REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES et al. v. PIMENTEL, temporary administrator of ESTATE OF PIMENTEL, DECEASED, et al.

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REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES et al. v. PIMENTEL,
temporary administrator of ESTATE OF
PIMENTEL, DECEASED, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 06–1204. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 12, 2008
A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Ferdi
nand Marcos, while he was President of the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), led to a nearly $2 billion judgment in a United States Dis
trict Court. The Pimentel class then sought to attach the assets of
Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos, held by
a New York broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Philippine
commission (Commission) established to recover property wrongfully
taken by Marcos are also attempting to recover this and other Marcos
property. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) holds some of the dis
puted assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pending litigation in the
Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court determining whether Marcos’ prop
erty should be forfeited to the Republic. Facing claims from various
Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch filed this
interpleader action under 28 U. S. C. § 1335, naming, among the defend
ants, the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, PNB (all petitioners here),
and the Pimentel class (respondents here). The Republic and the Com
mission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Im
munities Act of 1976, and moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19(b), arguing that the action could not proceed without
them. Arelma and PNB also sought a Rule 19(b) dismissal. The Dis
trict Court refused, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and
are required parties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the
Sandiganbayan litigation’s outcome. Finding that that litigation could
not determine entitlement to Arelma’s assets, the District Court va
cated the stay and ultimately awarded the assets to the Pimentel class.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not warranted
under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission
were required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of success on
the merits that the action could proceed without them. The court found
it unnecessary to consider whether prejudice to those entities might be
lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action,
found the entities’ failure to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan an

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equitable consideration counseling against dismissing the interpleader
suit, and found that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would
serve the Pimentel class’ interests.
Held:
1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, this Court need not rule on the question whether the Republic
and the Commission, having been dismissed from the suit, had the right
to seek review of the decision that the suit could proceed in their ab
sence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an action
under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing to have the
judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds simply because
they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on, the underlying merits
ruling denying them the interpleaded assets. Pp. 861–862.
2. Rule 19 requires dismissal of the interpleader action. Pp. 862–873.
(a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does not
always result in dismissal. When joinder is not feasible, the question
whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive considerations
in Rule 19(b), which asks whether “in equity and good conscience, the
action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dis
missed.” The joinder issue can be complex, and the case-specific deter
minations involve multiple factors, some “substantive, some procedural,
some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against
opposing interests,” Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patter
son, 390 U. S. 102, 119. Pp. 862–863.
(b) Here, Rule 19(a)’s application is not contested: The Republic and
the Commission are required entities. And this Court need not decide
the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because the
Ninth Circuit’s errors of law require reversal. Pp. 863–873.
(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining
whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to absent entities and
present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder.
Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit gave insufficient weight to the sover
eign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering whether
they would be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full effect to
sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity interests that con
tributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. See, e. g., Ver
linden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486. These
interests are concrete here. The entities’ claims arise from historically
and politically significant events for the Republic and its people, and the
entities have a unique interest in resolving matters related to Arelma’s
assets. A foreign state has a comity interest in using its courts for a
dispute if it has a right to do so. Its dignity is not enhanced if other
nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. A more specific

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affront could result if property the Republic and the Commission claim
is seized by a foreign court decree. This Court has not considered the
precise question presented, but authorities involving the intersection of
joinder and the United States’ governmental immunity, see, e. g., Mine
Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375, instruct that
where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the sovereign’s claims are
not frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for
injury to the absent sovereign’s interests. The claims of the Republic
and the Commission were not frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus erred
in ruling on their merits. The privilege of sovereign immunity from
suit is much diminished if an important and consequential ruling affect
ing the sovereign’s substantial interest is determined, or at least as
sumed, by a federal court in its absence and over its objection. The
Pimentel class’ interest in recovering its damages is not discounted,
but important comity concerns are implicated by assertion of foreign
sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts below gave too
much weight to the Pimentel class’ interests, but that they did not
accord proper weight to the compelling sovereign immunity claim.
Pp. 865–869.
(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could
be lessened or avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal,
Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been
proposed or appear to be available. As to the third factor—whether a
judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule
19(b)(3)—“adequacy” refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’
claims, but to the “public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever
possible,” Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with the ac
tion in the absence of the Republic and the Commission would not fur
ther this public interest because they could not be bound by a judgment
to which they were not parties. As to the fourth factor—whether the
plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed
for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4)—the Ninth Circuit made much of the tort
victims’ lack of an alternative forum. But Merrill Lynch, not the Pi
mentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in the interpleader ac
tion. See 28 U. S. C. § 1335(a). The Pimentel class’ interests are not
irrelevant to Rule 19(b)’s equitable balance, but the Rule’s other provi
sions are the relevant ones to consult. A dismissal on the ground of
nonjoinder will not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determining
entitlement to the assets so it could be done with the matter, but it
likely would give Merrill Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal
litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments.
Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch is outweighed by prejudice to the absent
entities invoking sovereign immunity. In the usual course, the Ninth

