UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA et al.

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151 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 04–1203. Argued November 9, 2005—Decided January 10, 2006*
Goodman, petitioner in No. 04–1236, is a paraplegic who sued respondent
state defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his confine
ment in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. As relevant here, the
Federal District Court dismissed the § 1983 claims because Goodman’s
allegations were vague, and granted respondents summary judgment on
the Title II money damages claims because they were barred by state
sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner in No. 04–1203, in
tervened on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
judgment as to the Title II claims, but reversed the § 1983 ruling, finding
that Goodman had alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number
of Eighth Amendment claims against state agents and should be permit
ted to amend his complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide
the validity of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Held: Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages
against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amend
ment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Pp. 157–160.
(a) Because this Court assumes that the Eleventh Circuit correctly
held that Goodman had alleged actual Eighth Amendment violations for
purposes of § 1983, and because respondents do not dispute Goodman’s
claim that this same conduct violated Title II, Goodman’s Title II money
damages claims were evidently based, at least in part, on conduct that
independently violated § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one
doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment’s provisions by creating private remedies against the
States for actual violations of those provisions. This includes the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private
suits for damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit erred
in dismissing those of Goodman’s claims based on conduct that violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 157–159.
*Together with No. 04–1236, Goodman v. Georgia et al., also on certio
rari to the same court.

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Syllabus
(b) Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be
best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim
basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II;
(2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amend
ment; and (3) insofar as such conduct violated Title II but did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation
of sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless valid. P. 159.
120 Fed. Appx. 785, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 160.
Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the
United States in No. 04–1203. With him on the brief were
Acting Assistant Attorney General Schlozman, Patricia A.
Millett, David K. Flynn, and Sarah E. Harrington.
Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for petitioner in
No. 04–1236. With him on the briefs were Drew S. Days
III, Beth S. Brinkmann, and Seth M. Galanter.
Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief were Thurbert E. Baker,
Attorney General of Georgia, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy
Attorney General, John C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attor
ney General, and David E. Langford, Assistant Attorney
General.
Gene C. Schaerr argued the cause and filed a brief for the
State of Tennessee et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance
in both cases. With him on the brief were Paul G. Sum
mers, Attorney General of Tennessee, Michael E. Moore, So
licitor General, Linda T. Coberly, E. King Poor, Roberto J.
Sa´ nchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Mike Cox
of Michigan, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte
of New Hampshire, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,

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Opinion of the Court
Hardy Myers of Oregon, Rob McKenna of Washington, and
Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.†
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison
may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104
Stat. 337, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed.
and Supp. II).
I
A
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be ex
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub
jected to discrimination by any such entity.” § 12132 (2000
ed.). A “ ‘qualified individual with a disability’ ” is defined
as “an individual with a disability who, with or without rea
sonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for
ADAPT et al. by Paul M. Smith, Mark R. Heilbrun, Stephen F. Gold,
Elizabeth Alexander, David C. Fathi, Richard Taranto, Gerald Weber,
Catherine Hanssens, Steve Banks, John Boston, Rhonda Brownstein, and
Leonard Zandrow; for the American Association on Mental Retardation
et al. by James W. Ellis, Michael B. Browde, and April Land; for the
American Bar Association by Robert J. Grey, Jr.; for former President
George H. W. Bush by C. Boyden Gray and A. Stephen Hut, Jr.; for the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Charles Lester,
Jr., Barbara R. Arnwine, Michael L. Foreman, Ossai Miazad, Vincent A.
Eng, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Angela Ciccolo; for the National Disability
Rights Network by Kathleen Behan and Joan A. Magagna; for Paralyzed
Veterans of America et al. by Jerrold J. Ganzfried and Elizabeth B. Mc-
Callum; and for Dick Thornburgh et al. by Charles D. Siegal, Bradley S.
Phillips, Daniel P. Collins, Peter Blanck, Arlene Mayerson, and Eve Hill.

