MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

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MARSHALL v. MARSHALL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 04–1544. Argued February 28, 2006—Decided May 1, 2006
Among longstanding limitations on federal-court jurisdiction otherwise
properly exercised are the so-called “domestic relations” and “probate”
exceptions. Neither is compelled by the text of the Constitution or
federal statute. Both are judicially created doctrines stemming in
large measure from misty understandings of English legal history. In
view of lower federal-court decisions expansively interpreting the two
exceptions, this Court reined in the domestic relations exception in An
kenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, and endeavored similarly to curtail
the probate exception in Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490.
Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, is
the surviving widow of J. Howard Marshall II (J. Howard), who died
without providing for Vickie in his will. According to Vickie, J. Howard
intended to provide for her through a gift in the form of a “catchall”
trust. Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), J. Howard’s son, was
the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s estate plan. While the estate
was subject to ongoing Texas Probate Court proceedings, Vickie filed
for bankruptcy in California. Pierce filed a proof of claim in the Fed
eral Bankruptcy Court, alleging that Vickie had defamed him when,
shortly after J. Howard’s death, her lawyers told the press that Pierce
had engaged in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his
father’s assets. Pierce sought a declaration that his claim was not dis
chargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie answered, asserting truth as a de
fense. She also filed counterclaims, among them a claim that Pierce had
tortiously interfered with a gift she expected from J. Howard. Vickie’s
tortious interference counterclaim turned her objection to Pierce’s claim
into an adversary proceeding, see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007, in which
the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for Vickie on Pierce’s
claim and, after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on
her counterclaim. The court also held that both Vickie’s objection to
Pierce’s claim and her counterclaim qualified as “core proceedings”
under 28 U. S. C. § 157, which meant that the court had authority to
enter a final judgment disposing of those claims. It awarded Vickie
substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Pierce then filed a
post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as

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serting that Vickie’s tortious interference claim could be tried only in
the Texas probate proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court denied the mo
tion. Relying on Markham, the Bankruptcy Court observed that a
federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in probate property,
so long as its final judgment does not interfere with the state court’s
possession of the property. Subsequently, the Texas Probate Court
declared that J. Howard’s estate plan was valid.
Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court review of the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Among other things, the District Court
held that the probate exception did not reach Vickie’s counterclaim.
Citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494, the court said that the exception
would bar federal jurisdiction only if such jurisdiction would “interfere”
with the probate proceedings. It would not do so, the court concluded,
because: (1) success on Vickie’s counterclaim did not necessitate any dec
laration that J. Howard’s will was invalid, and (2) under Texas law, pro
bate courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims of the
kind Vickie’s counterclaim asserted. The court also held that Vickie’s
claim did not qualify as a “core proceedin[g]” over which a bankruptcy
court may exercise plenary power, see 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)–(c). Accord
ingly, the District Court treated the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as
proposed, rather than final, and undertook de novo review. Adopting
and supplementing the Bankruptcy Court’s findings, the District Court
determined that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expec
tancy by, inter alia, conspiring to suppress or destroy the inter vivos
trust instrument J. Howard had directed his lawyers to prepare for
Vickie, and to strip J. Howard of his assets by backdating, altering, and
otherwise falsifying documents and presenting them to J. Howard under
false pretenses. The District Court awarded Vickie some $44.3 million
in compensatory damages and, based on “overwhelming” evidence of
Pierce’s willfulness, maliciousness, and fraud, an equal amount in puni
tive damages.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Although the Court of Appeals recog
nized that Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter, it nonetheless
held that the probate exception bars federal jurisdiction in this case.
It read the exception broadly to exclude from the federal courts’ adjudi
catory authority not only direct challenges to a will or trust, but also
questions which would ordinarily be decided by a probate court in de
termining the validity of the decedent’s estate planning instrument,
whether those questions involve fraud, undue influence, or tortious in
terference with the testator’s intent. The court also held that a State’s
vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters in a special court
strips federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain any probate related

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matter, including claims respecting tax liability, debt, gift, and tort.
Noting that the Probate Court had ruled it had exclusive jurisdiction
over all of Vickie’s claims, the Ninth Circuit held that ruling binding on
the Federal District Court.
Held: The Ninth Circuit had no warrant from Congress, or from this
Court’s decisions, for its sweeping extension of the probate exception
recognized in those decisions. Because this case does not fall within
the exception’s scope, the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction
over Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce. Pp. 305–315.
(a) Ankenbrandt addressed the domestic relations exception’s deriva
tion and limits. Among other things, the Court, 504 U. S., at 693–695,
traced the current exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 584–589,
in which the Court had announced in dicta—without citation or discus
sion—that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits for divorce or ali
mony. Finding no Article III impediment to federal-court jurisdiction
in domestic relations cases, 504 U. S., at 695–697, the Ankenbrandt
Court, id., at 698–701, anchored the exception in the Judiciary Act of
1789, which, until 1948, provided circuit-court diversity jurisdiction over
“all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.” The Barber
majority, the Ankenbrandt Court acknowledged, 504 U. S., at 698, did
not expressly tie its announcement of a domestic relations exception to
the text of the diversity statute, but the Barber dissenters made the
connection. Because English chancery courts lacked authority to issue
divorce and alimony decrees, the dissenters stated, United States courts
similarly lacked authority to decree divorces or award alimony, 21 How.,
at 605. The Ankenbrandt Court was “content” “to rest [its] conclusion
that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter of statutory con
struction not on the accuracy of [Barber’s] historical justifications,” but,
“rather,” on “Congress’ apparent acceptance of this construction of the
diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948,” 504 U. S.,
at 700. Ankenbrandt further determined that Congress did not intend
to terminate the exception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity
distinction with the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ” Ibid. The Anken
brandt Court nevertheless emphasized that the exception covers only
“a narrow range of domestic relations issues.” Id., at 701. Noting that
some lower federal courts had applied the exception “well beyond the
circumscribed situations posed by Barber and its progeny,” ibid., the
Court clarified that only “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”
remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds, id., at 703, 704. While rec
ognizing state tribunals’ “special proficiency” in handling issues arising
in the granting of such decrees, id., at 704, the Court viewed federal
courts as equally equipped to deal with complaints alleging torts, ibid.
Pp. 305–308.

