DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al.

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481 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 04–848. Argued November 7, 2005—Decided February 22, 2006
Under the Postal Reorganization Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) applies to “tort claims arising out of [Postal Service] activities.”
39 U. S. C. § 409(c). The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in
certain cases involving negligence committed by federal employees in
the course of their employment, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1), making the
United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances,” § 2674. However, the
sovereign immunity bar remains as to, inter alia, “[a]ny claim arising
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter.” § 2680(b). Consequently, the United States may be liable if
postal workers commit torts under local law, but not for claims defined
by the exception. Petitioner Dolan filed an FTCA suit against the
Postal Service for injuries she suffered when she tripped and fell over
mail left on her porch by postal employees. The District Court dis
missed the suit, and the Third Circuit affirmed, both concluding that,
although the FTCA generally waives sovereign immunity as to federal
employees’ torts, Dolan’s claims were barred by § 2680(b)’s exception.
Held: Because the postal exception is inapplicable in this case, Dolan’s
claim may go forward. This Court assumes that under the applicable
state law a person injured by tripping over a package or bundle negli
gently left by a private party would have a cause of action for damages.
The question is whether § 2680(b)’s exception preserves sovereign im
munity in such a case. Considered in isolation, “negligent transmis
sion” could embrace a wide range of acts. However, interpretation of
a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, consid
ering the statute’s purpose and context. Here, both context and prece
dent require reading the phrase so that it does not go beyond negligence
causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the
wrong address. Starting with context, “negligent transmission” fol
lows the terms “loss” and “miscarriage,” which limit the reach of trans
mission. Mail is “lost” if it is destroyed or misplaced and “miscarried”
if it goes to the wrong address. Since both terms refer to failings in
the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right
address, it would be odd if “negligent transmission” swept far more
broadly to include injuries caused by postal employees but involving

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482 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE
Syllabus
neither failure to transmit mail nor damage to its contents. This inter
pretation is supported by Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, where
this Court noted that one of the FTCA’s purposes was to waive the
Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto
accidents involving postal trucks delivering—and thus “transmitting”—
the mail. Nothing in the statutory text supports a distinction between
negligent driving, which the Government claims relates only circum
stantially to the mail, and Dolan’s accident, which was caused by the
mail itself. In both cases the postal employee acts negligently while
transmitting mail. In addition, focusing on whether the mail itself
caused the injury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn
on, e. g., whether a mail sack was empty or full. It is more likely that
Congress intended to retain immunity only for injuries arising because
mail either fails to arrive or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at the
wrong address, since such harms are primarily identified with the Postal
Service’s function of transporting mail. The Government claims that,
given the Postal Service’s vast operations, Congress must have intended
to insulate delivery-related torts from liability, but § 2680(b)’s specificity
indicates otherwise. Had Congress intended to preserve immunity for
all delivery-related torts, it could have used sweeping language similar
to that used in other FTCA exceptions, e. g., § 2680(i). Furthermore,
losses of the type for which immunity is retained under § 2680(b) are at
least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registra
tion and insurance. The Government raises the specter of frivolous
slip-and-fall claims inundating the Postal Service, but that is a risk
shared by any business making home deliveries. Finally, the general
rule that a sovereign immunity waiver “will be strictly construed . . . in
favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Pen˜ a, 518 U. S. 187, 192, is “unhelpful”
in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous interpretations of the
exceptions run the risk of defeating” the central purpose of the statute,
Kosak, supra, at 853, n. 9, which “waives the Government’s immunity
from suit in sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U. S. 543, 547. Pp. 485–492.
377 F. 3d 285, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 492. Alito, J., took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
James R. Radmore argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Michael T. Kirkpatrick.

