SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., et al. v. APCC SERVICES, INC., et al.

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269 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., et al. v. APCC
SERVICES, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 07–552. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code or
1–800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier (which
completes the call). The carrier then compensates the payphone opera
tor (which connects the call to the carrier in the first place). The pay
phone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for any compensation
that the carrier fails to pay for these “dial-around” calls. Many pay
phone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection
firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit
on their behalf. A group of aggregators (respondents here) were as
signed legal title to the claims of approximately 1,400 payphone opera
tors. The aggregators separately agreed to remit all proceeds to those
operators, who would then pay the aggregators for their services.
After entering into these agreements, the aggregators filed federal
court lawsuits seeking compensation from petitioner long-distance carri
ers. The District Court refused to dismiss the claims, finding that the
aggregators had standing, and the D. C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held: An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue
that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to
remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Pp. 273–292.
(a) History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have found
ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at issue,
courts—both before and after the founding—have always permitted the
party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a strong tradition
specifically of suits by assignees for collection. And while precedents
of this Court, Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302, Spiller v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117, and Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282, do
not conclusively resolve the standing question here, they offer powerful
support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have
long been seen as “amenable” to resolution by the judicial process, Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102. Pp. 273–285.
(b) Petitioners offer no convincing reason to depart from the histori
cal tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In
any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing requirements

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270 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC
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Syllabus
articulated in this Court’s more modern decisions. Petitioners argue
that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an injury and that
assignments for collection do not transfer the payphone operators’ inju
ries. But the operators assigned their claims lock, stock, and barrel,
and precedent makes clear that an assignee can sue based on his assign
or’s injuries. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765. In arguing that the aggregators cannot
satisfy the redressability requirement because they will remit their re
covery to the payphone operators, petitioners misconstrue the nature of
the redressability inquiry, which focuses on whether the injury that a
plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation—not on
what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with the money recovered.
See, e. g., id., at 771. Petitioners’ claim that the assignments constitute
nothing more than a contract for legal services is overstated. There is
an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning
a claim to a lawyer. The latter confers a property right (which credi
tors might attach); the former does not. Finally, as a practical matter,
it would be particularly unwise to abandon history and precedent in
resolving the question here, for any such ruling could be overcome by,
e. g., rewriting the agreement to give the aggregator a tiny portion of
the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Pp. 285–289.
(c) Petitioners’ reasons for denying prudential standing—that the ag
gregators are seeking redress for third parties; that the litigation repre
sents an effort by the aggregators and payphone operators to circum
vent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class-action requirements; and
that practical problems could arise because the aggregators are suing,
e. g., payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests or
honor judgments—are unpersuasive. And because there are no allega
tions that the assignments were made in bad faith and because the as
signments were made for ordinary business purposes, any other pruden
tial questions need not be considered here. Pp. 289–292.
489 F. 3d 1249, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Ken
nedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissent
ing opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 298.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were David W. Carpenter, Thomas C.
Goldstein, Patricia A. Millett, and David P. Murray.

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Opinion of the Court
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Donald J. Russell and Michael
W. Ward.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether an assignee of a legal
claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in
federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit
the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Because his
tory and precedent make clear that such an assignee has long
been permitted to bring suit, we conclude that the assignee
does have standing.
I
When a payphone customer makes a long-distance call
with an access code or 1–800 number issued by a long
distance communications carrier, the customer pays the car
rier (which completes that call), but not the payphone opera
tor (which connects that call to the carrier in the first place).
In these circumstances, the long-distance carrier is required
to compensate the payphone operator for the customer’s call.
See 47 U. S. C. § 226; 47 CFR § 64.1300 (2007). The pay
phone operator can sue the long-distance carrier in court for
any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these
“dial-around” calls. And many have done so. See Global
Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Tele
communications, Inc., 550 U. S. 45 (2007) (finding that the
Communications Act of 1934 authorizes such suits).
Because litigation is expensive, because the evidentiary
demands of a single suit are often great, and because the
resulting monetary recovery is often small, many payphone
operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and col
lection firms called “aggregators” so that, in effect, these
*Douglas P. Lobel, David A. Vogel, and Lori R. E. Ploeger filed a brief
for Qwest Communications Corp. as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Bruce D. Sokler and Robert G. Kidwell filed a brief for NetworkIP, LLC,
et al. as amicus curiae.

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aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. See Brief for
Respondents 3. Typically, an individual aggregator collects
claims from different payphone operators; the aggregator
promises to remit to the relevant payphone operator (i. e.,
the assignor of the claim) any dial-around compensation that
is recovered; the aggregator then pursues the claims in court
or through settlement negotiations; and the aggregator is
paid a fee for this service.
The present litigation involves a group of aggregators who
have taken claim assignments from approximately 1,400 pay
phone operators. Each payphone operator signed an As
signment and Power of Attorney Agreement (Agreement) in
which the payphone operator “assigns, transfers and sets
over to [the aggregator] for purposes of collection all rights,
title and interest of the [payphone operator] in the [payphone
operator’s] claims, demands or causes of action for ‘Dial-
Around Compensation’ . . . due the [payphone operator] for
periods since October 1, 1997.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 114.
The Agreement also “appoints” the aggregator as the pay
phone operator’s “true and lawful attorney-in-fact.” Ibid.
The Agreement provides that the aggregator will litigate “in
the [payphone operator’s] interest.” Id., at 115. And the
Agreement further stipulates that the assignment of the
claims “may not be revoked without the written consent of
the [aggregator].” Ibid. The aggregator and payphone op
erator then separately agreed that the aggregator would
remit all proceeds to the payphone operator and that the
payphone operator would pay the aggregator for its services
(typically via a quarterly charge).
After signing the agreements, the aggregators (respond
ents here) filed lawsuits in federal court seeking dial-around
compensation from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-distance
carriers (petitioners here). AT&T moved to dismiss the
claims, arguing that the aggregators lack standing to sue
under Article III of the Constitution. The District Court
initially agreed to dismiss, APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,

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254 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140–141 (DC 2003), but changed its mind
in light of a “long line of cases and legal treatises that recog
nize a well-established principle that assignees for collection
purposes are entitled to bring suit where [as here] the as
signments transfer absolute title to the claims.” APCC
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (DC 2003).
After consolidating similar cases, a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed
that the aggregators have standing to sue, but held that the
relevant statutes do not create a private right of action.
APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 F. 3d
1238 (2005) (per curiam). This Court granted the aggrega
tors’ petition for certiorari on the latter statutory question,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsider
ation in light of Global Crossing, supra. APCC Services,
Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 550 U. S. 901 (2007).
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
District Court allowing the litigation to go forward. 489
F. 3d 1249, 1250 (2007) (per curiam). The long-distance car
riers then asked us to consider the standing question. We
granted certiorari, and we now affirm.
II
We begin with the most basic doctrinal principles: Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the federal “judicial
Power” to the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies.”
That case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied only where
a plaintiff has standing. See, e. g., DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332 (2006). And in order to have Article
III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an in
jury in fact (i. e., a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a
“legally protected interest”); (2) causation (i. e., a “ ‘fairly . . .
trace[able]’ ” connection between the alleged injury in fact
and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redress
ability (i. e., it is “ ‘likely’ ” and not “merely ‘speculative’ ”
that the plaintiff ’s injury will be remedied by the relief plain

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tiff seeks in bringing suit). Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992) (calling these the “irreducible
constitutional minimum” requirements).
In some sense, the aggregators clearly meet these require
ments. They base their suit upon a concrete and particular
ized “injury in fact,” namely, the carriers’ failure to pay dial
around compensation. The carriers “caused” that injury.
And the litigation will “redress” that injury—if the suits are
successful, the long-distance carriers will pay what they owe.
The long-distance carriers argue, however, that the aggrega
tors lack standing because it was the payphone operators
(who are not plaintiffs), not the aggregators (who are plain
tiffs), who were “injured in fact” and that it is the payphone
operators, not the aggregators, whose injuries a legal victory
will truly “redress”: The aggregators, after all, will remit
all litigation proceeds to the payphone operators. Brief for
Petitioners 18. Thus, the question before us is whether,
under these circumstances, an assignee has standing to pur
sue the assignor’s claims for money owed.
We have often said that history and tradition offer a mean
ingful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers
federal courts to consider. See, e. g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998) (“We have al
ways taken [the case-or-controversy requirement] to mean
cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable
to, and resolved by, the judicial process” (emphasis added));
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 445 U. S. 375, 382 (1980) (“The purpose of the case-or
controversy requirement is to limit the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in
a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process” (emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted)); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460
(1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (in crafting Article III,
“the framers . . . gave merely the outlines of what were to

