RANDALL et al. v. SORRELL et al.

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RANDALL et al. v. SORRELL et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 04–1528. Argued February 28, 2006—Decided June 26, 2006*
Vermont’s Act 64 stringently limits both the amounts that candidates for
state office may spend on their campaigns and the amounts that individ
uals, organizations, and political parties may contribute to those cam
paigns. Soon after Act 64 became law, the petitioners—individuals who
have run for state office, citizens who vote in state elections and contrib
ute to campaigns, and political parties and committees participating in
state politics—brought this suit against the respondents, state officials
charged with enforcing the Act. The District Court held that Act 64’s
expenditure limits violate the First Amendment, see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, and that the Act’s limits on political parties’ contributions to
candidates were unconstitutional, but found the other contribution limits
constitutional. The Second Circuit held that all of the Act’s contribu
tion limits are constitutional, ruled that the expenditure limits may be
constitutional because they are supported by compelling interests in
preventing corruption or its appearance and in limiting the time state
officials must spend raising campaign funds, and remanded for the Dis
trict Court to determine whether the expenditure limits were narrowly
tailored to those interests.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded.
382 F. 3d 91, reversed and remanded.
Justice Breyer, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Alito,
concluded in Parts I, II–B–3, III, and IV that both of Act 64’s sets of
limitations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 241–242,
244–263.
1. The expenditure limits violate the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantees under Buckley. Pp. 241–242, 244–246.
(a) In Buckley, the Court held, inter alia, that the Government’s
asserted interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of cor
ruption,” 424 U. S., at 25, provided sufficient justification for the contri
bution limitations imposed on campaigns for federal office by the Fed
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, id., at 23–38, but that FECA’s
expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment, id., at 39–59.
*Together with No. 04–1530, Vermont Republican State Committee
et al. v. Sorrell et al., and No. 04–1697, Sorrell et al. v. Randall et al., also
on certiorari to the same court.

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The Court explained that the difference between the two kinds of limita
tions is that expenditure limits “impose significantly more severe re
strictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than” do contribution limits. Id., at 23. Contribution limits, though a
“marginal restriction,” nevertheless leave the contributor “fre[e] to dis
cuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 20–21. Expenditure limits, by con
trast, impose “[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication,” id., at 19, and thereby necessar
ily “reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audi
ence reached,” ibid. For over 30 years, in considering the constitution
ality of a host of campaign finance statutes, this Court has adhered to
Buckley’s constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See, e. g.,
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 134. Pp. 241–242.
(b) The respondents argue unpersuasively that Buckley should be
distinguished from the present cases on a ground they say Buckley did
not consider: that expenditure limits help to protect candidates from
spending too much time raising money rather than devoting that time
to campaigning among ordinary voters. There is no significant basis
for that distinction. Act 64’s expenditure limits are not substantially
different from those at issue in Buckley. Nor is Vermont’s primary
justification for imposing its expenditure limits significantly different
from Congress’ rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption
and its appearance. The respondents say unpersuasively that, had the
Buckley Court considered the time protection rationale for expenditure
limits, the Court would have upheld those limits in the FECA. The
Buckley Court, however, was aware of the connection between expendi
ture limits and a reduction in fundraising time. And, in any event, the
connection seems perfectly obvious. Under these circumstances, the
respondents’ argument amounts to no more than an invitation so to limit
Buckley’s holding as effectively to overrule it. That invitation is de
clined. Pp. 244–246.
2. Act 64’s contribution limits violate the First Amendment because
those limits, in their specific details, burden protected interests in a
manner disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to
advance. Pp. 246–263.
(a) In upholding the $1,000 contribution limit before it, the Buckley
Court recognized, inter alia, that such limits, unlike expenditure limits,
“involv[e] little direct restraint on” the contributor’s speech, 424 U. S.,
at 21, and are permissible as long as the government demonstrates that
they are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest,”
id., at 25. It found that the interest there advanced, “prevent[ing] cor
ruption” and its “appearance,” was “sufficiently important” to justify
the contribution limits, id., at 25–26, and that those limits were “closely

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232 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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drawn.” Although recognizing that, in determining whether a particu
lar contribution limit was “closely drawn,” the amount, or level, of that
limit could make a difference, see id., at 21, the Court added that such
“distinctions in degree become significant only when they . . . amount to
differences in kind,” id., at 30. Pointing out that it had “no scalpel to
probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000,”
ibid., the Court found “no indication” that FECA’s contribution limita
tions would have “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of cam
paigns,” id., at 21. Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld
contribution limits in other statutes, but has recognized that such limits
might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment
interests than their anticorruption objectives could justify, see, e. g.,
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 395–397.
Pp. 246–248.
(b) Although the Court has “no scalpel to probe,” 424 U. S., at 30,
with exactitude whether particular contribution limits are too low and
normally defers to the legislature in that regard, it must nevertheless
recognize the existence of some lower bound, as Buckley acknowledges.
While the interests served by contribution limits, preventing corruption
and its appearance, “directly implicate the integrity of our electoral
process,” McConnell, supra, at 136, that does not simply mean the lower
the limit, the better. Contribution limits that are too low also can harm
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic
accountability. Where there is strong indication in a particular case,
i. e., danger signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely
serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, must review the
record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the
statute’s “tailoring,” i. e., toward assessing the restrictions’ proportion
ality. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U. S. 485, 499. Danger signs that Act 64’s contribution limits may fall
outside tolerable First Amendment limits are present here. They are
substantially lower than both the limits the Court has previously upheld
and the comparable limits in force in other States. Consequently, the
record must be examined to determine whether Act 64’s contribution
limits are “closely drawn” to match the State’s interests. Pp. 248–253.
(c) The record demonstrates that, from a constitutional perspective,
Act 64’s contribution limits are too restrictive. Five sets of factors,
taken together, lead to the conclusion that those limits are not narrowly
tailored. First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively
prove, that Act 64’s contribution limits will significantly restrict the
amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive cam
paigns. Second, Act 64’s insistence that a political party and all of its

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affiliates together abide by exactly the same low $200 to $400 contribu
tion limits that apply to individual contributors threatens harm to a
particularly important political right, the right to associate in a political
party. See, e. g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567,
574. Although the Court upheld federal limits on political parties’ con
tributions to candidates in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Re
publican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, the limits there at
issue were far less problematic, for they were significantly higher than
Act 64’s limits, see, e. g., id., at 438–439, and n. 3, and they were much
higher than the federal limits on contributions from individuals to candi
dates, see id., at 453. Third, Act 64’s treatment of volunteer services
aggravates the problem. Although the Act excludes uncompensated
volunteer services from its “contribution” definition, it does not exclude
the expenses volunteers incur, e. g., travel expenses, in the course of
campaign activities. The combination of very low contribution lim
its and the absence of an exception excluding volunteer expenses may
well impede a campaign’s ability effectively to use volunteers, thereby
making it more difficult for individuals to associate in this way.
Cf. Buckley, supra, at 22. Fourth, unlike the contribution limits upheld
in Shrink, Act 64’s limits are not adjusted for inflation, but decline in
real value each year. A failure to index limits means that limits already
suspiciously low will almost inevitably become too low over time.
Fifth, nowhere in the record is there any special justification for Act
64’s low and restrictive contribution limits. Rather, the basic justifica
tions the State has advanced in support of such limits are those present
in Buckley. Indeed, other things being equal, one might reasonably
believe that a contribution of, say, $250 (or $450) to a candidate’s cam
paign was less likely to prove a corruptive force than the far larger
contributions at issue in the other campaign finance cases the Court has
considered. Pp. 253–262.
(d) It is not possible to sever some of the Act’s contribution limit
provisions from others that might remain fully operative. Doing so
would require the Court to write words into the statute (inflation index
ing), to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions), or to
foresee which of many different possible ways the Vermont Legislature
might respond to the constitutional objections to Act 64. In these cir
cumstances, the legislature likely would not have intended the Court to
set aside the statute’s contribution limits. The legislature is free to
rewrite those provisions to address the constitutional difficulties here
identified. Pp. 262–263.
Justice Breyer, joined by The Chief Justice in Parts II–B–1 and
II–B–2, rejected the respondents’ argument that Buckley should, in ef
fect, be overruled because subsequent experience has shown that contri

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bution limits alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its appearance.
Stare decisis, the basic legal principle commanding judicial respect for
a court’s earlier decisions and their rules of law, prevents the overruling
of Buckley. Adherence to precedent is the norm; departure from it is
exceptional, requiring “special justification,” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U. S. 203, 212, especially where, as here, the principle at issue has be
come settled through iteration and reiteration over a long period.
There is no special justification here. Subsequent case law has not
made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined its basic legal
principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443. Nor is
there any demonstration that circumstances have changed so radically
as to undermine Buckley’s critical factual assumptions. The respond
ents have not shown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruption
or its appearance in Vermont; nor have they shown that expenditure
limits are the only way to attack that problem. Cf. McConnell, 540
U. S. 93. Finally, overruling Buckley now would dramatically under
mine the considerable reliance that Congress and state legislatures have
placed upon it in drafting campaign finance laws. And this Court has
followed Buckley, upholding and applying its reasoning in later cases.
Pp. 242–244.
Justice Alito agreed that Act 64’s expenditure and contribution lim
its violate the First Amendment, but concluded that respondents’
backup argument asking this Court to revisit Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, need not be reached because they have failed to address considera
tions of stare decisis. Pp. 263–264.
Justice Kennedy agreed that Vermont’s limitations on campaign
expenditures and contributions violate the First Amendment, but con
cluded that, given his skepticism regarding this Court’s campaign fi
nance jurisprudence, see, e. g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n,
540 U. S. 93, 286–287, 313, it is appropriate for him to concur only in the
judgment. Pp. 264–265.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed that Vermont’s
Act 64 is unconstitutional, but disagreed with the plurality’s rationale
for striking down that statute. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, provides
insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First Amend
ment, is therefore illegitimate and not protected by stare decisis, and
should be overruled and replaced with a standard faithful to the Amend
ment. This Court erred in Buckley when it distinguished between con
tribution and expenditure limits, finding the former to be a less severe
infringement on First Amendment rights. See, e. g., Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–418. Both the contribu
tion and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 should be subjected to strict
scrutiny, which they would fail. See, e. g., Colorado Republican Fed

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eral Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 640–
641. Pp. 265–273.
Breyer, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opin
ion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined, and in which Alito, J., joined except
as to Parts II–B–1 and II–B–2. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 263. Kennedy, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 264. Thomas, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
p. 265. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 273. Souter, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, and in which
Stevens, J., joined as to Parts II and III, post, p. 281.
James Bopp, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in
Nos. 04–1528 and 04–1530. On the briefs for petitioners
in No. 04–1528 were Peter F. Langrock, Mitchell L. Pearl,
Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro, and Joel M. Gora.
Mr. Bopp filed briefs for the Vermont Republican State Com
mittee et al., petitioners in No. 04–1530.
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, pro se,
argued the cause for respondents in Nos. 04–1528 and 04–
1530 and cross-petitioners in No. 04–1697. With him on the
brief were Timothy B. Tomasi, Eve Jacobs-Carnahan, and
Bridget C. Asay, Assistant Attorneys General, and Carter
G. Phillips.
Brenda Wright argued the cause for respondents/cross
petitioners Vermont Public Interest Research Group et al.
With her on the brief were Lisa J. Danetz, John C. Bonifaz,
Thomas C. Goldstein, and Scott P. Lewis.†
†A brief of amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 04–1528 was filed for
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza
tions by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Laurence E. Gold, and Michael B. Trister.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Heidi Behrens-
Benedict by Scott N. Auby in No. 04–1528; and for Senator John F. Reed
by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., in Nos. 04–1528 and 04–1530.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed in all cases for the State of Connecticut
et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Jane
R. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike

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236 RANDALL v. SORRELL
Opinion of Breyer, J.
Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice joins,
and in which Justice Alito joins except as to Parts II–B–1
and II–B–2.
We here consider the constitutionality of a Vermont cam
paign finance statute that limits both (1) the amounts that
candidates for state office may spend on their campaigns
(expenditure limitations) and (2) the amounts that individu
als, organizations, and political parties may contribute to
those campaigns (contribution limitations). Vt. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002). We hold that both sets of limi
tations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Well
established precedent makes clear that the expenditure lim
its violate the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 54–58 (1976) (per curiam). The contribution limits
Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Lisa Madigan of Illinois,
Tom Miller of Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jere
miah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Patricia A.
Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, W. A. Drew Edmond
son of Oklahoma, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Peggy A. Lauten
schlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for the Secretary
of State of New Hampshire et al. by Philip Allen Lacovara, Charles A.
Rothfeld, and Daniel T. Brown; for the Center for Competitive Politics
et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; for the Center for Democracy and Election Manage
ment at American University by Ilann M. Maazel; for the Democratic
National Committee by Joseph E. Sandler; for the Equal Justice Society
et al. by Martin R. Glick; for the Republican National Committee by
Bobby R. Burchfield, M. Miller Baker, and Thomas J. Josefiak; for
ReclaimDemocracy.org by Daniel J. H. Greenwood; for TheRestofUs.org
et al. by Douglas R. M. Nazarian, Patricia A. Brannan, and Martha M.
Tierney; for Current and Former State Court Justices and Judges by Deb
orah Goldberg; for Bill Bradley et al. by Mark C. Alexander, John J. Gib
bons, and Lawrence S. Lustberg; for Norman Dorsen et al. by Burt Neu
borne and Mr. Dorsen, pro se; for Senator John McCain et al. by Seth P.
Waxman, Roger M. Witten, Randolph D. Moss, Bradley S. Phillips, Don
ald J. Simon, Alan Morrison, J. Gerald Hebert, Trevor Potter, Paul Ryan,
Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Fred Wertheimer, and Scott L. Nelson; and for
Senator Mitch McConnell by Theodore B. Olson and Douglas R. Cox.