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(b) This Court has recognized a probate exception, kin to the domes
tic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking pronounce
ment on the subject. Among other things, the Markham Court first
stated that, although “a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a
will or administer an estate, . . . it has [long] been established . . . that
federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits ‘in favor of
creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a decedent’s
estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal court does not
interfere with the probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction
of the probate or control of the property in the custody of the state
court.” 326 U. S., at 494. The Court next described a probate excep
tion of distinctly limited scope: “[W]hile a federal court may not exercise
its jurisdiction to disturb or affect the possession of property in the
custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate
rights in such property where the final judgment does not undertake to
interfere with the state court’s possession save to the extent that the
state court is bound by the judgment to recognize the right adjudicated
by the federal court.” Ibid. The first of these quoted passages is not
a model of clear statement, and some lower federal courts have read the
words “interfere with the probate proceedings” to block federal jurisdic
tion over a range of matters well beyond probate of a will or administra
tion of a decedent’s estate, including an executor’s breach of fiduciary
duty. This Court reads Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the
second above-quoted passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or affect[ing]
the possession of property in the custody of a state court.” Ibid.
Though that reading renders the first-quoted passage in part redundant,
redundancy in this context is preferable to incoherence. This Court
therefore comprehends Markham’s “interference” language as essen
tially a reiteration of the general principle that, when one court is exer
cising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in
rem jurisdiction over the same res. See, e. g., Penn General Casualty
Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189, 195–196. Thus,
the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or
annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also
precludes federal courts from disposing of property that is in the cus
tody of a state probate court. But it does not bar federal courts from
adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal
jurisdiction. Pp. 308–312.
(c) Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an estate, the
probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter. Provoked by
Pierce’s claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, Vickie’s claim alleges the
widely recognized tort of interference with a gift or inheritance. She

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seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the probate or an
nulment of a will. Cf. Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199, 208. Nor does
she seek to reach a res in a state court’s custody. See Markham, 326
U. S., at 494. Furthermore, no “sound policy considerations” militate
in favor of extending the probate exception to cover this case. Cf. An
kenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial courts, both federal and state, often
address conduct of the kind Vickie alleges. State probate courts pos
sess no “special proficiency” in handling such issues. Cf. id., at 704.
P. 312.
(d) This Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s alternate rationale that the
Texas Probate Court’s jurisdictional ruling bound the Federal District
Court. Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action for inter
ference with an expected gift or inheritance. It is clear, under Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, that Texas law governs the substantive
elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim. But it is also clear
that Texas may not reserve to its probate courts the exclusive right to
adjudicate a transitory tort. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 360. Jurisdiction is determined “by the law of
the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial oper
ation of a [state] statute . . . , even though it created the right of action.”
Ibid. Directly on point, the Court has held that federal-court jurisdic
tion, “having existed from the beginning of the Federal government,
[can]not be impaired by subsequent state legislation creating courts of
probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 281. Durfee v. Duke,
375 U. S. 106, on which the Ninth Circuit relied, is not to the contrary.
Durfee stands only for the proposition that a state court’s final judgment
determining its own jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and
credit, so long as the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly litigated in
the court that rendered the judgment. See id., at 111, 115. At issue
here, however, is not the Texas Probate Court’s jurisdiction, but the
federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain Vickie’s tortious interfer
ence claim. Under our federal system, Texas cannot render its pro
bate courts exclusively competent to entertain a claim of that genre.
Pp. 312–314.
(e) The Ninth Circuit may address on remand the questions whether
Vickie’s claim was “core” and Pierce’s arguments concerning claim and
issue preclusion. Pp. 314–315.
392 F. 3d 1118, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, post, p. 315.