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meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt
of services or the participation in programs or activities pro
vided by a public entity.” § 12131(2). The Act defines
“ ‘public entity’ ” to include “any State or local government”
and “any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality
of a State,” § 12131(1). We have previously held that this
term includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 210 (1998). Title II au
thorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against
public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U. S. C. § 12133
(incorporating by reference 29 U. S. C. § 794a).
In enacting the ADA, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(4).
Moreover, the Act provides that “[a] State shall not be im
mune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of
the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court
of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.”
§ 12202. We have accepted this latter statement as an un
equivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 363–364 (2001).
B
Petitioner in No. 04–1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic
inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all relevant
times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville.
After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state
prison system, Goodman filed a pro se complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia challenging the conditions of his confinement. He
named as defendants the State of Georgia and the Georgia
Department of Corrections (state defendants) and several in
dividual prison officials. He brought claims under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, and other pro

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visions not relevant here, seeking both injunctive relief and
money damages against all defendants.
Goodman’s pro se complaint and subsequent filings in the
District Court included many allegations, both grave and
trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in the
Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, he
claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day in a
12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair
around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities ren
dered him unable to use the toilet and shower without assist
ance, which was often denied. On multiple occasions, he as
serted, he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from
his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own, and, on
several other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own
feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in
cleaning up the waste. He also claimed that he had been
denied physical therapy and medical treatment, and denied
access to virtually all prison programs and services on ac
count of his disability.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recom
mendation that the allegations in the complaint were vague
and constituted insufficient notice pleading as to Goodman’s
§ 1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the § 1983 claims
against all defendants without providing Goodman an oppor
tunity to amend his complaint. The District Court also dis
missed his Title II claims against all individual defendants.
Later, after our decision in Garrett, the District Court
granted summary judgment to the state defendants on Good
man’s Title II claims for money damages, holding that those
claims were barred by state sovereign immunity.
Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, petitioner in
No. 04–1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of
Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Elev
enth Circuit determined that the District Court had erred in
dismissing all of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, because Goodman’s

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multiple pro se filings in the District Court alleged facts suf
ficient to support “a limited number of Eighth-Amendment
claims under § 1983” against certain individual defendants.
App. A to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04–1236, p. 17a, judgt. order
reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Ap
peals held that the District Court should have given Good
man leave to amend his complaint to develop three Eighth
Amendment claims relating to his conditions of confinement:
“First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move his
wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be believed,
this effectively amounts to some form of total restraint
twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day without penal
justification. Second, Goodman has alleged several in
stances in which he was forced to sit in his own bodily
waste because prison officials refused to provide assist
ance. Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to
proceed with a § 1983 claim based on the prison staff ’s
supposed ‘deliberate indifference’ to his serious medical
condition of being partially paraplegic . . . .” App. A to
Pet. for Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a (citation and
footnote omitted).
The court remanded the suit to the District Court to permit
Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning Goodman
not to reassert all the § 1983 claims included in his initial
complaint, “some of which [we]re obviously frivolous.” Id.,
at 18a.
The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of
Goodman’s allegations under Title II. Instead, relying on
its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248 (2004), the
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding that
Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages against the
State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted cer
tiorari to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly abro
gates state sovereign immunity with respect to the claims at
issue here. 544 U. S. 1031 (2005).

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II
In reversing the dismissal of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had alleged actual viola
tions of the Eighth Amendment by state agents on the
grounds set forth above. See App. A to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a. The State does not contest this
holding, see Brief for Respondents 41–44, and we did not
grant certiorari to consider the merits of Goodman’s Eighth
Amendment claims; we assume without deciding, therefore,
that the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of these claims was
correct. Moreover, Goodman urges, and the State does not
dispute, that this same conduct that violated the Eighth
Amendment also violated Title II of the ADA. See Brief
for Petitioner in No. 04–1236, p. 46; Brief for Respondents
41–44. In fact, it is quite plausible that the alleged deliber
ate refusal of prison officials to accommodate Goodman’s
disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hy
giene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs
constituted “exclu[sion] from participation in or . . . deni[al
of] the benefits of ” the prison’s “services, programs, or activ
ities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 210
(noting that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” in
§ 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and voca
tional prison programs). Therefore, Goodman’s claims for
money damages against the State under Title II were evi
dently based, at least in large part, on conduct that independ
ently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S.
459, 463 (1947) (plurality opinion) (the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amend
ment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment).
In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our
other cases addressing Congress’s ability to abrogate sover
eign immunity pursuant to its § 5 powers. See Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 543, n. 4 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissent
ing) (respondents were not actually denied constitutional