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Opinion of the Court
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement,
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Robert D. Kamen
shine, Mary Anne Gibbons, Lori J. Dym, and Stephan J.
Boardman.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Each day, according to the Government’s submissions here,
the United States Postal Service delivers some 660 million
pieces of mail to as many as 142 million delivery points.
This case involves one such delivery point—petitioner Bar
bara Dolan’s porch—where mail left by postal employees al
legedly caused her to trip and fall. Claiming injuries as a
result, Dolan filed a claim for administrative relief from the
Postal Service. When her claim was denied, she and her
husband (whose claim for loss of consortium the Dolans later
conceded was barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies) filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that the
Postal Service’s negligent placement of mail at their home
subjected the Government to liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The Dis
trict Court dismissed Dolan’s suit, and the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed, 377 F. 3d 285 (2004). Both
courts concluded that, although the FTCA generally waives
sovereign immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s
claims were barred by an exception to that waiver, 28
U. S. C. § 2680(b). We disagree and hold that Dolan’s suit
may proceed.
I
Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 101
et seq., the Postal Service is “an independent establishment
of the executive branch of the Government of the United
*Harold Krent, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for
the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

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States,” § 201. Holding a monopoly over carriage of letters,
the Postal Service has “significant governmental powers,”
including the power of eminent domain, the authority to
make searches and seizures in the enforcement of laws pro
tecting the mails, the authority to promulgate postal regula
tions, and, subject to the Secretary of State’s supervision,
the power to enter international postal agreements. See
Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U. S.
736, 741 (2004) (discussing 39 U. S. C. §§ 101, 401, 407, 601–
606). Consistent with this status, the Postal Service enjoys
federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver. See ibid.;
cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a
waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government
and its agencies from suit”).
Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally “waives
the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by giving it the
power ‘to sue and be sued in its official name,’ ” Flamingo
Industries, supra, at 741 (quoting 39 U. S. C. § 401(1)), the
statute also provides that the FTCA “shall apply to tort
claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service,” § 409(c).
The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in two dif
ferent sections of the United States Code. The first confers
federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of cases
involving negligence committed by federal employees in
the course of their employment. This jurisdictional grant
covers:
“claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1).

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As to claims falling within this jurisdictional grant, the
FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable
“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances,” though not “for inter
est prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” § 2674; see
generally United States v. Olson, ante, at 44.
The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for
certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the excep
tions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The
13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28 U. S. C.
§ 2680, and the relevant subsection for our purposes, pertain
ing to postal operations, is § 2680(b). It states:
“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out of
the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters
or postal matter.”
As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal
employees commit torts under local law, but not for claims
defined by this exception.
This was the provision relied upon by the District Court
and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of
Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Raila v.
United States, 355 F. 3d 118, 121 (2004). We granted certio
rari. 544 U. S. 998 (2005).
II
We assume that under the applicable state law a person
injured by tripping over a package or bundle of papers negli
gently left on the porch of a residence by a private party
would have a cause of action for damages. See 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether, when mail left
by the Postal Service causes the slip and fall, the § 2680(b)
exception for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter” preserves sovereign immunity
despite the FTCA’s more general statements of waiver.

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If considered in isolation, the phrase “negligent transmis
sion” could embrace a wide range of negligent acts com
mitted by the Postal Service in the course of delivering mail,
including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from leaving pack
ets and parcels on the porch of a residence. After all, in
ordinary meaning and usage, transmission of the mail is not
complete until it arrives at the destination. See, e. g., Web
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 2429 (1971) (de
fining “transmission” as “an act, process, or instance of trans
mitting” and “transmit” as “to cause to go or be conveyed
to another person or place”). In large part this inference—
transmission includes delivery—led the District Court and
Court of Appeals to rule for the Government. See 377 F. 3d,
at 288; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a–6a. The definition of words
in isolation, however, is not necessarily controlling in statu
tory construction. A word in a statute may or may not ex
tend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. In
terpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of
the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that
inform the analysis. Here, we conclude both context and
precedent require a narrower reading, so that “negligent
transmission” does not go beyond negligence causing mail to
be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the
wrong address. See Raila, supra, at 121 (holding the postal
exception covers “damages and delay of the postal material
itself and consequential damages therefrom”). The phrase
does not comprehend all negligence occurring in the course
of mail delivery.
Starting with context, the words “negligent transmission”
in § 2680(b) follow two other terms, “loss” and “miscarriage.”
Those terms, we think, limit the reach of “transmission.”
“[A] word is known by the company it keeps”—a rule that
“is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth
to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367