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Kent L. Richland argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Dana Gardner Adelstein, Alan Dia
mond, Edward L. Xanders, and Philip W. Boesch, Jr.
Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Dep
uty Assistant Attorney General Morrison, Jonathan S.
Cohen, and Joan I. Oppenheimer.
G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Rheba Rutkowski, Robert A.
Brundage, Susan Kim, William C. Heuer, Thomas C. Gold
stein, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, and Kent L. Jones.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall famously
cautioned: “It is most true that this Court will not take juris
diction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must
take jurisdiction if it should. . . . We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
*Richard Lieb filed a brief of amici curiae urging reversal for Richard
Aaron et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Barry R. McBee,
First Assistant Attorney General, Edward D. Burbach, Deputy Attorney
General for Litigation, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, and Rance L. Craft,
Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec
tive States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado,
Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jim
Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, and Hardy
Myers of Oregon; for the National College of Probate Judges by James
R. Wade; for the Philanthropy Roundtable by Ronald A. Cass; for the
Washington Legal Foundation by Sidney P. Levinson, Daniel J. Popeo,
and Paul D. Kamenar; for Bonnie Snavely by Carter G. Phillips and Jay
T. Jorgensen; and for Ernest A. Young et al. by Craig Goldblatt.
Robert Whitman filed a brief of amicus curiae for Heirs, Inc.

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usurp that which is not given.” 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).
Among longstanding limitations on federal jurisdiction oth
erwise properly exercised are the so-called “domestic rela
tions” and “probate” exceptions. Neither is compelled by
the text of the Constitution or federal statute. Both are ju
dicially created doctrines stemming in large measure from
misty understandings of English legal history. See, e. g., At
wood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward
a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 Hastings L. J. 571,
584–588 (1984); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802
(EDNY 1968) (collecting cases and commentary revealing
vulnerability of historical explanation for domestic relations
exception); Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 14 Probate L. J. 77, 125–126, and n. 256 (1997) (de
scribing historical explanation for probate exception as “an
exercise in mythography”). In the years following Mar
shall’s 1821 pronouncement, courts have sometimes lost sight
of his admonition and have rendered decisions expansively
interpreting the two exceptions. In Ankenbrandt v. Rich
ards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), this Court reined in the “domestic
relations exception.” Earlier, in Markham v. Allen, 326
U. S. 490 (1946), the Court endeavored similarly to curtail
the “probate exception.”
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case read
the probate exception broadly to exclude from the federal
courts’ adjudicatory authority “not only direct challenges to
a will or trust, but also questions which would ordinarily be
decided by a probate court in determining the validity of the
decedent’s estate planning instrument.” 392 F. 3d 1118,
1133 (2004). The Court of Appeals further held that a
State’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters
in a special court strips federal courts of jurisdiction to en
tertain any “probate related matter,” including claims re
specting “tax liability, debt, gift, [or] tort.” Id., at 1136.
We hold that the Ninth Circuit had no warrant from Con

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gress, or from decisions of this Court, for its sweeping exten
sion of the probate exception.
I
Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), also known as
Anna Nicole Smith, is the surviving widow of J. Howard
Marshall II (J. Howard). Vickie and J. Howard met in Octo
ber 1991. After a courtship lasting more than two years,
they were married on June 27, 1994. J. Howard died on Au
gust 4, 1995. Although he lavished gifts and significant
sums of money on Vickie during their courtship and mar
riage, J. Howard did not include anything for Vickie in his
will. According to Vickie, J. Howard intended to provide for
her financial security through a gift in the form of a “catch
all” trust.
Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), one of J. How
ard’s sons, was the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s estate
plan, which consisted of a living trust and a “pourover” will.
Under the terms of the will, all of J. Howard’s assets not
already included in the trust were to be transferred to the
trust upon his death.
Competing claims regarding J. Howard’s fortune ignited
proceedings in both state and federal courts. In January
1996, while J. Howard’s estate was subject to ongoing pro
ceedings in Probate Court in Harris County, Texas, Vickie
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., in the United States Bank
ruptcy Court for the Central District of California. See 275
B. R. 5, 8 (CD Cal. 2002). In June 1996, Pierce filed a proof
of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding, id., at 9; see
11 U. S. C. § 501, alleging that Vickie had defamed him when,
shortly after J. Howard’s death, lawyers representing Vickie
told members of the press that Pierce had engaged in forg
ery, fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his father’s
assets, 275 B. R., at 9. Pierce sought a declaration that

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the debt he asserted in that claim was not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Ibid.1 Vickie answered, asserting truth as a
defense. She also filed counterclaims, among them a claim
that Pierce had tortiously interfered with a gift she ex
pected. Ibid.; see App. 23–25. Vickie alleged that Pierce
prevented the transfer of his father’s intended gift to her
by, among other things: effectively imprisoning J. Howard
against his wishes; surrounding him with hired guards for
the purpose of preventing personal contact between him and
Vickie; making misrepresentations to J. Howard; and trans
ferring property against J. Howard’s expressed wishes.
Id., at 24.
Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim turned her ob
jection to Pierce’s claim into an adversary proceeding. Id.,
at 39; see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007. In that proceeding,
the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Vickie on Pierce’s claim and, after a trial on the merits,
entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference
counterclaim. See 253 B. R. 550, 558–559 (2000). The
Bankruptcy Court also held that both Vickie’s objection to
Pierce’s claim and Vickie’s counterclaim qualified as “core
proceedings” under 28 U. S. C. § 157, which meant that the
court had authority to enter a final judgment disposing of
those claims. See 257 B. R. 35, 39–40 (2000). The court
awarded Vickie compensatory damages of more than $449
million—less whatever she recovered in the ongoing probate
action in Texas—as well as $25 million in punitive damages.
Id., at 40.
Pierce filed a post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that Vickie’s tortious
interference claim could be tried only in the Texas probate
proceedings. Id., at 36. The Bankruptcy Court held that
1 Among debts not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see 11 U. S. C. § 523(a),
are those arising from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor,”
§ 523(a)(6).