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rights); Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U. S. 721, 752, 755 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Ne
vada provided family leave “on a gender-neutral basis”—
“a practice which no one contends suffers from a constitu
tional infirmity”); Garrett, 531 U. S., at 362, 367–368 (failure
to make the special accommodations requested by disabled
respondents was not unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 69–70, 83–84 (2000) (most petitioners
raised nonconstitutional disparate-impact challenges to the
State’s age-related policies); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 643–
644, and n. 9 (1999) (Florida satisfied due process by provid
ing remedies for patent infringement by state actors); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 512 (1997) (church building
permit denied under neutral law of general applicability).
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regard
ing the scope of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement pow
ers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g., Lane,
541 U. S., at 513 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 538
(Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554 (Scalia, J., dissent
ing), no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to
“enforce . . . the provisions” of the Amendment by creating
private remedies against the States for actual violations of
those provisions. “Section 5 authorizes Congress to create
a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id., at 559–560 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871,
17 Stat. 13); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456
(1976) (“In [§ 5] Congress is expressly granted authority to
enforce . . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment” by providing actions for money damages
against the States (emphasis added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 346 (1880) (“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are directed to the States . . . . It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce . . . ”). This en

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forcement power includes the power to abrogate state sover
eign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages
against the States. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 456. Thus,
insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for dam
ages against the States for conduct that actually violates
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state
sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit erred in dismiss
ing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that were based on
such unconstitutional conduct.
From the many allegations in Goodman’s pro se complaint
and his subsequent filings in the District Court, it is not clear
precisely what conduct he intended to allege in support of
his Title II claims. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not
address the issue, it is likewise unclear to what extent the
conduct underlying Goodman’s constitutional claims also vio
lated Title II. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered that
the suit be remanded to the District Court to permit Good
man to amend his complaint, but instructed him to revise his
factual allegations to exclude his “frivolous” claims—some of
which are quite far afield from actual constitutional viola
tions (under either the Eighth Amendment or some other
constitutional provision), or even from Title II violations.
See, e. g., App. 50 (demanding a “steam table” for Goodman’s
housing unit). It is therefore unclear whether Goodman’s
amended complaint will assert Title II claims premised on
conduct that does not independently violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the
lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first
instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the
State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent
such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment;
and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s
purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class
of conduct is nevertheless valid.

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Stevens, J., concurring
* * *
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the
suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with Disa
bilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign immu
nity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of action for
damages against States for conduct that violates the Consti
tution. Ante, at 159. And the state defendants have cor
rectly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
that Title II is constitutional insofar as it authorizes pro
spective injunctive relief against the State. See Brief for
Respondents 6; see also Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248, 1264
(CA11 2004). Rather than attempting to define the outer
limits of Title II’s valid abrogation of state sovereign immu
nity on the basis of the present record, the Court’s opinion
wisely permits the parties, guided by Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U. S. 509 (2004), to create a factual record that will inform
that decision.* I therefore join the opinion.
It is important to emphasize that although petitioner
Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims provide a sufficient
basis for reversal, our opinion does not suggest that this is
*Such definition is necessary because Title II prohibits “ ‘a somewhat
broader swath of conduct’ ” than the Constitution itself forbids. Lane,
541 U. S., at 533, n. 24 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S.
62, 81 (2000)). While a factual record may not be absolutely necessary to
our resolution of the question, it will surely aid our understanding of issues
such as how, in practice, Title II’s “reasonableness” requirement applies in
the prison context, cf. Lane, 541 U. S., at 531–532 (explaining that Title II
requires only “ ‘reasonable modifications’ ”), and therefore whether certain
of Goodman’s claims are even covered by Title II, cf. App. 83, ¶ 14 (com
plaining of lack of access to, among other things, “television, phone calls,
[and] entertainment”).