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them the familiar operations of the English judicial system
and its manifestations on this side of the ocean before the
Union”). Consequently, we here have carefully examined
how courts have historically treated suits by assignors and
assignees. And we have discovered that history and prece
dent are clear on the question before us: Assignees of a claim,
including assignees for collection, have long been permitted
to bring suit. A clear historical answer at least demands
reasons for change. We can find no such reasons here, and
accordingly we conclude that the aggregators have standing.
A
We must begin with a minor concession. Prior to the 17th
century, English law would not have authorized a suit like
this one. But that is because, with only limited exceptions,
English courts refused to recognize assignments at all. See,
e. g., Lampet’s Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 48a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994,
997 (K. B. 1612) (stating that “no possibility, right, title, nor
thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers”
(footnote omitted)); Penson & Higbed’s Case, 4 Leo. 99, 74
Eng. Rep. 756 (K. B. 1590) (refusing to recognize the right of
an assignee of a right in contract); see also 9 J. Murray, Cor
bin on Contracts § 47.3, p. 134 (rev. ed. 2007) (noting that the
King was excepted from the basic rule and could, as a result,
always receive assignments).
Courts then strictly adhered to the rule that a “chose in
action”—an interest in property not immediately reducible
to possession (which, over time, came to include a financial
interest such as a debt, a legal claim for money, or a contrac
tual right)—simply “could not be transferred to another per
son by the strict rules of the ancient common law.” See 2
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *442. To permit transfer, the
courts feared, would lead to the “multiplying of contentions
and suits,” Lampet’s Case, supra, at 48a, 77 Eng. Rep., at
997, and would also promote “maintenance,” i. e., officious in

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termeddling with litigation, see Holdsworth, History of the
Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law, 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 997, 1006–1009 (1920).
As the 17th century began, however, str ic t anti
assignment rules seemed inconsistent with growing commer
cial needs. And as English commerce and trade expanded,
courts began to liberalize the rules that prevented assign
ments of choses in action. See 9 Corbin, supra, § 47.3, at 134
(suggesting that the “pragmatic necessities of trade” induced
“evolution of the common law”); Holdsworth, supra, at 1021–
1022 (the “common law” was “induced” to change because
of “considerations of mercantile convenience or necessity”);
J. Ames, Lectures on Legal History 214 (1913) (noting that
the “objection of maintenance” yielded to “the modern com
mercial spirit”). By the beginning of the 18th century,
courts routinely recognized assignments of equitable (but
not legal) interests in a chose in action: Courts of equity per
mitted suits by an assignee who had equitable (but not legal)
title. And courts of law effectively allowed suits either by
the assignee (who had equitable, but not legal title) or the
assignor (who had legal, but not equitable title).
To be more specific, courts of equity would simply permit
an assignee with a beneficial interest in a chose in action
to sue in his own name. They might, however, require the
assignee to bring in the assignor as a party to the action so
as to bind him to whatever judgment was reached. See,
e. g., Warmstrey v. Tanfield, 1 Ch. Rep. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498
(1628–1629); Fashion v. Atwood, 2 Ch. Cas. 36, 22 Eng. Rep.
835 (1688); Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern. 428, 428–429, 23 Eng.
Rep. 874 (Ch. 1701); Squib v. Wyn, 1 P. Wms. 378, 381, 24
Eng. Rep. 432, 433 (Ch. 1717); Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P.
Wms. 197, 199, 24 Eng. Rep. 1028, 1029 (Ch. 1733); Row v.
Dawson, 1 Ves. sen. 331, 332–333, 27 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1064–
1065 (Ch. 1749). See also M. Smith, Law of Assignment:
The Creation and Transfer of Choses in Action 131 (2007)
(by the beginning of the 18th century, “it became settled that

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equity would recognize the validity of the assignment of both
debts and of other things regarded by the common law as
choses in action”).
Courts of law, meanwhile, would permit the assignee with
an equitable interest to bring suit, but nonetheless required
the assignee to obtain a “power of attorney” from the holder
of the legal title, namely, the assignor, and further required
the assignee to bring suit in the name of that assignor. See,
e. g., Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 Harv. L. Rev.
816, 822 (1916) (“[C]ommon law lawyers were able, through
the device of the ‘power of attorney’ . . . to enable the as
signee to obtain relief in common law proceedings by suing
in the name of the assignor”); 29 R. Lord, Williston on Con
tracts § 74:2, pp. 214–215 (4th ed. 2003). Compare, e. g., Bar
row v. Gray, Cro. Eliz. 551, 78 Eng. Rep. 797 (K. B. 1653),
and South & Marsh’s Case, 3 Leo. 234, 74 Eng. Rep. 654
(Exch. 1686) (limiting the use of a power of attorney to
cases in which the assignor owed the assignee a debt), with
Holdsworth, supra, at 1021 (noting that English courts aban
doned that limitation by the end of the 18th century). At
the same time, courts of law would permit an assignor to sue
even when he had transferred away his beneficial interest.
And they permitted the assignor to sue in such circum
stances precisely because the assignor retained legal title.
See, e. g., Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284
(K. B. 1787) (allowing the bankrupt assignor of a chose in
action to sue a debtor for the benefit of the assignee because
the assignor possessed legal, though not equitable, title).
The upshot is that by the time Blackstone published vol
ume II of his Commentaries in 1766, he could dismiss the
“ancient common law” prohibition on assigning choses in ac
tion as a “nicety . . . now disregarded.” 2 Blackstone, supra,
at *442.
B
Legal practice in the United States largely mirrored that
in England. In the latter half of the 18th century and

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throughout the 19th century, American courts regularly “ex
ercised their powers in favor of the assignee,” both at law
and in equity. 9 Corbin on Contracts § 47.3, at 137. See,
e. g., McCullum v. Coxe, 1 Dall. 139 (Pa. 1785) (protecting
assignee of a debt against a collusive settlement by the as
signor); Dennie v. Chapman, 1 Root 113, 115 (Conn. Super.
1789) (assignee of a nonnegotiable note can bring suit “in
the name of the original promisee or his administrator”);
Andrews v. Beecker, 1 Johns. Cas. 411, 411–412, n. (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1800) (per curiam) (“Courts of law . . . are, in justice,
bound to protect the rights of the assignees, as much as a
court of equity, though they may still require the action to
be brought in the name of the assignor”); Riddle & Co. v.
Mandeville, 5 Cranch 322 (1809) (assignees of promissory
notes entitled to bring suit in equity). Indeed, § 11 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 specifically authorized federal courts
to take “cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of
any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of
an assignee” so long as federal jurisdiction would lie if the
assignor himself had brought suit. 1 Stat. 79.
Thus, in 1816, Justice Story, writing for a unanimous
Court, summarized the practice in American courts as fol
lows: “Courts of law, following in this respect the rules of
equity, now take notice of assignments of choses in action,
and exert themselves to afford them every support and pro
tection.” Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 236. He
added that courts of equity have “disregarded the rigid
strictness of the common law, and protected the rights of the
assignee of choses in action,” and noted that courts of com
mon law “now consider an assignment of a chose in action as
substantially valid, only preserving, in certain cases, the
form of an action commenced in the name of the assignor.”
Id., at 237, n.
It bears noting, however, that at the time of the founding
(and in some States well before then) the law did permit the
assignment of legal title to at least some choses in action.

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In such cases, the assignee could bring suit on the assigned
claim in his own name, in a court of law. See, e. g., Act of
Oct. 1705, Ch. XXXIV, 3 Va. Stat. 378 (W. Hening ed. 1823)
(reprinted 1969) (permitting any person to “assign or trans
fer any bond or bill for debt over to any other person” and
providing that “the assignee or assignees, his and their exec
utors and administrators by virtue of such assignment shall
and may have lawfull power to commence and prosecute any
suit at law in his or their own name or names”); Act of May
28, 1715, Ch. XXVIII, Gen. Laws of Penn. 60 (J. Dunlop
comp. 2d ed. 1849) (permitting the assignment of “bonds, spe
cialties, and notes” and authorizing “the person or persons,
to whom the said bonds, specialties or notes, are . . . as
signed” to “commence and prosecute his, her or their actions
at law”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 4, 1 Stat. 322 (“[I]t shall
be lawful for any inventor, his executor or administrator to
assign the title and interest in the said invention, at anytime,
and the assignee . . . shall thereafter stand in the place of
the original inventor, both as to right and responsibility”).
C
By the 19th century, courts began to consider the specific
question presented here: whether an assignee of a legal claim
for money could sue when that assignee had promised to
give all litigation proceeds back to the assignor. During
that century American law at the state level became less
formalistic through the merger of law and equity, through
statutes more generously permitting an assignor to pass
legal title to an assignee, and through the adoption of rules
that permitted any “real party in interest” to bring suit.
See 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1541, pp. 320–321 (2d ed. 1990) (hereinafter
Wright & Miller); see also 9 Corbin, supra, § 47.3, at 137.
The courts recognized that pre-existing law permitted an as
signor to bring suit on a claim even though the assignor re
tained nothing more than naked legal title. Since the law

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increasingly permitted the transfer of legal title to an as
signee, courts agreed that assignor and assignee should be
treated alike in this respect. And rather than abolish the
assignor’s well-established right to sue on the basis of naked
legal title alone, many courts instead extended the same
right to an assignee. See, e. g., Clark & Hutchins, The Real
Party in Interest, 34 Yale L. J. 259, 264–265 (1925) (noting
that the changes in the law permitted both the assignee with
“naked legal title” and the assignee with an equitable inter
est in a claim to bring suit).
Thus, during the 19th century, most state courts enter
tained suits virtually identical to the litigation before us:
suits by individuals who were assignees for collection only,
i. e., assignees who brought suit to collect money owed to
their assignors but who promised to turn over to those as
signors the proceeds secured through litigation. See, e. g.,
Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo. 428, 431
(1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory note for
collection only can bring suit, even though they lack a bene
ficial interest in the note, because the assignment “creates in
them such legal interest, that they thereby become the per
sons to sue”); Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349, 350, 353
(1871) (allowing suit by the assignee of a cause of action even
though the assignors “ ‘expected to receive the amount re
covered in the action,’ ” because the assignee, as “legal
holder of the claim,” was “the real party in interest”); Sear
ing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N. W. 708, 709 (1882)
(where legal title to a judgment was assigned “merely for
the purpose of enabling plaintiff to enforce its collection”
and the assignor in fact retained the beneficial interest, the
plaintiff-assignee could “prosecute this suit to enforce the
collection of the judgment”); Grant v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263,
265, 19 P. 493 (1888) (holding that the assignee of a bond
could bring suit, even though he lacked a beneficial interest
in the bond, and adopting the rule that an assignee with legal
title to an assigned claim can bring suit even where the as
signee must “account to the assignor” for “a part of the pro