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are unconstitutional because in their specific details (involv
ing low maximum levels and other restrictions) they fail to
satisfy the First Amendment’s requirement of careful tailor
ing. Id., at 25–30. That is to say, they impose burdens
upon First Amendment interests that (when viewed in light
of the statute’s legitimate objectives) are disproportionately
severe.
I
A
Prior to 1997, Vermont’s campaign finance law imposed no
limit upon the amount a candidate for state office could
spend. It did, however, impose limits upon the amounts
that individuals, corporations, and political committees could
contribute to the campaign of such a candidate. Individuals
and corporations could contribute no more than $1,000 to any
candidate for state office. § 2805(a) (1996). Political com
mittees, excluding political parties, could contribute no more
than $3,000. § 2805(b). The statute imposed no limit on the
amount that political parties could contribute to candidates.
In 1997, Vermont enacted a more stringent campaign fi
nance law, Pub. Act No. 64, codified at Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17,
§ 2801 et seq. (2002) (hereinafter Act or Act 64), the statute
at issue here. Act 64, which took effect immediately after
the 1998 elections, imposes mandatory expenditure limits on
the total amount a candidate for state office can spend during
a “two-year general election cycle,” i. e., the primary plus
the general election, in approximately the following amounts:
governor, $300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000; other
statewide offices, $45,000; state senator, $4,000 (plus an addi
tional $2,500 for each additional seat in the district); state
representative (two-member district), $3,000; and state rep
resentative (single member district), $2,000. § 2805a(a).
These limits are adjusted for inflation in odd-numbered years
based on the Consumer Price Index. § 2805a(e). Incum
bents seeking reelection to statewide office may spend no

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more than 85% of the above amounts, and incumbents seek
ing reelection to the State Senate or House may spend no
more than 90% of the above amounts. § 2805a(c). The Act
defines “[e]xpenditure” broadly to mean the
“payment, disbursement, distribution, advance, deposit,
loan or gift of money or anything of value, paid or prom
ised to be paid, for the purpose of influencing an election,
advocating a position on a public question, or supporting
or opposing one or more candidates.” § 2801(3).
With certain minor exceptions, expenditures over $50 made
on a candidate’s behalf by others count against the candi
date’s expenditure limit if those expenditures are “inten
tionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by” the can
didate’s campaign. §§ 2809(b), (c). These provisions apply
so as to count against a campaign’s expenditure limit any
spending by political parties or committees that is coordi
nated with the campaign and benefits the candidate. And
any party expenditure that “primarily benefits six or fewer
candidates who are associated with the political party”
is “presumed” to be coordinated with the campaign and
therefore to count against the campaign’s expenditure limit.
§§ 2809(b), (d).
Act 64 also imposes strict contribution limits. The
amount any single individual can contribute to the campaign
of a candidate for state office during a “two-year general
election cycle” is limited as follows: governor, lieutenant gov
ernor, and other statewide offices, $400; state senator, $300;
and state representative, $200. § 2805(a). Unlike its ex
penditure limits, Act 64’s contribution limits are not indexed
for inflation.
A political committee is subject to these same limits.
Ibid. So is a political party, ibid., defined broadly to include
“any subsidiary, branch or local unit” of a party, as well as
any “national or regional affiliates” of a party (taken sepa
rately or together). § 2801(5). Thus, for example, the stat

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ute treats the local, state, and national affiliates of the Demo
cratic Party as if they were a single entity and limits their
total contribution to a single candidate’s campaign for gover
nor (during the primary and the general election together)
to $400.
The Act also imposes a limit of $2,000 upon the amount
any individual can give to a political party during a 2-year
general election cycle. § 2805(a).
The Act defines “contribution” broadly in approximately
the same way it defines “expenditure.” § 2801(2). Any ex
penditure made on a candidate’s behalf counts as a contri
bution to the candidate if it is “intentionally facilitated by,
solicited by or approved by” the candidate. §§ 2809(a), (c).
And a party expenditure that “primarily benefits six or
fewer candidates who are associated with the” party is “pre
sumed” to count against the party’s contribution limits.
§§ 2809(a), (d).
There are a few exceptions. A candidate’s own contribu
tions to the campaign and those of the candidate’s family fall
outside the contribution limits. § 2805(f). Volunteer serv
ices do not count as contributions. § 2801(2). Nor does the
cost of a meet-the-candidate function, provided that the total
cost for the function amounts to $100 or less. § 2809(d).
In addition to these expenditure and contribution limits,
the Act sets forth disclosure and reporting requirements and
creates a voluntary public financing system for gubernatorial
elections. §§ 2803, 2811, 2821–2823, 2831, 2832, 2851–2856.
None of these is at issue here. The Act also limits the
amount of contributions a candidate, political committee,
or political party can receive from out-of-state sources.
§ 2805(c). The lower courts held these out-of-state contribu
tion limits unconstitutional, and the parties do not challenge
that holding.
B
The petitioners are individuals who have run for state of
fice in Vermont, citizens who vote in Vermont elections and

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contribute to Vermont campaigns, and political parties and
committees that participate in Vermont politics. Soon after
Act 64 became law, they brought this lawsuit in Federal Dis
trict Court against the respondents, state officials charged
with enforcement of the Act. Several other private groups
and individual citizens intervened in the District Court pro
ceedings in support of the Act and are joined here as re
spondents as well.
The District Court agreed with the petitioners that the
Act’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. See
Buckley, 424 U. S. 1. The court also held unconstitutional
the Act’s limits on the contributions of political parties to
candidates. At the same time, the court found the Act’s
other contribution limits constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell,
118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (Vt. 2000).
Both sides appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit held that all of the Act’s contri
bution limits are constitutional. It also held that the Act’s
expenditure limits may be constitutional. Landell v. Sor
rell, 382 F. 3d 91 (2004). It found those limits supported by
two compelling interests, namely, an interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption and an interest in
limiting the amount of time state officials must spend raising
campaign funds. The Circuit then remanded the case to the
District Court with instructions to determine whether the
Act’s expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to those
interests.
The petitioners and respondents all sought certiorari.
They asked us to consider the constitutionality of Act 64’s
expenditure limits, its contribution limits, and a related
definitional provision. We agreed to do so. 545 U. S. 1165
(2005).
II
We turn first to the Act’s expenditure limits. Do those
l i mits v i olate the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantees?

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A
In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court considered the con
stitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq., a
statute that, much like the Act before us, imposed both ex
penditure and contribution limitations on campaigns for pub
lic office. The Court, while upholding FECA’s contribution
limitations as constitutional, held that the statute’s expendi
ture limitations violated the First Amendment.
Buckley stated that both kinds of limitations “implicate
fundamental First Amendment interests.” 424 U. S., at 23.
It noted that the Government had sought to justify the stat
ute’s infringement on those interests in terms of the need to
prevent “corruption and the appearance of corruption.” Id.,
at 25; see also id., at 55. In the Court’s view, this rationale
provided sufficient justification for the statute’s contribution
limitations, but it did not provide sufficient justification for
the expenditure limitations.
The Court explained that the basic reason for this differ
ence between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure
limitations “impose significantly more severe restrictions on
protected freedoms of political expression and association
than” do contribution limitations. Id., at 23. Contribution
limitations, though a “marginal restriction upon the contrib
utor’s ability to engage in free communication,” nevertheless
leave the contributor “fre[e] to discuss candidates and is
sues.” Id., at 20–21. Expenditure limitations, by contrast,
impose “[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a cam
paign.” Id., at 19. They thereby necessarily “reduc[e] the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.” Ibid. Indeed, the freedom “to engage
in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on ex
penditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far

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and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”
Id., at 19, n. 18.
The Court concluded that “[n]o governmental interest that
has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on
the quantity of political expression imposed by” the statute’s
expenditure limitations. Id., at 55. It decided that the
Government’s primary justification for expenditure limita
tions, preventing corruption and its appearance, was ade
quately addressed by the Act’s contribution limitations and
disclosure requirements. Ibid. The Court also considered
other governmental interests advanced in support of expend
iture limitations. It rejected each. Id., at 56–57. Conse
quently, it held that the expenditure limitations were “consti
tutionally invalid.” Id., at 58.
Over the last 30 years, in considering the constitutionality
of a host of different campaign finance statutes, this Court
has repeatedly adhered to Buckley’s constraints, including
those on expenditure limits. See McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 134 (2003); Federal Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.,
533 U. S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II); Nixon v. Shrink Mis
souri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386 (2000) (Shrink);
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 610 (1996) (Colorado I) (plu
rality opinion); Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 259–260 (1986); Federal
Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 491 (1985); California Medical Assn.
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 194–195 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
B
1
The respondents recognize that, in respect to expenditure
limits, Buckley appears to be a controlling—and unfavor
able—precedent. They seek to overcome that precedent in

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two ways. First, they ask us in effect to overrule Buckley.
Post-Buckley experience, they believe, has shown that con
tribution limits (and disclosure requirements) alone cannot
effectively deter corruption or its appearance; hence experi
ence has undermined an assumption underlying that case.
Indeed, the respondents have devoted several pages of their
briefs to attacking Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits.
See Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Vermont Public
Interest Research Group et al. 6–39 (hereinafter VPIRG
Brief) (arguing that “sound reasons exist to revisit the appli
cable standard of review” for expenditure limits); Brief for
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner William H. Sorrell et al. 28–31
(hereinafter Sorrell Brief) (arguing that “the Court should
revisit Buckley and consider alternative constitutional ap
proaches to spending limits”).
Second, in the alternative, they ask us to limit the scope
of Buckley significantly by distinguishing Buckley from the
present case. They advance as a ground for distinction a
justification for expenditure limitations that, they say, Buck
ley did not consider, namely, that such limits help to protect
candidates from spending too much time raising money
rather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordi
nary voters. We find neither argument persuasive.
2
The Court has often recognized the “fundamental impor
tance” of stare decisis, the basic legal principle that com
mands judicial respect for a court’s earlier decisions and the
rules of law they embody. See Harris v. United States, 536
U. S. 545, 556–557 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing numerous
cases). The Court has pointed out that stare decisis “ ‘pro
motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent develop
ment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions,
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.’ ” United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne v.