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Circuit’s failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the
Republic and the Commission would warrant reversal and remand for
further determinations, but here, that error plus this Court’s analysis
under Rule 19(b)’s additional provisions require the action’s dismissal.
Pp. 869–873.
464 F. 3d 885, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined, in
which Souter, J., joined as to all but Parts IV–B and V, and in which
Stevens, J., joined as to Part II. Stevens, J., post, p. 875, and Souter,
J., post, p. 879, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Stephen V. Bomse, E. Joshua
Rosenkranz, Adam J. Gromfin, Kenneth S. Geller, and David
M. Gossett.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Douglas
Hallward-Driemeier, and Michael S. Raab.
Robert A. Swift argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief for respondent Mariano J. Pimentel were
Craig W. Hillwig, Sherry P. Broder, and Jon M. Van Dyke.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case turns on the interpretation and proper applica
tion of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
requires us to address the Rule’s operation in the context of
foreign sovereign immunity.
This interpleader action was commenced to determine the
ownership of property allegedly stolen by Ferdinand Marcos
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Philippine
Human Rights Groups by Mark S. Davis; and for Professors of Interna
tional Law by William J. Aceves.
A. Robert Pietrzak, Daniel A. McLaughlin, Carter G. Phillips, and
Daniel R. Spector filed a brief for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. as amicus curiae.

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when he was the President of the Republic of the Philip
pines. Two entities named in the suit invoked sovereign im
munity. They are the Republic of the Philippines and the
Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Governance, re
ferred to in turn as the Republic and the Commission. They
were dismissed, but the interpleader action proceeded to
judgment over their objection. Together with two parties
who remained in the suit, the Republic and the Commission
now insist it was error to allow the litigation to proceed.
Under Rule 19, they contend, the action should have been
dismissed once it became clear they could not be joined as
parties without their consent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
agreeing with the District Court, held the action could pro
ceed without the Republic and the Commission as parties.
Among the reasons the Court of Appeals gave was that the
absent, sovereign entities would not prevail on their claims.
We conclude the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight
to the foreign sovereign status of the Republic and the Com
mission, and that the court further erred in reaching and
discounting the merits of their claims.
I
A
When the opinion of the Court of Appeals is consulted, the
reader will find its quotations from Rule 19 do not accord
with its text as set out here; for after the case was in the
Court of Appeals and before it came here, the text of the
Rule changed. The Rules Committee advised the changes
were stylistic only, see Advisory Committee’s Notes on 2007
Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, 28 U. S. C., p. 826
(2006 ed., Supp. I); and we agree. These are the three rele
vant stylistic changes. First, the word “required” replaced
the word “necessary” in subparagraph (a). Second, the 1966
Rule set out factors in longer clauses and the 2007 Rule sets
out the factors affecting joinder in separate lettered head

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ings. Third, the word “indispensable,” which had remained
as a remnant of the pre-1966 Rule, is altogether deleted from
the current text. Though the word “indispensable” had a
lesser place in the 1966 Rule, it still had the latent potential
to mislead.
As the substance and operation of the Rule both pre- and
post-2007 are unchanged, we will refer to the present, re
vised version. The pre-2007 version is printed in the appen
dix to this opinion, infra, at 873–875. The current Rule
states, in relevant part, as follows:
“Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties
“(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
“(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to serv
ice of process and whose joinder will not deprive the
court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as
a party if:
“(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord
complete relief among existing parties; or
“(B) that person claims an interest relating to the sub
ject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the
action in the person’s absence may:
“(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s
ability to protect the interest; or
“(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
“(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been
joined as required, the court must order that the person
be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a
plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a proper
case, an involuntary plaintiff.
“(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the
joinder would make venue improper, the court must dis
miss that party.

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“(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person
who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined,
the court must determine whether, in equity and good
conscience, the action should proceed among the existing
parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the
court to consider include:
“(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the per
son’s absence might prejudice that person or the exist
ing parties;
“(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened
or avoided by:
“(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
“(B) shaping the relief; or
“(C) other measures;
“(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s ab
sence would be adequate; and
“(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate rem
edy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 19(a)–(b), 28 U. S. C.
See also Rule 19(c) (imposing pleading requirements); Rule
19(d) (creating exception for class actions).
B
In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic,
incorporated Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), under Panamanian law.
Around the same time, Arelma opened a brokerage account
with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill
Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As
of the year 2000, the account had grown to approximately
$35 million.
Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his
presidency became the subject of worldwide attention and
protest. A class action by and on behalf of some 9,539 of his
human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his estate,
among others. The class action was tried in the United

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States District Court for the District of Hawaii and resulted
in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767 (CA9 1996). We refer to
that litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class mem
bers as the Pimentel class. In a related action, the Estate
of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation (the
Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the assets
to satisfy their own judgment against Marcos’ widow, Imelda
Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Haw. 91, 113–115, 969
P. 2d 1209, 1231–1233 (1998).
The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment
by attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill Lynch. The
Republic and the Commission claim a right to the assets
under a 1955 Philippine law providing that property derived
from the misuse of public office is forfeited to the Republic
from the moment of misappropriation. See An Act Declar
ing Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep.
Act No. 1379, 51:9 O. G. 4457 (June 18, 1955).
After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission
was created to recover any property he wrongfully took.
Almost immediately the Commission asked the Swiss Gov
ernment for assistance in recovering assets—including
shares in Arelma—that Marcos had moved to Switzerland.
In compliance the Swiss Government froze certain assets
and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission asked the Sandi
ganbayan, a Philippine court of special jurisdiction over cor
ruption cases, to declare forfeited to the Republic any prop
erty Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office. That
litigation is still pending in the Sandiganbayan.
The Swiss assets were transferred to an escrow account
set up by the Commission at the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), pending the Sandiganbayan’s decision as to their
rightful owner. The Republic and the Commission re