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ceeds” or “is to account for the whole proceeds” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash.
636, 638, 637, 29 P. 209, 210 (1892) (holding that the assignee
of promissory notes was the real party in interest, even
though the assignment was “for the purpose of collection”
and the assignee had “no interest other than that of the legal
holder of said notes”); Wines v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 9 Utah
228, 235, 33 P. 1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (holding that an as
signee could bring suit based on causes of action assigned to
him “simply to enable him to sue” and who “would turn over
to the assignors all that was recovered in the action, after
deducting [the assignors’] proportion of the expenses of the
suit”); Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355,
357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a party who was assigned
legal title to contractual rights, where the assignor retained
the beneficial interest, noting that the doctrine that “prevails
in Colorado” is that the assignee may bring suit in his own
name “although there may be annexed to the transfer the
condition that when the sum is collected the whole or some
part of it must be paid over to the assignor”). See also Ap
pendix, infra (collecting cases from numerous other States
approving of suits by assignees for collection).
Of course, the dissent rightly notes, some States during
this period of time refused to recognize assignee-for
collection suits, or otherwise equivocated on the matter.
See post, at 309 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). But so many
States allowed these suits that by 1876, the distinguished
procedure and equity scholar John Norton Pomeroy declared
it “settled by a great preponderance of authority, although
there is some conflict” that an assignee is “entitled to sue in
his own name” whenever the assignment vests “legal title”
in the assignee, and notwithstanding “any contemporaneous,
collateral agreement by virtue of which he is to receive a
part only of the proceeds . . . or even is to thus account [to the
assignor] for the whole proceeds.” Remedies and Remedial
Rights § 132, p. 159 (internal quotation marks omitted; em
phasis added). Other contemporary scholars reached the

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same basic conclusion. See, e. g., P. Bliss, A Treatise Upon
the Law of Pleading § 51, p. 69 (2d ed. 1887) (stating that
“[m]ost of the courts have held that where negotiable paper
has been indorsed, or other choses in action have been as
signed, it does not concern the defendant for what purpose
the transfer has been made” and giving examples of States
permitting assignees to bring suit even where they lacked a
beneficial interest in the assigned claims (emphasis added)).
See also Clark & Hutchins, supra, at 264 (“[M]any, probably
most, American jurisdictions” have held that “an assignee
who has no beneficial interest, like an assignee for collection
only, may prosecute an action in his own name” (emphasis
added)). Even Michael Ferguson’s California Law Review
Comment—which the dissent cites as support for its argu
ment about “the divergent practice” among the courts, post,
at 310—recognizes that “[a] majority of courts has held that
an assignee for collection only is a real party in interest”
entitled to bring suit. See Comment, The Real Party in In
terest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant’s Interest in
the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L. Rev.
1452, 1475 (1967) (emphasis added); see also id., at 1476,
n. 118 (noting that even “[t]he few courts that have waivered
on the question have always ended up in the camp of the
majority” (emphasis added)).
During this period, a number of federal courts similarly
indicated approval of suits by assignees for collection only.
See, e. g., Bradford v. Jenks, 3 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (No. 1,769)
(CC Ill. 1840) (stating that the plaintiff, the receiver of a
bank, could bring suit in federal court to collect on a note
owed to that bank if he sued as the bank’s assignee, not its
receiver, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff could not
sue as an assignee because there was no diversity jurisdic
tion); Orr v. Lacy, 18 F. Cas. 834 (No. 10,589) (CC Mich. 1847)
(affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the endorsee of a bill of
exchange, on the ground that, as endorsee, he had the “legal
right” to bring suit notwithstanding the fact that the pro

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ceeds of the litigation would be turned over to the endorser);
Murdock v. The Emma Graham, 17 F. Cas. 1012, 1013 (No.
9,940) (SD Ohio 1878) (permitting the assignee of a claim
for injury to a “float or barge” to bring suit when, “under
the assignment,” the assignor’s creditors would benefit from
the litigation); The Rupert City, 213 F. 263, 266–267 (WD
Wash. 1914) (assignees of claims for collection only could
bring suit in maritime law because “an assignment for
collection . . . vest[s] such an interest in [an] assignee as to
entitle him to sue”).
Even this Court long ago indicated that assignees for col
lection only can properly bring suit. For example, in Waite
v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 (1902), the plaintiff sued to col
lect on a number of municipal bonds and coupons whose
“legal title” had been vested in him but which were trans
ferred to him “for collection only.” Id., at 324. The Court,
in a unanimous decision, ultimately held that the federal
courts could not hear his suit because the amount-in
controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction would not
have been satisfied if the bondholders and coupon holders
had sued individually. See id., at 328–329. However, be
fore reaching this holding, the Court expressly stated that
the suit could properly be brought in federal court “if the
only objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is that
the plaintiff was invested with the legal title to the bonds
and coupons simply for purposes of collection.” Id., at 325.
Next, in Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S.
117 (1920), a large number of cattle shippers assigned to
Spiller (the secretary of a Cattle Raiser’s Association) their
individual reparation claims against railroads they said had
charged them excessive rates. The Federal Court of Ap
peals held that Spiller could not bring suit because, in effect,
he was an assignee for collection only and would be passing
back to the cattle shippers any money he recovered from
the litigation. In a unanimous decision, this Court reversed.
The Court wrote that the cattle shippers’ “assignments were

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absolute in form” and “plainly” “vest[ed] the legal title in
Spiller.” Id., at 134. The Court conceded that the assign
ments did not pass “beneficial or equitable title” to Spiller.
Ibid. But the Court then said that “this was not necessary
to support the right of the assignee to claim an award of
reparation and enable him to recover it by action at law
brought in his own name but for the benefit of the equitable
owners of the claims.” Ibid. The Court thereby held
that Spiller’s legal title alone was sufficient to allow him to
bring suit in federal court on the aggregated claims of his
assignors.
Similarly, in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 (1939), this
Court unanimously held that (under New York law) a plain
tiff, an assignee for collection, had “dominion over the claim
for purposes of suit” because the assignment purported to
“ ‘sell, assign, transfer and set over’ the chose in action” to
the assignee. Id., at 289. More importantly for present
purposes, the Court said that the assignment’s “legal effect
was not curtailed by the recital that the assignment was for
purposes of suit and that its proceeds were to be turned over
or accounted for to another.” Ibid.
To be clear, we do not suggest that the Court’s decisions
in Waite, Spiller, and Titus conclusively resolve the standing
question before us. We cite them because they offer addi
tional and powerful support for the proposition that suits by
assignees for collection have long been seen as “amenable”
to resolution by the judicial process. Steel Co., 523 U. S.,
at 102.
Finally, we note that there is also considerable, more re
cent authority showing that an assignee for collection may
properly sue on the assigned claim in federal court. See,
e. g., 6A Wright & Miller § 1545, at 346–348 (noting that an
assignee with legal title is considered to be a real party in
interest and that as a result “federal courts have held that
an assignee for purposes of collection who holds legal title to
the debt according to the governing substantive law is the

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real party in interest even though the assignee must account
to the assignor for whatever is recovered in the action”); 6
Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments § 184, pp. 262–263 (1999) (“An as
signee for collection or security only is within the meaning
of the real party in interest statutes and entitled to sue in
his or her own name on an assigned account or chose in ac
tion, although he or she must account to the assignor for the
proceeds of the action, even when the assignment is without
consideration” (footnote omitted)). See also Rosenblum v.
Dingfelder, 111 F. 2d 406, 407 (CA2 1940); Staggers v. Otto
Gerdau Co., 359 F. 2d 292, 294 (CA2 1966); Dixie Portland
Flour Mills, Inc. v. Dixie Feed & Seed Co., 382 F. 2d 830,
833 (CA6 1967); Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assn. v.
Klamath Medical Serv. Bur., 701 F. 2d 1276, 1282 (CA9
1983).
D
The history and precedents that we have summarized
make clear that courts have long found ways to allow assign
ees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts—
both before and after the founding— have always permitted
the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there
is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for col
lection. We find this history and precedent “well nigh con
clusive” in respect to the issue before us: Lawsuits by assign
ees, including assignees for collection only, are “cases and
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and re
solved by, the judicial process.” Vermont Agency of Natu
ral Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765,
777–778 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why
we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by
assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event,
we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III

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standing requirements articulated in more modern decisions
of this Court.
Petitioners argue, for example, that the aggregators have
not themselves suffered any injury in fact and that the as
signments for collection “do not suffice to transfer the pay
phone operators’ injuries.” Brief for Petitioners 18. It is,
of course, true that the aggregators did not originally suffer
any injury caused by the long-distance carriers; the pay
phone operators did. But the payphone operators assigned
their claims to the aggregators lock, stock, and barrel. See
APCC Servs., 418 F. 3d, at 1243 (there is “no reason to be
lieve the assignment is anything less than a complete trans
fer to the aggregator” of the injury and resulting claim); see
also App. to Pet. for Cert. 114 (Agreement provides that each
payphone operator “assigns, transfers and sets over” to the
aggregator “all rights, title and interest” in dial-around com
pensation claims). And within the past decade we have
expressly held that an assignee can sue based on his assign
or’s injuries. In Vermont Agency, supra, we considered
whether a qui tam relator possesses Article III standing to
bring suit under the False Claims Act, which authorizes a
private party to bring suit to remedy an injury (fraud) that
the United States, not the private party, suffered. We held
that such a relator does possess standing. And we said that
is because the Act “effect[s] a partial assignment of the
Government’s damages claim” and that assignment of the
“United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer standing on
[the relator].” Id., at 773, 774. Indeed, in Vermont Agency
we stated quite unequivocally that “the assignee of a claim
has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the as
signor.” Id., at 773.
Petitioners next argue that the aggregators cannot satisfy
the redressability requirement of standing because, if suc
cessful in this litigation, the aggregators will simply remit
the litigation proceeds to the payphone operators. But peti
tioners misconstrue the nature of our redressability inquiry.

