LOCKE et al. v. KARASS, STATE CONTROLLER, et al.

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LOCKE et al. v. KARASS, STATE CONTROLLER, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 07–610. Argued October 6, 2008—Decided January 21, 2009
The collective-bargaining agreement between Maine and respondent local
union, the exclusive bargaining agent for certain state employees, re
quires nonmember employees represented by the union to pay the local
a “service fee” equal to the portion of union dues related to ordinary
representational activities, e. g., collective bargaining or contract admin
istration activities. That fee does not include nonchargeable union ac
tivities such as political, public relations, or lobbying activities. The
fee includes a charge that represents the “affiliation fee” the local pays
to the national union. But, it covers only the part of the affiliation fee
that helps to pay for the national’s own chargeable activities, which in
clude some litigation activities that directly benefit other locals or the
national itself, rather than respondent local. The petitioners, nonmem
bers of the local, brought this suit claiming, inter alia, that the First
Amendment prohibits charging them for any portion of the service fee
that represents litigation that does not directly benefit the local, i. e.,
“national litigation.” The District Court found no material facts at
issue and upheld this element of the fee. The First Circuit affirmed.
Held: Under this Court’s precedent, the First Amendment permits a local
union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses as long as
(1) the subject matter of the (extralocal) litigation is of a kind that would
be chargeable if the litigation were local, e. g., litigation appropriately
related to collective bargaining rather than political activities, and
(2) the charge is reciprocal in nature, i. e., the contributing local reason
ably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national’s re
sources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing
local if and when it takes place. Pp. 213–221.
(a) Prior decisions frame the question at issue. The Court has long
held that the First Amendment permits local unions designated as the
exclusive bargaining representatives for certain employees to charge
nonmember employees a service fee as a condition of their continued
employment. With respect to litigation expenses, the Court also held
that a local could charge nonmembers for expenses of litigation normally
conducted by an exclusive representative, including litigation incidental
to collective bargaining, but said (in language that the petitioners here
emphasize) that litigation expenses “not having such a connection with

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208 LOCKE v. KARASS
Syllabus
the bargaining unit are not to be charged to objecting employees.”
Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 453. Later, the Court held, with
respect to the chargeability of a local’s payment of an affiliation fee to a
national, that the local “may charge objecting employees for their pro
rata share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities
of its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not per
formed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees’ bargaining
unit.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 524. The Court
added that the local unit need not “demonstrate a direct and tangible
impact upon the dissenting employee’s unit,” although there must be
“some indication that the payment [say, to the national] is for services
that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local
union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.” Ibid.
However, the Lehnert Court split into three irreconcilable factions on
the subject here at issue, payment for national litigation. Pp. 213–217.
(b) Because Lehnert failed to find a majority as to the chargeability
of national litigation expenses, the lower courts have been uncertain
about the matter. Having examined the question further, however, the
Court now believes that, consistent with its precedent, costs of such
litigation are chargeable provided the litigation meets the relevant
standards for charging other national expenditures that the Lehnert ma
jority enunciated. Under those standards, a local may charge a non
member an appropriate share of its contribution to a national’s litigation
expenses if (1) the subject matter of the national litigation bears an
appropriate relation to collective bargaining and (2) the arrangement is
reciprocal—that is, the local’s payment to the national affiliate is for
“services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the
local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.”
500 U. S., at 524. Logic suggests that the same standard should apply
to national litigation expenses as to other national expenses, and the
Court can find no significant difference between litigation activities and
other national activities, the cost of which this Court has found charge
able. The petitioners’ arguments to the contrary, which rest primarily
on their understanding of Ellis and Lehnert, are rejected. Pp. 217–219.
(c) Applying Lehnert’s standard to the national litigation expenses
at issue demonstrates that they are both appropriately related to
collective-bargaining activities and reciprocal, and are therefore charge
able. First, the record establishes that the kind of national litigation
activity for which the local charges nonmembers concerns only those
aspects of collective bargaining, contract administration, or other mat
ters that the courts have held chargeable. No one here denies that
under Lehnert this kind of activity bears an appropriate relation to col

