CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

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271 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 06–1595. Argued October 8, 2008—Decided January 26, 2009
In response to questions from an official of respondent local government
(Metro) during an internal investigation into rumors of sexual harass
ment by the Metro School District employee relations director (Hughes),
petitioner Crawford, a 30-year employee, reported that Hughes had sex
ually harassed her. Metro took no action against Hughes, but soon fired
Crawford, alleging embezzlement. She filed suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that Metro was retaliating for her
report of Hughes’s behavior, in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a),
which makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any . . .
employe[e]” who (1) “has opposed any practice made an unlawful em
ployment practice by this subchapter” (opposition clause), or (2) “has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter” (participa
tion clause). The court granted Metro summary judgment, and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the opposition clause demanded “ac
tive, consistent” opposing activities, whereas Crawford had not initiated
any complaint prior to the investigation, and finding that the participa
tion clause did not cover Metro’s internal investigation because it was
not conducted pursuant to a Title VII charge pending with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
Held: The antiretaliation provision’s protection extends to an employee
who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in
answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation. Be
cause “oppose” is undefined by statute, it carries its ordinary dictionary
meaning of resisting or contending against. Crawford’s statement is
thus covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving
account of Hughes’s sexually obnoxious behavior toward her. “Oppose”
goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, and
may be used to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to
advance a position beyond disclosing it. Thus, a person can “oppose”
by responding to someone else’s questions just as surely as by provoking
the discussion. Nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protect
ing an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but
not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when

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272 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY.
Syllabus
asked a question. Metro unconvincingly argues for the Sixth Circuit’s
active, consistent opposition rule, claiming that employers will be less
likely to raise questions about possible discrimination if a retaliation
charge is easy to raise when things go badly for an employee who re
sponded to enquiries. Employers, however, have a strong inducement
to ferret out and put a stop to discriminatory activity in their operations
because Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 765, and
Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807, hold “[a]n employer . . .
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . . authority over the
employee.” The Circuit’s rule could undermine the Ellerth-Faragher
scheme, along with the statute’s “ ‘primary objective’ ” of “avoid[ing]
harm” to employees, Faragher, supra, at 806, for if an employee report
ing discrimination in answer to an employer’s questions could be penal
ized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to
keep quiet about Title VII offenses. Because Crawford’s conduct is
covered by the opposition clause, this Court does not reach her argu
ment that the Sixth Circuit also misread the participation clause. Met
ro’s other defenses to the retaliation claim were never reached by the
District Court, and thus remain open on remand. Pp. 276–280.
211 Fed. Appx. 373, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
joined, post, p. 280.
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Ann Buntin Steiner.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With her on the
brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Solicitor Gen
eral Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker, Den
nis J. Dimsey, Angela M. Miller, Ronald S. Cooper, Carolyn
L. Wheeler, and Jennifer S. Goldstein.
Francis H. Young argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was James L. Charles.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio
et al. by Marc Dann, Attorney General of Ohio, William P. Marshall,
Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer and Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy So

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273 Cite as: 555 U. S. 271 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V),
forbids retaliation by employers against employees who re
port workplace race or gender discrimination. The question
here is whether this protection extends to an employee who
speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative,
but in answering questions during an employer’s internal in
vestigation. We hold that it does.
I
In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into
rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District’s
licitors, and Susan A. Choe, Patrick M. Dull, and Duffy W. Jamieson,
Assistant Attorneys General, by Roberto J. Sa´ nchez-Ramos, Secretary of
Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona,
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Beau Biden of Delaware, Bill McCol
lum of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom
Miller of Iowa, Jack Conway of Kentucky, Martha Coakley of Massachu
setts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Mike McGrath of Montana, Anne Mil
gram of New Jersey, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Andrew M. Cuomo of
New York, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont,
and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Leadership Confer
ence on Civil Rights et al. by Michael L. Foreman and Michael B.
de Leeuw; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by
Bruce B. Elfvin, Christina M. Royer, Mary L. Heen, Adele P. Kimmel,
and Catherine K. Ruckelshaus; for the National Women’s Law Center
et al. by Melissa Hart, Marcia D. Greenberger, Jocelyn F. Samuels, and
Dina R. Lassow; and for the Tennessee Education Association et al. by
Richard L. Colbert and Courtney L. Wilbert.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America by Catherine E. Stetson, Jes
sica L. Ellsworth, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane Brennan; for the Equal
Employment Advisory Council et al. by Rae T. Vann, Alexandra Tsiros,
Karen R. Harned, and Elizabeth G. Milito; and for the National School
Boards Association by Francisco M. Negro´ n, Jr., Lisa E. Soronen,
F. Damon Kitchen, Jack R. Wallace, and Robert J. Sniffen.