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That inquiry focuses, as it should, on whether the injury that
a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litiga
tion—not on what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with
the money he recovers. See, e. g., id., at 771 (to demonstrate
redressability, the plaintiff must show a “substantial likeli
hood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury
in fact” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added));
Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561 (“[I]t must be likely . . . that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision” (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis added)). Here, a legal
victory would unquestionably redress the injuries for which
the aggregators bring suit. The aggregators’ injuries relate
to the failure to receive the required dial-around compensa
tion. And if the aggregators prevail in this litigation, the
long-distance carriers would write a check to the aggre
gators for the amount of dial-around compensation owed.
What does it matter what the aggregators do with the money
afterward? The injuries would be redressed whether the
aggregators remit the litigation proceeds to the payphone
operators, donate them to charity, or use them to build
new corporate headquarters. Moreover, the statements our
prior cases made about the need to show redress of the in
jury are consistent with what numerous authorities have
long held in the assignment context, namely, that an assignee
for collection may properly bring suit to redress the injury
originally suffered by his assignor. Petitioners might dis
agree with those authorities. But petitioners have not pro
vided us with a good reason to reconsider them.
The dissent argues that our redressability analysis “could
not be more wrong,” because “[w]e have never approved
federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief
requested will run to a party not before the court. Never.”
Post, at 302. But federal courts routinely entertain suits
which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves
directly bringing suit. Trustees bring suits to benefit their
trusts; guardians ad litem bring suits to benefit their wards;

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receivers bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees
in bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; execu
tors bring suit to benefit testator estates; and so forth. The
dissent’s view of redressability, if taken seriously, would
work a sea change in the law. Moreover, to the extent that
trustees, guardians ad litem, and the like have some sort
of “obligation” to the parties whose interests they vindicate
through litigation, see post, at 304–305, n. 2, the same is true
in respect to the aggregators here. The aggregators have a
contractual obligation to litigate “in the [payphone opera
tor’s] interest.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 115a. (And if the
aggregators somehow violate that contractual obligation,
say, by agreeing to settle the claims against the long-distance
providers in exchange for a kickback from those providers,
each payphone operator would be able to bring suit for
breach of contract.)
Petitioners also make a further conceptual argument.
They point to cases in which this Court has said that a party
must possess a “personal stake” in a case in order to have
standing under Article III. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S.
186, 204 (1962). And petitioners add that, because the ag
gregators will not actually benefit from a victory in this case,
they lack a “personal stake” in the litigation’s outcome. The
problem with this argument is that the general “personal
stake” requirement and the more specific standing require
ments (injury in fact, redressability, and causation) are flip
sides of the same coin. They are simply different descrip
tions of the same judicial effort to ensure, in every case or
controversy, “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de
pends for illumination.” Ibid. See also Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 517 (2007) (“At bottom, the gist of the
question of standing is whether petitioners have such a per
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness” (internal quotation marks omit
ted)). Courts, during the past two centuries, appear to have

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found that “concrete adverseness” where an assignee for col
lection brings a lawsuit. And petitioners have provided us
with no grounds for reaching a contrary conclusion.
Petitioners make a purely functional argument, as well.
Read as a whole, they say, the assignments in this litigation
constitute nothing more than a contract for legal services.
We think this argument is overstated. There is an impor
tant distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assign
ing a claim to a lawyer (on the lawyer’s promise to remit
litigation proceeds). The latter confers a property right
(which creditors might attach); the former does not.
Finally, we note, as a practical matter, that it would be
particularly unwise for us to abandon history and precedent
in resolving the question before us. Were we to agree with
petitioners that the aggregators lack standing, our holding
could easily be overcome. For example, the Agreement
could be rewritten to give the aggregator a tiny portion of
the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Or
the payphone operators might assign all of their claims to a
“Dial-Around Compensation Trust” and then pay a trustee
(perhaps the aggregator) to bring suit on behalf of the trust.
Accordingly, the far more sensible course is to abide by the
history and tradition of assignee suits and find that the ag
gregators possess Article III standing.
IV
Petitioners argue that, even if the aggregators have stand
ing under Article III, we should nonetheless deny them
standing for a number of prudential reasons. See Elk Grove
Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11 (2004) (pru
dential standing doctrine “embodies judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction” (internal quota
tion marks omitted)).
First, petitioners invoke certain prudential limitations
that we have imposed in prior cases where a plaintiff has
sought to assert the legal claims of third parties. See, e. g.,

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Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501 (1975) (expressing a “re
luctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff ’s claim to
relief rests on the legal rights of third parties”); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U. S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the ordinary case, a party is denied
standing to assert the rights of third persons”); Secretary of
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 955
(1984) (a plaintiff ordinarily “ ‘cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties’ ”).
These third-party cases, however, are not on point. They
concern plaintiffs who seek to assert not their own legal
rights, but the legal rights of others. See, e. g., Warth,
supra, at 499 (plaintiff “generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on
the legal rights or interests of third parties” (emphasis
added)); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125 (2004)
(lawyers lack standing to assert the constitutional rights of
defendants deprived of appointed counsel on appeal); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400 (1991) (permitting a criminal defendant
to assert rights of juror discriminated against because of
race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976) (permitting beer
vendors to assert rights of prospective male customers aged
18 to 21 who, unlike females of the same ages, were barred
from purchasing beer). Here, the aggregators are suing
based on injuries originally suffered by third parties. But
the payphone operators assigned to the aggregators all
“rights, title and interest” in claims based on those injuries.
Thus, in the litigation before us, the aggregators assert what
are, due to that transfer, legal rights of their own. The ag
gregators, in other words, are asserting first-party, not
third-party, legal rights. Moreover, we add that none of the
third-party cases cited by petitioners involved assignments
or purported to overturn the longstanding doctrine permit
ting an assignee to bring suit on an assigned claim.
Second, petitioners suggest that the litigation here simply
represents an effort by the aggregators and the payphone

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operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23’s class-action requirements. But we do not understand
how “circumvention” of Rule 23 could constitute a basis for
denying standing here. For one thing, class actions are
permissive, not mandatory. More importantly, class actions
constitute but one of several methods for bringing about
aggregation of claims, i. e., they are but one of several
methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get
similar claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum.
See Rule 20(a) (permitting joinder of multiple plaintiffs);
Rule 42 (permitting consolidation of related cases filed in the
same district court); 28 U. S. C. § 1407 (authorizing consolida
tion of pretrial proceedings for related cases filed in multiple
federal districts); § 1404 (making it possible for related cases
pending in different federal courts to be transferred and con
solidated in one district court); D. Herr, Annotated Manual
for Complex Litigation § 20.12, p. 279 (4th ed. 2007) (noting
that “[r]elated cases pending in different federal courts may
be consolidated in a single district” by transfer under 28
U. S. C. § 1404(a)); J. Tidmarsh & R. Trangsrud, Complex Lit
igation and the Adversary System 473–524 (1998) (section on
“Transfer Devices that Aggregate Cases in a Single Venue”).
Because the federal system permits aggregation by other
means, we do not think that the aggregators should be de
nied standing simply because the payphone operators chose
one aggregation method over another.
Petitioners also point to various practical problems that
could arise because the aggregators, rather than the pay
phone operators, are suing. In particular, they say that the
payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests
served on them, that the payphone operators may not honor
judgments reached in this case, and that petitioners may not
be able to bring, in this litigation, counterclaims against
the payphone operators. See Brief for Petitioners 46–48.
Even assuming all that is so, courts have long permitted as
signee lawsuits notwithstanding the fact that such problems

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could arise. Regardless, courts are not helpless in the face
of such problems. For example, a district court can, if ap
propriate, compel a party to collect and to produce whatever
discovery-related information is necessary. See Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1), 30–31, 33–36. That court might grant a
motion to join the payphone operators to the case as “re
quired” parties. See Rule 19. Or the court might allow the
carriers to file a third-party complaint against the payphone
operators. See Rule 14(a). And the carriers could always
ask the Federal Communications Commission to find admin
istrative solutions to any remaining practical problems.
Cf. 47 U. S. C. § 276(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the FCC to “pre
scribe regulations” that “ensure that all payphone service
providers are fairly compensated for each and every com
pleted [dial-around] call”). We do not say that the litigation
before us calls for the use of any such procedural device.
We mention them only to explain the lack of any obvious
need for the remedy that the carriers here propose, namely,
denial of standing.
Finally, we note that in this litigation, there has been no
allegation that the assignments were made in bad faith. We
note, as well, that the assignments were made for ordinary
business purposes. Were this not so, additional prudential
questions might perhaps arise. But these questions are not
before us, and we need not consider them here.
V
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
Examples of cases in which state courts entertained or
otherwise indicated approval of suits by assignees for collec
tion only. References to “Pomeroy’s rule” are references to
the statement of law set forth in J. Pomeroy, Remedies and
Remedial Rights § 132, p. 159 (1876).