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quested that Merrill Lynch follow the same course and trans
fer the Arelma assets to an escrow account at PNB. Merrill
Lynch did not do so. Facing claims from various Marcos
creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch instead
filed an interpleader action under 28 U. S. C. § 1335. The
named defendants in the interpleader action were, among
others, the Republic and the Commission, Arelma, PNB, and
the Pimentel class (the respondents here).
The Pimentel case had been tried as a class action before
Judge Manuel Real of the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, who was sitting by des
ignation in the District of Hawaii after the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human
rights complaints against Marcos in that court. See Hilao,
supra, at 771. Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file the
interpleader action in the District of Hawaii, and he presided
over the matter.
After being named as defendants in the interpleader ac
tion, the Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. § 1604. They moved to dismiss pur
suant to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that the action
could not proceed without them. Arelma and PNB also
moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b). Without address
ing whether they were entitled to sovereign immunity, Judge
Real initially rejected the request by the Republic and the
Commission to dismiss the interpleader action. They ap
pealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. It held the Re
public and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immu
nity and that under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or
“necessary” parties under the old terminology). See In re
Republic of the Philippines, 309 F. 3d 1143, 1149–1152 (CA9
2002). The Court of Appeals entered a stay pending the
outcome of the litigation in the Sandiganbayan over the Mar
cos assets. See id., at 1152–1153.

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After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandi
ganbayan could not determine entitlement to the Arelma
assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed the action to
proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel class. A
week later, in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in
1991, the Republic asked that court to declare the Arelma
assets forfeited, arguing the matter was ripe for decision.
The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled.
In the interpleader case the Republic, the Commission, Ar
elma, and PNB appealed the District Court’s judgment in
favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of
Appeals affirmed. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d 885 (CA9 2006). Dismissal
of the interpleader suit, it held, was not warranted under
Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission
were required (“necessary”) parties under Rule 19(a), their
claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that
the interpleader action could proceed without them. One of
the reasons the court gave was that any action commenced
by the Republic and the Commission to recover the assets
would be barred by New York’s 6-year statute of limita
tions for claims involving the misappropriation of public
property. See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 213 (West Supp.
2008). The court thus found it unnecessary to consider
whether any prejudice to the Republic and the Commission
might be lessened by some form of judgment or interim de
cree in the interpleader action. The court also considered
the failure of the Republic and the Commission to obtain a
judgment in the Sandiganbayan—despite the Arelma share
certificates having been located and held in escrow at PNB
since 1997–1998—to be an equitable consideration counseling
against dismissal of the interpleader suit. The court further
found it relevant that allowing the interpleader case to
proceed would serve the interests of the Pimentel class,
which, at this point, likely has no other available forum in

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which to enforce its judgment against property belonging
to Marcos.
This Court granted certiorari. See 552 U. S. 1061 (2007).
II
We begin with the question we asked the parties to ad
dress when we granted certiorari: Whether the Republic and
the Commission, having been dismissed from the inter
pleader action based on their successful assertion of sover
eign immunity, had the right to appeal the District Court’s
determination under Rule 19 that the action could proceed
in their absence; and whether they have the right to seek
this Court’s review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment af
firming the District Court. See ibid.
Respondents contend that the Republic and the Commis
sion were not proper parties in the Court of Appeals when
it reviewed the District Court’s judgment allowing the ac
tion to proceed without them; and, respondents continue, the
Republic and the Commission are not proper parties in the
instant proceeding before us. See Brief for Respondent
Pimentel 21.
Without implying that respondents are correct in saying
the Republic and the Commission could neither appeal nor
become parties here, we conclude we need not rule on this
point. Other parties before us, Arelma and PNB, also seek
review of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the Dis
trict Court. They, too, moved to dismiss the action under
Rule 19(b), appealed from the denial of their motion, and are
petitioners before this Court. As a general matter any
party may move to dismiss an action under Rule 19(b). A
court with proper jurisdiction may also consider sua sponte
the absence of a required person and dismiss for failure to
join. See, e. g., Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184
U. S. 199, 235 (1902); see also Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102, 111 (1968).

