WINKELMAN, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians, WINKELMAN et ux., et al. v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

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516 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
WINKELMAN, a minor, by and through his parents
and legal guardians, WINKELMAN et ux., et al. v.
PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 05–983. Argued February 27, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
Respondent school district receives federal funds under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), so it must provide chil
dren such as petitioner Winkelmans’ son Jacob a “free appropriate pub
lic education,” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), in accordance with an individu
alized education program (IEP) that the parents, school officials, and
others develop as members of the student’s “IEP Team.” Regarding
Jacob’s IEP as deficient, the Winkelmans unsuccessfully appealed
through IDEA’s administrative review process. Proceeding without
counsel, they then filed a federal-court complaint on their own behalf
and on Jacob’s behalf. The District Court granted respondent judg
ment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit entered an order dismissing
the Winkelmans’ subsequent appeal unless they obtained an attorney,
citing Circuit precedent holding that because the right to a free appro
priate public education belongs only to the child, and IDEA does not
abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from rep
resenting minor children, IDEA does not allow nonlawyer parents to
proceed pro se in federal court.
Held:
1. IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are
not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but en
compass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their
child. Pp. 522–535.
(a) IDEA’s text resolves the question whether parents or only chil
dren have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requires consid
ering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA’s goals include “ensur[ing]
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appro
priate public education” and “that the rights of children with disabilities
and parents of such children are protected,” 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)–
(B), and many of its terms mandate or otherwise describe parental
involvement. Parents play “a significant role,” Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U. S. 49, 53, in the development of each child’s IEP, see §§ 1412(a)(4),
1414(d). They are IEP team members, § 1414(d)(1)(B), and their “con
cerns” “for enhancing [their child’s] education” must be considered by

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the team, § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). A State must, moreover, give “any party”
who objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the IEP’s
construction, or related matter the opportunity “to present a
complaint . . . ,” § 1415(b)(6), and engage in an administrative review
process that culminates in an “impartial due process hearing,”
§ 1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. “Any party aggrieved by the
[hearing officer’s] findings and decision . . . [has] the right to bring a
civil action with respect to the complaint.” § 1415(i)(2)(A). A court or
hearing officer may require a state agency “to reimburse the parents
for the cost of [private school] enrollment if . . . the agency had not
made a free appropriate public education available to the child.”
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governs when and to what extent a
court may award attorney’s fees, see § 1415(i)(3)(B), including an award
“to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,”
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Pp. 523–526.
(b) These various provisions accord parents independent, enforce
able rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administrative
stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar
them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court at the adju
dication stage. Respondent argues that parental involvement is con
templated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests,
but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical
structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with
disabilities and parents of such children,” § 1400(d)(1)(B), would make no
sense unless “rights” refers to the parents’ rights as well as the child’s.
Other provisions confirm this view. See, e. g., § 1415(a). Even if this
Court were inclined to ignore the Act’s plain text and adopt respondent’s
countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that the sole purpose driv
ing IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s
rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest
in their child’s education and upbringing.
The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s ar
gument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of the hear
ing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and re
imbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any challenge
not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceedings entitle
parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s proce
dures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational
program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any
matter” related to the proceedings and requires that administrative res
olution be based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public
education,” § 1415(f)(3)(E), with judicial review to follow. The text and
structure of IDEA create in parents an independent stake not only in

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518 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.
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the procedures and costs implicated by the process but also in the sub
stantive decision to be made. Incongruous results would follow, more
over, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA
rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to
disentangle the Act’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights from
its substantive ones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties
a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of
any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differenti
ate between these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leave
some parents without any legal remedy. Pp. 526–533.
(c) Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, when it contends that because
IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it must provide
clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independent rights
to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice
before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties
in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule,
for the determination that IDEA gives parents independent, enforce
able rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on
States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe.
The basic measure of monetary recovery is not expanded by recognizing
that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased
costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do
not suffice to invoke Spending Clause concerns, particularly in light of
provisions in IDEA that empower courts to award attorney’s fees to
prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “im
proper purpose,” § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). Pp. 533–535.
2. The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal for
lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are
entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this
holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concerning
whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
P. 535.
Reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissent
ing in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 535.
Jean-Claude Andre´ argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioners.