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Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)). Stare decisis thereby
avoids the instability and unfairness that accompany disrup
tion of settled legal expectations. For this reason, the rule
of law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the
norm. Departure from precedent is exceptional, and re
quires “special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S.
203, 212 (1984). This is especially true where, as here, the
principle has become settled through iteration and reitera
tion over a long period of time.
We can find here no such special justification that would
require us to overrule Buckley. Subsequent case law has
not made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined
its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States,
530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). We cannot find in the respondents’
claims any demonstration that circumstances have changed
so radically as to undermine Buckley’s critical factual as
sumptions. The respondents have not shown, for example,
any dramatic increase in corruption or its appearance in Ver
mont; nor have they shown that expenditure limits are the
only way to attack that problem. Cf. McConnell v. FEC,
540 U. S. 93. At the same time, Buckley has promoted con
siderable reliance. Congress and state legislatures have
used Buckley when drafting campaign finance laws. And,
as we have said, this Court has followed Buckley, upholding
and applying its reasoning in later cases. Overruling Buck
ley now would dramatically undermine this reliance on our
settled precedent.
For all these reasons, we find this a case that fits the stare
decisis norm. And we do not perceive the strong justifica
tion that would be necessary to warrant overruling so well
established a precedent. We consequently decline the re
spondents’ invitation to reconsider Buckley.
3
The respondents also ask us to distinguish these cases
from Buckley. But we can find no significant basis for that

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distinction. Act 64’s expenditure limits are not substan
tially different from those at issue in Buckley. In both
instances the limits consist of a dollar cap imposed upon a
candidate’s expenditures. Nor is Vermont’s primary justi
fication for imposing its expenditure limits significantly
different from Congress’ rationale for the Buckley limits:
preventing corruption and its appearance.
The sole basis on which the respondents seek to distin
guish Buckley concerns a further supporting justifica
tion. They argue that expenditure limits are necessary in
order to reduce the amount of time candidates must spend
raising money. VPIRG Brief 16–20; Sorrell Brief 22–25.
Increased campaign costs, together with the fear of a
better-funded opponent, mean that, without expenditure lim
its, a candidate must spend too much time raising money
instead of meeting the voters and engaging in public debate.
Buckley, the respondents add, did not fully consider this jus
tification. Had it done so, they say, the Court would have
upheld, not struck down, FECA’s expenditure limits.
In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller consideration of
this time protection rationale would have changed Buckley’s
result. The Buckley Court was aware of the connection be
tween expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising time.
In a section of the opinion dealing with FECA’s public financ
ing provisions, it wrote that Congress was trying to “free
candidates from the rigors of fundraising.” 424 U. S., at 91;
see also id., at 96 (“[L]imits on contributions necessarily in
crease the burden of fundraising,” and “public financing” was
designed in part to relieve Presidential candidates “from the
rigors of soliciting private contributions”); id., at 258–259
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
The Court of Appeals’ opinion and the briefs filed in this
Court pointed out that a natural consequence of higher cam
paign expenditures was that “candidates were compelled to
allow to fund raising increasing and extreme amounts of
money and energy.” Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 838

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(CADC 1975); see also Brief for United States et al. as Amici
Curiae in Buckley v. Valeo, O. T. 1975, Nos. 75–436 and 75–
437, p. 36 (“Fund raising consumes candidate time that oth
erwise would be devoted to campaigning”). And, in any
event, the connection between high campaign expenditures
and increased fundraising demands seems perfectly obvious.
Under these circumstances, the respondents’ argument
amounts to no more than an invitation so to limit Buckley’s
holding as effectively to overrule it. For the reasons set
forth above, we decline that invitation as well. And, given
Buckley’s continued authority, we must conclude that Act
64’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.
III
We turn now to a more complex question, namely, the con
stitutionality of Act 64’s contribution limits. The parties,
while accepting Buckley’s approach, dispute whether, de
spite Buckley’s general approval of statutes that limit cam
paign contributions, Act 64’s contribution limits are so severe
that in the circumstances its particular limits violate the
First Amendment.
A
As with the Act’s expenditure limits, we begin with Buck
ley. In that case, the Court upheld the $1,000 contribu
tion limit before it. Buckley recognized that contribution
limits, like expenditure limits, “implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests,” namely, the freedoms of “political ex
pression” and “political association.” 424 U. S., at 15, 23.
But, unlike expenditure limits (which “necessarily reduc[e]
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of is
sues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached,” id., at 19), contribution limits “in
volv[e] little direct restraint on” the contributor’s speech, id.,
at 21. They do restrict “one aspect of the contributor’s free
dom of political association,” namely, the contributor’s ability
to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless “per

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mi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a con
tribution,” and they do “not in any way infringe the contrib
utor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Id., at
21, 24.
Consequently, the Court wrote, contribution limitations
are permissible as long as the Government demonstrates
that the limits are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently
important interest.” Id., at 25. It found that the interest
advanced in the case, “prevent[ing] corruption” and its “ap
pearance,” was “sufficiently important” to justify the stat
ute’s contribution limits. Id., at 25–26.
The Court also found that the contribution limits before it
were “closely drawn.” It recognized that, in determining
whether a particular contribution limit was “closely drawn,”
the amount, or level, of that limit could make a difference.
Indeed, it wrote that “contribution restrictions could have a
severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations pre
vented candidates and political committees from amassing
the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Id., at 21.
But the Court added that such “distinctions in degree be
come significant only when they can be said to amount to
differences in kind.” Id., at 30. Pointing out that it had
“ ‘no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not
serve as well as $1,000,’ ” ibid., the Court found “no indica
tion” that the $1,000 contribution limitations imposed by the
Act would have “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding
of campaigns,” id., at 21. It therefore found the limita
tions constitutional.
Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contribu
tion limits in other statutes. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377 ($1,075
limit on contributions to candidates for Missouri state audi
tor); California Medical Assn., 453 U. S. 182 ($5,000 limit on
contributions to multicandidate political committees). The
Court has recognized, however, that contribution limits
might sometimes work more harm to protected First
Amendment interests than their anticorruption objectives

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could justify. See Shrink, supra, at 395–397; Buckley,
supra, at 21. And individual Members of the Court
have expressed concern lest too low a limit magnify the
“reputation-related or media-related advantages of incum
bency and thereby insulat[e] legislators from effective elec
toral challenge.” Shrink, supra, at 403–404 (Breyer, J.,
joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring). In the cases before us,
the petitioners challenge Act 64’s contribution limits on
that basis.
B
Following Buckley, we must determine whether Act 64’s
contribution limits prevent candidates from “amassing the
resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy,” 424
U. S., at 21; whether they magnify the advantages of incum
bency to the point where they put challengers to a significant
disadvantage; in a word, whether they are too low and too
strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny. In answering
these questions, we recognize, as Buckley stated, that we
have “ ‘no scalpel to probe’ ” each possible contribution level.
Id., at 30. We cannot determine with any degree of exacti
tude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the stat
ute’s legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is
better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legis
lators have “particular expertise” in matters related to the
costs and nature of running for office. McConnell, 540 U. S.,
at 137. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legisla
ture’s determination of such matters.
Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, we must recognize
the existence of some lower bound. At some point the con
stitutional risks to the democratic electoral process become
too great. After all, the interests underlying contribution
limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup
tion, “directly implicate the integrity of our electoral proc
ess.” McConnell, supra, at 136 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Yet that rationale does not simply mean “the
lower the limit, the better.” That is because contribution

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limits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns
against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing demo
cratic accountability. Were we to ignore that fact, a statute
that seeks to regulate campaign contributions could itself
prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to
promote. Thus, we see no alternative to the exercise of in
dependent judicial judgment as a statute reaches those outer
limits. And, where there is strong indication in a particular
case, i. e., danger signs, that such risks exist (both present in
kind and likely serious in degree), courts, including appellate
courts, must review the record independently and carefully
with an eye toward assessing the statute’s “tailoring,” that
is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[A]n appellate court has an obliga
tion to ‘make an independent examination of the whole rec
ord’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not con
stitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression’ ”
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284–
286 (1964))).
We find those danger signs present here. As compared
with the contribution limits upheld by the Court in the past,
and with those in force in other States, Act 64’s limits are
sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are not
closely drawn. The Act sets its limits per election cycle,
which includes both a primary and a general election. Thus,
in a gubernatorial race with both primary and final election
contests, the Act’s contribution limit amounts to $200 per
election per candidate (with significantly lower limits for con
tributions to candidates for State Senate and House of Rep
resentatives, see supra, at 238). These limits apply both to
contributions from individuals and to contributions from po
litical parties, whether made in cash or in expenditures coor
dinated (or presumed to be coordinated) with the candidate.
See supra, at 238–239.

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These limits are well below the limits this Court upheld in
Buckley. Indeed, in terms of real dollars (i. e., adjusting for
inflation), the Act’s $200 per election limit on individual con
tributions to a campaign for governor is slightly more than
one-twentieth of the limit on contributions to campaigns for
federal office before the Court in Buckley. Adjusted to re
flect its value in 1976 (the year Buckley was decided), Ver
mont’s contribution limit on campaigns for statewide office
(including governor) amounts to $113.91 per 2-year election
cycle, or roughly $57 per election, as compared to the $1,000
per election limit on individual contributions at issue in
Buckley. (The adjusted value of Act 64’s limit on contribu
tions from political parties to candidates for statewide office,
again $200 per candidate per election, is just over one one
hundredth of the comparable limit before the Court in Buck
ley, $5,000 per election.) Yet Vermont’s gubernatorial
district—the entire State—is no smaller than the House dis
tricts to which Buckley’s limits applied. In 1976, the aver
age congressional district contained a population of about
465,000. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 459 (1976) (Statistical Ab
stract) (describing results of 1970 census). Indeed, Ver
mont’s population is 621,000—about one-third larger. Sta
tistical Abstract 21 (2006) (describing Vermont’s population
in 2004).
Moreover, considered as a whole, Vermont’s contribution
limits are the lowest in the Nation. Act 64 limits contribu
tions to candidates for statewide office (including governor)
to $200 per candidate per election. We have found no State
that imposes a lower per election limit. Indeed, we have
found only seven States that impose limits on contributions
to candidates for statewide office at or below $500 per elec
tion, more than twice Act 64’s limit. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 16–905 (West Cum. Supp. 2005) ($760 per election
cycle, or $380 per election, adjusted for inflation); Colo.
Const., Art. XXVIII, § 3 ($500 per election, adjusted for in

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flation); Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a) (2003) ($500 per election); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A, § 1015(1) (West Supp. 2005) ($500
for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election);
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, § 7A (West Cum. Supp. 2006) ($500
per year, or $250 per election); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–
216(1)(a) (2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide
office, per election); S. D. Codified Laws § 12–25–1.1 (2004)
($1,000 per year, or $500 per election). We are aware of no
State that imposes a limit on contributions from political par
ties to candidates for statewide office lower than Act 64’s
$200 per candidate per election limit. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 21–A, § 1015(1) (next lowest: $500 for contribution
from party to candidate for governor, $250 for contribution
from party to candidate for other statewide office, both per
election). Similarly, we have found only three States that
have limits on contributions to candidates for state legisla
ture below Act 64’s $150 and $100 per election limits. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16–905 ($296 per election cycle, or $148 per
election); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–216(1)(a) ($130 per elec
tion); S. D. Codified Laws § 12–25–1.1 ($250 per year, or $125
per election). And we are aware of no State that has a
lower limit on contributions from political parties to state
legislative candidates. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A,
§ 1015(1) (next lowest: $250 per election).
Finally, Vermont’s limit is well below the lowest limit this
Court has previously upheld, the limit of $1,075 per election
(adjusted for inflation every two years, see Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 130.032.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998)) for candidates for Missouri
state auditor. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377. The comparable Ver
mont limit of roughly $200 per election, not adjusted for in
flation, is less than one-sixth of Missouri’s current inflation
adjusted limit ($1,275).
We recognize that Vermont’s population is much smaller
than Missouri’s. Indeed, Vermont is about one-ninth of the
size of Missouri. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006). Thus, per
citizen, Vermont’s limit is slightly more generous. As of

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2006, the ratio of the contribution limit to the size of the
constituency in Vermont is .00064, while Missouri’s ratio is
.00044, 31% lower. Cf. App. 55 (doing same calculation in
2000).
But this does not necessarily mean that Vermont’s
limits are less objectionable than the limit upheld in
Shrink. A campaign for state auditor is likely to be less
costly than a campaign for governor; campaign costs do
not automatically increase or decrease in precise propor
tion to the size of an electoral district. See App. 66 (1998
winning candidate for Vermont state auditor spent about
$60,000; winning candidate for governor spent about
$340,000); Opensecrets.org, The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle:
Hot Races, avai lable at http://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/hotraces.asp?cycle=2004 (as visited June 22, 2006,
and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (U. S. Senate cam
paigns identified as competitive spend less per voter than
U. S. House campaigns identified as competitive). More
over, Vermont’s limits, unlike Missouri’s limits, apply in the
same amounts to contributions made by political parties.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.4 (2000) (enacting limits on contribu
tions from political parties to candidates 10 times higher than
limits on contributions from individuals). And, as we have
said, Missouri’s (current) $1,275 per election limit, unlike Ver
mont’s $200 per election limit, is indexed for inflation. See
supra, at 251; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.2 (2000).
The factors we have mentioned offset any neutralizing
force of population differences. At the very least, they
make it difficult to treat Shrink’s (then) $1,075 limit as pro
viding affirmative support for the lawfulness of Vermont’s
far lower levels. Cf. 528 U. S., at 404 (Breyer, J., concur
ring) (The Shrink “limit . . . is low enough to raise . . . a
[significant constitutional] question”). And even were that
not so, Vermont’s failure to index for inflation means that
Vermont’s levels would soon be far lower than Missouri’s re
gardless of the method of comparison.