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U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S.
26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in a list should be given re
lated meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here,
as both parties acknowledge, mail is “lost” if it is destroyed
or misplaced and “miscarried” if it goes to the wrong ad
dress. Since both those terms refer to failings in the postal
obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right
address, it would be odd if “negligent transmission” swept
far more broadly to include injuries like those alleged here—
injuries that happen to be caused by postal employees but
involve neither failure to transmit mail nor damage to its
contents.
Our interpretation would be less secure were it not for a
precedent we deem to have decisive weight here. We refer
to Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984). In Kosak,
an art collector alleged in an FTCA suit that artworks he
owned were damaged when the United States Customs Serv
ice seized and detained them. Id., at 849–850. The ques
tion was whether the Government retained immunity based
on § 2680(c), a provision that has since been amended but at
the time covered:
“[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or col
lection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of
any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or
excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” Id., at
852, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In its opinion concluding the exception did apply and thus
that the United States retained sovereign immunity, the
Court gave specific consideration to the postal exception.
In a part of the opinion central to its holding, the Court con
trasted what it called the “generality of § 2680(c)” with the
“specificity of § 2680(b),” id., at 855. The Court observed:
“One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort
Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity
from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents

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in which employees of the Postal System were at fault.
In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs torts
committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of bar
ring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most
concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision
carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which
the Government was not assuming financial responsibil
ity—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans
mission of letters or postal matter’—thereby excluding,
by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles.”
Ibid. (footnote omitted).
In the present case neither party suggests Kosak’s conclu
sion regarding negligent operation of postal motor vehicles
should be ignored as dictum. In light of Kosak’s discussion,
we cannot interpret the phrase “negligent transmission” in
§ 2680(b) to cover all negligence in the course of mail deliv
ery. Although postal trucks may well be delivering—and
thus transmitting—mail when they collide with other vehi
cles, Kosak indicates the United States, nonetheless, retains
no immunity.
Seeking to distinguish postal auto accidents from Dolan’s
fall, the Government argues that negligent driving relates
only circumstantially to the mail, whereas Dolan’s accident
was caused by the mail itself. Nothing in the statutory text
supports this distinction. Quite the contrary, if placing mail
so as to create a slip-and-fall risk constitutes “negligent
transmission,” the same should be true of driving postal
trucks in a manner that endangers others on the road. In
both cases the postal employee acts negligently while trans
mitting mail. In addition, as the Second Circuit recognized
and as the Government acknowledged at oral argument, fo
cusing on whether the mail itself caused the injury would
yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on whether a
mail sack causing a slip-and-fall was empty or full, or
whether a pedestrian sideswiped by a passing truck was hit