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Respondents argue, however, that Arelma and PNB have
no standing to raise before this Court the question whether
the action may proceed in the absence of the Republic and
the Commission. Arelma and PNB lost on the merits of
their underlying claims to the interpleaded assets in both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals. By failing to
petition for certiorari on that merits ruling, respondents con
tend, Arelma and PNB abandoned any entitlement to the
interpleaded assets and therefore lack a concrete stake in the
outcome of further proceedings. We disagree. Dismissal of
the action under Rule 19(b) would benefit Arelma and PNB
by vacating the judgment denying them the interpleaded
assets. A party that seeks to have a judgment vacated in
its entirety on procedural grounds does not lose standing
simply because the party does not petition for certiorari on
the substance of the order.
III
We turn to the question whether the interpleader action
could proceed in the District Court without the Republic and
the Commission as parties.
Subdivision (a) of Rule 19 states the principles that deter
mine when persons or entities must be joined in a suit. The
Rule instructs that nonjoinder even of a required person
does not always result in dismissal. Subdivision (a) opens
by noting that it addresses joinder “if Feasible.” Where
joinder is not feasible, the question whether the action
should proceed turns on the factors outlined in subdivi
sion (b). The considerations set forth in subdivision (b) are
nonexclusive, as made clear by the introductory statement
that “[t]he factors for the court to consider include.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The general direction is whether “in
equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among
the existing parties or should be dismissed.” Ibid. The
design of the Rule, then, indicates that the determination

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whether to proceed will turn upon factors that are case spe
cific, which is consistent with a Rule based on equitable con
siderations. This is also consistent with the fact that the
determination of who may, or must, be parties to a suit has
consequences for the persons and entities affected by the
judgment; for the judicial system and its interest in the in
tegrity of its processes and the respect accorded to its de
crees; and for society and its concern for the fair and prompt
resolution of disputes. See, e. g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi
nois, 431 U. S. 720, 737–739 (1977). For these reasons, the
issue of joinder can be complex, and determinations are case
specific. See, e. g., Provident Bank, supra, at 118–119.
Under the earlier Rules the term “indispensable party”
might have implied a certain rigidity that would be in ten
sion with this case-specific approach. The word “indispen
sable” had an unforgiving connotation that did not fit easily
with a system that permits actions to proceed even when
some persons who otherwise should be parties to the action
cannot be joined. As the Court noted in Provident Bank,
the use of “indispensable” in Rule 19 created the “verbal
anomaly” of an “indispensable person who turns out to be
dispensable after all.” 390 U. S., at 117, n. 12. Though the
text has changed, the new Rule 19 has the same design and,
to some extent, the same tension. Required persons may
turn out not to be required for the action to proceed after all.
In all events it is clear that multiple factors must bear on
the decision whether to proceed without a required person.
This decision “must be based on factors varying with the
different cases, some such factors being substantive, some
procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some sub
ject to balancing against opposing interests.” Id., at 119.
IV
We turn to Rule 19 as it relates to this case. The applica
tion of subdivision (a) of Rule 19 is not contested. The Re
public and the Commission are required entities because

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“[w]ithout [them] as parties in this interpleader action, their
interests in the subject matter are not protected.” In re
Republic of Philippines, 309 F. 3d, at 1152; see Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). All parties appear to concede this.
The disagreement instead centers around the application of
subdivision (b), which addresses whether the action may pro
ceed without the Republic and the Commission, given that
the Rule requires them to be parties.
We have not addressed the standard of review for Rule
19(b) decisions. The case-specific inquiry that must be fol
lowed in applying the standards set forth in subdivision (b),
including the direction to consider whether “in equity and
good conscience” the case should proceed, implies some de
gree of deference to the district court. In this case, how
ever, we find implicit in the District Court’s rulings, and ex
plicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, errors of law
that require reversal. Whatever the appropriate standard
of review, a point we need not decide, the judgment could
not stand. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 99–100
(1996) (a court “by definition abuses its discretion when it
makes an error of law”).
The Court of Appeals erred in not giving the necessary
weight to the absent entities’ assertion of sovereign immu
nity. The court in effect decided the merits of the Republic
and the Commission’s claims to the Arelma assets. Once it
was recognized that those claims were not frivolous, it was
error for the Court of Appeals to address them on their mer
its when the required entities had been granted sovereign
immunity. The court’s consideration of the merits was itself
an infringement on foreign sovereign immunity; and, in any
event, its analysis was flawed. We discuss these errors first
in the context of how they affected the Court of Appeals’
analysis under the first factor of Rule 19(b). We then ex
plain that the outcome suggested by the first factor is con
firmed by our analysis under the other provisions of Rule
19(b). The action may not proceed.

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A
As to the first Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which a
judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice
that person or the existing parties, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
19(b)(1)—the judgment of the Court of Appeals is incorrect.
In considering whether the Republic and the Commission
would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed in their
absence, the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to
their sovereign status. The doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity has been recognized since early in the history of
our Nation. It is premised upon the “perfect equality and
absolute independence of sovereigns, and th[e] common in
terest impelling them to mutual intercourse.” Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 137 (1812). The
Court has observed that the doctrine is designed to “give
foreign states and their instrumentalities some protection
from the inconvenience of suit,” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
538 U. S. 468, 479 (2003).
The privilege is codified by federal statute. FSIA, 28
U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611, provides that “a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sec
tions 1605 to 1607,” absent existing international agreements
to the contrary. § 1604; see Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486–489 (1983) (explaining the his
tory of the doctrine’s codification). Exceptions to the gen
eral principle of foreign sovereign immunity are contained in
§§ 1605–1607 of the statute. They are inapplicable here, or
at least the parties do not invoke them. Immunity in this
case, then, is uncontested; and pursuant to the Court of Ap
peals’ earlier ruling on the issue, the District Court dis
missed the Republic and the Commission from the action on
this ground.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to give
full effect to sovereign immunity when they held the action
could proceed without the Republic and the Commission.