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In sum, Act 64’s contribution limits are substantially lower
than both the limits we have previously upheld and compara
ble limits in other States. These are danger signs that Act
64’s contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First
Amendment limits. We consequently must examine the rec
ord independently and carefully to determine whether Act
64’s contribution limits are “closely drawn” to match the
State’s interests.
C
Our examination of the record convinces us that, from a
constitutional perspective, Act 64’s contribution limits are
too restrictive. We reach this conclusion based not merely
on the low dollar amounts of the limits themselves, but also
on the statute’s effect on political parties and on volunteer
activity in Vermont elections. Taken together, Act 64’s sub
stantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the
funds necessary to run a competitive election, on the ability
of political parties to help their candidates get elected, and
on the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to
campaigns show that the Act is not closely drawn to meet
its objectives. In particular, five factors together lead us to
this decision.
First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively
prove, that Act 64’s contribution limits will significantly re
strict the amount of funding available for challengers to run
competitive campaigns. For one thing, the petitioners’ ex
pert, Clark Bensen, conducted a race-by-race analysis of the
1998 legislative elections (the last to take place before Act
64 took effect) and concluded that Act 64’s contribution limits
would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to Republican
challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from
18% to 53% of their total campaign income. See 3 Tr. 52–57
(estimating loss of 47% of funds for candidate Tully, 50% for
Harvey, 53% for Welch, 19% for Bahre, 29% for Delaney, 36%
for LaRocque, 18% for Smith, and 31% for Brown).

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For another thing, the petitioners’ expert witnesses
produced evidence and analysis showing that Vermont politi
cal parties (particularly the Republican Party) “target” their
contributions to candidates in competitive races, that those
contributions represent a significant amount of total candi
date funding in such races, and that the contribution limits
will cut the parties’ contributions to competitive races dra
matically. See 1 id., at 189–190; 3 id., at 50–51; 8 id., at 139;
10 id., at 150; see also, e. g., Gierzynski & Breaux, The Role
of Parties in Legislative Campaign Financing, 15 Am. Rev.
Politics 171 (1994); Thompson, Cassie, & Jewell, A Sacred
Cow or Just a Lot of Bull? Party and PAC Money in State
Legislative Elections, 47 Pol. Research Q. 223 (1994). Their
statistics showed that the party contributions accounted for
a significant percentage of the total campaign income in
those races. And their studies showed that Act 64’s contri
bution limits would cut the party contributions by between
85% (for the legislature on average) and 99% (for governor).
More specifically, Bensen pointed out that in 1998, the Re
publican Party made contributions to 19 Senate campaigns
in amounts that averaged $2,001, which on average repre
sented 16% of the recipient campaign’s total income. 3
Tr. 84. Act 64 would reduce these contributions to $300 per
campaign, an average reduction of about 85%. Ibid. The
party contributed to 50 House campaigns in amounts averag
ing $787, which on average represented 28% of the recipient
campaign’s total income. Id., at 85. Act 64 would reduce
these contributions to $200 per campaign, an average reduc
tion of 74.5%. Ibid. And the party contributed $40,600 to
its gubernatorial candidate, an amount that accounted for
about 16% of the candidate’s funding. Id., at 86. The Act
would have reduced that contribution by 99%, to $400.
Bensen added that 57% of all 1998 Senate campaigns and
30% of all House campaigns exceeded Act 64’s expenditure
limits, which were enacted along with the statute’s contribu
tion limits. 7 Trial Exhs. in No. 00–9159(L) etc. (CA2), Exh.

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8, p. 2351. Moreover, 27% of all Senate campaigns and 10%
of all House campaigns spent more than double those lim
its. Ibid.
The respondents did not contest these figures. Rather,
they presented evidence that focused, not upon strongly con
tested campaigns, but upon the funding amounts available for
the average campaign. The respondents’ expert, Anthony
Gierzynski, concluded, for example, that Act 64 would have
a “minimal effect on . . . candidates’ ability to raise funds.”
App. 46. But he rested this conclusion upon his finding that
“only a small proportion of ” all contributions to all cam
paigns for state office “made during the last three elections
would have been affected by the new limits.” Id., at 47; see
also id., at 51 (discussing “average amount of revenues lost
to the limits” in legislative races (emphasis added)); id., at
52–53 (discussing total number of campaigns receiving con
tributions over Act 64’s limit). The lower courts similarly
relied almost exclusively on averages in assessing Act 64’s
effect. See 118 F. Supp. 2d, at 470 (“Approximately 88% to
96% of the campaign contributions to recent House races
were under $200” (emphasis added)); id., at 478 (“Expert tes
timony revealed that over the last three election cycles the
percentage of all candidates’ contributions received over
the contribution limits was less than 10%” (emphasis added)).
The respondents’ evidence leaves the petitioners’ evidence
unrebutted in certain key respects. That is because the
critical question concerns not simply the average effect of
contribution limits on fundraising but, more importantly, the
ability of a candidate running against an incumbent office
holder to mount an effective challenge. And information
about average races, rather than competitive races, is only
distantly related to that question, because competitive races
are likely to be far more expensive than the average race.
See, e. g., N. Ornstein, T. Mann, & M. Malbin, Vital Statistics
on Congress 2001–2002, pp. 89–98 (2002) (data showing that
spending in competitive elections, i. e., where incumbent

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wins with less than 60% of vote or where incumbent loses,
is far greater than in most elections, where incumbent wins
with more than 60% of the vote). We concede that the rec
ord does contain some anecdotal evidence supporting the re
spondents’ position, namely, testimony about a post-Act-64
competitive mayoral campaign in Burlington, which suggests
that a challenger can “amas[s] the resources necessary for
effective advocacy,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. But the facts
of that particular election are not described in sufficient de
tail to offer a convincing refutation of the implication arising
from the petitioners’ experts’ studies.
Rather, the petitioners’ studies, taken together with low
average Vermont campaign expenditures and the typically
higher costs that a challenger must bear to overcome the
name-recognition advantage enjoyed by an incumbent, raise
a reasonable inference that the contribution limits are so low
that they may pose a significant obstacle to candidates in
competitive elections. Cf. Ornstein, supra, at 87–96 (In the
2000 U. S. House and Senate elections, successful challengers
spent far more than the average candidate). Information
about average races does not rebut that inference. Conse
quently, the inference amounts to one factor (among others)
that here counts against the constitutional validity of the
contribution limits.
Second, Act 64’s insistence that political parties abide by
exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other
contributors threatens harm to a particularly important po
litical right, the right to associate in a political party. See,
e. g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567,
574 (2000) (describing constitutional importance of associat
ing in political parties to elect candidates); Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 357 (1997) (same); Col
orado I, 518 U. S., at 616 (same); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S.
279, 288 (1992) (same). Cf. Buckley, supra, at 20–22 (contri
bution limits constitute “only a marginal restriction” on First
Amendment rights because contributor remains free to asso

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ciate politically, e. g., in a political party, and “assist person
ally” in the party’s “efforts on behalf of candidates”).
The Act applies its $200 to $400 limits—precisely the same
limits it applies to an individual—to virtually all affiliates
of a political party taken together as if they were a single
contributor. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2805(a) (2002). That
means, for example, that the Vermont Democratic Party,
taken together with all its local affiliates, can make one con
tribution of at most $400 to the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate, one contribution of at most $300 to a Democratic
candidate for State Senate, and one contribution of at most
$200 to a Democratic candidate for the State House of Repre
sentatives. The Act includes within these limits not only
direct monetary contributions but also expenditures in kind:
stamps, stationery, coffee, doughnuts, gasoline, campaign
buttons, and so forth. See § 2801(2). Indeed, it includes all
party expenditures “intended to promote the election of a
specific candidate or group of candidates” as long as the can
didate’s campaign “facilitate[s],” “solicit[s],” or “approve[s]”
them. §§ 2809(a), (c). And a party expenditure that “pri
marily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated
with the” party is “presumed” to count against the party’s
contribution limits. § 2809(d).
In addition to the negative effect on “amassing funds” that
we have described, see supra, at 253–256, the Act would se
verely limit the ability of a party to assist its candidates’
campaigns by engaging in coordinated spending on advertis
ing, candidate events, voter lists, mass mailings, even yard
signs. And, to an unusual degree, it would discourage those
who wish to contribute small amounts of money to a party,
amounts that easily comply with individual contribution lim
its. Suppose that many individuals do not know Vermont
legislative candidates personally, but wish to contribute, say,
$20 or $40, to the State Republican Party, with the intent
that the party use the money to help elect whichever candi
dates the party believes would best advance its ideals and

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interests—the basic object of a political party. Or, to take
a more extreme example, imagine that 6,000 Vermont citi
zens each want to give $1 to the State Democratic Party
because, though unfamiliar with the details of the individual
races, they would like to make a small financial contribution
to the goal of electing a Democratic state legislature. And
further imagine that the party believes control of the legisla
ture will depend on the outcome of three (and only three)
House races. The Act prohibits the party from giving
$2,000 (of the $6,000) to each of its candidates in those pivotal
races. Indeed, it permits the party to give no more than
$200 to each candidate, thereby thwarting the aims of the
6,000 donors from making a meaningful contribution to state
politics by giving a small amount of money to the party they
support. Thus, the Act would severely inhibit collective po
litical activity by preventing a political party from using con
tributions by small donors to provide meaningful assistance
to any individual candidate. See supra, at 256–257.
We recognize that we have previously upheld limits on
contributions from political parties to candidates, in particu
lar the federal limits on coordinated party spending. Colo
rado II, 533 U. S. 431. And we also recognize that any such
limit will negatively affect to some extent the fund-allocating
party function just described. But the contribution limits
at issue in Colorado II were far less problematic, for they
were significantly higher than Act 64’s limits. See id., at
438–439, and n. 3, 442, n. 7 (at least $67,560 in coordinated
spending and $5,000 in direct cash contributions for U. S.
Senate candidates, at least $33,780 in coordinated spending
and $5,000 in direct cash contributions for U. S. House candi
dates). And they were much higher than the federal limits
on contributions from individuals to candidates, thereby re
flecting an effort by Congress to balance (1) the need to allow
individuals to participate in the political process by contrib
uting to political parties that help elect candidates with

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(2) the need to prevent the use of political parties “to circum
vent contribution limits that apply to individuals.” Id., at
453. Act 64, by placing identical limits upon contributions
to candidates, whether made by an individual or by a political
party, gives to the former consideration no weight at all.
We consequently agree with the District Court that the
Act’s contribution limits “would reduce the voice of political
parties” in Vermont to a “whisper.” 118 F. Supp. 2d, at 487.
And we count the special party-related harms that Act 64
threatens as a further factor weighing against the constitu
tional validity of the contribution limits.
Third, the Act’s treatment of volunteer services aggra
vates the problem. Like its federal statutory counterpart,
the Act excludes from its definition of “contribution” all
“services provided without compensation by individuals vol
unteering their time on behalf of a candidate.” Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801(2) (2002). Cf. 2 U. S. C. § 431(8)(B)(i)
(2000 ed. and Supp. III) (similar exemption in federal cam
paign finance statute). But the Act does not exclude the
expenses those volunteers incur, such as travel expenses, in
the course of campaign activities. The Act’s broad defini
tions would seem to count those expenses against the volun
teer’s contribution limit, at least where the spending was
facilitated or approved by campaign officials. Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801(3) (2002) (“[E]xpenditure” includes “any
thing of value, paid . . . for the purpose of influencing an
election”); §§ 2809(a), (c) (Any “expenditure . . . intentionally
facilitated by, solicited by or approved by the candidate”
counts as a “contribution”). And, unlike the Federal Gov
ernment’s treatment of comparable requirements, the State
has not (insofar as we are aware) created an exception ex
cluding such expenses. Cf. 2 U. S. C. §§ 431(8)(B)(iv), (ix)
(2000 ed. and Supp. III) (excluding from the definition of
“contribution” volunteer travel expenses up to $1,000 and
payment by political party for campaign materials used in
connection with volunteer activities).