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by the side-view mirror or a dangling parcel. See Raila,
355 F. 3d, at 122–123.
We think it more likely that Congress intended to retain
immunity, as a general rule, only for injuries arising, directly
or consequentially, because mail either fails to arrive at all or
arrives late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address.
Illustrative instances of the exception’s operation, then,
would be personal or financial harms arising from nondeliv
ery or late delivery of sensitive materials or information
(e. g., medicines or a mortgage foreclosure notice) or from
negligent handling of a mailed parcel (e. g., shattering of
shipped china). Such harms, after all, are the sort primarily
identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting
mail throughout the United States.
Resisting this conclusion, the Government emphasizes the
Postal Service’s vast operations—the 660 million daily mail
ings and 142 million delivery points mentioned at the outset.
See Brief for Respondents 36. As delivery to mailboxes and
doorsteps is essential to this nationwide undertaking, Con
gress must have intended, the Government asserts, to insu
late delivery-related torts from liability. If, however, door
step delivery is essential to the postal enterprise, then
driving postal trucks is no less so. And in any event, while
it is true “[t]he § 2680 exceptions are designed to protect cer
tain important governmental functions and prerogatives
from disruption,” Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301,
311 (1992), the specificity of § 2680(b), see Kosak, supra, at
855, indicates that Congress did not intend to immunize all
postal activities.
Other FTCA exceptions paint with a far broader brush.
They cover, for example: “[a]ny claim for damages caused by
the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of
the monetary system,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(i); “[a]ny claim aris
ing out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,” § 2680( j);
“[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” § 2680(k); “[a]ny

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claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Au
thority, ” § 2680(l), or “ the Panama Canal Company, ”
§ 2680(m); and “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of a
Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a
bank for cooperatives,” § 2680(n). Had Congress intended to
preserve immunity for all torts related to postal delivery—
torts including hazardous mail placement at customer
homes—it could have used similarly sweeping language in
§ 2680(b). By instead “carefully delineat[ing]” just three
types of harm (loss, miscarriage, and negligent transmis
sion), see Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855, Congress expressed the
intent to immunize only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not
all torts committed in the course of mail delivery.
Further supporting our interpretation, losses of the type
for which immunity is retained under § 2680(b) are at least
to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal
registration and insurance. See United States Postal
Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual 609.1.1
(Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/
609.htm (as visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of
Court’s case file) (allowing indemnity claims for loss or dam
age of “insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with
postal insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR § 111.1 (2005)
(incorporating by reference the Domestic Mail Manual).
The same was true when Congress enacted the FTCA in
1946. See 39 U. S. C. § 245 (1940 ed. and Supp. V) (setting
rates and conditions for mail insurance); § 381 (1946 ed.) (“For
the greater security of valuable mail matter the Postmaster
General may establish a uniform system of registration, and
as a part of such system he may provide rules under which
the senders or owners of any registered matter shall be
indemnified for loss, rifling, or damage thereof in the
mails . . . ”). As Kosak explains, one purpose of the FTCA
exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act
to suits for which adequate remedies were already avail
able,” 465 U. S., at 858—an objective consistent with retain

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ing immunity as to claims of mail damage or delay covered by
postal registration and insurance. While the Government
suggests other injuries falling outside the FTCA are also
subject to administrative relief, even assuming that is true,
the provision the Government cites permits only discretion
ary relief, not an automatic remedy like postal insurance.
See 39 U. S. C. § 2603 (indicating the Postal Service “may
adjust and settle” personal-injury and property-damage
claims “not cognizable” under the FTCA’s administrative re
lief provision); see also 31 U. S. C. § 224c (1940 ed.) (indicat
ing that “[w]hen any damage is done to person or property
by or through the operation of the Post Office Depart
ment . . . the Postmaster General is invested with power to
adjust and settle any claim for such damage when his award
for such damage in any case does not exceed $500”); Legisla
tive Reorganization Act of 1946, § 424(a), 60 Stat. 846–847
(repealing § 224c as to negligence claims cognizable under
the FTCA).
The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-and
fall claims inundating the Postal Service. It is true that, in
addition to other considerations we have identified, Kosak
describes “avoiding exposure of the United States to liability
for excessive or fraudulent claims” as a principal aim of the
FTCA exceptions, 465 U. S., at 858. Slip-and-fall liability,
however, to the extent state tort law imposes it, is a risk
shared by any business that makes home deliveries. Given
that “negligent transmission,” viewed in context and in light
of Kosak, cannot sweep as broadly as the Government
claims, ordinary protections against frivolous litigation must
suffice here, just as they do in the case of motor vehicle
collisions.
Finally, it should be noted that this case does not implicate
the general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s sover
eign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Pen˜ a, 518 U. S. 187,
192 (1996). As Kosak explains, this principle is “unhelpful”