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1. Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo. 428,
431 (1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory note
for collection only can bring suit, even though they lack a
beneficial interest in the note, because the assignment “cre
ates in them such legal interest, that they thereby become
the persons to sue”);
2. Castner v. Austin Sumner & Co., 2 Minn. 44, 47–48
(1858) (holding that the assignees of promissory notes were
proper plaintiffs, regardless of the arrangement they and
their assignor had made in respect to the proceeds of the
litigation, because the defendants “can only raise the objec
tion of a defect of parties to the suit, when it appears that
some other person or party than the Plaintiffs have such a
legal interest in the note that a recovery by the Plaintiffs
would not preclude it from being enforced, and they be
thereby subjected to the risk of another suit for the same
subject-matter” (emphasis added));
3. Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa 481, 485–486 (1866) (holding that
the assignee could sue, notwithstanding the possibility that
the assignor was the party “beneficially interested in the ac
tion,” because “[t]he course of decision in this State estab
lishes this rule, viz.: that the party holding the legal title of
a note or instrument may sue on it though he be an agent or
trustee, and liable to account to another for the proceeds of
the recovery”);
4. Allen v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 231, 234 (1870) (opinion of
Hunt, Comm’r) (holding that the assignee with legal title to
a cause of action was “legally the real party in interest”
“[e]ven if he be liable to another as a debtor upon his contract
for the collection he may thus make”);
5. Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349, 350, 353 (1871) (opin
ion of Earl, Comm’r) (allowing suit by the assignee of a cause
of action even though the assignors “ ‘expected to receive the
amount recovered in the action,’ ” because the assignee, as
“legal holder of the claim,” was “the real party in interest”);

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6. Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486, 490 (1878) (holding that
so long as an assignee has legal title to the assigned commer
cial paper, the assignee may bring suit even if the assign
ment was “merely for the purpose of collection” and he acts
merely as “equitable trustee” for the assignor, i. e., the as
signor maintains the beneficial interest in the paper);
7. Searing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N. W. 708, 709
(1882) (where legal title to a judgment was assigned “merely
for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to enforce the collection”
and the assignor in fact retained the beneficial interest, the
plaintiff-assignee could “prosecute this suit to enforce the
collection of the judgment”);
8. Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo. App. 531, 536 (1888) (hold
ing, in light of the “recognized practice in this state,” that
the assignee could bring suit to recover on certain accounts
even where the assignment of the accounts had been made
“with the agreement that they were to [be] [he]ld solely for
the purpose of [the litigation],” i. e., the assignor maintained
the beneficial interest in the accounts (emphasis added));
9. Grant v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263, 265, 264, 19 P. 493 (1888)
(holding that the assignee of a bond could bring suit, even
though he lacked a beneficial interest in the bond, and en
dorsing Pomeroy’s rule as “a clear and correct explication of
the law”);
10. Young v. Hudson, 99 Mo. 102, 106, 12 S. W. 632, 633
(1889) (holding that an assignee could sue to collect on an
account for merchandise sold, even though the money would
be remitted to the assignor, because “[a]n assignee of a chose
in action arising out of contract may sue upon it in his own
name, though the title was passed to him only for the pur
pose of collection”);
11. Jackson v. Hamm, 14 Colo. 58, 61, 23 P. 88, 88–89
(1890) (holding that the assignee of a judgment was “the real
party in interest” and was “entitled to sue in his own name,”
even though the beneficial interest in the judgment was held
by someone else);

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12. Saulsbury v. Corwin, 40 Mo. App. 373, 376 (1890) (per
mitting suit by an assignee of a note who “had no interest in
the note” on the theory that “[o]ne who holds negotiable
paper for collection merely may sue on it in his own name”);
13. Anderson v. Reardon, 46 Minn. 185, 186, 48 N. W. 777
(1891) (where plaintiff had been assigned a claim on the “un
derstanding” that he would remit the proceeds to the
assignor less the “amount due him for services already ren
dered, and to be thereafter rendered” to the assignor, the
plaintiff could bring suit, even though he had “already col
lected on the demand enough to pay his own claim for serv
ices up to that time,” because “[i]t is no concern of the de
fendant whether the assignee of a claim receives the money
on it in his own right or as trustee of the assignor”);
14. McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 638, 637, 29 P. 209,
210 (1892) (holding that the assignee of promissory notes was
the real party in interest, even though the assignment was
“for the purpose of collection” and the assignee had “no in
terest other than that of the legal holder of said notes”);
15. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Heipler, 49 Minn. 395,
396, 52 N. W. 33 (1892) (upholding the plaintiff-assignee’s
judgment where that assignee “held the legal title to the
demand” and notwithstanding the fact that “there was an
agreement between the [assignor] and the plaintiff that the
latter took the [assignment] only for collection”);
16. Wines v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 9 Utah 228, 235, 33 P.
1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (adopting Pomeroy’s rule and holding
that an assignee could bring suit based on causes of action
assigned to him “simply to enable him to sue” and who
“would turn over to the assignors all that was recovered in
the action, after deducting their proportion of the expenses
of the suit”);
17. Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 323, 33 P. 913, 916 (1893)
(holding that the plaintiff-assignee could sue on claims as
signed by multiple parties “for collection,” stating that “[i]t
is [a] matter of common knowledge that for the purpose of

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saving expense commercial associations and others resort to
this method” and repeating the rule that “[i]n such cases the
assignee becomes the legal holder of a chose in action, which
is sufficient to entitle him to recover”);
18. Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355,
357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a party who was assigned
legal title to contractual rights, where the assignor retained
the beneficial interest, noting that the doctrine that “prevails
in Colorado” is that the assignee may bring suit in his own
name “although there may be annexed to the transfer the
condition that when the sum is collected the whole or some
part of it must be paid over to the assignor”);
19. Cox’s Executors v. Crockett & Co., 92 Va. 50, 58, 57, 22
S. E. 840, 843 (1895) (finding that suit by assignor following
an adverse judgment against assignee was barred by res ju
dicata but endorsing Pomeroy’s rule that an assignee could
bring suit as the “real party in interest” even where the
assignee must “account to the assignor, or other person, for
the residue, or even is to thus account for the whole pro
ceeds” of the litigation);
20. Sroufe v. Soto Bros. & Co., 5 Ariz. 10, 11, 12, 43 P. 221
(1896) (holding that state law permits “a party to maintain
an action on an account which has been assigned to him for
the purpose of collection, only” because such parties are
“holders of the legal title of said accounts”);
21. Ingham v. Weed, 5 Cal. Unreported Cases 645, 649, 48
P. 318, 320 (1897) (holding that the assignees of promissory
notes could bring suit where the assignors retained part of
the beneficial interest in the outcome, and expressly noting
that the assignees could bring suit even if the entire interest
in the notes had been assigned to them as “agents for collec
tion” because, citing Pomeroy and prior California cases “to
the same effect,” an assignee can bring suit where he has
“legal title” to a claim, notwithstanding “any contemporane
ous collateral agreement” by which he is to account to the

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assignor for part or even “the whole proceeds” (internal quo
tation marks omitted));
22. Citizens’ Bank v. Corkings, 9 S. D. 614, 615, 616, 70
N. W. 1059, 1060, rev’d on other grounds, 10 S. D. 98, 72 N. W.
99 (1897) (holding that where the assignee “took a formal
written assignment absolute in terms, but with the under
standing that he would take the claim, collect what he could,
and turn over to the company the proceeds thereof less the
expenses of collection,” the assignee could sue because the
“rule is that a written or verbal assignment, absolute in
terms, and vesting in the assignee the apparent legal title to
a chose in action, is unaffected by a collateral contemporane
ous agreement respecting the proceeds”);
23. Chase v. Dodge, 111 Wis. 70, 73, 86 N. W. 548, 549
(1901) (adopting New York’s rule that an assignee is the real
party in interest so long as he “holds the legal title” to an
assigned claim, regardless of the existence of “any private or
implied understanding” between the assignor and assignee
concerning the beneficial interest (internal quotation marks
omitted));
24. Roth v. Continental Wire Co., 94 Mo. App. 236, 262–
264, 68 S. W. 594, 602 (1902) (noting that Missouri has
adopted Pomeroy’s rule and holding that the trial court did
not err in excluding evidence that plaintiff was assigned the
cause of action for collection only);
25. Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 402, 75 P. 557, 558 (1904)
(overruling prior state cases and holding that where the as
signment of a bond or note vests legal title in the assignee,
the assignee can bring suit even where the assignee promises
to remit to the assignor “a part or all of the proceeds” (em
phasis added));
26. Eagle Mining & Improvement Co. v. Lund, 14 N. M.
417, 420–422, 94 P. 949, 950 (1908) (adopting the rule that the
assignee of a note can bring suit even where the assignor, not
the assignee, maintains the beneficial interest in the note);

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27. Harrison v. Pearcy & Coleman, 174 Ky. 485, 488, 487,
192 S. W. 513, 514–515 (1917) (holding that the assignee could
bring suit to collect on a note, even though he was “an as
signee for the purpose of collection only” and had “no finan
cial interest in the note”);
28. James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P.
137, 139 (1925) (“By the clear weight of authority a person
to whom a chose in action has been assigned for the purpose
of collection may maintain an action thereon . . . and as such
is authorized by statute in this state to maintain an action
in his own name”).
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, dissenting.
The majority concludes that a private litigant may sue in
federal court despite having to “pass back . . . all proceeds
of the litigation,” Brief for Respondents 9, thus depriving
that party of any stake in the outcome of the litigation. The
majority reaches this conclusion, in flat contravention of our
cases interpreting the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III, by reference to a historical tradition that is, at
best, equivocal. That history does not contradict what com
mon sense should tell us: There is a legal difference between
something and nothing. Respondents have nothing to gain
from their lawsuit. Under settled principles of standing,
that fact requires dismissal of their complaint.1
I
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power
of the federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.”
§ 2. As we have recently reaffirmed, “[n]o principle is
more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our sys
tem of government than the constitutional limitation of
1 Because respondents have failed to demonstrate that they have Article
III standing to bring their claims, I do not reach the question whether
prudential considerations would also bar their suit.