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The absence of some such exception may matter in the
present context, where contribution limits are very low.
That combination, low limits and no exceptions, means that
a gubernatorial campaign volunteer who makes four or five
round trips driving across the State performing volunteer
activities coordinated with the campaign can find that he or
she is near, or has surpassed, the contribution limit. So too
will a volunteer who offers a campaign the use of her house
along with coffee and doughnuts for a few dozen neighbors
to meet the candidate, say, two or three times during a cam
paign. Cf. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002) (excluding
expenditures for such activities only up to $100). Such sup
porters will have to keep careful track of all miles driven,
postage supplied (500 stamps equals $200), pencils and pads
used, and so forth. And any carelessness in this respect can
prove costly, perhaps generating a headline, “Campaign laws
violated,” that works serious harm to the candidate.
These sorts of problems are unlikely to affect the constitu
tionality of a limit that is reasonably high. Cf. Buckley, 424
U. S., at 36–37 (Coordinated expenditure by a volunteer “pro
vides material financial assistance to a candidate,” and there
fore “may properly be viewed as a contribution”). But Act
64’s contribution limits are so low, and its definition of “con
tribution” so broad, that the Act may well impede a cam
paign’s ability effectively to use volunteers, thereby making
it more difficult for individuals to associate in this way.
Cf. id., at 22 (Federal contribution limits “leave the contribu
tor free to become a member of any political association and
to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of
candidates”). Again, the very low limits at issue help to
transform differences in degree into difference in kind. And
the likelihood of unjustified interference in the present con
text is sufficiently great that we must consider the lack of
tailoring in the Act’s definition of “contribution” as an added
factor counting against the constitutional validity of the con
tribution limits before us.

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Fourth, unlike the contribution limits we upheld in Shrink,
see supra, at 251, Act 64’s contribution limits are not ad
justed for inflation. Its limits decline in real value each
year. Indeed, in real dollars the Act’s limits have already
declined by about 20% ($200 in 2006 dollars has a real value
of $160.66 in 1997 dollars). A failure to index limits means
that limits which are already suspiciously low, see supra, at
249–253, will almost inevitably become too low over time.
It means that future legislation will be necessary to stop that
almost inevitable decline, and it thereby imposes the burden
of preventing the decline upon incumbent legislators who
may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels
to ensure the adequate financing of electoral challenges.
Fifth, we have found nowhere in the record any special
justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low
or so restrictive as to bring about the serious associational
and expressive problems that we have described. Rather,
the basic justifications the State has advanced in support of
such limits are those present in Buckley. The record con
tains no indication that, for example, corruption (or its ap
pearance) in Vermont is significantly more serious a matter
than elsewhere. Indeed, other things being equal, one
might reasonably believe that a contribution of, say, $250 (or
$450) to a candidate’s campaign was less likely to prove a
corruptive force than the far larger contributions at issue in
the other campaign finance cases we have considered. See
supra, at 250–253.
These five sets of considerations, taken together, lead us
to conclude that Act 64’s contribution limits are not narrowly
tailored. Rather, the Act burdens First Amendment inter
ests by threatening to inhibit effective advocacy by those
who seek election, particularly challengers; its contribution
limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper partici
pation in campaigns through volunteer activities; and they
are not indexed for inflation. Vermont does not point to a
legitimate statutory objective that might justify these spe

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cial burdens. We understand that many, though not all,
campaign finance regulations impose certain of these bur
dens to some degree. We also understand the legitimate
need for constitutional leeway in respect to legislative line
drawing. But our discussion indicates why we conclude that
Act 64 in this respect nonetheless goes too far. It dispropor
tionately burdens numerous First Amendment interests, and
consequently, in our view, violates the First Amendment.
We add that we do not believe it possible to sever some of
the Act’s contribution limit provisions from others that might
remain fully operative. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Cor
poration Comm’n of Okla., 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932) (“invalid
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a
law”); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 191 (1999) (severability “essentially
an inquiry into legislative intent”); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1,
§ 215 (2003) (severability principles apply to Vermont stat
utes). To sever provisions to avoid constitutional objection
here would require us to write words into the statute (infla
tion indexing), or to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on
party contributions), or to foresee which of many different
possible ways the legislature might respond to the constitu
tional objections we have found. Given these difficulties, we
believe the Vermont Legislature would have intended us to
set aside the statute’s contribution limits, leaving the legisla
ture free to rewrite those provisions in light of the constitu
tional difficulties we have identified.
IV
We conclude that Act 64’s expenditure limits violate the
First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo. We
also conclude that the specific details of Act 64’s contribution
limits require us to hold that those limits violate the First
Amendment, for they burden First Amendment interests in
a manner that is disproportionate to the public purposes they
were enacted to advance. Given our holding, we need not,

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Opinion of Alito, J.
and do not, examine the constitutionality of the statute’s pre
sumption that certain party expenditures are coordinated
with a candidate. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re
versed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I concur in the judgment and join in Justice Breyer’s
opinion except for Parts II–B–1 and II–B–2. Contrary to
the suggestion of those sections, respondents’ primary de
fense of Vermont’s expenditure limits is that those limits are
consistent with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per cu
riam). See Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner William
H. Sorrell et al. 15–28 (hereinafter Sorrell Brief); Brief for
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Vermont Public Interest Re
search Group et al. 5–36 (hereinafter VPIRG Brief). Only
as a backup argument, an afterthought almost, do respond
ents make a naked plea for us to “revisit Buckley.” Sorrell
Brief 28; VPIRG Brief 36. This is fairly incongruous, given
that respondents’ defense of Vermont’s contribution limits
rests squarely on Buckley and later decisions that built on
Buckley, and yet respondents fail to explain why it would
be appropriate to reexamine only one part of the holding in
Buckley. More to the point, respondents fail to discuss the
doctrine of stare decisis or the Court’s cases elaborating on
the circumstances in which it is appropriate to reconsider a
prior constitutional decision. Indeed, only once in 99 pages
of briefing from respondents do the words “stare decisis” ap
pear, and that reference is in connection with contribution
limits. See Sorrell Brief 31. Such an incomplete presenta
tion is reason enough to refuse respondents’ invitation to
reexamine Buckley. See United States v. International
Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996).

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Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
Whether or not a case can be made for reexamining Buck
ley in whole or in part, what matters is that respondents
do not do so here, and so I think it unnecessary to reach
the issue.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment.
The Court decides the constitutionality of the limitations
Vermont places on campaign expenditures and contributions.
I agree that both limitations violate the First Amendment.
As the plurality notes, our cases hold that expenditure
limitations “place substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in
protected political expression, restrictions that the First
Amendment cannot tolerate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, 58–59 (1976) (per curiam); see also Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518
U. S. 604, 618 (1996) (principal opinion); Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985).
The parties neither ask the Court to overrule Buckley in
full nor challenge the level of scrutiny that decision applies
to campaign contributions. The exacting scrutiny the plu
rality applies to expenditure limitations, however, is appro
priate. For the reasons explained in the plurality opinion,
respondents’ attempts to distinguish the present limitations
from those we have invalidated are unavailing. The Court
has upheld contribution limits that do “not come even close
to passing any serious scrutiny.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Those concerns aside, Vermont’s contributions,
as the plurality’s detailed analysis indicates, are even more
stifling than the ones that survived Shrink’s unduly lenient
review.
The universe of campaign finance regulation is one this
Court has in part created and in part permitted by its course
of decisions. That new order may cause more problems than

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it solves. On a routine, operational level the present system
requires us to explain why $200 is too restrictive a limit
while $1,500 is not. Our own experience gives us little basis
to make these judgments, and certainly no traditional or
well-established body of law exists to offer guidance. On a
broader, systemic level political parties have been denied
basic First Amendment rights. See, e. g., McConnell v. Fed
eral Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 286–287, 313 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Entering to fill the void have been new entities
such as political action committees, which are as much the
creatures of law as of traditional forces of speech and associa
tion. Those entities can manipulate the system and attract
their own elite power brokers, who operate in ways obscure
to the ordinary citizen.
Viewed within the legal universe we have ratified and
helped create, the result the plurality reaches is correct;
given my own skepticism regarding that system and its oper
ation, however, it seems to me appropriate to concur only in
the judgment.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, con
curring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the plurality that Vt. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002) (Act 64 or Act), is unconstitu
tional, I disagree with its rationale for striking down that
statute. Invoking stare decisis, the plurality rejects the in
vitation to overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam).1 It then applies Buckley to invalidate the expend
iture limitations and, less persuasively, the contribution limi
1 Although the plurality’s stare decisis analysis is limited to Buckley’s
treatment of expenditure limitations, its reasoning cannot be so confined,
and would apply equally to Buckley’s standard for evaluating contribution
limits. See ante, at 244 (noting, inter alia, that Buckley has engendered
“considerable reliance” that would be “dramatically undermine[d]” by
overruling it now).

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tations. I continue to believe that Buckley provides insuf
ficient protection to political speech, the core of the First
Amendment. The illegitimacy of Buckley is further under
scored by the continuing inability of the Court (and the plu
rality here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled
fashion. As a result, stare decisis should pose no bar to
overruling Buckley and replacing it with a standard faithful
to the First Amendment. Accordingly, I concur only in the
judgment.
I
I adhere to my view that this Court erred in Buckley when
it distinguished between contribution and expenditure limits,
finding the former to be a less severe infringement on First
Amendment rights. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern
ment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–418 (2000) (Shrink) (dissenting
opinion); Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 465–466 (2001)
(Colorado II) (same); Colorado Republican Federal Cam
paign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604,
635–644 (1996) (Colorado I) (opinion concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part). “[U]nlike the Buckley Court, I
believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as
seriously upon freedom of political expression and associa
tion as do expenditure limits.” Id., at 640. The Buckley
Court distinguished contributions from expenditures based
on the presence of an intermediary between a contributor
and the speech eventually produced. But that reliance is
misguided, given that “[e]ven in the case of a direct ex
penditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates
the dissemination of the spender’s message.” Colorado I,
supra, at 638–639 (opinion of Thomas, J.); Shrink, supra,
at 413–418 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Likewise, Buckley’s
suggestion that contribution caps only marginally restrict
speech, because “[a] contribution serves as a general expres
sion of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the support,” 424 U. S.,

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at 21, even if descriptively accurate, does not support restric
tions on contributions. After all, statements of general sup
port are as deserving of constitutional protection as those
that communicate specific reasons for that support. Colo
rado I, supra, at 639–640 (opinion of Thomas, J.); Shrink,
supra, at 414–415, and n. 3 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Ac
cordingly, I would overrule Buckley and subject both the
contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 to strict
scrutiny, which they would fail. See Colorado I, supra,
at 640–641 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“I am convinced that
under traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on
both spending and giving in the political process . . . are
unconstitutional”). See also Colorado II, supra, at 465–466
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
II
The plurality opinion, far from making the case for Buck
ley as a rule of law, itself demonstrates that Buckley’s lim
ited scrutiny of contribution limits is “insusceptible of princi
pled application,” and accordingly is not entitled to stare
decisis effect. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed,
“ ‘when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly rea
soned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow prece
dent.’ ” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 306 (2004) (plural
ity opinion) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827
(1991); internal quotation marks omitted). Today’s newly
minted, multifactor test, particularly when read in combina
tion with the Court’s decision in Shrink, supra, places this
Court in the position of addressing the propriety of regula
tions of political speech based upon little more than its im
pression of the appropriate limits.
The plurality sets forth what appears to be a two-step
process for evaluating the validity of contribution limits:
First, determine whether there are “danger signs” in a par
ticular case that the limits are too low; and, second, use “in
dependent judicial judgment” to “review the record inde

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pendently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the
statute’s ‘tailoring,’ that is, toward assessing the proportion
ality of the restrictions.” Ante, at 249. Neither step of this
test can be reduced to a workable inquiry to be performed by
States attempting to comply with this Court’s jurisprudence.
As to the first step, it is entirely unclear how to determine
whether limits are so low as to constitute “danger signs” that
require a court to “examine the record independently and
carefully.” Ante, at 253. The plurality points to several as
pects of the Act that support its conclusion that such signs
are present here: (1) The limits are set per election cycle,
rather than divided between primary and general elections;
(2) the limits apply to contributions from political parties;
(3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation; and (4) the lim
its are below those we have previously upheld. Ante, at
249–253.
The first two elements of the Act are indeed constitution
ally problematic, but they have no bearing on whether the
contribution limits are too low. The first substantially ad
vantages candidates in a general election who did not face a
serious primary challenge. In practice, this restriction will
generally suppress more speech by challengers than by in
cumbents, without serving the interests the Court has recog
nized as compelling, i. e., the prevention of corruption or the
appearance thereof. Cf. B. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly
of Campaign Finance Reform 50–51 (2001) (hereinafter
Smith) (describing the ability of incumbents to amass money
early, discouraging serious challengers from entering a race).
The second element has no relation to these compelling inter
ests either, given that “ ‘[t]he very aim of a political party is
to influence its candidate’s stance on issues and, if the candi
date takes office or is reelected, his votes.’ ” Colorado II,
supra, at 476 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Colorado I,
supra, at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dis
senting in part)). That these provisions are unconstitu
tional, however, does not make the contribution limits on in
dividuals unconstitutionally low.