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lective bargaining. See, e. g., 500 U. S., at 519. Second, although the
location of the litigation activity is at the national (or extraunit) level,
such activity is chargeable as long as the charges are for services that
may ultimately inure to local members’ benefit by virtue of their mem
bership in the national union. Ibid. Respondent local says that the
payment of its affiliation fee gives locals in general access to the nation
al’s financial resources—compiled via contributions from various lo
cals—which would not otherwise be available to the local when needed
to effectively negotiate, administer, or enforce the local’s collective
bargaining agreements. Because no one claims that the national would
treat respondent local any differently from other locals in this regard,
the existence of reciprocity is not in dispute. Pp. 219–221.
498 F. 3d 49, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined,
post, p. 221.
W. James Young argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Milton L. Chappell and Stephen C.
Whiting.
Jeremiah A. Collins argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief for respondent Maine State Employees
Association, SEIU Local 1989, Service Employees Interna
tional Union were Robert Alexander and Laurence Gold.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Maine requires government employees to pay
a service fee to the local union that acts as their exclusive
bargaining agent even if those employees disagree with, and
*Sharon L. Browne and Alan W. Foutz filed a brief for the Pacific Legal
Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States by former Solici
tors General Clement and Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kat
sas, Daryl Joseffer, Douglas N. Letter, Mark S. Flynn, and Nora Carroll;
and for the Commonwealth of Virginia by Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney
General, William E. Thro, State Solicitor General, Stephen R. McCul
lough, Deputy State Solicitor General, and William C. Mims, Chief Dep
uty Attorney General.

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210 LOCKE v. KARASS
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do not belong to, the union. This Court has held that, in
principle, the government may require this kind of payment
without violating the First Amendment. See, e. g., Railway
Employes v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956) (upholding such an
arrangement as constitutional); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.,
431 U. S. 209 (1977) (same); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn.,
500 U. S. 507 (1991) (same). At the same time, the Court
has considered the constitutionality of charging for various
elements of such a fee, upholding the charging of some ele
ments (e. g., those related to administering a collective
bargaining contract) while forbidding the charging of other
elements (e. g., those related to political expenditures).
Compare, e. g., Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435 (1984),
with Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 (1961).
In this case, a local union charges nonmembers a service
fee that (among other things) reflects an affiliation fee that
the local union pays to its national union organization. We
focus upon one portion of that fee, a portion that the national
union uses to pay for litigation expenses incurred in large
part on behalf of other local units. We ask whether a local’s
charge to nonmembers that reflects that element is consist
ent with the First Amendment. And we conclude that
under our precedent the Constitution permits including this
element in the local’s charge to nonmembers as long as
(1) the subject matter of the (extralocal) litigation is of a
kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local,
e. g., litigation appropriately related to collective bargaining
rather than political activities, and (2) the litigation charge
is reciprocal in nature, i. e., the contributing local reasonably
expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national’s
resources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the
contributing local if and when it takes place.
I
Maine has designated the Maine State Employees Asso
ciation (the local union) as the exclusive bargaining agent

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for certain executive branch employees. A collective
bargaining agreement between Maine and the local requires
nonmember employees whom the union represents to pay
the local union a “service fee.” And that service fee equals
that portion of ordinary union dues that is related to ordi
nary representational activities, e. g., collective-bargaining or
contract administration activities. In calculating the fee,
the union starts with ordinary union dues and subtracts a
sum representing the pro rata cost of nonchargeable union
activities such as political, public relations, or lobbying
activities.
The service fee includes a charge that represents the affil
iation fee the local pays to its national union, the Service
Employees International Union. The included charge takes
account of the affiliation fee, however, only insofar as the fee
helps to pay for the national’s activities that are of a charge
able kind, such as collective-bargaining or contract adminis
tration activities. The local does not charge nonmembers
for the portion of the affiliation fee that helps pay for the
national’s activities of a kind that would not normally be
chargeable, such as political, public relations, or lobbying
activities.
The local includes in the chargeable portion of the affilia
tion fee an amount that helps the national pay for litigation
activities, some of which do not directly benefit Maine’s state
employees’ local but rather directly benefit other locals or
the national organization itself. (For purposes of simplicity,
we shall call all this extraunit litigation “national litigation.”)
As is true of all other parts of the affiliation fee, the local’s
charge to nonmembers reflects these national litigation costs
only insofar as the national litigation concerns activities
that are of a chargeable kind. The local does not charge
nonmembers for the portion of national litigation costs that
concerns activities of a kind that would not normally be
chargeable, such as political, public relations, or lobbying
activities.