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federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006)
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997); internal
quotation marks omitted). Unlike the political branches, di
rectly elected by the people, the courts derive their authority
under Article III, including the power of judicial review,
from “the necessity . . . of carrying out the judicial function
of deciding cases.” Cuno, supra, at 340. That is why Arti
cle III courts “may exercise power only . . . ‘as a necessity,’ ”
that is, only when they are sure they have an actual case
before them. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 752 (1984)
(quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143
U. S. 339, 345 (1892)). “If a dispute is not a proper case or
controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or ex
pounding the law in the course of doing so.” Cuno, supra,
at 341.
Given the importance of ensuring a court’s jurisdiction be
fore deciding the merits of a case, “[w]e have always insisted
on strict compliance with th[e] jurisdictional standing re
quirement.” Raines, supra, at 819. And until today, it has
always been clear that a party lacking a direct, personal
stake in the litigation could not invoke the power of the fed
eral courts. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S.
555, 573 (1992) (plaintiff must demonstrate a “concrete pri
vate interest in the outcome of [the] suit”); Lance v. Coffman,
549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) (plaintiff must seek
relief that “directly and tangibly benefits him” (quoting
Lujan, supra, at 574; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244, n. 15
(1982) (Article III requires a litigant to show that a favorable
decision “will relieve a discrete injury to himself ” (emphasis
added)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975) (“The
Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to
protect against injury to the complaining party” (emphasis
added)).

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In recent years, we have elaborated the standing require
ments of Article III in terms of a three-part test—whether
the plaintiff can demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly
traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
102–103 (1998). But regardless of how the test is articu
lated, “the point has always been the same: whether a plain
tiff ‘personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court’s intervention.’ ” Id., at 103, n. 5 (quoting Warth,
supra, at 508; emphasis added). An assignee who has ac
quired the bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right
to the substantive recovery cannot show that he has a per
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court’s decision today is
unprecedented. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), does not
support it. Vermont Agency, in recognizing that a qui tam
relator as assignee of the United States had standing to sue,
did not dispense with the essential requirement of Article
III standing that the plaintiff have a “concrete private inter
est in the outcome of [the] suit.” Id., at 772 (quoting Lujan,
supra, at 573; internal quotation marks omitted). In Ver
mont Agency, the qui tam relator’s bounty was sufficient to
establish standing because it represented a “partial assign
ment of the Government’s damages claim,” encompassing
both a legal right to assert the claim and a stake in the re
covery. 529 U. S., at 773. Thus, it was clear that the False
Claims Act gave the “relator himself an interest in the law
suit,” in addition to “the right to retain a fee out of the
recovery.” Id., at 772.
Here, respondents are authorized to bring suit on behalf
of the payphone operators, but they have no claim to the
recovery. Indeed, their take is not tied to the recovery in
any way. Respondents receive their compensation based on
the number of payphones and telephone lines operated by
their clients, see App. 198, not based on the measure of dam

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ages ultimately awarded by a court or paid by petitioners as
part of a settlement. Respondents received the assign
ments only as a result of their willingness to assume the
obligation of remitting any recovery to the assignors, the
payphone operators. That is, after all, the entire point of
the arrangement. The payphone operators assigned their
claims to respondents “for purposes of collection,” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 114; respondents never had any share in the
amount collected. The absence of any right to the substan
tive recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from
the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing.
“When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose.” Bob
Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited
(Columbia Records 1965).
To be sure, respondents doubtless have more than just a
passing interest in the litigation. As collection agencies, re
spondents must demonstrate that they are willing to make
good on their threat to pursue their clients’ claims in liti
gation. Even so, “an interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’
of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury in
fact for Article III standing purposes.” Vermont Agency,
supra, at 773. The benefit respondents would receive—the
general business goodwill that would result from a successful
verdict, the ability to collect dial-around compensation for
their clients more effectively—is nothing more than a by
product of the current litigation. Such an interest cannot
support their standing to sue in federal court. Cf. Steel Co.,
supra, at 107 (the costs of investigating and prosecuting a
substantive claim do not give rise to standing to assert the
claim); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 70 (1986) (an inter
est in recovering attorney’s fees does not confer standing to
litigate the underlying claim).
The undeniable consequence of today’s decision is that a
plaintiff need no longer demonstrate a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation. Instead, the majority has re
placed the personal stake requirement with a completely im

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personal one. The right to sue is now the exact opposite of
a personal claim—it is a marketable commodity. By sever
ing the right to recover from the right to prosecute a claim,
the Court empowers anyone to bring suit on any claim,
whether it be the first assignee, the second, the third, or
so on. But, as we have said in another context, standing is
not “commutative.” Cuno, 547 U. S., at 352. Legal claims,
at least those brought in federal court, are not fungible
commodities.
The source of the Court’s mistake is easy to identify. The
Court goes awry when it asserts that the standing inquiry
focuses on whether the injury is likely to be redressed, not
whether the complaining party’s injury is likely to be re
dressed. See ante, at 286–287. That could not be more
wrong. We have never approved federal-court jurisdiction
over a claim where the entire relief requested will run to a
party not before the court. Never. The Court commits
this mistake by treating the elements of standing as separate
strands rather than as interlocking and related elements
meant to ensure a personal stake. Our cases do not condone
this approach.
The Court expressly rejected such an argument in Ver
mont Agency, where the relator argued that he was “suing
to remedy an injury in fact suffered by the United States.”
529 U. S., at 771. We dismissed the argument out of hand,
noting that “[t]he Art. III judicial power exists only to re
dress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complain
ing party.” Id., at 771–772 (quoting Warth, 422 U. S., at 499;
emphasis in Vermont Agency; internal quotation marks
omitted). Although the Court’s analysis in that section of
the opinion concerned the right of the relator to assert the
United States’ injury, the Court treated it as axiomatic that
any “redress” must also redound to the benefit of the relator.
In Steel Co., the Court similarly rejected a basis for stand
ing that turned on relief sought—the imposition of civil pen
alties—that was “payable to the United States Treasury,”
but not to the plaintiff. 523 U. S., at 106. We observed that

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the plaintiff sought “not remediation of its own injury,” but
merely the “vindication of the rule of law.” Ibid. (emphasis
added). Importantly, the Court recognized that “[r]elief
that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap
a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of
the redressability requirement.” Id., at 107. Again, the
Court’s emphasis on the party’s injury makes clear that the
basis for rejecting standing in Steel Co. was the fact that the
remedy sought would not benefit the party before the Court.
The majority’s view of the Article III redressability re
quirement is also incompatible with what we said in Raines,
521 U. S. 811. In that case, we held that individual Members
of Congress lacked standing to contest the constitutionality
of the Line Item Veto Act. We observed that the Congress
men “do not claim that they have been deprived of some
thing to which they personally are entitled.” Id., at 821.
Rather, the Members sought to enforce a right that ran to
their office, not to their person. “If one of the Members
were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim;
the claim would be possessed by his successor instead. The
claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the Member’s seat,
a seat which the Member holds . . . as trustee for his constit
uents, not as a prerogative of personal power.” Ibid. We
therefore held that the individual Members did “not have a
sufficient ‘personal stake’ in th[e] dispute” to maintain their
challenge. Id., at 830. See also Warth, supra, at 506 (deny
ing standing where “the record is devoid of any indication”
that the requested “relief would benefit petitioners”); Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26,
39, 42 (1976) (denying standing to plaintiffs who did not
“stand to profit in some personal interest” because it was
“purely speculative” whether the relief sought “would result
in these respondents’ receiving the hospital services they de
sire” (emphasis added)).
The majority finds that respondents have a sufficient stake
in this litigation because the substantive recovery will ini
tially go to them, and “[w]hat does it matter what the ag