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We are left, then, with two reasons to scrutinize Act 64’s
limitations: They are lower than those of other States, and
lower than those we have upheld in previous cases, i. e.,
Buckley and Shrink. But the relative limits of other States
cannot be the key factor, for such considerations are nothing
more than a moving target. After all, if the Vermont Legis
lature simply persuaded several other States to lower their
contribution limits to parallel Act 64, then the Act, which
would still “significantly restrict the amount of funding avail
able for challengers to run competitive campaigns,” ante, at
253, would survive this aspect of the plurality’s proposed
test.
Nor is the relationship of these limits to those in Buckley
and Shrink a critical fact. In Shrink, the Court specifically
determined that Buckley did not “set a minimum constitu
tional threshold for contribution limits,” rejecting such a
contention as a “fundamental misunderstanding of what we
held.” 528 U. S., at 396. The plurality’s current treatment
of the limits in Shrink as a constitutional minimum, or at
least as limits below which “danger signs” are present, thus
cannot be reconciled with Shrink itself.
Having nevertheless concluded that these “danger signs”
require us to scrutinize the record, the plurality embarks on
an odd review of the contribution limits, combining unrelated
factors to determine that, “[t]aken together,” ante, at 253,
the restrictions of Act 64 are not closely drawn to meet their
objectives. Two of these factors simply cause the already
stringent limitations on individual contributions to be more
stringent; i. e., volunteer services count toward the contribu
tion limit, ante, at 259–260, and the limits do not change with
inflation, so they will become even more stringent in time,
ante, at 261.2 While these characteristics confirm the plu
2 Ironically, the plurality is troubled by the fact that the absence of a
provision adjusting the limits for inflation means that the real value of the
limits will decline, and that “the burden of preventing the decline [lies]
upon incumbent legislators who may not diligently police the need for
changes in limit levels to ensure the adequate financing of electoral chal

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rality’s impression that these limits are, indeed, quite low,
they have nothing whatsoever to do with whether the re
strictions are closely drawn to meet their objectives. The
plurality would presumably uphold a limit on contributions
of $1 million, even if volunteer services counted toward that
limit and the limit did not change with inflation. Character
izing these facts as shifting Act 64’s limits from “suspiciously
low” to “too low,” ibid., provides no insight on how to draw
this constitutional line.
The plurality next departs from the general applicability
of the contribution limits entirely, and notes the substantial
interference of the contribution limits with the activities of
parties. Again, I do not dispute that the limitation on party
contributions is unconstitutional; as I have previously noted,
such limitations are unconstitutional even under Buckley.
See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 476–477 (dissenting opinion).
But it is entirely unclear why the mere fact that the “suspi
ciously low” contribution limits also apply to parties should
mean that those limits are in fact “too low” when they are
applied to individuals. If the limits impermissibly intrude
upon the associational rights of parties, then the limits are
unconstitutional as applied to parties. But limits on indi
viduals cannot be transformed from permissible to too low
simply because they also apply to political parties.3
lenges.” Ante, at 261. It is impossible to square this wariness of incum
bents’ disinclination to enact future laws protecting challengers with the
plurality’s deference to those same incumbents when they make empirical
judgments regarding “the precise restriction necessary to carry out the
statute’s legitimate objectives” in the first place. Ante, at 248.
3 The plurality’s connection of these two factors implies that it is con
cerned not with the impact on the speech of contributors, but solely with
the speech of candidates, for whom the two facts might be connected. See
ante, at 253. Indeed, the plurality notably omits interference with partic
ipation in campaigns through monetary contributions from the list of rea
sons the Act is unconstitutional. See ante, at 253, 261. But contributors,
too, have a right to free speech. See Colorado I, 518 U. S. 604, 637 (1996)

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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
We are left, then, with two arguably relevant points to
transform these contribution limits from the realm of the
“suspicious” to the realm of the impermissible. First, the
limits affect a substantial portion of the money given to chal
lengers. But contribution limits always disproportionately
burden challengers, who often have smaller bases of support
than incumbents. See Smith 66–70. In Shrink, the Court
expressly rejected the argument that a negative impact on
a challenger could render a contribution limit invalid, relying
on the same sort of analysis of the “average effect of contri
bution limits on fundraising,” ante, at 255, that the plurality
today rejects. See 528 U. S., at 396 (noting that 97.62% of
all contributors for state auditor made contributions of less
than $2,000, and that “[e]ven if we were to assume that the
contribution limits affected respondent[’s] ability to wage
a competitive campaign . . . a showing of one affected in
dividual does not point up a system of suppressed political
advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley”).
Cf. id., at 420 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court in Buck
ley provided no basis for suppressing the speech of an indi
vidual candidate simply because other candidates (or candi
dates in the aggregate) may succeed in reaching the voting
public. . . . [A]ny such reasoning would fly in the face of the
premise of our political system—liberty vested in individual
hands safeguards the functioning of our democracy”). An
individual’s First Amendment right is infringed whether his
speech is decreased by 5% or 95%, and whether he suffers
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (“If an individ
ual is limited in the amount of resources he can contribute to the pool, he
is most certainly limited in his ability to associate for purposes of effective
advocacy”). Even Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), rec
ognizes that contribution limits restrict the free speech of contributors,
even if it understates the significance of this restriction. See id., at 20–21
(“[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may con
tribute to a candidate . . . entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication”).

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alone or shares his violation with his fellow citizens. Cer
tainly, the First Amendment does not authorize us to judge
whether a restriction of political speech imposes a suffi
ciently severe disadvantage on challengers that a candidate
should be able to complain. See Shrink, supra, at 427
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts have no yardstick by
which to judge the proper amount and effectiveness of cam
paign speech”).
The plurality’s final justification fares no better. Arguing
that Vermont offers no justification for imposing a limit
lower than that imposed in any other State is simply another
way of saying that the benchmark for whether a contribution
limitation is constitutional is what other States have im
posed. As I have noted above, supra, at 269, tying individu
als’ First Amendment rights to the presence or absence of
similar laws in other States is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.
The plurality recognizes that the burdens which lead it to
invalidate Act 64’s contribution limits are present under
“many, though not all, campaign finance regulations.” Ante,
at 262. As a result, the plurality does not purport to offer
any single touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of
such laws. Indeed, its discussion offers nothing resembling
a rule at all. From all appearances, the plurality simply
looked at these limits and said, in its “independent judicial
judgment,” ante, at 249, that they are too low. The atmo
spherics—whether they vary with inflation, whether they
are as high as those in other States or those in Shrink and
Buckley, whether they apply to volunteer activities and par
ties—no doubt help contribute to the plurality’s sentiment.
But a feeling does not amount to a workable rule of law.
This is not to say that the plurality errs in concluding that
these limits are too low to satisfy even Buckley’s lenient
standard. Indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine that
any legislator would ever find his scruples overcome by a
$201 donation. See Shrink, supra, at 425 (Thomas, J., dis

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Stevens, J., dissenting
senting) (“I cannot fathom how a $251 contribution could
pose a substantial risk of ‘secur[ing] a political quid pro
quo’ ” (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26)). And the statistics
relied on by the plurality indeed reveal that substantial re
sources will be lost by candidates running campaigns under
these limits. See ante, at 253–256. Given that these con
tribution limits severely impinge on the ability of candidates
to run campaigns and on the ability of citizens to contribute
to campaigns, and do so without any demonstrable need to
avoid corruption, they cannot possibly satisfy even Buckley’s
ambiguous level of scrutiny.
But the plurality’s determination that this statute clearly
lies on the impermissible side of the constitutional line gives
no assistance in drawing this line, and it is clear that no
such line can be drawn rationally. There is simply no way
to calculate just how much money a person would need to
receive before he would be corrupt or perceived to be cor
rupt (and such a calculation would undoubtedly vary by per
son). Likewise, there is no meaningful way of discerning
just how many resources must be lost before speech is “dis
proportionately burden[ed].” Ante, at 262. Buckley, as the
plurality has applied it, gives us license to simply strike
down any limits that just seem to be too stringent, and to
uphold the rest. The First Amendment does not grant us
this authority. Buckley provides no consistent protection to
the core of the First Amendment, and must be overruled.
* * *
For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Justice Breyer and Justice Souter debate whether
the per curiam decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1
(1976), forecloses any constitutional limitations on candidate
expenditures. This is plainly an issue on which reasonable
minds can disagree. The Buckley Court never explicitly ad

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274 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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dressed whether the pernicious effects of endless fundraising
can serve as a compelling state interest that justifies ex
penditure limits, post, at 282 (Souter, J., dissenting), yet its
silence, in light of the record before it, suggests that it im
plicitly treated this proposed interest insufficient, ante, at
245–246 (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.). Assuming this to
be true, however, I am convinced that Buckley’s holding on
expenditure limits is wrong, and that the time has come to
overrule it.
I have not reached this conclusion lightly. As Justice
Breyer correctly observes, stare decisis is a principle of
“ ‘fundamental importance.’ ” Ante, at 243. But it is not an
inexorable command, and several factors, taken together,
provide special justification for revisiting the constitutional
ity of statutory limits on candidate expenditures.
To begin with, Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits it
self upset a long-established practice. For the preceding 65
years, congressional races had been subject to statutory lim
its on both expenditures and contributions. See Act of Aug.
19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 28; Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925, 43 Stat. 1073; Federal Election Campaign Finance
Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 5; Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263; United States v. Auto
mobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 575–576 (1957); McConnell v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 115–117 (2003). As
the Court of Appeals had recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F. 2d 821, 859 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam), our ear
lier jurisprudence provided solid support for treating these
limits as permissible regulations of conduct rather than
speech. Ibid. (discussing Burroughs v. United States, 290
U. S. 534 (1934), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612
(1954)); see also 519 F. 2d, at 841, and n. 41, 851, and n. 68.
While Buckley’s holding on contribution limits was consist
ent with this backdrop, its holding on expenditure limits “in
volve[d] collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in
its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience,”
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940).