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“the ‘probate exception’ argument was waived” because it
was not timely raised. Id., at 39. Relying on this Court’s
decision in Markham, the court observed that a federal court
has jurisdiction to “adjudicate rights in probate property, so
long as its final judgment does not undertake to interfere
with the state court’s possession of the property.” 257 B. R.,
at 38 (citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494).
Meanwhile, in the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a
declaration that the living trust and his father’s will were
valid. 392 F. 3d, at 1124–1125. Vickie, in turn, challenged
the validity of the will and filed a tortious interference claim
against Pierce, ibid., but voluntarily dismissed both claims
once the Bankruptcy Court entered its judgment, id., at
1128. Following a jury trial, the Probate Court declared the
living trust and J. Howard’s will valid. Id., at 1129.
Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court re
view of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. While rejecting
the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Pierce had for
feited any argument based on the probate exception, the Dis
trict Court held that the exception did not reach Vickie’s
claim. 264 B. R. 609, 619–625 (CD Cal. 2001). The Bank
ruptcy Court “did not assert jurisdiction generally over the
probate proceedings . . . or take control over [the] estate’s
assets,” the District Court observed, id., at 621, “[t]hus, the
probate exception would bar federal jurisdiction over Vick
ie’s counterclaim only if such jurisdiction would ‘interfere’
with the probate proceedings,” ibid. (quoting Markham, 326
U. S., at 494). Federal jurisdiction would not “interfere”
with the probate proceedings, the District Court concluded,
because: (1) success on Vickie’s counterclaim did not necessi
tate any declaration that J. Howard’s will was invalid, 264
B. R., at 621; and (2) under Texas law, probate courts do not
have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims of the kind
asserted in Vickie’s counterclaim, id., at 622–625.
The District Court also held that Vickie’s claim did not
qualify as a “core proceedin[g] arising under title 11, or aris
ing in a case under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(1); see 264

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B. R., at 625–632. A bankruptcy court may exercise plenary
power only over “core proceedings.” See § 157(b)–(c).2 In
noncore matters, a bankruptcy court may not enter final
judgment; it has authority to issue only proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo by
the district court. See § 157(c)(1). Accordingly, the Dis
trict Court treated the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as
“proposed[,] rather than final,” and undertook a “comprehen
sive, complete, and independent review of ” the Bankruptcy
Court’s determinations. Id., at 633.
2 “Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—
“(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
“(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemp
tions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for
the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of
distribution in a case under title 11;
“(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate;
“(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
“(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
“(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
“(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
“(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
“(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
“(J) objections to discharges;
“(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
“(L) confirmations of plans;
“(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
“(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property result
ing from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate;
“(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the es
tate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
“(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter
15 of title 11.” 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(2) (2000 ed. and Supp. V).

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Adopting and supplementing the Bankruptcy Court’s find
ings, the District Court determined that Pierce had tor
tiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy. Specifically, the
District Court found that J. Howard directed his lawyers to
prepare an inter vivos trust for Vickie consisting of half the
appreciation of his assets from the date of their marriage.
See 275 B. R., at 25–30, 51–53. It further found that Pierce
conspired to suppress or destroy the trust instrument and to
strip J. Howard of his assets by backdating, altering, and
otherwise falsifying documents, arranging for surveillance of
J. Howard and Vickie, and presenting documents to J. How
ard under false pretenses. See id., at 36–50, 57–58; see also
253 B. R., at 554–556, 559–560. Based on these findings, the
District Court awarded Vickie some $44.3 million in compen
satory damages. 275 B. R., at 53–57. In addition, finding
“overwhelming” evidence of Pierce’s “willfulness, malicious
ness, and fraud,” the District Court awarded an equal
amount in punitive damages. Id., at 57–58.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
appeals court recognized that Vickie’s claim “does not in
volve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will,
or any other purely probate matter.” 392 F. 3d, at 1133.
Nevertheless, the court held that the probate exception bars
federal jurisdiction in this case. In the Ninth Circuit’s view,
a claim falls within the probate exception if it raises “ques
tions which would ordinarily be decided by a probate court
in determining the validity of the decedent’s estate planning
instrument,” whether those questions involve “fraud, undue
influence[, or] tortious interference with the testator’s in
tent.” Ibid.
The Ninth Circuit was also of the view that state-court
delineation of a probate court’s exclusive adjudicatory au
thority could control federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In
this regard, the Court of Appeals stated: “Where a state has
relegated jurisdiction over probate matters to a special court