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gregators do with the money afterward?” Ante, at 287.
The majority’s assertion implies, incorrectly, that respond
ents have, or ever had, a choice of what to do with the recov
ery. It may be true that a plaintiff ’s independent decision
to pledge his recovery to another, as in respondents’ hypo
thetical of an “original owner of a claim who signs a collat
eral agreement with a charity obligating herself to donate
every penny she recovers in [the] litigation,” Brief for Re
spondents 21, would not divest the plaintiff of Article III
standing. But respondents never had the right to direct the
disposition of the recovery; they have only the right to sue.
The hypothetical plaintiff who chooses to pledge her recov
ery to charity, by contrast, will secure a personal benefit
from the recovery. Unlike respondents’ claims, the hypo
thetical plaintiff ’s pre-existing claim is not tied in any way
to her separate agreement to direct her recovery to charity.
She has more than the right to sue; she has the right to
exercise her independent authority to direct the proceeds as
she sees fit. In that situation, the Article III requirement
that a plaintiff demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation is satisfied.2
2 The majority believes that the examples of trustees, guardians ad
litem, receivers, and executors show that “federal courts routinely enter
tain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves
directly bringing suit.” Ante, at 287. None of these examples is perti
nent to the question here. “A guardian ad litem or next friend . . . is a
nominal party only; the ward is the real party in interest . . . .” 6A
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1548,
pp. 373–374 (2d ed. 1990). A receiver “is considered to be an officer of
the court, and therefore not an agent of the parties, whose appointment is
incident to other proceedings in which some form of primary relief is
sought.” 12 id., § 2981, at 9–10 (2d ed. 1997) (footnote omitted). Trustees
hold legal title to the assets in the trust estate and have an independent
fiduciary obligation to sue to preserve those assets. The trustee’s dis
charge of its legal obligation is an independent, personal benefit that sup
ports the trustee’s standing to sue in federal court. The majority’s re
sponse that assignees for collection only have a “contractual obligation to
litigate,” ante, at 288, is unavailing, because the contractual obligation to
sue and remit the proceeds of any recovery was a condition of the assign

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The Court believes that these standing principles, em
bodying a “core component derived directly from the Consti
tution,” Allen, 468 U. S., at 751, that is of “particular impor
tance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a demo
cratic society,” and that is “crucial in maintaining the tripar
tite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution,” Cuno,
547 U. S., at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted), should
yield “as a practical matter” to the prospect that a contrary
“holding could easily be overcome,” ante, at 289. The Court
chooses to elevate expediency above the strictures imposed
by the Constitution. That is a tradeoff the Constitution
does not allow. Cf. Raines, supra, at 820 (“[W]e must put
aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of
this important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of con
venience and efficiency”). Perhaps it is true that a “dollar
or two,” ante, at 289, would give respondents a sufficient
stake in the litigation. Article III is worth a dollar. And
in any case, the ease with which respondents can comply
with the requirements of Article III is not a reason to aban
don our precedents; it is a reason to adhere to them.
II
Given all this, it is understandable that the majority opts
to minimize its reliance on modern standing principles and
to retreat to a broad, generalized reading of the historical
tradition of assignments. But that history does not support
the majority’s conclusion.
ment of the claim in the first place. The majority’s reasoning is perfectly
circular: A suit pursuant to a contract to remit proceeds satisfies Article
III because there is a contract to remit proceeds.
In any event, the majority cannot dispute the point that suits by trust
ees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like make up a settled, continu
ous practice “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the
judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83, 102 (1998). As shown below, the same cannot be said for suits by
assignees for collection only. See infra, at 309–312.

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The first problem lies in identifying the relevant tradition.
Much of the majority’s historical analysis focuses on the ge
neric (and undisputed) point that common law and equity
courts eventually permitted assignees to sue on their as
signed claims. See ante, at 275–279. I would treat that
point as settled as much by stare decisis, see Vermont
Agency, 529 U. S., at 773, as by the historic practice of the
King’s Bench and Chancery. But the general history of as
signments says nothing about the particular aspect of suits
brought on assigned claims that is relevant to this case:
whether an assignee who has acquired the legal right to sue,
but no right to any substantive recovery, can maintain an
action in court. On that precise question, the historical
sources are either nonexistent or equivocal.
A
None of the English common-law sources on which the ma
jority relies establishes that assignments of this sort would
be permitted either at law or in equity. As the majori
ty’s discussion makes clear, both systems permitted suits
brought on assignments—either in equity by an assignee
having a beneficial interest in the litigation, or at law by an
assignee who had a power of attorney and sued in the name
of the assignor. See ante, at 276–277. But at all times,
suits based on assignments remained subject to the prohibi
tion on champerty and maintenance. See 7 W. Holdsworth,
History of English Law 535–536 (1926).3 By the 18th cen
3 Blackstone defined maintenance as the “officious intermeddling in a
suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it . . . . This is an offence
against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and per
verts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression.” 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *134–*135. Champerty “is a species of
maintenance, . . . being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum
partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they
prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party’s suit
at his own expense.” Id., at *135.

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tury, an assignment no longer constituted maintenance per
se, see id., at 536, but it appears to have been an open ques
tion whether an assignment of the “[b]are [r]igh[t] to [l]iti
gate” would fail as “[s]avouring” of champerty and mainte
nance, see M. Smith, Law of Assignment: The Creation and
Transfer of Choses in Action 318, 321 (2007). In order to
sustain an assignment of the right to sue, the assignment had
to include the transfer of a property interest to which the
right of action was incident or subsidiary. Id., at 321–322;
see also Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 481, 160 Eng.
Rep. 196 (1835); Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257, 55 Eng.
Rep. 894 (1866); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Juris
prudence § 1040h, pp. 234–235 (8th ed. 1861); R. Megarry &
P. Baker, Snell’s Principles of Equity 82 (25th ed. 1960).
American courts as well understood the common-law rule
to require a transfer of interest to the assignee—over and
above the “naked right to bring a suit”—that gave the as
signee a “valuable right of property.” Traer v. Clews, 115
U. S. 528, 541 (1885). A New York court, surveying the
English sources, concluded that “an assignment to the plain
tiff of the assignor’s right to maintain and prosecute an ac
tion for the specific performance of defendants’ agreement,
amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the assignor
has undertaken to assign to the plaintiff a bare right to liti
gate for the former’s benefit exclusively.” Williams v.
Boyle, 1 Misc. 364, 367, 20 N. Y. S. 720, 722 (Ct. Common
Pleas 1892). To secure standing in a court of equity, the
court held, “it must appear that the assignee’s successful
prosecution of the action is susceptible of personal enjoy
ment by him . . . .” Ibid. (emphasis added).
So while there is no doubt that at common law, courts of
law and equity sought ways of protecting the rights of as
signees, they did not do so to the exclusion of the age-long
objection to maintenance, which could be found when the as
signee lacked a sufficient interest in the subject matter of
the litigation. During the common-law period at least, it re

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mained an open question whether an assignee for collection,
who by agreement took nothing from the suit, had a suffi
cient interest in the assigned debt to support his right to sue.
To be sure, the assignments at issue here purport to give
respondents “all rights, title and interest” in the payphone
operators’ claims for dial-around compensation. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 114. But when severed from the right to re
tain any of the substantive recovery, it is not clear that
common-law courts of law or equity would have treated the
assigned right to litigate as incidental or subsidiary to the
interest represented by the claim itself. Cf. 7 Holdsworth,
supra, at 538 (“[I]t was not till certain classes of rights . . .
became more freely assignable in equity, that it became nec
essary to distinguish between the cases in which assignment
was permitted and cases in which it was not; and it is for
this reason that we find very little clear authority on these
questions till quite modern times”).4
I do not take the majority’s point to be that the common
law tradition supplies the answer to this question. As the
majority concedes, it was not until the 19th century that
“courts began to consider the specific question presented
here.” Ante, at 279. But even granting this starting point,
the Court’s recitation of the 19th-century tradition fails to
account for the deep divergence in practice regarding the
right of assignees with no stake in the substantive recovery
to maintain an action in court.
4 The fact that a bankrupt assignor could sue at law to recover debts for
the benefit of an assignee creditor, see ante, at 277 (citing Winch v. Keeley,
1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K. B. 1787)), says nothing about the issue
in this case. It is of course true that one has standing to sue when the
result of a favorable judgment will be the discharge of a debt or other
legal obligation. The only legal obligation respondents seek to discharge
is the obligation to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the payphone
operators. But as explained above, a party lacking the independent right
to direct the disposition of the proceeds cannot demonstrate the personal
stake required to invoke the authority of an Article III court. See
supra, at 304.