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There are further reasons for reexamining Buckley’s hold
ing on candidate expenditure limits that do not apply to its
holding on candidate contribution limits. Although we have
subsequently reiterated the line Buckley drew between
these two types of limits, we have done so primarily in cases
affirming the validity of contribution limits or their func
tional equivalents. See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 134–138;
Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed
eral Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440–442 (2001); Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386–
387 (2000); cf. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Elec
tion Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 194–195 (1981) (plurality opin
ion). In contrast, these are our first post-Buckley cases
that raise the constitutionality of expenditure limits on the
amounts that candidates for office may spend on their own
campaigns.1
Accordingly, while we have explicitly recognized the im
portance of stare decisis in the context of Buckley’s holding
on contribution limits, McConnell, 540 U. S., at 137–138, we
have never before done so with regard to its rejection of
expenditure limits. And McConnell’s recognition rested
largely on an interest specific to Buckley’s holding on contri
bution limits. There, we stated that “[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative
and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide addi
tional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contri
bution limits that the Court has consistently followed since
Buckley was decided.” 540 U. S., at 137–138 (emphasis
added). This powerful buttress is absent from Buckley’s re
1 We have, of course, invalidated limits on independent expenditures by
third persons. Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Po
litical Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985); Colorado Republican Fed
eral Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604 (1996);
cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U. S. 238 (1986). In these cases the principal parties accepted Buckley’s
holding on candidate expenditure limits and gave us no cause to consider
how much weight to give stare decisis.

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276 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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fusal to defer to the Legislature’s judgment as to the impor
tance of expenditure limits. Relatedly, while Congress and
state legislatures have long relied on Buckley’s authorization
of contribution limits, Buckley’s rejection of expenditure
limits “has not induced [comparable] detrimental reliance,”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003). See also Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion) (not
ing lessened stare decisis concern where “it is hard to imag
ine how any action taken in reliance upon [the prior case]
could conceivably be frustrated”).
Perhaps in partial recognition of these points, Justice
White refused to abandon his opposition to Buckley’s holding
on expenditure limits. See Federal Election Comm’n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 271
(1986); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 507–512 (1985) (dis
senting opinion). He believed Buckley deeply wrong on this
issue because it confused “the identification of speech with
its antecedents.” National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U. S., at 508. Over the course of his steadfast
campaign, he converted at least one other Buckley partici
pant to this position, see National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 518–521 (Marshall, J., dissent
ing), and his reasoning has since persuaded me—the nonpar
ticipating Member of the Buckley Court—as well.
As Justice White recognized, it is quite wrong to equate
money and speech. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 263 (opinion con
curring in part and dissenting in part). To the contrary:
“The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations
on the spending of money is minimal and indirect. All
rights of direct political expression and advocacy are re
tained. Even under the campaign laws as originally
enacted, everyone was free to spend as much as they
chose to amplify their views on general political issues,
just not specific candidates. The restrictions, to the ex

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277 Cite as: 548 U. S. 230 (2006)
Stevens, J., dissenting
tent they do affect speech, are viewpoint-neutral and in
dicate no hostility to the speech itself or its effects.”
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U. S., at 508–509 (White, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, these limits on expenditures are far more akin
to time, place, and manner restrictions than to restrictions
on the content of speech. Like Justice White, I would up
hold them “so long as the purposes they serve are legitimate
and sufficiently substantial.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 264.
Buckley’s conclusion to the contrary relied on the follow
ing oft-quoted metaphor:
“Being free to engage in unlimited political expression
subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to
drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires
on a single tank of gasoline.” Id., at 19, n. 18.
But, of course, while a car cannot run without fuel, a candi
date can speak without spending money. And while a car
can only travel so many miles per gallon, there is no limit on
the number of speeches or interviews a candidate may give
on a limited budget. Moreover, provided that this budget is
above a certain threshold, a candidate can exercise due care
to ensure that her message reaches all voters. Just as a
driver need not use a Hummer to reach her destination, so a
candidate need not flood the airways with ceaseless sound
bites of trivial information in order to provide voters with
reasons to support her.
Indeed, the examples of effective speech in the political
arena that did not depend on any significant expenditure by
the campaigner are legion. It was the content of William
Jennings Bryan’s comments on the “Cross of Gold”—and Wil
liam McKinley’s responses delivered from his front porch in
Canton, Ohio—rather than any expenditure of money that
appealed to their cost-free audiences. Neither Abraham
Lincoln nor John F. Kennedy paid for the opportunity to
engage in the debates with Stephen Douglas and Richard

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278 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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Nixon that may well have determined the outcomes of Presi
dential elections. When the seasoned campaigners who
were Members of the Congress that endorsed the expendi
ture limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend
ments of 1974 concluded that a modest budget would not
preclude them from effectively communicating with the elec
torate, they necessarily rejected the Buckley metaphor.
These campaigners also identified significant government
interests favoring the imposition of expenditure limits. Not
only do these limits serve as an important complement to
corruption-reducing contribution limits, see id., at 264 (opin
ion of White, J.), but they also “protect equal access to the
political arena, [and] free candidates and their staffs from the
interminable burden of fundraising.” Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518
U. S. 604, 649–650 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). These
last two interests are particularly acute. When campaign
costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to throw
their hats into the ring, we fail “to protect the political proc
ess from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and
to promote individual responsibility for democratic gov
ernment.” Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 590. States
have recognized this problem,2 but Buckley’s perceived ban
on expenditure limits severely limits their options in deal
ing with it.
The interest in freeing candidates from the fundraising
straitjacket is even more compelling. Without expenditure
limits, fundraising devours the time and attention of political
leaders, leaving them too busy to handle their public respon
sibilities effectively. That fact was well recognized by back
ers of the legislation reviewed in Buckley, by the Court of
Appeals judges who voted to uphold the expenditure limita
tions in that statute, and by Justice White—who not inciden
2 See Brief for State of Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae 16–17 (citing
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–940(B)(7); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–45–102; Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 32–1602(1); and R. I. Gen. Laws § 17–25–18).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
tally had personal experience as an active participant in a
Presidential campaign. Cf. 519 F. 2d, at 838 (and citations
to legislative history contained therein); 424 U. S., at 265
(opinion of White, J.). The validity of their judgment has
surely been confirmed by the mountains of evidence that has
been accumulated in recent years concerning the time that
elected officials spend raising money for future campaigns
and the adverse effect of fundraising on the performance of
their official duties.3
Additionally, there is no convincing evidence that these im
portant interests favoring expenditure limits are fronts for
incumbency protection. Buckley’s cursory suggestion to
the contrary, id., at 56–57, failed to take into account the
mixed evidence before it on this issue. See 519 F. 2d, at 861,
862 (detailing how “[t]he material available to the court looks
both ways”). And only by “permit[ting] States nationwide
to experiment with these critically-needed reforms”—as 18
States urge us to do—will we enable further research on how
expenditure limits relate to our incumbent reelection rates.
See Brief for State of Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae
3.4 In the meantime, a legislative judgment that “enough is
3 See, e. g., Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Govern
ment Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials,
37 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 669, 673–683 (2006); see also post, at 283 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
4 Indeed, the example of the city of Albuquerque suggests that concerns
about incumbent entrenchment are unfounded. In 1974, the city set ex
penditure limits on municipal elections. A 2-year interlude aside, these
limits applied until 2001, when they were successfully challenged by mu
nicipal candidates. Homans v. Albuquerque, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200
(NM 2002), aff ’d, 366 F. 3d 900 (CA10), cert. denied, 543 U. S. 1002 (2004).
In its findings of fact, the Federal District Court determined that “[n]a
tionwide, eighty-eight percent (88%) of incumbent Mayors successfully
sought reelection in 1999. In contrast, since 1974, the City has had a zero
percent (0%) success rate for Mayors seeking reelection.” 217 F. Supp.
2d, at 1200 (citation omitted). The court further concluded that the “sys
tem of unlimited spending has deleterious effects on the competitiveness
of elections because it gives incumbent candidates an electoral advan

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280 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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enough” should command the greatest possible deference
from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at
best, has an indirect relationship to activity that affects the
quantity—rather than the quality or the content—of repeti
tive speech in the marketplace of ideas.
One final point bears mention. Neither the opinions in
Buckley nor those that form today’s cacophony pay heed to
how the Framers would have viewed candidate expenditure
limits. This is not an unprincipled approach, as the histori
cal context is “usually relevant but not necessarily disposi
tive.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 123 (2006) (Ste
vens, J., concurring). This is particularly true of contexts
that are so different. At the time of the framing the ac
cepted posture of the leading candidates was one of modesty,
acknowledging a willingness to serve rather than a desire to
compete. Speculation about how the Framers would have
legislated if they had foreseen the era of televised sound
bites thus cannot provide us with definitive answers.
Nevertheless, I am firmly persuaded that the Framers
would have been appalled by the impact of modern fund
raising practices on the ability of elected officials to per
form their public responsibilities. I think they would have
viewed federal statutes limiting the amount of money that
congressional candidates might spend in future elections as
well within Congress’ authority.5 And they surely would
tage.” Ibid. While far from conclusive, this example cuts against the
view that there is a slam-dunk correlation between expenditure limits and
incumbent advantage. See also Brief for Center for Democracy and Elec
tion Management at American University as Amicus Curiae (concluding
that Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Malta—all of which
have campaign expenditure limits—have more electoral competition than
the United States, Jamaica, Ireland, and Australia—all of which lack
such limits).
5 See Art. I, § 4 (providing that the “Times, Places and Manner of hold
ing Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations”); see also § 5 (providing that
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings”).

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Souter, J., dissenting
not have expected judges to interfere with the enforcement
of expenditure limits that merely require candidates to
budget their activities without imposing any restrictions
whatsoever on what they may say in their speeches, debates,
and interviews.
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with Justice Souter
that it would be entirely appropriate to allow further pro
ceedings on expenditure limits to go forward in these cases.
For the reasons given in Parts II and III of his dissent, I also
agree that Vermont’s contribution limits and presumption of
coordinated expenditures by political parties are constitu
tional, and so join those portions of his opinion.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
and with whom Justice Stevens joins as to Parts II and
III, dissenting.
In 1997, the Legislature of Vermont passed Act 64 after a
series of public hearings persuaded legislators that rehabili
tating the State’s political process required campaign finance
reform. A majority of the Court today decides that the ex
penditure and contribution limits enacted are irreconcilable
with the Constitution’s guarantee of free speech. I would
adhere to the Court of Appeals’s decision to remand for
further enquiry bearing on the limitations on candidates’
expenditures, and I think the contribution limits satisfy
controlling precedent. I respectfully dissent.
I
Rejecting Act 64’s expenditure limits as directly con
travening Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per cu
riam), ante, at 242–246 (opinion of Breyer, J.), is at least
premature.
We said in Buckley that “expenditure limitations impose
far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and associa
tion than do . . . contribution limitations,” 424 U. S., at 44,
but the Buckley Court did not categorically foreclose the
possibility that some spending limit might comport with the

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First Amendment. Instead, Buckley held that the consti
tutionality of an expenditure limitation “turns on whether
the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy
the [applicable] exacting scrutiny.” Ibid. In applying that
standard in Buckley itself, the Court gave no indication that
it had given serious consideration to an aim that Vermont’s
statute now pursues: to alleviate the drain on candidates’ and
officials’ time caused by the endless fundraising necessary to
aggregate many small contributions to meet the opportuni
ties for ever more expensive campaigning. Instead, we
dwelt on rejecting the sufficiency of interests in reducing
corruption, equalizing the financial resources of candidates,
and capping the overall cost of political campaigns, see id.,
at 55–57. Although Justice White went a step further in
dissenting from the Court on expenditures, and made some
thing of the interest in getting officials off the “treadmill”
driven by the “obsession with fundraising,” see id., at 265
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), this lurk
ing issue was not treated as significant on the expenditure
question in the per curiam opinion. Whatever the observa
tions made to the Buckley Court about the effect of fundrais
ing on candidates’ time, the Court did not squarely address
a time-protection interest as support for the expenditure
limits, much less one buttressed by as thorough a record as
we have here.*
*In approving the public funding provisions of the subject campaign
finance law, Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code, the Buckley Court
appreciated that in enacting the provision Congress was legislating in part
“to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising,” 424 U. S., at 91; see
also id., at 96 (“Congress properly regarded public financing as an appro
priate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the
rigors of soliciting private contributions”). Recognition of the interest
as to Subtitle H, a question of congressional power involving a different
evidentiary burden, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987);
see also Buckley, supra, at 90, does not imply a conclusive rejection of it
as to the separate issue of expenditure limits.