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Thomas, J., dissenting
in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous interpreta
tions of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central
purpose of the statute,” 465 U. S., at 853, n. 9, which
“waives the Government’s immunity from suit in sweeping
language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543,
547 (1951); see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503
U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing “[w]e have on occasion narrowly
construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity
where that was consistent with Congress’ clear intent, as in
the context of the ‘sweeping language’ of the [FTCA]” (quot
ing Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 547)). Hence, “the proper ob
jective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsec
tions of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify ‘those circumstances
which are within the words and reason of the exception’—no
less and no more.” Kosak, supra, at 853, n. 9 (quoting
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). Having
made that inquiry here, we conclude Dolan’s claims fall out
side § 2680(b).
* * *
The postal exception is inapplicable, and Dolan’s claim falls
within the FTCA’s general waiver of federal sovereign im
munity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Govern
ment’s sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking money
damages
“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis
sion of any employee of the Government while acting

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Thomas, J., dissenting
within the scope of his office or employment, under cir
cumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” 28
U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1),
save several exceptions found in § 2680. As relevant here,
Congress reserved to the Government its sovereign immu
nity respecting “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscar
riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”
§ 2680(b) (postal exception).
Petitioner Barbara Dolan claims to have suffered personal
injuries when she tripped over letters, packages, and period
icals that an employee of the United States Postal Service
(Postal Service) negligently left on her porch. Today, the
Court concludes that Dolan’s lawsuit may proceed because
her claim does not fall within the exception. I disagree.
Dolan’s claim arises out of the Postal Service’s “negligent
transmission” of mail and is thus covered by the terms of the
postal exception. Even if the exception is ambiguous, this
Court’s cases require that ambiguities as to the scope of the
Government’s waiver of immunity be resolved in its favor.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
The text of the postal exception, and every term therein,
should be ascribed its ordinary meaning. See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 477 (1994) (noting that we interpret a
statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning
when that term is not defined in the statute). The term in
controversy here is “negligent transmission.” The crux of
my disagreement with the majority is its failure to assign
the term “transmission” its plain meaning. That term is de
fined as the “[a]ct, operation, or process, of transmitting.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary 2692 (2d ed. 1934,
as republished 1945). “Transmit” is defined as, inter alia,
“[t]o send or transfer from one person or place to another; to

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494 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE
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forward by rail, post, wire, etc., . . . [t]o cause . . . to pass
or be conveyed.” Id., at 2692–2693. There is no cause to
conclude that Congress was unaware of the ordinary defini
tion of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” when it
enacted the FTCA and the postal exception in 1946. Nor is
there textual indication that Congress intended to deviate
from the ordinary meaning of these terms.1 Accordingly,
I would interpret the term “transmission” consistent with
its ordinary meaning, see ante, at 486, and conclude that the
postal exception exempts the Government from liability for
any claim arising out of the negligent delivery of the mail to
a Postal Service patron, including Dolan’s slip-and-fall claim.
Rejecting the “ordinary meaning and usage” of “negligent
transmission,” the majority concludes that the term covers
only injury arising “directly or consequentially” from “negli
gence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged
condition, or at the wrong address.” Ante, at 486, 489.
Thus, in the majority’s view, “negligent transmission” covers
direct injury to the mail as well as personal injury arising
from injury to the mail, but does not cover personal injury
that does not arise from damage to the mail. For example,
in the majority’s view, if a mail carrier negligently drops a
box containing glassware on a patron’s doorstep, causing the
contents to shatter, and the patron later injures himself
while attempting to handle the shards of glass, the postal
exception would bar a claim for damages for the destroyed
item as well as a related claim for personal injury. That
1 In fact, this reading is supported by Congress’ routine definitional use
of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” in both criminal and civil
postal statutes to refer to the handling, processing, and delivery of mail
to a final destination. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 43, § 6, 5 Stat. 734
(respecting deputy postmasters authorized “to transmit to any person or
place” official letters or packages free of charge); 18 U. S. C. §§ 1696(b) and
(c) (referring to unlawful “transmission” of letters); §§ 1716(b), (c), (d), and
(e) (regulating and proscribing “transmission in the mails” of dangerous
items (e. g., medicines) except when the “transmission” is “to,” “from,” or
“between” specified individuals or entities).