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Numbers may help illustrate the scope of the issue. In
2005, the full service fee the local charged nonmembers
amounted to about 49% of a member’s ordinary union dues.
(The petitioners here, beneficiaries of grandfathering rules,
paid a half fee, amounting to about 24.5% of a member’s fee.)
The full fee for employees like the petitioners would have
amounted to about $9.70 per month. About $1.34 per month
of that $9.70 reflected a pro rata share of the portion of the
national affiliation fee that the local believed was chargeable.
The portion of the $1.34 per month affiliation fee charge
that represented national litigation costs—the cost here at
issue—amounted to considerably less.
Although the amount at issue per nonmember may be
small, nonmembers believed the principle important. And
in December 2005, nonmembers challenged in arbitration
several aspects of the local’s service fee, including the ele
ment at issue here. In 2006, the arbitrator found all aspects
of the service fee lawful. Before the arbitrator reached his
decision, however, the petitioners, who are nonmembers of
the local union, brought this lawsuit in Maine’s Federal Dis
trict Court also challenging various aspects of the service
fee, including this element. In particular, they claimed that
the First Amendment prohibits charging them for any por
tion of the service fee that represents what we have called
“national litigation,” i. e., litigation that does not directly
benefit the local. The District Court, finding no material
facts at issue, upheld this element of the fee. 425 F. Supp.
2d 137 (2006). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s determination. 498 F. 3d 49
(2007). Because of uncertainty among the Circuits as to
whether, or when, the Constitution permits charging non
members for the costs of national litigation, we granted
certiorari. Compare Otto v. Pennsylvania State Educ.
Assn.-NEA, 330 F. 3d 125 (CA3 2003), with Pilots Against
Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 938 F. 2d 1123 (CA10
1991).

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II
Prior decisions of this Court frame the question before us.
In Hanson, Street, and Abood, the Court set forth a general
First Amendment principle: The First Amendment permits
the government to require both public sector and private
sector employees who do not wish to join a union designated
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative at their
unit of employment to pay that union a service fee as a condi
tion of their continued employment. Taken together, Han
son and Street make clear that the local union cannot charge
the nonmember for certain activities, such as political or
ideological activities (with which the nonmembers may dis
agree). But under that precedent, the local can charge non
members for activities more directly related to collective
bargaining. In such instances, the Court has determined
that the First Amendment burdens accompanying the pay
ment requirement are justified by the government’s interest
in preventing freeriding by nonmembers who benefit from
the union’s collective-bargaining activities and in maintain
ing peaceful labor relations. Street, 367 U. S., at 768–772;
Hanson, 351 U. S., at 233–238.
In Abood, the Court explained the basis for a First
Amendment challenge to service fees as follows: “To be re
quired to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining
agent might well be thought . . . to interfere in some way
with an employee’s freedom to associate for the advancement
of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.” 431
U. S., at 222. But the Abood Court rejected such a chal
lenge. It found that, “the judgment clearly made in Hanson
and Street is that such interference as exists is constitution
ally justified by the legislative assessment of the important
contribution of the union shop to the system of labor rela
tions established by Congress.” Ibid. The Court added
that, “ ‘furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway
for the leadership of the group. As long as they act to pro
mote the cause which justified bringing the group together,

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the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely
because he disagrees with the group’s strategy.’ ” Id., at 223
(quoting Street, supra, at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
In Ellis and Lehnert, the Court refined the general First
Amendment principle. In particular, it refined the bound
aries of Abood’s constitutional “leeway” by describing the
nature of the cost elements that the local, constitutionally
speaking, could include, or which the local could not constitu
tionally include, in the service fee. In 1984, the Court wrote
in Ellis that service fees are constitutionally permissible
when they relate to the union’s duties of “negotiating and
administering a collective agreement and in adjusting griev
ances and disputes.” 466 U. S., at 446–447 (citing Railway
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U. S. 113, 121 (1963)). Accordingly, the
Court explained, the local union could charge the nonmember
for union “expenditures [that] are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclu
sive representative of the employees in dealing with the em
ployer on labor-management issues.” 466 U. S., at 448. In
doing so, the union could charge nonmembers for “the di
rect costs of negotiating and administering a collective
bargaining contract” and for “the expenses of activities or
undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement
or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representa
tive of the employees in the bargaining unit.” Ibid.
Applying this standard, the Ellis Court examined the par
ticular service fee charges challenged in that case. The
Court held that the local union could charge nonmembers for
the costs of a national convention, id., at 448–449; for the
costs of social activities, id., at 449–450; and for the costs of
those portions of publications not devoted to political causes,
id., at 450–451. Convention expenses are chargeable, the
Court explained, because, if a local union is to function effec
tively, “it must maintain its corporate or associational exist
ence.” Id., at 448.