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
The majority concedes that “some States during this pe
riod of time refused to recognize assignee-for-collection
suits,” ante, at 281, but that refusal was substantially more
widespread than the majority acknowledges. See Robbins
v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142 (1865); Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind.
448, 16 N. E. 378 (1888); Moses v. Ingram, 99 Ala. 483, 12 So.
374 (1893); Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123
(1902); Coombs v. Harford, 99 Me. 426, 59 A. 529 (1904); Mar
tin v. Mask, 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343 (1912). These courts
concluded that assignees having no legal or beneficial inter
est to vindicate could not sue on the assigned claims.
Several more States, including some enlisted by the major
ity, only eventually recognized the right of assignees for col
lection to sue after taking inconsistent positions on the issue.
In fact, the rule regarding assignees for collection only was
so unsettled that the Kansas Supreme Court reversed itself
twice in the span of 19 years. Compare Krapp v. Eldridge,
33 Kan. 106, 5 P. 372 (1885) (assignees for collection only may
sue as the real party in interest), with Stewart v. Price, 64
Kan. 191, 67 P. 553 (1902) (assignees for collection only may
not sue), with Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 75 P. 557 (1904)
(assignees for collection only may sue again). During this
period, many other courts reversed course on the flinty prob
lem posed by assignees for collection only. See Hoagland v.
Van Etten, 23 Neb. 462, 36 N. W. 755 (1888), overruled by
Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N. W. 2d 908 (1947);
State ex rel. Freebourn v. Merchants’ Credit Serv., Inc., 104
Mont. 76, 66 P. 2d 337 (1937), overruled by Rae v. Cameron,
112 Mont. 159, 114 P. 2d 1060 (1941).
The majority’s survey of 19th-century judicial practice
thus ignores a substantial contrary tradition during this pe
riod. That tradition makes clear that state courts did not
regularly “entertai[n] suits virtually identical to the litiga
tion before us.” Ante, at 280. In reality, all that the major
ity’s cases show is that the question whether assignees for
collection could maintain an action in court was hotly con

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tested—a live issue that spawned much litigation and diverse
published decisions. The confusion was much remarked on
by courts of this period, even those that ultimately sided
with the Court’s understanding of the prevailing practice.
See, e. g., Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P.
355, 356 (1895) (“There is much controversy in the various
states respecting that almost universal code provision, that
a suit must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest”); Compton v. Atwell, 207 F. 2d 139, 140–141 (CADC
1953) (“[W]hether an assignee for collection only is the real
party in interest . . . has produced a variance of judicial opin
ion” and “has so divided other courts”).
Commentators have also called attention to the divergent
practice. As the majority notes, John Norton Pomeroy ob
served that “there is some conflict” on the question whether
an assignee for collection obligated to “account for the whole
proceeds . . . is entitled to sue in his own name.” Remedies
and Remedial Rights § 132, p. 159 (1876) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Comment, The Real Party in In
terest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant’s Interest in
the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L. Rev.
1452, 1475 (1967) (“Nowhere do the courts manifest more
confusion than in deciding whether an assignee for collection
only is a real party in interest”); Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 587,
588 (1953) (observing that “[t]here is, however, little agree
ment among the courts as to the meaning and purpose of
[real party in interest] provisions” and noting that they have
been construed “to prevent the owner of the bare legal title
to a chose in action from suing”). Indeed, notable legal com
mentators of the period argued against permitting suits by
assignees for collection. See, e. g., 1 J. Kerr, Law of Plead
ing and Practice § 586, pp. 791–792 (1919) (“[T]he party in
whom the legal interest is vested is not always the real party
in interest. ‘The real party in interest’ is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
cause. . . . The rule should be restricted to parties whose
interests are in issue, and are to be affected by the decree”).

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This unsettled and conflicting state of affairs is under
standable given the transformation in the understanding of
the common-law prohibition on suits by assignees with no
beneficial interest. The immediate cause for this transfor
mation was the merger of law and equity, and the creation
of real party in interest provisions intended to reconcile the
two forms of actions. Allen v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 231
(1870) (noting that New York code provision allowing assign
ees to sue as the real party in interest “abolishe[d] the dis
tinction between actions at law and suits in equity”); see
ante, at 279. The fusion of law and equity forced courts to
confront the novel question of what to do with assignees for
collection only, who could not sue at law in their own name,
and who could not recover on a bill in equity for the lack of
any beneficial interest to enforce. Were such assignees,
under the new system, real parties in interest who could
bring suit? It is not surprising that courts took conflicting
positions on this question, a question for which the historical
tradition did not provide an answer. Given this, it is diffi
cult to characterize a practice as showing what sort of cases
and controversies were “traditionally amenable to . . . the
judicial process,” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 102 (emphasis added),
when the practice was a self-conscious break in tradition.
In Vermont Agency, by contrast, the Court relied on a long
and unbroken tradition of informer statutes that reached
back to the 14th century and prevailed up to the “period
immediately before and after the framing of the Constitu
tion.” 529 U. S., at 776. The Court noted that the Ameri
can Colonies “pass[ed] several informer statutes expressly
authorizing qui tam suits,” and that the First Congress itself
“enacted a considerable number of informer statutes.” Ibid.
This tradition provided relevant evidence of what the
Framers in 1787 would have understood the terms “case”
and “controversy” to mean. See Coleman v. Miller, 307
U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (the Article
III “[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters
that were the traditional concern of the courts at West

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minster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel
of lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies’ ”).5
There is certainly no comparable tradition here. The be
lated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century courts
come too late to provide insight into the meaning of Article
III. Although we have sometimes looked to cases postdat
ing the founding era as evidence of common-law traditions,
we have never done so when the courts self-consciously con
fronted novel questions arising from a break in the received
tradition, or where the practice of later courts was so diver
gent. A belated and equivocal tradition cannot fill in for the
fundamental requirements of Article III where, as here,
those requirements are so plainly lacking.
B
Nor do our own cases establish that we “long ago indicated
that assignees for collection only can properly bring suit.”
Ante, at 283. (If the majority truly believed that, one would
expect the cases to be placed front and center in the Court’s
analysis, rather than as an afterthought.) None addressed
the requirements of Article III, and so none constitutes bind
ing precedent. See Steel Co., supra, at 91 (“[D]rive-by juris
dictional rulings of this sort . . . have no precedential effect”);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996) (“[W]e have
repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdic
tional defects has no precedential effect”).
5 The statutes from the American Colonies add nothing to the majority’s
historical argument. See ante, at 278–279. Exceptions (some created by
statute) to the general rule against assignments at law arose early in the
common-law period, including exceptions for executors and administrators
of estates, assignees in bankruptcy, negotiable instruments, and assign
ments involving the sovereign. See 29 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts
§ 74:2, pp. 214–215 (4th ed. 2003). What none of these exceptions provides
for, however, are suits brought by assignees for collection only—i. e., as
signees who have no share in the substantive recovery. Such assignees,
as the majority acknowledges, did not attract the attention of courts until
the 19th century. See ante, at 279.

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In Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 (1902), we addressed
the then-existing statutory provision that barred jurisdiction
over suits “improperly or collusively made or joined . . . for
the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under
this act.” Id., at 325. We held that a plaintiff who took
legal title of multiple bonds “for purposes of collection” could
not satisfy the statute when the bonds individually did not
meet the amount in controversy requirement. Ibid. The
Court did not say that the “suit could properly be brought
in federal court,” ante, at 283, if the only objection was the
limitation placed on the plaintiff ’s assignment; instead, the
Court remarked that such a limited assignment would not
violate the statutory prohibition on suits that are “improp
erly or collusively made or joined,” Waite, supra, at 325.
In Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117
(1920), the plaintiff, secretary of the Cattle Raisers’ Associa
tion, sued to enforce an order of reparations issued by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which found that the de
fendant railroads had charged excessive shipping rates to the
members of the association. The question before the Court
was the validity of the lower court’s ruling that the assign
ments to the plaintiff—which reserved a beneficial interest
in the assignors, the individual members of the association—
did not vest legal title in the secretary “so as [to] authorize
the Commission to make the award of damages in his name.”
Id., at 134. We concluded that the agency was authorized
to issue the reparations order in the name of the plaintiff
because the assignments were “absolute in form.” Ibid.
We then concluded that “beneficial or equitable title” was not
necessary for the plaintiff “to claim an award of reparation”
and enforce that award in his own name in court. Ibid. In
other words, the Court addressed merely the question
whether it was appropriate for a federal agency (not bound
by the constraints of Article III) to enter an award in the
plaintiff ’s name. In no way did the Court endorse the right

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of an assignee for collection to sue as an initial matter in
federal court.
Nor did the Court address Article III standing require
ments in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 (1939). There, we
found that an assignment “for purposes of suit,” where the
assignee had an obligation to account for the proceeds (in
part) to another, did not render the assignment invalid under
New York state law. Id., at 289. Thus, we held that the
Ohio courts had failed to give full faith and credit to an ear
lier, valid New York court judgment. Id., at 292. If we had
been presented with the Article III question, we would
likely have found it significant that the plaintiff-assignee
stood to take the balance of any recovery after the proceeds
were used to discharge the debts of the assignor (plaintiff ’s
brother) and the plaintiff ’s wife. Id., at 286. But in any
event, the Court’s conclusion that the assignment was valid
under New York law, where the restrictions of Article III do
not operate, does not support the view that suits by assign
ees for collection are permissible in federal courts.
C
When we have looked to history to confirm our own Article
III jurisdiction, we have relied on a firmly entrenched histor
ical tradition that served to confirm the application of mod
ern standing principles. See Vermont Agency, 529 U. S.,
at 774–778. The Court’s decision today illustrates the con
verse approach. It relies on an equivocal and contradictory
tradition to override the clear application of the case-or
controversy requirement that would otherwise bar respond
ents’ suit.
But perhaps we should heed the counsels of hope rather
than despair. The majority, after all, purports to comply
with our Article III precedents, see ante, at 285–287, so
those precedents at least live to give meaning to “the judicia
ry’s proper role in our system of government” another day,
Raines, 521 U. S., at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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What is more, the majority expressly and repeatedly
grounds its finding of standing on its conclusion that “history
and precedent are clear” that these types of suits “have long
been permitted,” ante, at 275, and that there is “a strong
tradition” of such suits “during the past two centuries,” ante,
at 285, 288. This conclusion is, for the reasons we have set
forth, achingly wrong—but at least the articulated test is
clear and daunting.
Finally, there is the majority’s point that all this fuss could
have been avoided for a dollar, see ante, at 289—a price, by
this point, that most readers would probably be happy to
contribute. The price will be higher in future standing
cases. And when it is—when standing really matters—it
would be surprising if the Court were to look to a case in
which it did not.
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand for further proceedings.