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David B. Salmons argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, David K. Flynn,
Gregory B. Friel, and Kent D. Talbert.
Pierre H. Bergeron argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Christina Henagen Peer.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some four years ago, Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman, parents of
five children, became involved in lengthy administrative and
legal proceedings. They had sought review related to con
cerns they had over whether their youngest child, 6-year-old
Jacob, would progress well at Pleasant Valley Elementary
School, which is part of the Parma City School District in
Parma, Ohio.
Jacob has autism spectrum disorder and is covered by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA),
84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. (2000 ed.
and Supp. IV). His parents worked with the school district
to develop an individualized education program (IEP), as re
quired by the Act. All concede that Jacob’s parents had the
statutory right to contribute to this process and, when agree
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Autism Soci
ety of America et al. by Barbara E. Etkind and Ilise L. Feitshans; for the
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc., et al. by Lynn S. Preece,
Erin McCloskey Maus, and Angela C. Vigil; for the Equal Justice Founda
tion et al. by Benson A. Wolman, Robert J. Krummen, and Robert M.
Clyde, Jr.; for the Ohio Coalition for the Education of Children with Disa
bilities et al. by Thomas C. Goldstein, Eric H. Zagrans, Pamela S. Kar
lan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Amy Howe, and Kevin K. Russell; and for Senator
Edward M. Kennedy et al. by Jody Manier Kris.
Julie Wright Halbert and Pammela Quinn filed a brief for the Council
of the Great City Schools as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Julie Carleton Martin, Francisco M. Negro´ n, Jr., Naomi E. Gittins,
Thomas E. M. Hutton, and Lisa E. Soronen filed a brief for the National
School Boards Association et al. as amici curiae.

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520 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.
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ment could not be reached, to participate in administrative
proceedings including what the Act refers to as an “impartial
due process hearing.” § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
The disagreement at the center of the current dispute con
cerns the procedures to be followed when parents and their
child, dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hear
ing, seek further review in a United States District Court.
The question is whether parents, either on their own behalf
or as representatives of the child, may proceed in court un
represented by counsel though they are not trained or li
censed as attorneys. Resolution of this issue requires us to
examine and explain the provisions of IDEA to determine if
it accords to parents rights of their own that can be vindi
cated in court proceedings, or alternatively, whether the Act
allows them, in their status as parents, to represent their
child in court proceedings.
I
Respondent Parma City School District, a participant in
IDEA’s educational spending program, accepts federal funds
for assistance in the education of children with disabilities.
As a condition of receiving funds, it must comply with
IDEA’s mandates. IDEA requires that the school district
provide Jacob with a “free appropriate public education,”
which must operate in accordance with the IEP that Jacob’s
parents, along with school officials and other individuals, de
velop as members of Jacob’s “IEP Team.” Brief for Peti
tioners 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The school district proposed an IEP for the 2003–2004
school year that would have placed Jacob at a public elemen
tary school. Regarding this IEP as deficient under IDEA,
Jacob’s nonlawyer parents availed themselves of the adminis
trative review provided by IDEA. They filed a complaint
alleging respondent had failed to provide Jacob with a free
appropriate public education; they appealed the hearing of
ficer’s rejection of the claims in this complaint to a state-level
review officer; and after losing that appeal they filed, on their

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own behalf and on behalf of Jacob, a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In
reliance upon 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) they
challenged the administrative decision, alleging, among other
matters: that Jacob had not been provided with a free appro
priate public education; that his IEP was inadequate; and
that the school district had failed to follow procedures man
dated by IDEA. Pending the resolution of these challenges,
the Winkelmans had enrolled Jacob in a private school at
their own expense. They had also obtained counsel to assist
them with certain aspects of the proceedings, although they
filed their federal complaint, and later their appeal, without
the aid of an attorney. The Winkelmans’ complaint sought
reversal of the administrative decision, reimbursement for
private-school expenditures and attorney’s fees already in
curred, and, it appears, declaratory relief.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for judg
ment on the pleadings, finding it had provided Jacob with a
free appropriate public education. Petitioners, proceeding
without counsel, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Relying on its recent decision in
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist., 409 F. 3d 753
(2005), the Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the
Winkelmans’ appeal unless they obtained counsel to repre
sent Jacob. See Order in No. 05–3886 (Nov. 4, 2005), App. A
to Pet. for Cert. 1a. In Cavanaugh the Court of Appeals
had rejected the proposition that IDEA allows nonlawyer
parents raising IDEA claims to proceed pro se in federal
court. The court ruled that the right to a free appropriate
public education “belongs to the child alone,” 409 F. 3d, at
757, not to both the parents and the child. It followed, the
court held, that “any right on which the [parents] could pro
ceed on their own behalf would be derivative” of the child’s
right, ibid., so that parents bringing IDEA claims were not
appearing on their own behalf, ibid. See also 28 U. S. C.
§ 1654 (allowing parties to prosecute their own claims pro