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Vermont’s argument therefore does not ask us to overrule
Buckley; it asks us to apply Buckley’s framework to deter
mine whether its evidence here on a need to slow the fund
raising treadmill suffices to support the enacted limitations.
Vermont’s claim is serious. Three decades of experience
since Buckley have taught us much, and the findings made
by the Vermont Legislature on the pernicious effect of the
nonstop pursuit of money are significant. See, e. g., Act 64,
H. 28, Legislative Findings and Intent, App. 20 (hereinafter
Legislative Findings) (finding that “candidates for statewide
offices are spending inordinate amounts of time raising cam
paign funds”); ibid. (finding that “[r]obust debate of issues,
candidate interaction with the electorate, and public involve
ment and confidence in the electoral process have decreased
as campaign expenditures have increased”); see also Landell
v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (Vt. 2000) (noting testi
mony of Sen. Shumlin before the legislature that raising
funds “was one of the most distasteful things that I’ve had
to do in public service” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F. 3d 91, 123 (CA2 2004) (public offi
cials testified at trial that “elected officials spend time with
donors rather than on their official duties”).
The legislature’s findings are surely significant enough to
justify the Court of Appeals’s remand to the District Court
to decide whether Vermont’s spending limits are the least
restrictive means of accomplishing what the court unexcep
tionably found to be worthy objectives. See id., at 124–125,
135–137. The District Court was instructed to examine a
variety of outstanding issues, including alternatives consid
ered by Vermont’s Legislature and the reasons for rejecting
them. See id., at 136. Thus, the constitutionality of the ex
penditure limits was not conclusively decided by the Second
Circuit, and I believe the evidentiary work that remained to
be done would have raised the prospect for a sound answer
to that question, whatever the answer might have been. In

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284 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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stead, we are left with an unresolved question of narrow tai
loring and with consequent doubt about the justifiability of
the spending limits as necessary and appropriate correctives.
This is not the record on which to foreclose the ability of a
State to remedy the impact of the money chase on the demo
cratic process. I would not, therefore, disturb the Court of
Appeals’s stated intention to remand.
II
Although I would defer judgment on the merits of the ex
penditure limitations, I believe the Court of Appeals cor
rectly rejected the challenge to the contribution limits.
Low though they are, one cannot say that “the contribution
limitation[s are] so radical in effect as to render political as
sociation ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice
below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.”
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377,
397 (2000).
The limits set by Vermont are not remarkable departures
either from those previously upheld by this Court or from
those lately adopted by other States. The plurality con
cedes that on a per-citizen measurement Vermont’s limit for
statewide elections “is slightly more generous,” ante, at 251,
than the one set by the Missouri statute approved by this
Court in Shrink, supra. Not only do those dollar amounts
get more generous the smaller the district, they are consist
ent with limits set by the legislatures of many other States,
all of them with populations larger than Vermont’s, some sig
nificantly so. See, e. g., Montana Right to Life Assn. v. Ed
dleman, 343 F. 3d 1085, 1088 (CA9 2003) (approving $400
limit for candidates filed jointly for Governor and Lieutenant
Governor, since increased to $500, see Mont. Code Ann. § 13–
37–216(1)(a)(i) (2005)); Daggett v. Commission on Govern
mental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F. 3d 445, 452
(CA1 2000) ($500 limit for gubernatorial candidates in

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285 Cite as: 548 U. S. 230 (2006)
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Maine); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kel
ley, 427 F. 3d 1106, 1113 (CA8 2005) ($500 limit on contri
butions to legislative candidates in election years, $100 in
other years); Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Mortham,
No. 6:98–770–CV.ORL–19A, 2000 WL 33733256, *3 (MD Fla.,
Mar. 20, 2000) ($500 limit on contributions to any state candi
date). The point is not that this Court is bound by judicial
sanctions of those numbers; it is that the consistency in legis
lative judgment tells us that Vermont is not an eccentric
party of one, and that this is a case for the judicial deference
that our own precedents say we owe here. See Shrink,
supra, at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where a legislature
has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for exam
ple, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice
defers to empirical legislative judgments”); see also ante, at
248 (plurality opinion) (“[O]rdinarily we have deferred to the
legislature’s determination of [matters related to the costs
and nature of running for office]”).
To place Vermont’s contribution limits beyond the consti
tutional pale, therefore, is to forget not only the facts of
Shrink, but also our self-admonition against second-guessing
legislative judgments about the risk of corruption to which
contribution limits have to be fitted. See Shrink, supra, at
391, and n. 5. And deference here would surely not be
overly complaisant. Vermont’s legislators themselves testi
fied at length about the money that gets their special atten
tion, see Legislative Findings, App. 20 (finding that “[s]ome
candidates and elected officials, particularly when time is
limited, respond and give access to contributors who make
large contributions in preference to those who make small or
no contributions”); 382 F. 3d, at 122 (testimony of Elizabeth
Ready: “If I have only got an hour at night when I get home
to return calls, I am much more likely to return [a donor’s]
call than I would [a non-donor’s] . . . . [W]hen you only have
a few minutes to talk, there are certain people that get ac
cess” (alterations in original)). The record revealed the

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amount of money the public sees as suspiciously large, see
118 F. Supp. 2d, at 479–480 (“The limits set by the legislature
. . . accurately reflect the level of contribution considered
suspiciously large by the Vermont public. Testimony sug
gested that amounts greater than the contribution limits are
considered large by the Vermont public”). And testimony
identified the amounts high enough to pay for effective cam
paigning in a State where the cost of running tends to be on
the low side, see id., at 471 (“In the context of Vermont poli
tics, $200, $300, and $400 donations are clearly large, as the
legislature determined. Small donations are considered to
be strong acts of political support in this state. William
Meub testified that a contribution of $1 is meaningful be
cause it represents a commitment by the contributor that
is likely to become a vote for the candidate. Gubernatorial
candidate Ruth Dwyer values the small contributions of $5
so much that she personally sends thank you notes to those
donors”); id., at 470–471 (“In Vermont, many politicians have
run effective and winning campaigns with very little money,
and some with no money at all. . . . Several candidates, cam
paign managers, and past and present government officials
testified that they will be able to raise enough money to
mount effective campaigns in the system of contribution lim
its established by Act 64”); id., at 472 (“Spending in Vermont
statewide elections is very low . . . . Vermont ranks 49th
out of the 50 states in campaign spending. The majority of
major party candidates for statewide office in the last three
election cycles spent less than what the spending limits of
Act 64 would allow. . . . In Vermont legislative races, low-cost
methods such as door-to-door campaigning are standard and
even expected by the voters”).
Still, our cases do not say deference should be absolute.
We can all imagine dollar limits that would be laughable, and
per capita comparisons that would be meaningless because
aggregated donations simply could not sustain effective cam
paigns. The plurality thinks that point has been reached in

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Vermont, and in particular that the low contribution limits
threaten the ability of challengers to run effective races
against incumbents. Thus, the plurality’s limit of deference
is substantially a function of suspicion that political incum
bents in the legislature set low contribution limits because
their public recognition and easy access to free publicity will
effectively augment their own spending power beyond any
thing a challenger can muster. The suspicion is, in other
words, that incumbents cannot be trusted to set fair limits,
because facially neutral limits do not in fact give challengers
an even break. But this received suspicion is itself a proper
subject of suspicion. The petitioners offered, and the plural
ity invokes, no evidence that the risk of a pro-incumbent ad
vantage has been realized; in fact, the record evidence runs
the other way, as the plurality concedes. See ante, at 256
(“[T]he record does contain some anecdotal evidence sup
porting the respondents’ position, namely, testimony about
a post-Act-64 competitive mayoral campaign in Burlington,
which suggests that a challenger can ‘amas[s] the resources
necessary for effective advocacy,’ Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21”).
I would not discount such evidence that these low limits are
fair to challengers, for the experience of the Burlington race
is confirmed by recent empirical studies addressing this issue
of incumbent’s advantage. See, e. g., Eom & Gross, Contri
bution Limits and Disparity in Contributions Between Gu
bernatorial Candidates, 59 Pol. Research Q. 99 (2006) (“Anal
yses of both the number of contributors and the dollar
amount of contributions [to gubernatorial candidates] sug
gest no support for an increased bias in favor of incumbents
resulting from the presence of campaign contribution limits.
If anything, contribution limits can work to reduce the bias
that traditionally works in favor of incumbents. Also, con
tribution limits do not seem to increase disparities between
gubernatorial candidates in general” (emphasis deleted));
Bardwell, Money and Challenger Emergence in Gubernato
rial Primaries, 55 Pol. Research Q. 653 (2002) (finding that

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288 RANDALL v. SORRELL
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contribution limits favor neither incumbents nor chal
lengers); Hogan, The Costs of Representation in State Legis
latures: Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending, 81
Soc. Sci. Q. 941, 952 (2000) (finding that contribution limits
reduce incumbent spending but have no effect on challenger
or open-seat candidate spending). The Legislature of Ver
mont evidently tried to account for the realities of campaign
ing in Vermont, and I see no evidence of constitutional
miscalculation sufficient to dispense with respect for its
judgments.
III
Four issues of detail call for some attention, the first being
the requirement that a volunteer’s expenses count against
the person’s contribution limit. The plurality certainly
makes out the case that accounting for these expenses will
be a colossal nuisance, but there is no case here that the
nuisance will noticeably limit volunteering, or that volun
teers whose expenses reach the limit cannot continue with
their efforts subject to charging their candidates for the ex
cess. Granted, if the provisions for contribution limits were
teetering on the edge of unconstitutionality, Act 64’s treat
ment of volunteers’ expenses might be the finger-flick that
gives the fatal push, but it has no greater significance than
that.
Second, the failure of the Vermont law to index its limits
for inflation is even less important. This challenge is to the
law as it is, not to a law that may have a different impact
after future inflation if the state legislature fails to bring it
up to economic date.
Third, subjecting political parties to the same contribution
limits as individuals does not condemn the Vermont scheme.
What we said in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Re
publican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 454–455
(2001), dealing with regulation of coordinated expenditures,
goes here, too. The capacity and desire of parties to make
large contributions to competitive candidates with uphill

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fights are shared by rich individuals, and the risk that large
party contributions would be channels to evade individual
limits cannot be eliminated. Nor are these reasons to sup
port the party limits undercut by claims that the restrictions
render parties impotent, for the parties are not precluded
from uncoordinated spending to benefit their candidates.
That said, I acknowledge the suggestions in the petitioners’
briefs that such restrictions in synergy with other influences
weakening party power would justify a wholesale reexami
nation of the situation of party organization today. But
whether such a comprehensive reexamination belongs in
courts or only in legislatures is not an issue presented by
these cases.
Finally, there is the issue of Act 64’s presumption of coordi
nated expenditures on the part of political parties, Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002). The plurality has no occasion
to reach it; I do reach it, but find it insignificant. The Re
publican Party petitioners complain that the related expendi
ture provision imposes on both the candidate and the party
the burden in some circumstances to prove that coordination
of expenditure did not take place, thus threatening to charge
against a candidate’s spending limits some party expendi
tures that are in fact independent, with an ultimate conse
quence of chilling speech. See Brief for Petitioner Vermont
Republican State Committee et al. 45–46. On the contrary,
however, we can safely take the presumption on the repre
sentation to this Court by the Attorney General of Vermont:
the law imposes not a burden of persuasion but merely one of
production, leaving the presumption easily rebuttable. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–41 (representation that the presumption
disappears once credible evidence, such as an affidavit, is of
fered); see also Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Wil
liam H. Sorrell et al. 48 (The presumption “contributes no
evidence and disappears when facts appear. In a case cov
ered by the presumption, a political party need only pre
sent some evidence that the presumed fact is not true and

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the presumption vanishes. . . . Simple testimony that the
expenditure was not coordinated would suffice to defeat
the presumption” (citations, internal quotation marks, and
alterations omitted)). As so understood, the rebuttable
presumption clearly imposes no onerous burden like the con
clusive presumption in Colorado Republican Federal Cam
paign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 619
(1996) (principal opinion), or the nearly conclusive one in
Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S.
781, 785–786 (1988). Requiring the party in possession of
the pertinent facts to come forward with them, as easily as
by executing an affidavit, does not rise to the level of a con
stitutionally offensive encumbrance here. Cf. County Court
of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 158, n. 16 (1979) (“To
the extent that a presumption imposes an extremely low bur
den of production—e. g., being satisfied by ‘any’ evidence—
it may well be that its impact is no greater than that of a
permissive inference”).
IV
Because I would not pass upon the constitutionality of Ver
mont’s expenditure limits prior to further enquiry into their
fit with the problem of fundraising demands on candidates,
and because I do not see the contribution limits as depressed
to the level of political inaudibility, I respectfully dissent.