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Thomas, J., dissenting
view is correct, as far as it goes. However, under the major
ity’s view, if the mail carrier negligently places a heap of mail
on a patron’s front porch and the patron trips and falls over
the mail as he walks out of his front door, his personal in
jury claim may go forward. There is no basis in the text
for the line drawn by the majority. Indeed, the majority’s
view is at odds with the broad language of the postal excep
tion, which expressly applies to “[a]ny claim arising out
of . . . negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”
§ 2680(b) (emphasis added).
The majority rationalizes its view by concluding that the
terms “loss” and “miscarriage” necessarily limit the term
“transmission.” Ante, at 486. Applying the rule of nosci
tur a sociis—that a word is known by the company it keeps—
the majority reasons that because both “loss” and “miscar
riage” refer to “failings in the postal obligation to deliver
mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd
if ‘negligent transmission’ swept far more broadly.” Ante,
at 487. But there is nothing “odd” about interpreting the
term “negligent transmission” to encompass more ground
than the decidedly narrower terms “loss” and “miscarriage.”
The rule of noscitur a sociis is intended to prevent ascrib
ing to one word a meaning so expansive that it conflicts with
other terms of the provision in a manner that gives “ ‘unin
tended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ ” Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D.
Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). That rule, however,
“does not require [the Court] to construe every term in a
series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of
the terms,” where, as here, nothing in the text demands
a more limited construction. Gustafson, supra, at 586
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, to read
Congress’ use of narrow terms in a list as limiting the mean
ing of broad terms in the same list “would defy common
sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect
to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined

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496 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE
Thomas, J., dissenting
with one word with a more restricted meaning.” 513 U. S.,
at 587.
Nor does this Court’s opinion in Kosak v. United States,
465 U. S. 848 (1984), support the majority’s narrow construc
tion of the postal exception. In Kosak, this Court suggested
that the postal exception does not apply to suits arising from
the negligent handling of motor vehicles by Postal Service
employees. Specifically, the Court stated:
“One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to
waive the Government’s immunity from liability for in
juries resulting from auto accidents . . . . In order to
ensure that § 2680(b) . . . did not have the effect of bar
ring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most
concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision
carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which
the Government was not assuming financial responsibil
ity—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans
mission of letters or postal matter’ . . . .” Id., at 855
(emphasis added).
That observation has no import beyond the recognition that
the postal exception—whatever its scope may be—was care
fully crafted so as not to undermine an undisputed principal
purpose of the FTCA—to waive the Government’s immunity
for injuries arising from auto accidents. It says nothing
further about the acts Congress intended to capture when
enacting the postal exception, and, thus, is unremarkable for
purposes of construing the exception.2
2 In an attempt to reconcile Kosak with this case, the majority argues
that “one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid ‘extending the
coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already
available,’ . . . an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to [some]
claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and in
surance.” Ante, at 490–491 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S., at 858). The ma
jority, however, ignores the fact that, in most cases, such insurance covers
only the sender, not the recipient, in which case recipients have no means
of obtaining compensation for loss or damage to money, gifts, heirlooms,