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se). As for the parents’ alternative argument, the court
held, nonlawyer parents cannot litigate IDEA claims on be
half of their child because IDEA does not abrogate the
common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from repre
senting minor children. 409 F. 3d, at 756. As the court in
Cavanaugh acknowledged, its decision brought the Sixth
Circuit in direct conflict with the First Circuit, which had
concluded, under a theory of “statutory joint rights,” that
the Act accords to parents the right to assert IDEA claims
on their own behalf. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional
School Dist., 346 F. 3d 247, 249, 250 (CA1 2003).
Petitioners sought review in this Court. In light of the
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a
nonlawyer parent of a child with a disability may prosecute
IDEA actions pro se in federal court, we granted certiorari.
549 U. S. 990 (2006). Compare Cavanaugh, supra, with
Maroni, supra; see also Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago,
434 F. 3d 527 (CA7 2006); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed.,
161 F. 3d 225 (CA3 1998); Wenger v. Canastota Central
School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine
v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576 (CA11 1997).
II
Our resolution of this case turns upon the significance of
IDEA’s interlocking statutory provisions. Petitioners’ pri
mary theory is that the Act makes parents real parties in
interest to IDEA actions, not “mer[e] guardians of their chil
dren’s rights.” Brief for Petitioners 16. If correct, this
allows Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman back into court, for there is
no question that a party may represent his or her own inter
ests in federal court without the aid of counsel. See 28
U. S. C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel . . . ”). Petitioners cannot cite a specific provision in
IDEA mandating in direct and explicit terms that parents
have the status of real parties in interest. They instead

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base their argument on a comprehensive reading of IDEA.
Taken as a whole, they contend, the Act leads to the neces
sary conclusion that parents have independent, enforceable
rights. Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 60 (2004)). Respondent, ac
cusing petitioners of “knit[ting] together various provisions
pulled from the crevices of the statute” to support these
claims, Brief for Respondent 19, reads the text of IDEA to
mean that any redressable rights under the Act belong only
to children, id., at 19–40.
We agree that the text of IDEA resolves the question pre
sented. We recognize, in addition, that a proper interpreta
tion of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statu
tory scheme. See Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486
(2006). Turning to the current version of IDEA, which the
parties agree governs this case, we begin with an overview
of the relevant statutory provisions.
A
The goals of IDEA include “ensur[ing] that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education” and “ensur[ing] that the rights of children
with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.”
20 U. S. C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). To this
end, the Act includes provisions governing four areas of par
ticular relevance to the Winkelmans’ claim: procedures to be
followed when developing a child’s IEP; criteria governing
the sufficiency of an education provided to a child; mecha
nisms for review that must be made available when there
are objections to the IEP or to other aspects of IDEA pro
ceedings; and the requirement in certain circumstances that
States reimburse parents for various expenses. See gener
ally §§ 1412(a)(10), 1414, 1415. Although our discussion of
these four areas does not identify all the illustrative provi
sions, we do take particular note of certain terms that man
date or otherwise describe parental involvement.