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Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity
interests that have contributed to the development of the
immunity doctrine. See, e. g., id., at 486 (“[F]oreign sover
eign immunity is a matter of grace and comity”); National
City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 362,
and n. 7 (1955) (foreign sovereign immunity derives from
“standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self
interest, and respect for the ‘power and dignity’ of the for
eign sovereign” (citing Schooner Exchange, supra, at 136–
137, 143–144)).
Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this
case. The claims of the Republic and the Commission arise
from events of historical and political significance for the Re
public and its people. The Republic and the Commission
have a unique interest in resolving the ownership of or
claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if, and how,
the assets should be used to compensate those persons who
suffered grievous injury under Marcos. There is a comity
interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for
a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a foreign
state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts with
out right or good cause. Then, too, there is the more specific
affront that could result to the Republic and the Commission
if property they claim is seized by the decree of a foreign
court. Cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30,
35–36 (1945) (pre-FSIA, common-law doctrine dictated that
courts defer to executive determination of immunity because
“[t]he judicial seizure” of the property of a friendly state may
be regarded as “an affront to its dignity and may . . . affect
our relations with it”).
Though this Court has not considered a case posing the
precise question presented here, there are some authorities
involving the intersection of joinder and the governmental
immunity of the United States. See, e. g., Mine Safety Ap
pliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375 (1945) (dis
missing an action where the Under Secretary of the Navy

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was sued in his official capacity, because the Government was
a required entity that could not be joined when it withheld
consent to be sued); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S.
382, 386–388 (1939) (dismissing the action for nonjoinder of a
required entity where the United States was the owner of
the land in question but had not consented to suit). The
analysis of the joinder issue in those cases was somewhat
perfunctory, but the holdings were clear: A case may not
proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to
suit. These cases instruct us that where sovereign immu
nity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not frivo
lous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is
a potential for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.
The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in undertaking to
rule on the merits of the Republic and the Commission’s
claims. There may be cases where the person who is not
joined asserts a claim that is frivolous. In that instance a
court may have leeway under both Rule 19(a)(1), defining
required parties, and Rule 19(b), addressing when a suit may
go forward nonetheless, to disregard the frivolous claim.
Here, the claims of the absent entities are not frivolous; and
the Court of Appeals should not have proceeded on the
premise that those claims would be determined against the
sovereign entities that asserted immunity.
The Court of Appeals determined that the claims of the
Republic and the Commission as to the assets would not suc
ceed because a suit would be time barred in New York.
This is not necessarily so. If the Sandiganbayan rules that
the Republic owns the assets or stock of Arelma because
Marcos did not own them and the property was forfeited to
the Republic under Philippine law, then New York misappro
priation rules might not be the applicable law. For instance,
the Republic and the Commission, standing in for Arelma
based upon the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, might not pursue
a misappropriation of public property suit, as the Court of
Appeals assumed they would. They might instead, or in the

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alternative, file suit for breach of contract against Merrill
Lynch. They would argue the statute of limitations would
start to run if and when Merrill Lynch refused to hand over
the assets. See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 213 (West Supp.
2008); Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 81 N. Y.
2d 399, 402, 615 N. E. 2d 985, 986 (1993) (“In New York, a
breach of contract cause of action accrues at the time of the
breach”). Or the Republic and the Commission might bring
an action either in state or federal court to enforce the Sandi
ganbayan’s judgment. See 1 Restatement (Third) of For
eign Relations Law of the United States § 482, Comment a
(1986) ( jurisdiction of foreign court rendering judgment
is presumed); id., Comment d (providing exceptions not rel
evant here); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2467(c) (providing for
enforcement of foreign forfeiture judgments in certain cir
cumstances). Merrill Lynch makes arguments why these
actions would not succeed, see Brief for Merrill Lynch as
Amicus Curiae 26–27, to which the Republic, the Commis
sion, and the United States respond, see Reply Brief for Peti
tioners 14–18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–
28. We need not seek to predict the outcomes. It suffices
that the claims would not be frivolous.
As these comments indicate, Rule 19 cannot be applied in
a vacuum, and it may require some preliminary assessment
of the merits of certain claims. For example, the Rule di
rects a court, in determining who is a required person, to
consider whether complete relief can be afforded in their ab
sence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(A). Likewise, in
the Rule 19(b) inquiry, a court must examine, to some extent,
the claims presented and the interests likely to be asserted
both by the joined parties and the absent entities or persons.
Here, however, it was improper to issue a definitive holding
regarding a nonfrivolous, substantive claim made by an ab
sent, required entity that was entitled by its sovereign status
to immunity from suit. That privilege is much diminished
if an important and consequential ruling affecting the sover