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and [the] state’s trial courts of general jurisdiction do not
have jurisdiction to hear probate matters, then the federal
courts also lack jurisdiction over probate matters.” Id., at
1136. Noting that “[t]he [P]robate [C]ourt ruled it had ex
clusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie[’s] claims,” the Ninth
Circuit held that “ruling . . . binding on the United States
[D]istrict [C]ourt.” Ibid. (citing Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S.
106, 115–116 (1963)).
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. 1165 (2005), to resolve the
apparent confusion among federal courts concerning the
scope of the probate exception. Satisfied that the instant
case does not fall within the ambit of the narrow exception
recognized by our decisions, we reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment.
II
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), we ad
dressed both the derivation and the limits of the “domestic
relations exception” to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, brought suit in
Federal District Court on behalf of her daughters, naming
as defendants their father (Ankenbrandt’s former husband)
and his female companion, both citizens of Louisiana. Id.,
at 691. Ankenbrandt’s complaint sought damages for the
defendants’ alleged sexual and physical abuse of the children.
Ibid. Federal jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of
citizenship. Ibid. (citing 28 U. S. C. § 1332). The District
Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdic
tion, holding that Ankenbrandt’s suit fell within “the ‘domes
tic relations’ exception to diversity jurisdiction.” 504 U. S.,
at 692. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. Ibid.
We reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Id., at
706–707.
Holding that the District Court improperly refrained from
exercising jurisdiction over Ankenbrandt’s tort claim, id., at
704, we traced explanation of the current domestic relations

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exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859). See An
kenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 693–695. In Barber, the Court up
held federal-court authority, in a diversity case, to enforce
an alimony award decreed by a state court. In dicta, how
ever, the Barber Court announced—without citation or dis
cussion—that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits for
divorce or the allowance of alimony. 21 How., at 584–589;
see Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 693–695.
Finding no Article III impediment to federal-court juris
diction in domestic relations cases, id., at 695–697, the Court
in Ankenbrandt anchored the exception in Congress’ original
provision for diversity jurisdiction, id., at 698–701. Begin
ning at the beginning, the Court recalled:
“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that ‘the circuit
courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where the matter
in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another State.’ ” Id., at 698
(quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78; emphasis
added in Ankenbrandt).
The defining phrase, “all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity,” the Court stressed, remained in successive
statutory provisions for diversity jurisdiction until 1948,
when Congress adopted the more economical phrase, “all
civil actions.” 504 U. S., at 698; 1948 Judicial Code and Judi
ciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28 U. S. C. § 1332.
The Barber majority, we acknowledged in Ankenbrandt,
did not expressly tie its announcement of a domestic rela
tions exception to the text of the diversity statute. 504
U. S., at 698. But the dissenters in that case made the con
nection. They stated that English courts of chancery lacked

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authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees. Because
“the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in chan
cery is bounded by that of the chancery in England,” Barber,
21 How., at 605 (opinion of Daniel, J.), the dissenters rea
soned, our federal courts similarly lack authority to decree
divorces or award alimony, ibid. Such relief, in other words,
would not fall within the diversity statute’s original grant of
jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity.” We concluded in Ankenbrandt that “it may be
inferred fairly that the jurisdictional limitation recognized
by the [Barber] Court rested on th[e] statutory basis” indi
cated by the dissenters in that case. 504 U. S., at 699.
We were “content” in Ankenbrandt “to rest our conclusion
that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter of stat
utory construction not on the accuracy of the historical jus
tifications on which [the exception] was seemingly based.”
Id., at 700. “[R]ather,” we relied on “Congress’ apparent
acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction
provisions in the years prior to 1948, when the statute lim
ited jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 1 Stat. 78). We further deter
mined that Congress did not intend to terminate the excep
tion in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity distinction
with the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ” 504 U. S., at 700. Ab
sent contrary indications, we presumed that Congress meant
to leave undisturbed “the Court’s nearly century-long inter
pretation” of the diversity statute “to contain an exception
for certain domestic relations matters.” Ibid.
We nevertheless emphasized in Ankenbrandt that the ex
ception covers only “a narrow range of domestic relations
issues.” Id., at 701. The Barber Court itself, we reminded,
“sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the en
forcement of an alimony decree that had been properly ob
tained in a state court of competent jurisdiction.” 504 U. S.,
at 702. Noting that some lower federal courts had applied

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the domestic relations exception “well beyond the circum
scribed situations posed by Barber and its progeny,” id., at
701, we clarified that only “divorce, alimony, and child cus
tody decrees” remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds,
id., at 703, 704. While recognizing the “special proficiency
developed by state tribunals . . . in handling issues that arise
in the granting of [divorce, alimony, and child custody] de
crees,” id., at 704, we viewed federal courts as equally
equipped to deal with complaints alleging the commission of
torts, ibid.
III
Federal jurisdiction in this case is premised on 28 U. S. C.
§ 1334, the statute vesting in federal district courts jurisdic
tion in bankruptcy cases and related proceedings. Decisions
of this Court have recognized a “probate exception,” kin to
the domestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal
jurisdiction. See Markham, 326 U. S., at 494; see also Sut
ton v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (1918); Waterman v. Canal-
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909). Like the
domestic relations exception, the probate exception has been
linked to language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking pro
nouncement on the probate exception, stated that “the eq
uity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . ,
which is that of the English Court of Chancery in 1789, did
not extend to probate matters.” 326 U. S., at 494. See gen
erally Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of
the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1479 (2001). As in Ankenbrandt, so in this case,
“[w]e have no occasion . . . to join the historical debate” over
the scope of English chancery jurisdiction in 1789, 504 U. S.,
at 699, for Vickie Marshall’s claim falls far outside the bounds
of the probate exception described in Markham. We there
fore need not consider in this case whether there exists any