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IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each
child with a disability, see §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d), with parents
playing “a significant role” in this process, Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U. S. 49, 53 (2005). Parents serve as members of the
team that develops the IEP. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The “con
cerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their
child” must be considered by the team. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii).
IDEA accords parents additional protections that apply
throughout the IEP process. See, e. g., § 1414(d)(4)(A) (re
quiring the IEP Team to revise the IEP when appropriate
to address certain information provided by the parents);
§ 1414(e) (requiring States to “ensure that the parents of [a
child with a disability] are members of any group that makes
decisions on the educational placement of their child”). The
statute also sets up general procedural safeguards that pro
tect the informed involvement of parents in the development
of an education for their child. See, e. g., § 1415(a) (requiring
States to “establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure
that children with disabilities and their parents are guaran
teed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of
a free appropriate public education”); § 1415(b)(1) (mandating
that States provide an opportunity for parents to examine all
relevant records). See generally §§ 1414, 1415. A central
purpose of the parental protections is to facilitate the provi
sion of a “ ‘free appropriate public education,’ ” § 1401(9),
which must be made available to the child “in conformity
with the [IEP],” § 1401(9)(D).
The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” pur
suant to an IEP to be an educational instruction “specially
designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability,” § 1401(29), coupled with any additional “ ‘related
services’ ” that are “required to assist a child with a disabil
ity to benefit from [that instruction],” § 1401(26)(A). See
also § 1401(9). The education must, among other things, be
provided “under public supervision and direction,” “meet the
standards of the State educational agency,” and “include an

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appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved.” Ibid. The instruc
tion must, in addition, be provided at “no cost to parents.”
§ 1401(29). See generally Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson
Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S.
176 (1982) (discussing the meaning of “free appropriate pub
lic education” as used in the statutory precursor to IDEA).
When a party objects to the adequacy of the education
provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related mat
ter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: It requires that a
State provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a
complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to such child.” § 1415(b)(6). By presenting a complaint a
party is able to pursue a process of review that, as relevant,
begins with a preliminary meeting “where the parents of
the child discuss their complaint” and the local educational
agency “is provided the opportunity to [reach a resolution].”
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV). If the agency “has not resolved the
complaint to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days,”
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), the parents may request an “impartial due
process hearing,” § 1415(f)(1)(A), which must be conducted
either by the local educational agency or by the state educa
tional agency, ibid., and where a hearing officer will resolve
issues raised in the complaint, § 1415(f)(3).
IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conduct
ing these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that
the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive
grounds based on a determination of whether the child re
ceived a free appropriate public education,” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i),
and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the
officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate
public education,” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate
public education;

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“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to
participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the
provision of a free appropriate public education to the
parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”
Ibid.
If the local educational agency, rather than the state edu
cational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a
hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State
educational agency.” § 1415(g)(1). Once the state educa
tional agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party
may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved
by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer]
shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to
the complaint.” § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also § 1415(i)(1).
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost re
covery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circum
stances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state
agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disabil
ity] for the cost of [private-school] enrollment if the court
or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a
free appropriate public education available to the child.”
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Second, it sets forth rules governing
when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees.
See § 1415(i)(3)(B). Included in this section is a provision
allowing an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent
of a child with a disability.” § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord
parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We
agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the adminis
trative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights
in federal court.

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The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in
a manner that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates par
ents will be the parties bringing the administrative com
plaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we
refer also to § 1415(b)(8) (requiring a state educational
agency to “develop a model form to assist parents in filing a
complaint”); § 1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an agency
must provide to a “parent’s due process complaint notice”);
and § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “the parent’s complaint”).
A wide range of review is available: Administrative com
plaints may be brought with respect to “any matter relating
to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.”
§ 1415(b)(6)(A). Claims raised in these complaints are then
resolved at impartial due process hearings, where, again,
the statute makes clear that parents will be participating
as parties. See generally supra, at 525–526. See also
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) (indicating “[a] parent or agency shall request
an impartial due process hearing” within a certain period of
time); § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (referring to “a parent’s right to a
due process hearing”). The statute then grants “[a]ny party
aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing
officer] . . . the right to bring a civil action with respect to
the complaint.” § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent
who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory pro
tection the moment the administrative proceedings end.
Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implica
tion bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights ac
corded to them once the time comes to file a civil action.
Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive
parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite
result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read
these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only
to the extent parents represent their child’s interests. In
respondent’s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than

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“collateral tools related to the child’s underlying substan
tive rights—not freestanding or independently enforceable
rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of
the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking
“to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and
parents of such children are protected.” § 1400(d)(1)(B).
The word “rights” in the quoted language refers to the rights
of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the
grammatical structure would make no sense.
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates
that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure
that children with disabilities and their parents are guaran
teed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a
free appropriate public education.” § 1415(a). It presumes
parents have rights of their own when it defines how States
might provide for the transfer of the “rights accorded to par
ents” by IDEA, § 1415(m)(1)(B), and it prohibits the raising
of certain challenges “[n]otwithstanding any other individ
ual right of action that a parent or student may maintain
under [the relevant provisions of IDEA],” §§ 1401(10)(E),
1412(a)(14)(E). To adopt respondent’s reading of the statute
would require an interpretation of these statutory provisions
(and others) far too strained to be correct.
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, re
spondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding
that the Act’s “references to parents are best understood as
accommodations to the fact of the child’s incapacity.” Doe
v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4
1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to
respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’
rights as referring in implicit terms to the child’s rights—
which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights ac
corded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the
plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we dis
agree that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of