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the only constitutional right applicable in the prison context
and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue. As we ex
plain, when the District Court and the Court of Appeals re
visit that issue, they should analyze Goodman’s claims to see
whether they state “actual constitutional violations (under
either the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional
provision),” ante, at 159 (emphasis added), and to evaluate
whether “Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign im
munity [in such contexts] is nevertheless valid,” ibid. This
approach mirrors that taken in Lane, which identified a con
stellation of “basic constitutional guarantees” that Title II
seeks to enforce and ultimately evaluated whether Title II
was an appropriate response to the “class of cases” at hand.
541 U. S., at 522–523, 531. The Court’s focus on Goodman’s
Eighth Amendment claims arises simply from the fact that
those are the only constitutional violations the Eleventh Cir
cuit found him to have alleged properly. See App. A to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a.
Moreover, our approach today is fully consistent with our
recognition that the history of mistreatment leading to Con
gress’ decision to extend Title II’s protections to prison
inmates was not limited to violations of the Eighth Amend
ment. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 524–525 (describing “back
drop of pervasive unequal treatment” leading to enactment
of Title II); see also, e. g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 391–424 (2001) (Appendixes
to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing submissions
made to Congress by the Task Force on the Rights and Em
powerment of Americans with Disabilities showing, for ex
ample, that prisoners with developmental disabilities were
subject to longer terms of imprisonment than other prison
ers); 2 House Committee on Education and Labor, Legisla
tive History of Public Law 101–336: The Americans with
Disabilities Act, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1331 (Comm. Print
1990) (stating that persons with hearing impairments “have
been arrested and held in jail over night without ever know

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ing their rights nor what they are being held for”); id., at
1005 (stating that police arrested a man with AIDS and “[i]n
stead of putting the man in jail, the officers locked him inside
his car to spend the night”); California Dept. of Justice, At
torney General’s Commission on Disability: Final Report 103
(Dec. 1989) (finding that inmates with disabilities were un
necessarily “confined to medical units where access to work,
job training, recreation and rehabilitation programs is lim
ited”). In fact, as the Solicitor General points out in his
brief arguing that Title II’s damages remedy constitutes ap
propriate prophylactic legislation in the prison context, the
record of mistreatment of prison inmates that Congress re
viewed in its deliberations preceding the enactment of Title
II was comparable in all relevant respects to the record that
we recently held sufficient to uphold the application of that
title to the entire class of cases implicating the fundamental
right of access to the courts. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 533–
534. And while it is true that cases involving inadequate
medical care and inhumane conditions of confinement have
perhaps been most numerous, courts have also reviewed
myriad other types of claims by disabled prisoners, such as
allegations of the abridgment of religious liberties, undue
censorship, interference with access to the judicial process,
and procedural due process violations. See, e. g., Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980) (procedural due process); May v.
Sheahan, 226 F. 3d 876 (CA7 2000) (access to judicial process,
lawyers, legal materials, and reading materials); Littlefield
v. Deland, 641 F. 2d 729 (CA10 1981) (access to reading
and writing materials); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F.
Supp. 715 (WDNY 1991) (access to law library and religious
services).
Indeed, given the constellation of rights applicable in the
prison context, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit has erred
in identifying only the Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment in performing the first
step of the “congruence and proportionality” inquiry set

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forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997). See
Miller, 384 F. 3d, at 1272, and n. 28 (declining to entertain
United States’ argument that Lane requires consideration of
constitutional rights beyond those provided by the Eighth
Amendment); App. A to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04–1236, p. 19a
(relying on Miller to find Goodman’s Title II claims for
money damages barred by the Eleventh Amendment). By
reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in these cases and
remanding for further proceedings, we not only provide the
parties an opportunity to create a more substantial factual
record, but also provide the District Court and the Court
of Appeals the opportunity to apply the Boerne framework
properly. Given these benefits, I agree with the Court’s de
cision to await further proceedings before trying to define
the extent to which Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity in the prison context.