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497 Cite as: 546 U. S. 481 (2006)
Thomas, J., dissenting
Even if Kosak does inform the outcome in this case, it does
not support the majority’s interpretation of “negligent trans
mission.” As discussed above, the majority does not pur
port to limit the type of negligent act that may fall under
the postal exception; rather it limits the scope of the excep
tion based on the type of consequence that the negligent act
causes (damage to the mail, late delivery, etc.). But Kosak’s
exclusion of the act of negligent driving—regardless of
whether the consequence of that act is damage to the mail
or injury to a person—from the scope of the postal exception
implies, if anything, that the Kosak Court envisioned dis
crete acts as being covered, independently of the nature of
their consequences. See ibid. (excluding “negligent han
dling of motor vehicles” from the “types of misconduct” for
which liability is barred by the postal exception). As such,
Kosak does not support an interpretation of “negligent
transmission” based upon the type of injury that is caused
by the Postal Service’s negligent handling of the mail.
II
Assuming that the postal exception is ambiguous, as the
majority suggests, see ante, at 486–487, settled principles
valuable papers, delayed medicine, or time-sensitive documents. See
United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual
609.4.3(f) and (ae), pp. 1129, 1130 (rev. Jan. 6, 2005). The majority’s justi
fication also fails to take into account the fact that postal patrons cannot
insure against the loss of items of sentimental value. See 609.4.3, gener
ally. With a more accurate depiction of registration and insurance cover
age in hand, the Government’s claim that, like injuries arising from negli
gent transmission of mail, other injuries outside the reach of the FTCA
are also amenable to administrative relief is not so easily dismissed.
Ante, at 491. Specifically, 39 U. S. C. § 2603, as the Government argues,
provides for the settlement of claims, within the discretion of the United
States, for injuries caused by the Postal Service that are not otherwise
cognizable, which would include claims like Dolan’s. The discretionary
nature of such settlements does not alter the fact that § 2603 undermines
the Court’s position that the purported unavailability of administrative
recovery for claims such as Dolan’s supports its proposed interpretation.

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498 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE
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governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign immu
nity require us to rule in favor of the Government.
A court may only exercise jurisdiction over the Govern
ment pursuant to “a clear statement from the United States
waiving sovereign immunity . . . together with a claim falling
within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 (2003). “[A]
waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sover
eign.” Lane v. Pen˜ a, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). These set
tled legal principles apply not only to the interpretation of
the scope of the Government’s waiver of immunity, but also
to the interpretation of the scope of any exceptions to that
waiver. See ibid. (explaining that, consistent with rules of
construction respecting waivers of sovereign immunity, am
biguities created by conditions on and qualifications of the
waiver must be strictly construed in favor of sovereign
immunity).
Thus, the majority is incorrect to conclude that “this case
does not implicate the general rule that ‘a waiver of the
Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed,
in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” Ante,
at 491. As this case clearly illustrates, the Government’s
amenability to suit can only be ascertained after construing
both the waiver of immunity and its exceptions. The well
established rationale for construing a waiver in favor of
the sovereign’s immunity, thus, applies with equal force to
the construction of an exception to that waiver. Accord
ingly, even if I were to conclude that the majority’s interpre
tation of “negligent transmission” were as plausible as my
own, I would still resolve this case in favor of the Govern
ment’s sovereign immunity as mandated by our canons of
construction.3
3 There is no canon of construction that counsels in favor of construing
the ambiguity against the Government. Although we have “on occasion
narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity,” we

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Thomas, J., dissenting
* * *
For these reasons, I would hold that a tort claim for per
sonal injury arising out of negligent delivery of mail to a
postal patron is barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b), the postal
exception. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
have done so in cases where Congress plainly waived the Government’s
immunity for the particular claim at issue, and the only question before
the Court was the permissibility of the form of the suit. United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (citing United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951), and United States v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949)). In cases where, as here, the question
whether a particular claim is subject to an exception is disputed, we have
construed FTCA exceptions broadly to preclude claims for actions Con
gress intended to except from the FTCA’s general waiver of immunity.
See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953); United States v.
Orleans, 425 U. S. 807 (1976); Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984).