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parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is
not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized
legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child.
See, e. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535
(1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–401
(1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law,
then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a
stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without ques
tion a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and
personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabili
ties.” § 1400(c)(1).
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language
of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Con
gress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights
concerning the education of their children. We instead in
terpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean
what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying
rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent’s argument has persuaded some
Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can
be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s
findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party ag
grieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under
this view the causes of action available to a parent might
relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e. g.,
Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands,
see, e. g., § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The argument supporting this
conclusion proceeds as follows: Because a “party aggrieved”
is, by definition, entitled to a remedy, and parents are, under
IDEA, only entitled to certain procedures and reimburse
ments as remedies, a parent cannot be a “party aggrieved”

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with regard to any claim not implicating these limited
matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions
we have recited. True, there are provisions in IDEA stat
ing parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and
reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing
too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other
entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find
little support for the inference that parents are excluded by
implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa.
Compare, e. g., § 1411(e)(3)(E) (barring States from using cer
tain funds for costs associated with actions “brought on be
half of a child” but failing to acknowledge that actions might
also be brought on behalf of a parent) with § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)
(allowing recovery of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party
who is the parent of a child with a disability” but failing to
acknowledge that a child might also be a prevailing party).
Without more, then, the language in IDEA confirming that
parents enjoy particular procedural and reimbursement
related rights does not resolve whether they are also entitled
to enforce IDEA’s other mandates, including the one most
fundamental to the Act: the provision of a free appropriate
public education to a child with a disability.
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceed
ings entitle parents to participate not only in the implemen
tation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive for
mulation of their child’s educational program. Among other
things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the
parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” par
ents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when
it formulates the IEP. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). The IEP, in
turn, sets the boundaries of the central entitlement provided
by IDEA: It defines a “ ‘free appropriate public education’ ”
for that parent’s child. § 1401(9).
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges
based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a

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hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evalua
tion, or educational placement of the child, or the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child. ”
§ 1415(b)(6)(A). To resolve these challenges a hearing offi
cer must make a decision based on whether the child “re
ceived a free appropriate public education.” § 1415(f)(3)(E).
When this hearing has been conducted by a local educational
agency rather than a state educational agency, “any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a
hearing may appeal such findings and decision” to the state
educational agency. § 1415(g)(1). Judicial review follows,
authorized by a broadly worded provision phrased in the
same terms used to describe the prior stage of review: “Any
party aggrieved” may bring “a civil action.” § 1415(i)(2)(A).
These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and
structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only
in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but
also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore
conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated
references to various procedures and remedies, between
the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to
parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party ag
grieved” for purposes of § 1415(i)(2) with regard to “any
matter” implicating these rights. See § 1415(b)(6)(A). The
status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that
relate to procedure and cost recovery. To find otherwise
would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and
expansive system of review established by the Act. Cf.
Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526
U. S. 66, 73 (1999) (looking to IDEA’s “overall statutory
scheme” to interpret its provisions).
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous re
sults that would follow were we to accept the proposition
that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstan
tive matters. The statute’s procedural and reimbursement
related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy

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532 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.
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of the education provided to a child, see, e. g., § 1415(f)(3)(E),
see also § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and it is difficult to disentangle
the provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere
to both parent and child while others do not. Were we nev
ertheless to recognize a distinction of this sort it would im
pose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one
worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA
concerning how a court might in practice differentiate be
tween these matters. It is, in addition, out of accord with
the statute’s design to interpret the Act to require that par
ents prove the substantive inadequacy of their child’s educa
tion as a predicate for obtaining, for example, reimbursement
under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), yet to prevent them from obtaining
a judgment mandating that the school district provide their
child with an educational program demonstrated to be an
appropriate one. The adequacy of the educational program
is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provi
sions of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we
decline to infer them.
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have
employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a rem
edy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States
provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at
public expense,” § 1401(9)(A), including specially designed
instruction “at no cost to parents,” § 1401(29). Parents may
seek to enforce this mandate through the federal courts,
we conclude, because among the rights they enjoy is the
right to a free appropriate public education for their child.
Under the countervailing view, which would make a parent’s
ability to enforce IDEA dependant on certain procedural and
reimbursement-related rights, a parent whose disabled child
has not received a free appropriate public education would
have recourse in the federal courts only under two circum
stances: when the parent happens to have some claim related
to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to
incur, and has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to