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uncodified probate exception to federal bankruptcy jurisdic
tion under § 1334.3
In Markham, the plaintiff Alien Property Custodian 4 com
menced suit in Federal District Court against an executor
and resident heirs to determine the Custodian’s asserted
rights regarding a decedent’s estate. 326 U. S., at 491–492.
Jurisdiction was predicated on § 24(1) of the Judicial Code,
now 28 U. S. C. § 1345, which provides for federal jurisdiction
over suits brought by an officer of the United States. At the
time the federal suit commenced, the estate was undergoing
3 We note that the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by § 1334(b) is
subject to a mandatory abstention provision applicable to certain state-law
claims. Section 1334(c)(2) provides:
“Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not
arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to
which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall ab
stain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be
timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”
That provision is, in turn, qualified: “Non-core proceedings under section
157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject to the
mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).” § 157(b)(4). Be
cause the Bankruptcy Court rejected Pierce’s motion for mandatory ab
stention as untimely, 257 B. R. 35, 39 (CD Cal. 2000), we need not consider
whether these provisions might have required abstention upon a timely
motion.
4 Section 6 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415, 50 U. S. C.
App., authorizes the President to appoint an official known as the “alien
property custodian,” who is responsible for “receiv[ing,] . . . hold[ing], ad
minister[ing], and account[ing] for” “all money and property in the United
States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy . . . .” The Act
was originally enacted during World War I “to permit, under careful safe
guards and restrictions, certain kinds of business to be carried on” among
warring nations, and to “provid[e] for the care and administration of the
property and property rights of enemies and their allies in this country
pending the war.” Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 414, n. 1 (1945) (Bur
ton, J., concurring) (quoting S. Rep. No. 113, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1917)).

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probate administration in a state court. The Custodian had
issued an order vesting in himself all right, title, and interest
of German legatees. He sought and gained in the District
Court a judgment determining that the resident heirs had
no interest in the estate, and that the Custodian, substituting
himself for the German legatees, was entitled to the entire
net estate, including specified real estate passing under the
will.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had ordered the case
dismissed for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
this Court held that federal jurisdiction was properly in
voked. The Court first stated:
“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction to
probate a will or administer an estate . . . . But it has
been established by a long series of decisions of this
Court that federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to
entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’
and other claimants against a decedent’s estate ‘to es
tablish their claims’ so long as the federal court does
not interfere with the probate proceedings or assume
general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the prop
erty in the custody of the state court.” 326 U. S., at 494
(quoting Waterman, 215 U. S., at 43).
Next, the Court described a probate exception of distinctly
limited scope:
“[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction
to disturb or affect the possession of property in the
custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its jurisdic
tion to adjudicate rights in such property where the final
judgment does not undertake to interfere with the state
court’s possession save to the extent that the state court
is bound by the judgment to recognize the right adjudi
cated by the federal court.” 326 U. S., at 494.
The first of the above-quoted passages from Markham is
not a model of clear statement. The Court observed that

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federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits to deter
mine the rights of creditors, legatees, heirs, and other claim
ants against a decedent’s estate, “so long as the federal court
does not interfere with the probate proceedings.” Ibid. (em
phasis added). Lower federal courts have puzzled over the
meaning of the words “interfere with the probate proceed
ings,” and some have read those words to block federal juris
diction over a range of matters well beyond probate of a will
or administration of a decedent’s estate. See, e. g., Mangieri
v. Mangieri, 226 F. 3d 1, 2–3 (CA1 2000) (breach of fiduciary
duty by executor); Golden ex rel. Golden v. Golden, 382 F. 3d
348, 360–362 (CA3 2004) (same); Lepard v. NBD Bank, Div.
of Bank One, 384 F. 3d 232, 234–237 (CA6 2004) (breach of
fiduciary duty by trustee); Storm v. Storm, 328 F. 3d 941,
943–945 (CA7 2003) (probate exception bars claim that plain
tiff ’s father tortiously interfered with plaintiff ’s inheritance
by persuading trust grantor to amend irrevocable inter vivos
trust); Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F. 3d 1296, 1300–1301 (CA10
1999) (probate exception bars claim that defendants exerted
undue influence on testator and thereby tortiously interfered
with plaintiff ’s expected inheritance).
We read Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the sec
ond above-quoted passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or af
fect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a state
court.” 326 U. S., at 494. True, that reading renders the
first-quoted passage in part redundant, but redundancy in
this context, we do not doubt, is preferable to incoherence.
In short, we comprehend the “interference” language in
Markham as essentially a reiteration of the general principle
that, when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a
res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over
the same res. See, e. g., Penn General Casualty Co. v. Penn
sylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189, 195–196 (1935); Wa
terman, 215 U. S., at 45–46. Thus, the probate exception
reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of
a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also