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eign’s substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed,
by a federal court in the sovereign’s absence and over its
objection.
As explained above, the decision to proceed in the absence
of the Republic and the Commission ignored the substantial
prejudice those entities likely would incur. This most di
rectly implicates Rule 19(b)’s first factor, which directs con
sideration of prejudice both to absent persons and those who
are parties. We have discussed the absent entities. As to
existing parties, we do not discount the Pimentel class’ inter
est in recovering damages it was awarded pursuant to a
judgment. Furthermore, combating public corruption is a
significant international policy. The policy is manifested in
treaties providing for international cooperation in recover
ing forfeited assets. See, e. g., United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, G. A. Res. 58/4, chs. IV and V, U. N.
Doc. A/RES/58/4, pp. 22, 32 (Dec. 11, 2003) (reprinted in 43
I. L. M. 37 (2004)); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters Art. 16, Nov. 13, 1994, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 104–18 (1995). This policy does support the interest of
the Pimentel class in recovering damages awarded to it.
But it also underscores the important comity concerns impli
cated by the Republic and the Commission in asserting for
eign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the District
Court and the Court of Appeals gave too much weight to the
interest of the Pimentel class, but that it did not accord
proper weight to the compelling claim of sovereign immunity.
Based on these considerations we conclude the District
Court and the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to
the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission
should the interpleader proceed in their absence.
B
As to the second Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which
any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or meas
ures alternative to dismissal, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(2)—

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there is no substantial argument to allow the action to pro
ceed. No alternative remedies or forms of relief have been
proposed to us or appear to be available. See 7 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1608,
pp. 106–110 (3d ed. 2001) (collecting cases using alternative
forms of relief, including the granting of money damages
rather than specific performance, the use of declaratory judg
ment, and the direction that payment be withheld pending
suits against the absent party). If the Marcos estate did not
own the assets, or if the Republic owns them now, the claim
of the Pimentel class likely fails; and in all events, if there are
equally valid but competing claims, that too would require
adjudication in a case where the Republic and the Commis
sion are parties. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 534, and n. 16 (1967); Russell v.
Clark’s Executors, 7 Cranch 69, 98–99 (1812) (Marshall,
C. J.); Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of Okla. v. Hodel, 788 F. 2d
765, 774 (CADC 1986) (“Conflicting claims by beneficiaries to
a common trust present a textbook example of a case where
one party may be severely prejudiced by a decision in his
absence” (citing Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563, 570–
571 (1874))).
C
As to the third Rule 19(b) factor—whether a judgment
rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(3)—the Court of Appeals understood
“adequacy” to refer to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’
claims. But adequacy refers to the “public stake in settling
disputes by wholes, whenever possible.” Provident Bank,
390 U. S., at 111. This “social interest in the efficient admin
istration of justice and the avoidance of multiple litigation”
is an interest that has “traditionally been thought to support
compulsory joinder of absent and potentially adverse claim
ants.” Illinois Brick Co., 431 U. S., at 737–738. Going for
ward with the action without the Republic and the Commis
sion would not further the public interest in settling the

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dispute as a whole because the Republic and the Commission
would not be bound by the judgment in an action where they
were not parties.
D
As to the fourth Rule 19(b) factor—whether the plaintiff
would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed
for nonjoinder, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(4)—the Court of
Appeals made much of what it considered the tort victims’
lack of an alternative forum should this action be dismissed.
This seems to assume the plaintiff in this interpleader action
was the Pimentel class. It is Merrill Lynch, however, that
has the statutory status of plaintiff as the stakeholder in the
interpleader action.
It is true that, in an interpleader action, the stakeholder
is often neutral as to the outcome, while other parties press
claims in the manner of a plaintiff. That is insufficient,
though, to overcome the statement in the interpleader stat
ute that the stakeholder is the plaintiff. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 1335(a) (conditioning jurisdiction in part upon whether “the
plaintiff has deposited such money or property” at issue with
the district court or has “given bond payable to the clerk of
the court in such amount and with such surety as the court
or judge may deem proper”). We do not ignore that, in con
text, the Pimentel class (and indeed all interpleader claim
ants) are to some extent comparable to the plaintiffs in non
interpleader cases. Their interests are not irrelevant to the
Rule 19(b) equitable balance; but the other provisions of the
Rule are the relevant ones to consult.
Merrill Lynch, as the stakeholder, makes the point that if
the action is dismissed it loses the benefit of a judgment
allowing it to disburse the assets and be done with the mat
ter. Dismissal of the action, it urges, leaves it without an
adequate remedy, for it “could potentially be forced . . . to
defend lawsuits by the various claimants in different juris
dictions, possibly leading to inconsistent judgments.” Brief
for Merrill Lynch as Amicus Curiae 14. A dismissal of the