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reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child’s edu
cation would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of
action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child
could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appro
priate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent.
What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that
when Congress required States to provide adequate instruc
tion to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only
some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The
statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of chil
dren with disabilities and parents of such children are pro
tected.” § 1400(d)(1)(B). See, e. g., § 1415(e)(2) (requiring
that States implement procedures to ensure parents are
guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provi
sion of a free appropriate public education); § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii)
(requiring that mediation procedures not be “used to deny
or delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing . . . or
to deny any other rights afforded under this subchapter”);
cf. § 1400(c)(3) (noting IDEA’s success in “ensuring children
with disabilities and the families of such children access to a
free appropriate public education”).
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforce
able rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain
procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass
the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the
parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reason
ing we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail with
out overcoming a further difficulty. Citing our opinion in
Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548
U. S. 291 (2006), respondent argues that statutes passed pur
suant to the Spending Clause, such as IDEA, must provide
“ ‘clear notice’ ” before they can burden a State with some
new condition, obligation, or liability. Brief for Respondent

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41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best,
ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent
rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition
to the States. See id., at 40–49.
Respondent’s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Ar
lington we addressed whether IDEA required States to re
imburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions.
“[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance
of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set
out ‘unambiguously.’ ” 548 U. S., at 296 (quoting Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17
(1981)). The question to be answered in Arlington, there
fore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding
the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at 296. We found it did
not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does
not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA
grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not
impose any substantive condition or obligation on States
they would not otherwise be required by law to observe.
The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not
expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the
parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other
than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might
have more force: A determination by the Court that some
distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights
might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations.
But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter,
increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to de
fend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the
law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not
suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause.
Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in cer
tain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney’s
fees to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent

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535 Cite as: 550 U. S. 516 (2007)
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has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action . . .
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnec
essary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). This provision allows some relief
when a party has proceeded in violation of these standards.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkel
mans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under
IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA
claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to
grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose
of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal tradi
tions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a
parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable
interest in the education of one’s child; and, what is more,
Congress has found that “the education of children with disa
bilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the
role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families
of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate
in the education of their children at school and at home.”
§ 1400(c)(5).
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alter
native argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles
parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, con
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro
se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV),
when they seek reimbursement for private school expenses

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536 WINKELMAN v. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DIST.
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or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but
not when they seek a judicial determination that their child’s
free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substan
tively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without
a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA
and the general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The latter, codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1654, provides that “[i]n
all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (Empha
sis added.) The IDEA’s right-to-sue provision, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), provides that “[a]ny party
aggrieved by the findings and decision [of a hearing officer]
shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to
the [administrative] complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
when parents are “parties aggrieved” under the IDEA, they
are “parties” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1654, enti
tled to sue on their own behalf.1
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for
Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled
to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or prop
erty rights have been adversely affected by another person’s
actions or by a court’s decree or judgment,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 529–530.
This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to
parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to
them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are
1 As the Court notes, ante, at 520, 535, petitioners also argue that even
if parents do not have their own rights under the statute, they nonetheless
may act on behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides
agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay parents
from representing their children in court, a manifestation of the more gen
eral common-law rule that nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of
another. See Brief for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also,
e. g., Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998).
Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.