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precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of
property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But
it does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters out
side those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.
A
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Vickie’s claim
does not “involve the administration of an estate, the probate
of a will, or any other purely probate matter.” 392 F. 3d, at
1133. Provoked by Pierce’s claim in the bankruptcy pro
ceedings, Vickie’s claim, like Carol Ankenbrandt’s, alleges a
widely recognized tort. See King v. Acker, 725 S. W. 2d 750,
754 (Tex. App. 1987); 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B
(1977) (“One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift that [s]he would otherwise have
received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the
inheritance or gift.”). Vickie seeks an in personam judg
ment against Pierce, not the probate or annulment of a will.
Cf. Sutton, 246 U. S., at 208 (suit to annul a will found “sup
plemental to the proceedings for probate of the will” and
therefore not cognizable in federal court). Nor does she
seek to reach a res in the custody of a state court. See
Markham, 326 U. S., at 494.
Furthermore, no “sound policy considerations” militate in
favor of extending the probate exception to cover the case
at hand. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial courts,
both federal and state, often address conduct of the kind
Vickie alleges. State probate courts possess no “special
proficiency . . . in handling [such] issues.” Cf. id., at 704.
B
The Court of Appeals advanced an alternate basis for its
conclusion that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over Vick
ie’s claim. Noting that the Texas Probate Court “ruled it
had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie Lynn Marshall’s

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claims against E. Pierce Marshall,” the Ninth Circuit held
that “ruling . . . binding on the United States [D]istrict
[C]ourt.” 392 F. 3d, at 1136. We reject that determination.
Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action for
interference with an expected inheritance or gift, modeled
on the Restatement formulation. See King, 725 S. W. 2d, at
754; Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S. W. 2d 144, 146–147
(Tex. App. 1998).5 It is clear, under Erie R. Co. v. Tomp
kins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), that Texas law governs the substan
tive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim. It is
also clear, however, that Texas may not reserve to its pro
bate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate a transitory
5 Texas appellate courts have on occasion held claims of tortious interfer
ence with an expected inheritance “barred” by a prior probate court judg
ment, apparently applying ordinary principles of preclusion. See, e. g.,
Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, 902 S. W. 2d 13, 16 (Tex. App. 1995) (final
probate court judgment bars claim of tortious interference with inheri
tance expectancy because probate court “necessarily found that [the dece
dent] signed the will with testamentary capacity, and that it reflected his
intent, was not the result of coercion or undue influence, and was valid”);
Neill v. Yett, 746 S. W. 2d 32, 35–36 (Tex. App. 1988) (complaint alleging
fraud and tortious interference with inheritance expectancy, filed more
than two years after will was admitted to probate, was barred by both the
statute of limitations and the final probate judgment, and failed to state
the elements of the claim). Neither Thompson nor Neill questions the
Texas trial courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in question.
Pierce maintains that Thompson, Neill, and other Texas decisions sup
port his contention that preclusion principles bar Vickie’s claim. See
Brief for Respondent 36–38. Vickie argues to the contrary. See Brief
for Petitioner 42, n. 30 (urging that preclusion does not apply because
(1) Vickie’s claim was not litigated to final judgment in the Texas probate
proceedings; (2) having presented her claim in the Bankruptcy Court
years before she joined the Texas will contest, Vickie was not obliged to
present her claim in the Texas proceedings; (3) the Bankruptcy Court’s
judgment preceded the Probate Court judgment; and (4) the Texas Pro
bate Court did not have before it important evidence). See also Tex. Rule
Civ. Proc. 97 (2003); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S. W.
2d 203, 206–207 (Tex. 1999). The matter of preclusion remains open for
consideration on remand. See infra, at 315.

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tort. We have long recognized that “a State cannot create
a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy the
right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court
having jurisdiction.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914). Jurisdiction is determined
“by the law of the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by
the extraterritorial operation of a [state] statute . . . , even
though it created the right of action.” Ibid. Directly on
point, we have held that the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
“having existed from the beginning of the Federal govern
ment, [can]not be impaired by subsequent state legislation
creating courts of probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217
U. S. 268, 281 (1910) (upholding federal jurisdiction over ac
tion by heirs of decedent, who died intestate, to determine
their rights in the estate (citing Waterman, 215 U. S. 33)).
Our decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963), relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit, 392 F. 3d, at 1136, is not to the
contrary. Durfee stands only for the proposition that a state
court’s final judgment determining its own jurisdiction ordi
narily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the juris
dictional issue was fully and fairly litigated in the court that
rendered the judgment. See 375 U. S., at 111, 115. At
issue here, however, is not the Texas Probate Court’s juris
diction, but the federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain Vick
ie’s tortious interference claim. Under our federal system,
Texas cannot render its probate courts exclusively compe
tent to entertain a claim of that genre. We therefore hold
that the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction over
Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce.
IV
After determining that Vickie’s claim was not a “core pro
ceeding,” the District Court reviewed the case de novo and
entered its final judgment on March 7, 2002. 275 B. R., at
5–8. The Texas Probate Court’s judgment became final on
February 11, 2002, nearly one month earlier. App. to Pet.