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action on the ground of nonjoinder, however, will protect
Merrill Lynch in some respects. That disposition will not
provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determining the
party entitled to the assets, but it likely would provide Mer
rill Lynch with an effective defense against piecemeal litiga
tion and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. As matters
presently stand, in any later suit against it Merrill Lynch
may seek to join the Republic and the Commission and have
the action dismissed under Rule 19(b) should they again as
sert sovereign immunity. Dismissal for nonjoinder to some
extent will serve the purpose of interpleader, which is to
prevent a stakeholder from having to pay two or more par
ties for one claim.
Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch in this regard is out
weighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sover
eign immunity. Dismissal under Rule 19(b) will mean, in
some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a forum
for definitive resolution of their claims. But that result is
contemplated under the doctrine of foreign sovereign immu
nity. See, e. g., Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 497 (“[I]f a court de
termines that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity
applies, the plaintiff will be barred from raising his claim in
any court in the United States”).
V
The Court of Appeals’ failure to give sufficient weight to
the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission
should the interpleader proceed in their absence would, in
the usual course, warrant reversal and remand for further
proceedings. In this case, however, that error and our fur
ther analysis under the additional provisions of Rule 19(b)
lead us to conclude the action must be dismissed. This
leaves the Pimentel class, which has waited for years now to
be compensated for grievous wrongs, with no immediate way
to recover on its judgment against Marcos. And it leaves
Merrill Lynch, the stakeholder, without a judgment.

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The balance of equities may change in due course. One
relevant change may occur if it appears that the Sandigan
bayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a reasonable
period of time. Other changes could result when and if
there is a ruling. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Re
public and the Commission have no right to the assets, their
claims in some later interpleader suit would be less substan
tial than they are now. If the ruling is that the Republic
and the Commission own the assets, then they may seek to
enforce a judgment in our courts; or consent to become par
ties in an interpleader suit, where their claims could be con
sidered; or file in some other forum if they can obtain juris
diction over the relevant persons. We do note that if Merrill
Lynch, or other parties, elect to commence further litigation
in light of changed circumstances, it would not be necessary
to file the new action in the District Court where this action
arose, provided venue and jurisdictional requirements are
satisfied elsewhere. The present action, however, may not
proceed.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir
cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions
to order the District Court to dismiss the interpleader
action.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
The Court of Appeals issued its decision before the 2007
amendments to Rule 19(b) became effective. See Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d 885,
891 (CA9 2006). The text of the Rule before those changes
were adopted is as follows:
“Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just
Adjudication
“(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose joinder

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the sub
ject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in the person’s absence complete relief can
not be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter im
pair or impede the person’s ability to protect that inter
est or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties sub
ject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the
claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined,
the court shall order that the person be made a party.
If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do
so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party ob
jects to venue and joinder of that party would render
the venue of the action improper, that party shall be
dismissed from the action.
“(b) Determination by Court Whenever Join
der not Feasible. If a person as described in subdi
vision (a)(1)–(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties before it,
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be consid
ered by the court include: first, to what extent a judg
ment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudi
cial to the person or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be ade
quate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an ade
quate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

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“(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A plead
ing asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in
subdivision (a)(1)–(2) hereof who are not joined, and the
reasons why they are not joined.
“(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is
subject to the provisions of Rule 23.” Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc., 28 U. S. C.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
While I join Part II of the Court’s opinion holding that we
have jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals’ decision
and agree that we should not affirm the Court of Appeals’
judgment on the merits of its analysis under Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I believe the appropriate
disposition of this case is to reverse and remand for further
proceedings. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit
erred by concluding that the New York statute of limitations
provides a virtually insuperable obstacle to petitioners’ re
covery of the Arelma, S. A., assets, and I therefore agree
that this Court should reverse. I would not, however, give
near-dispositive effect to the Republic of the Philippines (Re
public) and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good
Governance’s (Commission) status as sovereign entities, as
the Court does in ordering outright dismissal of the case.
In my judgment, the Court of Appeals should either order
the District Judge to stay further proceedings pending a rea
sonably prompt decision of the Sandiganbayan or order the
case reassigned to a different District Judge to conduct fur
ther proceedings. There is, of course, a risk of unfairness
in conducting such proceedings without the participation of
petitioners. But it is a risk that they can avoid by waiving
their sovereign immunity, and the record provides a basis for
believing that they would do so if the case proceeded before
a different judge.

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The Republic did not invoke its sovereign immunity until
after the District Court denied its motion seeking dismissal
or transfer for improper venue, dismissal on act of state
grounds, or recusal of the District Judge. App. 9; id., at 2–3
(docket entries). In support of that motion they advanced a
factual basis for suspecting that the District Judge’s impar
tiality could be questioned. Memorandum of Law in Sup
port of the Motions To Dismiss, Transfer or Stay, and for
Recusal in Civ. No. CV00–595MLR (D. Haw.), pp. 23–28.
These facts demonstrate that the District Judge would likely
“have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind
previously-expressed views. ” Cali fornia v. Montrose
Chemical Corp. of California, 104 F. 3d 1507, 1521 (CA9
1997) (providing the standard for when the Ninth Circuit will
reassign a case (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It appears, for example, that the District Judge summoned
an attorney representing Merrill Lynch to a meeting in
chambers in Los Angeles on September 11, 2000, after learn
ing that the Republic and the Commission sought to obtain
the Arelma funds from Merrill Lynch. During these pro
ceedings, the District Judge directed Merrill Lynch to file an
interpleader action before him in the District of Hawaii and
to deposit the Arelma funds with the court, despite the attor
ney’s argument that New York would likely be the more ap
propriate forum. See ante, at 859; Tr. 6 (Sept. 11, 2000).
Merrill Lynch filed the interpleader on September 14, 2000,
and the District Judge sealed the file, making it difficult for
other parties to determine the status of the proceedings.
See Affidavit of Richard A. Martin in Support of the Motions
To Dismiss, Transfer or Stay Submitted by the Republic of
the Philippines and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government in Civ. No. CV00–595MLR (D. Haw.), ¶¶ 6–7, 11.
These actions bespeak a level of personal involvement and
desire to control the Marcos proceedings that create at least
a colorable basis for the Republic and the Commission’s con
cern about the District Judge’s impartiality.