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parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of
filing their own cases in federal court.
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as rele
vant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of
rights.2 First, under certain circumstances “a court or a
hearing officer may require the [school district] to reimburse
the parents” for private school expenditures “if the court or
hearing officer finds that the [school district] had not made a
free appropriate public education available to the child.” 20
U. S. C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis
added). Second, parents are accorded a variety of proce
dural protections, both during the development of their
child’s individualized education program (IEP), see, e. g.,
§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (parents are members of their child’s IEP
team); § 1415(b)(1) (parents must have an opportunity to ex
amine records and participate in IEP meetings), and in any
subsequent administrative challenges, see, e. g., §§ 1415(b)(6),
(8) (parents may file administrative due process complaints).
It is clear that parents may object to procedural viola
tions at the administrative due process hearing, see
§ 1415(b)(6)(A), and that a hearing officer may provide relief
to parents for certain procedural infractions, see § 1415(f)
(3)(E)(ii). Because the rights to reimbursement and to the
various procedural protections are accorded to parents them
selves, they are “parties aggrieved” when those rights are
infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking
to vindicate them.3
2 Because the grant of those rights is clear, and because I find no statu
tory basis for any other rights, I need not decide whether the Spending
Clause’s “clear notice” requirement is applicable here. Cf. Arlington Cen
tral School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 296 (2006).
3 Of course when parents assert procedural violations, they must also
allege that those violations adversely affected the outcome of the proceed
ings. Under Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a proce
dural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of
the proceeding to which the violation pertains, see Lujan v. Defenders of

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The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents
may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement
or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge
the substantive adequacy of their child’s FAPE—so that par
ents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See
ante, at 527–533. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly
than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the
Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that
parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason
for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appro
priate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it
is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs,
participating States must provide a “free appropriate pub
lic education . . . to all children with disabilities . . . .”
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The statute is replete
with references to the fact that a FAPE belongs to the child.
See, e. g., § 1400(d)(1)(A) (IDEA designed “to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free ap
propriate public education”); § 1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to
“the right of a child” to “receive a free appropriate public
education”); § 1411(e)(3)(F)(i) (same); § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II)
(referring to an agency “that is responsible for making a
free appropriate public education available to a child”);
§ 1415(b)(6)(A) (referring to “the provision of a free appro
priate public education to [a] child”). The parents of a dis
abled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child
receive a proper education. But there is a difference be
tween an interest and a statutory right. The text of the
IDEA makes clear that parents have no right to the educa
tion itself.4
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 571–578 (1992), here the parents’ interest in having
their child receive an appropriate education.
4 Nor can a parental right to education be justified, as the Court at
tempts, see ante, at 532–533, on the theory that the IDEA gives parents
a legal right to free schooling for their child. Parents acquire such a right

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The Court concedes, as it must, that while the IDEA gives
parents the right to reimbursement and procedural protec
tion in explicit terms, it does not do so for the supposed right
to the education itself. Ante, at 529–530. The obvious in
ference to be drawn from the statute’s clear and explicit con
ferral of discrete types of rights upon parents and children,
respectively, is that it does not by accident confer the
parent-designated rights upon children, or the children
designated rights upon parents. The Court believes, how
ever, that “the statute prevents us from placing too much
weight on [this] implicatio[n].” Ante, at 530. That conclu
sion is in error. Nothing in “the statute” undermines the
obvious “implication” of Congress’s scheme. What the
Court relies upon for its conclusion that parents have a sub
stantive right to a FAPE is not the “statutory structure,”
ibid., but rather the myriad procedural guarantees accorded
to parents in the administrative process, see ante, at 530–
531. But allowing parents, by means of these guarantees,
to help shape the contours of their child’s education is simply
not the same as giving them the right to that education.
Nor can the Court sensibly rely on the provisions governing
due process hearings and administrative appeals, the various
provisions that refer to the “parent’s complaint,” see, e. g., 20
U. S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), or the fact
that the right-to-sue provision, § 1415(i)(2)(A), refers to the
administrative complaint, which in turn allows parents to
challenge “any matter” relating to the provision of a FAPE,
§ 1415(b)(6)(A). These provisions prove nothing except
what all parties concede: that parents may represent their
child pro se at the administrative level. See Brief for Peti
tioners 17–18, 40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
12; Brief for Respondent 13, 44; see also Collinsgru v. Pal
myra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Parents
(in limited circumstances) only when they enroll their child in a private
institution. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).