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The Court also held that the local union could charge non
members for litigation expenses incidental to the local
union’s negotiation or administration of a collective
bargaining agreement, fair representation litigation, juris
dictional disputes, or other litigation normally conducted by
an exclusive representative. Id., at 453. But the Court
then said (in language that the petitioners here emphasize)
that “expenses of litigation not having such a connection
with the bargaining unit are not to be charged to objecting
employees.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
In 1991, the Court in Lehnert again described when an
expense is chargeable. The Court said that a chargeable ex
penditure must bear an appropriate relation to collective
bargaining activity. 500 U. S., at 519. (Its specific descrip
tion of that relation is not at issue here. Compare ibid. with
id., at 557–558 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).) The Court then considered one as
pect of the matter here before us, the chargeability of a local
union’s payment to a national organization, say, an affiliation
fee. The Court assumed that, in any given year, such a pay
ment would primarily benefit other local units or the national
organization itself, but it would not necessarily provide a di
rect benefit to the contributing local. The petitioners in the
case (nonmembers of a teacher’s union) argued that the Con
stitution forbids a local union to charge nonmembers for
these activities, i. e., for “activities that, though closely re
lated to collective bargaining generally, are not undertaken
directly on behalf of the bargaining unit to which the object
ing employees belong.” Id., at 519.
The Court divided five to four on the general affiliation fee
matter. The majority of the Court rejected the nonmem
bers’ claim. The Court noted that it had “never inter
preted” the chargeability test “to require a direct relation
ship between the expense at issue and some tangible benefit
to the dissenters’ bargaining unit.” Id., at 522. Indeed, “to

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216 LOCKE v. KARASS
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require so close a connection would be to ignore the
unified-membership structure under which many unions, in
cluding those here, operate.” Id., at 523. Rather, the affil
iation relationship is premised on the “notion that the parent
will bring to bear its often considerable economic, political,
and informational resources when the local is in need of
them.” Ibid. And that “part of a local’s affiliation fee
which contributes to the pool of resources potentially avail
able to the local is assessed for the bargaining unit’s protec
tion, even if it is not actually expended on that unit in any
particular membership year.” Ibid.
The Court then held that “a local bargaining representa
tive may charge objecting employees for their pro rata share
of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities
of its state and national affiliates, even if those activities
were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting
employees’ bargaining unit.” Id., at 524 (emphasis added).
Of particular relevance here, the Court added that the local
unit need not “demonstrate a direct and tangible impact
upon the dissenting employee’s unit.” Nonetheless, it said,
there must be “some indication that the payment [say, to the
national affiliate] is for services that may ultimately inure to
the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of
their membership in the parent organization.” Ibid.
Finally, the Lehnert Court turned to the subject now be
fore us, that of payment for national litigation. On this
point, the Court split into three irreconcilable factions. A
plurality of four wrote that, even though the union was
“clearly correct that precedent established through litigation
on behalf of one unit may ultimately be of some use to an
other unit,” it nonetheless found “extraunit litigation to be
more akin to lobbying in both kind and effect.” Id., at 528.
The plurality added that litigation is often “expressive.” It
concluded that “[w]hen unrelated to an objecting employee’s
unit, such activities are not germane to the union’s duties as
exclusive bargaining representative.” Ibid.

