ‘original jurisdiction’ but rather the [dis
crete] requirements of sections 1331 and 1332. Under
§ 1331, the sole issue is whether a federal question ap
pears on the face of the plaintiff ’s well-pleaded com
plaint; the [citizenship] of the parties and the amounts
they stand to recover [do not bear on that determi
nation]. Section 1332, by contrast, predicates original
jurisdiction on the identity of the parties (i. e., [their]
complete diversity) and their [satisfaction of the
amount-in-controversy specification]. [In short,] the
‘original jurisdiction’ language in § 1367 operates dif
ferently in federal-question and diversity cases not be
cause the meaning of that term varies, but because
the [jurisdiction-granting] statutes are different.” 370
F. 3d, at 139–140.
What is the utility of § 1367(b) under my reading of
§ 1367(a)? Section 1367(a) allows parties other than the
plaintiff to assert reactive claims once entertained under
the heading ancillary jurisdiction. See supra, at 581 (listing
claims, including compulsory counterclaims and impleader
claims, over which federal courts routinely exercised ancil
lary jurisdiction). As earlier observed, see supra, at 590–
591, § 1367(b) stops plaintiffs from circumventing § 1332’s ju
risdictional requirements by using another’s claim as a hook
to add a claim that the plaintiff could not have brought in
the first instance. Kroger is the paradigm case. See supra,
at 581–582. There, the Court held that ancillary jurisdiction
did not extend to a plaintiff ’s claim against a nondiverse
party who had been impleaded by the defendant under Rule
14. Section 1367(b), then, is corroborative of § 1367(a)’s cov
erage of claims formerly called ancillary, but provides excep
tions to ensure that accommodation of added claims would
not fundamentally alter “the jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332.” See Pfander, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 135–137.

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
While § 1367’s enigmatic text 12 defies flawless interpreta
tion, see supra, at 589, n. 8,13 the precedent-preservative
reading, I am persuaded, better accords with the historical
and legal context of Congress’ enactment of the supplemen
tal jurisdiction statute, see supra, at 582–584, 587, and the
established limits on pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, see
supra, at 580–582. It does not attribute to Congress a juris
dictional enlargement broader than the one to which the leg
islators adverted, cf. Finley, 490 U. S., at 549, and it follows
the sound counsel that “close questions of [statutory] con
struction should be resolved in favor of continuity and
12 The Court notes the passage this year of the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA), Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4, ante, at 571–572, only to dismiss
that legislation as irrelevant. Subject to several exceptions and qualifi
cations, CAFA provides for federal-court adjudication of state-law-based
class actions in which diversity is “minimal” (one plaintiff ’s diversity from
one defendant suffices), and the “matter in controversy” is an aggregate
amount in excess of $5,000,000. Significant here, CAFA’s enlargement of
federal-court diversity jurisdiction was accomplished, “clearly and conspic
uously,” by amending § 1332. Cf. Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F. 3d 124, 142 (CA1 2004).
13 If § 1367(a) itself renders unnecessary the listing of Rule 20 plaintiffs
and Rule 23 class actions in § 1367(b), see supra, at 592, then it is similarly
unnecessary to refer, as § 1367(b) does, to “persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 19.” On one account, Congress bracketed such
persons with persons “seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24” to
modify pre-§ 1367 practice. Before enactment of § 1367, courts enter
tained, under the heading ancillary jurisdiction, claims of Rule 24(a) inter
venors “of right,” see Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U. S. 365, 375, n. 18 (1978), but denied ancillary jurisdiction over claims of
“necessary” Rule 19 plaintiffs, see 13 Wright & Miller § 3523, p. 127 (2d
ed., Supp. 2005). Congress may have sought simply to underscore that
those seeking to join as plaintiffs, whether under Rule 19 or Rule 24,
should be treated alike, i. e., denied joinder when “inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” See 370 F. 3d, at 140, and
n. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted); H. R. Rep., at 29 (“Subsection
(b) makes one small change in pre-Finley practice,” i. e., it eliminates the
Rule 19/Rule 24 anomaly.).

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against change,” Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statu
tory Interpretation, 67 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 921, 925 (1992).14
* * *
For the reasons stated, I would hold that § 1367 does not
overrule Clark and Zahn. I would therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Elev
enth Circuit.
14 While the interpretation of § 1367 described in this opinion does not
rely on the measure’s legislative history, that history, as Justice Stevens
has shown, see ante, at 573 (dissenting opinion), is corroborative of the
statutory reading set out above.