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for Cert. 41. The Court of Appeals considered only the
issue of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. It did not ad
dress the question whether Vickie’s claim was “core”; nor
did it address Pierce’s arguments concerning claim and issue
preclusion. 392 F. 3d, at 1137. These issues remain open
for consideration on remand.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is re
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
The administration of decedents’ estates typically is gov
erned by rules of state law and conducted by state probate
courts. Occasionally, however, disputes between interested
parties arise, either in the probate proceeding itself or else
where, that qualify as cases or controversies that federal
courts have jurisdiction to decide. See, e. g., Reed v. Reed,
404 U. S. 71 (1971). In her opinion for the Court, Justice
Ginsburg has cogently explained why this is such a case.
I write separately to explain why I do not believe there is
any “probate exception” that ousts a federal court of jurisdic
tion it otherwise possesses.
The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law
should extend to easy cases as well. Markham v. Allen, 326
U. S. 490 (1946), like this case, was an easy case. In Mark
ham, as here, it was unnecessary to question the historical
or logical underpinnings of the probate exception to federal
jurisdiction because, whatever the scope of the supposed ex
ception, it did not extend to the case at hand. But Mark
ham’s obiter dicta—dicta that the Court now describes as
redundant if not incoherent, ante, at 311—generated both

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confusion and abdication of the obligation Chief Justice Mar
shall so famously articulated, see Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 404 (1821); see also ante, at 298–299. While the
Court today rightly abandons much of that dicta, I would
go further.
The Court is content to adopt the approach it followed in
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), and to accept
as foundation for the probate exception Markham’s bald as
sertion that the English High Court of Chancery’s jurisdic
tion did not “extend to probate matters” in 1789. 326 U. S.,
at 494; see ante, at 308. I would not accept that premise.
Not only had the theory Markham espoused been only spo
radically and tentatively cited as justification for the excep
tion,1 but the most comprehensive article on the subject has
persuasively demonstrated that Markham’s assertion is “an
exercise in mythography.” 2
Markham’s theory apparently is the source of the Court’s
reformulated exception, which “reserves to state probate
courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administra
tion of a decedent’s estate.” Ante, at 311. Although un
doubtedly narrower in scope than Markham’s ill-considered
description of the probate carve-out, this description also
1 Notably, Justice Joseph Bradley, a strong proponent of the theory that
federal courts sitting in equity cannot exercise jurisdiction over probate
matters because in England in 1789 such jurisdiction belonged to the eccle
siastical courts, see Case of Broderick’s Will, 21 Wall. 503 (1875), Gaines
v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 24–25 (1876) (dissenting opinion), urged that “even
in matters savoring of [e]cclesiastical process, after an issue has been
formed between definite parties,” the controversy should be heard by a
federal court. See Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 450, 460–461 (1887)
(dissenting opinion) (citing Gaines, 92 U. S., at 17, and Hess v. Reynolds,
113 U. S. 73 (1885)).
2 Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Probate
L. J. 77, 126 (1997); see ante, at 299 (acknowledging Winkler’s analysis).
Winkler also observes, citing Charles Dickens’ Bleak House (1853), that
Markham’s “suggestion that the High Court of Chancery had lacked juris
diction to ‘administer an estate’ was preposterous.” 14 Probate L. J., at
125, and n. 256.

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sweeps too broadly. For the Court has correctly upheld the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over actions involving the an
nulment of wills and the administration of decedents’ estates.
In Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1876), for example, the
Court held that a defendant in an action to annul a will
should be permitted to remove the case to federal court. In
so doing, it explained:
“[W]henever a controversy in a suit . . . arises respecting
the validity or construction of a will, or the enforcement
of a decree admitting it to probate, there is no more
reason why the Federal courts should not take jurisdic
tion of the case than there is that they should not take
jurisdiction of any other controversy between the par
ties.” Id., at 22.
Likewise, in Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 (1869), the Court
explained that it was “well settled that a court of chancery,
as an incident to its power to enforce trusts, and make those
holding a fiduciary relation account, has jurisdiction to com
pel executors and administrators to account and distribute
the assets in their hands.” Id., at 431. (In that same case,
a federal court later appointed a Special Master to adminis
ter the estate. This Court upheld some of the Master’s de
terminations and rejected others. See Hook v. Payne, 14
Wall. 252, 255 (1872).)
To be sure, there are cases that support limitations on fed
eral courts’ jurisdiction over the probate and annulment of
wills and the administration of decedents’ estates. But
careful examination reveals that at least most of the limita
tions so recognized stem not from some sui generis excep
tion, but rather from generally applicable jurisdictional
rules. Cf. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 497 (1883) (“Jurisdic
tion as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included
in nor excepted out of the grant of judicial power to the
courts of the United States”). Some of those rules, like the
rule that diversity jurisdiction will not attach absent an inter

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partes controversy, plainly are still relevant today. See,
e. g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215
U. S. 33, 44–45 (1909); see also id., at 46 (reaffirming the in
gremio legis principle). Others, like the rule that a bill in
equity will lie only where there is no adequate remedy else
where, have less straightforward application in the wake of
20th-century jurisdictional developments. See, e. g., Case of
Broderick’s Will, 21 Wall. 503, 510–512 (1875); Ellis, 109
U. S., at 503 (denying relief where plaintiff had “a plain, ade
quate and complete remedy at law”); see also Winkler, supra
n. 2, at 112–113. Whatever the continuing viability of these
individual rules, together they are more than adequate to
the task of cabining federal courts’ jurisdiction. They re
quire no helping hand from the so-called probate exception.
Rather than preserving whatever vitality that the “excep
tion” has retained as a result of the Markham dicta, I would
provide the creature with a decent burial in a grave adjacent
to the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 468 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).