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The Member of the Court who provided the fifth vote for
the other portions of the Court’s opinion dissented from the
part of the opinion on national litigation. Justice Marshall
noted that the plurality’s discussion of national litigation
costs was dicta because no such costs were at issue in the
case. Id., at 544 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Nevertheless, Justice Marshall characterized any
rule that found national litigation costs per se nonchargeable
as “surely incorrect” and indicated such costs should be as
sessed under the plurality’s own test, i. e., whether the litiga
tion bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining.
Id., at 546–547.
At the same time, four Members of the Court agreed with
the nonmembers that including national costs in the service
fee violates the First Amendment except when those costs
pay for specific services “actually provided” to the local.
Id., at 561 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis deleted). They thought that a
local union cannot charge nonmembers for national activities
unless there is a direct relationship between the expenses
and “some tangible benefit to the dissenters’ bargaining
unit.” Id., at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
other words, the dissent expressly rejected the majority’s
chargeability test for national expenses. But the dissent did
not separately discuss national litigation activities, perhaps
because, as Justice Marshall pointed out, they were not di
rectly at issue in that case.
III
As a result of the Lehnert Court’s failure to find a majority
as to the chargeability of national litigation expenses, the
lower courts have been uncertain about the matter. Com
pare Otto, 330 F. 3d, at 138, with Pilots Against Illegal
Dues, 938 F. 2d, at 1130–1131. Having examined the ques
tion further, we now believe that, consistent with the Court’s
precedent, costs of that litigation are chargeable provided

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218 LOCKE v. KARASS
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the litigation meets the relevant standards for charging
other national expenditures that the Lehnert majority enun
ciated. Under those standards, a local union may charge a
nonmember an appropriate share of its contribution to a na
tional’s litigation expenses if (1) the subject matter of the
national litigation bears an appropriate relation to collective
bargaining and (2) the arrangement is reciprocal—that is, the
local’s payment to the national affiliate is for “services that
may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the
local union by virtue of their membership in the parent orga
nization.” 500 U. S., at 524.
We reach this conclusion in part because logic suggests
that the same standard should apply to national litigation
expenses as to other national expenses. We can find no sig
nificant difference between litigation activities and other na
tional activities the cost of which this Court has found
chargeable. We can find no sound basis for holding that
national social activities, national convention activities, and
activities involved in producing the nonpolitical portions of
national union publications all are chargeable but national
litigation activities are not. See Ellis, 466 U. S., at 448–451.
Of course, a local nonmember presumably has the right to
attend, and consequently can directly benefit from, national
social and convention activities; and a local nonmember can
read, and benefit from, a national publication. But so can
a local nonmember benefit from national litigation aimed at
helping other units if the national or those other units will
similarly contribute to the cost of litigation on the local
union’s behalf should the need arise.
The petitioners’ arguments to the contrary rest primarily
upon their understanding of Ellis and Lehnert. Ellis, we
must concede, sets forth certain kinds of national litigation—
for the most part directly related to a local union’s particular
interests—as chargeable; but it then goes on to say, as we
have earlier pointed out, supra, at 215, that “expenses of
litigation not having such a connection with the bargaining

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unit are not to be charged to objecting employees.” 466
U. S., at 453. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals noted,
the Ellis Court focused upon a local union’s payment of na
tional litigation expenses without any understanding as to
reciprocity. Indeed, Justice Kennedy pointed out in his
Lehnert dissent, “Ellis . . . contains no discussion of whether
a local bargaining unit might choose to fund litigation . . .
through a cost sharing arrangement under the auspices of
the affiliate.” 500 U. S., at 564 (opinion concurring in judg
ment in part and dissenting in part). Ellis nowhere ex
plains why reciprocal litigation funding arrangements would
fail to benefit a local union. Hence, Ellis does not answer
the question presented here.
We must also concede that a plurality in Lehnert wrote
that national litigation expenses were not chargeable “[w]hen
unrelated to an objecting employee’s unit.” 500 U. S., at
528. But, again, reciprocal litigation funding was not before
the Court; hence the plurality could not (and did not) decide
whether an understanding as to reciprocity produced the re
lationship necessary for chargeability. Regardless, a plural
ity does not speak for the Court as a whole.
Nor can one simply add together the four Lehnert dissent
ers and the four Members of the plurality in an effort to find
a majority of Justices who hold the petitioners’ view. That
is because the Lehnert majority, speaking for the Court,
adopted a more liberal standard of chargeability than the
standard embraced by the dissent. And the question here
is whether that standard permits charging nonmembers for
national litigation expenses. There was no majority agree
ment in Lehnert about the answer to this last mentioned
question. The best we can do for the petitioners is to find
Lehnert ambiguous on the point at issue.
IV
Applying Lehnert’s standard to the national litigation ex
penses here at issue, we find them chargeable. First, the