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thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate
all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage
they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf
of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about
whose rights they are.5 The Court’s spraying statutory sec
tions about like buckshot cannot create a substantive paren
tal right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA’s
“text and structure” (by which it means the statute’s proce
dural protections), the Court announces the startling propo
sition that, in fact, the “IDEA does not differentiate . . .
between the rights accorded to children and the rights ac
corded to parents.” Ante, at 531. If that were so, the
Court could have spared us its painful effort to craft a dis
tinctive parental right out of scattered procedural provi
sions. But of course it is not so. The IDEA quite clearly
5 Contrary to indications in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 530–531, and to
the apparent language of the statute, a hearing officer does not always
render a decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of
whether the child received a free appropriate public education. ”
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). That provision is “[s]ubject to
clause (ii),” ibid., which provides that “[i]n matters alleging a procedural
violation” a hearing officer can grant relief if “the procedural inadequacies
. . . significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate pub
lic education to the parents’ child,” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). It is true that
a hearing officer who accepts such an allegation nominally grants relief by
concluding that the child did not receive a FAPE, § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), but it
is clear from the structure of the statute that this is not a decision on the
substantive adequacy of the FAPE, but rather the label attached to a
finding of procedural defect. Petitioners agree with me on this point.
See Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 23. See also 20 U. S. C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii)
(2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to
preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local educational agency to com
ply with procedural requirements under this section”). In any event,
even if a hearing officer was required to render a decision on the substan
tive adequacy of the FAPE, that feature of the statute still gives no clue
as to whether parents’ vindication of that substantive right at the adminis
trative stage is on their own behalf or on behalf of the child.

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differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and
their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432
F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are dis
tinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Con
gress specifically indicated that parents have rights under
the Act that are separate from and independent of their chil
dren’s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al.
as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that
a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most
definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a
disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court . . .
may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for
the cost of that enrollment”? § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed.,
Supp. IV) (emphasis added); see also Brief for Sen. Kennedy
et al., supra, at 21 (“The right of reimbursement runs to the
parents”). Does the Court believe that a child has a
procedural right under §§ 1414(d)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2000 ed.,
Supp. IV), which gives parents the power to excuse an IEP
team member from attending an IEP meeting? The IDEA
does not remotely envision communal “family” rights.
The Court believes that because parents must prove the
substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reim
bursement, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and because the suitability of
a FAPE may also be at issue when procedural violations are
alleged, § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), it is “out of accord with the stat
ute’s design” to “prevent [parents] from obtaining a judg
ment mandating that the school district provide their child”
with a FAPE. Ante, at 532. That is a total non sequitur.
That Congress has required parents to demonstrate the inad
equacy of their child’s FAPE in order to vindicate their own
rights says nothing about whether parents possess an under
lying right to education. The Court insists that the right to
a FAPE is the right “most fundamental to the Act.” Ante,
at 530. Undoubtedly so, but that sheds no light upon whom
the right belongs to, and hence upon who can sue in their

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own right. Congress has used the phrase “party ag
grieved,” and it is this Court’s job to apply that language,
not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between pa
rental and child rights will prove difficult to administer.
I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of
Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have
allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims,
but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely
v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006);
Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central
School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam);
Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581,
n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggest
ing that this majority rule has caused any confusion in prac
tice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes
clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’
and children’s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the
majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injus
tice,” ante, at 533, since parents who do not seek reimburse
ment or allege procedural violations would be “without a
remedy,” ante, at 532. That, of course, is not true. They
will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindi
cate their children’s rights: the power to bring suit, repre
sented by counsel. But even indulging the Court’s percep
tion that it is unfair to allow some but not all IDEA parents
to proceed pro se, that complaint is properly addressed to
Congress, which structured the rights as it has, and limited
suit to “party aggrieved.” And there are good reasons for
it to have done so. Pro se cases impose unique burdens on
lower courts—and on defendants, in this case the schools and
school districts that must hire their own lawyers. Since
pro se complaints are prosecuted essentially for free, without
screening by knowledgeable attorneys, they are much more
likely to be unmeritorious. And for courts to figure them

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543 Cite as: 550 U. S. 516 (2007)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
out without the assistance of plaintiff ’s counsel is much more
difficult and time consuming. In both categories of pro se
parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the
statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Ac
tions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous,
since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money
for private education without some solid reason to believe
the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural
violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive
record review that characterizes suits challenging the suit
ability of a FAPE.
* * *
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural vio
lations, and requested a declaration that their child’s FAPE
was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 521. I agree with
the Court that they may proceed pro se with respect to the
first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with
respect to the third.