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Furthermore, following the Republic and the Commis
sion’s motion to dismiss the action on sovereign immunity
grounds, the District Judge decided that they were not “real
parties in interest.” See In re Republic of Philippines, 309
F. 3d 1143, 1148 (CA9 2002). The Ninth Circuit reversed
and directed the District Judge to enter a stay, id., at 1153;
the District Court did so, but vacated the stay within
months. While the District Court’s decision to do so was
not without some basis, it presumably increased concern
about the possibility that the District Judge would not fairly
consider the Republic’s position on the merits.
Upon reassignment, the question whether to dismiss the
case, to stay the proceedings, or to require the Republic to
choose between asserting its sovereign immunity and de
fending on the merits would be open. The District Judge
might wish to hold a hearing to determine whether the Re
public and the Commission have a substantial argument that
the Republic owned the disputed assets when they were con
veyed to Arelma in 1972. While the Court assumes that the
Republic’s interest in the Arelma assets is “not frivolous,”
ante, at 867, on this record, it is not clear whether the Repub
lic has a sufficient claim to those assets to preclude their
recovery by judgment creditors of Marcos. The Republic’s
claim to disputed assets may be meritless for reasons unre
lated to the potential statute of limitations.
Further, in conducting the balancing inquiry mandated by
Rule 19, as interpreted by Justice Harlan’s opinion for the
Court in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patter
son, 390 U. S. 102 (1968), I would conclude that several facts
specific to this case suggest that the Republic and the Com
mission’s sovereign interests should be given less weight
than in the ordinary case. First, in all events, the Republic
and the Commission must take affirmative steps in United
States courts (or possibly invoke the assistance of the Attor
ney General to do so, see Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 27) at some point in order to recover the assets held

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in the United States. Thus, the sovereign interest impli
cated here is not of the same magnitude as when a sovereign
faces liability; the Republic’s interest is in choosing the most
convenient venue and time for the suit to proceed.
Second, in the past two decades, the Republic has partici
pated in other proceedings involving Marcos’ assets in our
courts without interposing any objection. Indeed, in 1987 it
filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in the underly
ing consolidated class action that led to the entry of respond
ents’ judgment against Marcos; in that brief the Republic
urged the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District Judge’s dis
missal of two of the cases (later consolidated) under the act
of state doctrine and “to allow the Plaintiffs in those two
cases to present their evidence of gross human rights viola
tions against Ferdinand Marcos and to pursue justice in U. S.
District Court.” App. A to Brief for Respondent Pimentel
RA–1.
This was the Republic’s position notwithstanding the fact
that any recovery would come from a judgment against Mar
cos’ assets—assets that the Republic and the Commission
now claim to have owned in full from the moment Marcos
acquired them. See, e. g., Brief for Republic in Nos. 04–
16401 etc. (CA9), p. 9 (“Under Philippine law, assets resulting
from the misuse of public office, bribery, corruption, and
other such crimes by public officials are forfeit to the Repub
lic from the moment such assets are generated”); Pet. for
Republic in No. 0141 (Sandiganbayan) (filed 1991) (seeking
forfeiture of a large number of Marcos assets). Even if the
Republic believed that Marcos might have some personal
assets that were not ill gotten, under the Republic’s theory
that amount could not possibly have approached the judg
ment respondents received. Either the Republic was en
couraging futile and purely symbolic litigation, or the Repub
lic believed that other creditors would have access to at least
a portion of Marcos’ vast assets.

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879 Cite as: 553 U. S. 851 (2008)
Opinion of Souter, J.
In sum, I am persuaded that the Court’s judgment today
represents a more “inflexible approach” than the Rule con
templates. Provident, 390 U. S., at 107. All parties have
an interest in the prompt resolution of the disposition of the
Arelma assets. A remand would allow a new judge to han
dle the matter in an expeditious fashion rather than requir
ing a brand new proceeding. The Court suggests that Mer
rill Lynch may file in another District Court—presumably in
New York—if it seeks to commence further litigation. See
ante, at 873. While this solution would put the matter be
fore another District Judge, it requires the initiation of a new
proceeding that may unnecessarily delay the final resolution.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join all but Parts IV–B and V of the Court’s opinion.
I differ as to relief because a conclusion of the matter pend
ing before the Sandiganbayan may simplify the issues raised
in this case and render one disposition or another more
clearly correct. I would therefore vacate the judgment and
remand for a stay of proceedings for a reasonable time to
await a decree of the Philippine court. If it should appear
later that no such decree can be expected, the Court of Ap
peals could decide on the next step in light of the Court’s
opinion. For reasons given by Justice Stevens, I would
order that any further proceedings in the District Court be
held before a judge fresh to the case.