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220 LOCKE v. KARASS
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kind of national litigation activity for which the local charges
nonmembers concerns only those aspects of collective bar
gaining, contract administration, or other matters that the
courts have held chargeable. Ellis, supra, at 446–447. The
lower courts found (and the petitioners here do not dispute)
that the local charges nonmembers only for those national
litigation activities that, in respect to subject matter, “were
comparable to those undertaken” by the local and which the
local “deemed chargeable” in its calculation of the “service
fee.” 498 F. 3d, at 52, 64–65. And no one here denies that
under Lehnert this kind of activity bears an appropriate re
lation to collective bargaining. See, e. g., Lehnert, 500 U. S.,
at 519 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 524 (“[A] local bar
gaining representative may charge objecting employees for
their pro rata share of the costs associated with otherwise
chargeable activities of its state and national affiliates . . . ”).
Second, the location of the litigation activity is at the na
tional (or extraunit), not the local, level. But, as we have
just said (under Lehnert), activity at the national level is
chargeable as long as the charges in question are “for serv
ices that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members
of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent
organization.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals treated the litigation charge at issue
as reciprocal in nature, and concluded the District Court
must have done so as well. See 498 F. 3d, at 64–65. The
local union here says that the payment of its affiliation fee
gives locals in general access to the national’s financial re
sources—compiled via contributions from various locals—
“which would not otherwise be available to the local union
when needed to effectively negotiate, administer or enforce
the local’s collective bargaining agreements.” Brief for Re
spondent 18–19. The resources in question include re
sources related to litigation. No one claims that the national
would treat the local union before us any differently, in terms
of making these resources available, than the national would

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Alito, J., concurring
treat any other local. The petitioners do not suggest the
contrary. And we consequently conclude, as did the lower
courts, that the existence of reciprocity is assumed by the
parties and not here in dispute.
The record then leads us to find that the national litigation
expenses before us are both appropriately related to collec
tive bargaining and reciprocal. Consequently, consistent
with our precedent, those expenses are chargeable. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice and Jus
tice Scalia join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to note
that our decision, as I understand it, does not reach the ques
tion of what “reciprocity” means. Petitioners have taken an
all-or-nothing position, contending that nonmembers of a
local may never be assessed for any portion of the national’s
extraunit litigation expenses. See ante, at 212 (noting that
petitioners “claimed that the First Amendment prohibits
charging them for any portion of the service fee that repre
sents what we have called ‘national litigation,’ i. e., litigation
that does not directly benefit the local” (emphasis added)).
The opinion correctly concludes, “as did the lower courts,
that the existence of reciprocity is assumed by the parties
and not here in dispute.” Ante this page.
Thus, this case does not require us to address what is
meant by a charge being “reciprocal in nature,” or what
showing is required to establish that services “ ‘may ulti
mately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union
by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.’ ”
Ante, at 220 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500
U. S. 507, 524 (1991)). I understand the Court’s opinion to
conclude that the litigation expenses at issue here are
chargeable only because the parties assumed that the benefit
of any such expenses would be reciprocal.

555US1 Unit: $U12 [01-28-14 17:40:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN
222 LOCKE v. KARASS
Alito, J., concurring
In its brief as amicus curiae, the United States argues
that a national union must bear the burden of proving that
any expenditures charged to nonmembers of a local are made
pursuant to a bona fide pooling arrangement. See Brief for
United States 28–29. Once nonmembers object to a charge,
the Government submits, the union must prove that the chal
lenged expenditure was made pursuant to an arrangement
that is akin to an insurance policy. See id., at 7. This is
necessary, the Government contends, to ensure that a charge
is in fact “reciprocal in nature.”
Because important First Amendment rights are at stake,
the Government’s argument regarding the burden of estab
lishing true reciprocity has considerable force. Nonetheless,
since petitioners in this case did not raise the question
whether the Maine State Employees Association’s pooling
arrangement was bona fide, we need not reach that ques
tion today.