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274 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY.
Opinion of the Court
employee relations director, Gene Hughes.1 211 Fed. Appx.
373, 374 (CA6 2006). When Veronica Frazier, a Metro
human resources officer, asked petitioner Vicky Crawford, a
30-year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed “inap
propriate behavior” on the part of Hughes, id., at 374–375,
Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing
behavior: once, Hughes had answered her greeting, “ ‘Hey
Dr. Hughes, [w]hat’s up?,’ ” by grabbing his crotch and saying
“ ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’ ”; he had repeatedly “ ‘put his crotch
up to [her] window’ ”; and on one occasion he had entered her
office and “ ‘grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch,’ ”
id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported
being sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although
Metro took no action against Hughes, it did fire Crawford
and the two other accusers soon after finishing the investiga
tion, saying in Crawford’s case that it was for embezzlement.
Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her re
port of Hughes’s behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII
violation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis
sion (EEOC), followed by this suit in the United States Dis
trict Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ibid.
The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses,
making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees . . . [1] because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchap
ter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a). The one is known as the “op
position clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and
Crawford accused Metro of violating both.
1 Because this case arises out of the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment for Metro, “we are required to view all facts and draw all rea
sonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, [Crawford].” Bros
seau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam).

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Opinion of the Court
The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro.
It held that Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause
because she had not “instigated or initiated any complaint,”
but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an
already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone
else.” Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03–cv–0996 (MD Tenn.,
Jan. 6, 2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a–17a. It concluded
that her claim also failed under the participation clause,
which Sixth Circuit precedent confined to protecting “ ‘an
employee’s participation in an employer’s internal inves
tigation . . . where that investigation occurs pursuant to
a pending EEOC charge’ ” (not the case here). Id., at 15a
(emphasis deleted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348
F. 3d 537, 543 (CA6 2003)).
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, hold
ing that the opposition clause “ ‘demands active, consistent
“opposing” activities to warrant . . . protection against retali
ation,’ ” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell v. Safety
Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. Appx. 607, 610 (CA6
2004)), whereas Crawford did “not claim to have instigated
or initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the
investigation, nor did she take any further action following
the investigation and prior to her firing,” 211 Fed. Appx., at
376. Again like the trial judge, the Court of Appeals under
stood that Crawford could show no violation of the participa
tion clause because her “ ‘employer’s internal investigation’ ”
was not conducted “ ‘pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Abbott, supra, at 543).
Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those
of other Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause,
see, e. g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F. 3d 256, 262 (CA7
1996), we granted Crawford’s petition for certiorari. 552
U. S. 1162 (2008). We now reverse and remand for further
proceedings.

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Opinion of the Court
II
The opposition clause makes it “unlawful . . . for an em
ployer to discriminate against any . . . employe[e] . . . because
he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful . . . by this
subchapter.” § 2000e–3(a). The term “oppose,” being left
undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Per
rin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979): “[t]o resist or
antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront; resist; with
stand,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed.
1957). Although these actions entail varying expenditures
of energy, “resist frequently implies more active striving
than oppose.” Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of
the English Language 1359 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “oppose”
as “to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion”).
The statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is thus
covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapprov
ing account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a
fellow employee, an answer she says antagonized her em
ployer to the point of sacking her on a false pretense. Craw
ford’s description of the louche goings-on would certainly
qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as “resist[ant]” or
“antagoni[stic]” to Hughes’s treatment, if for no other reason
than the point argued by the Government and explained by
an EEOC guideline: “When an employee communicates to
her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . .
a form of employment discrimination, that communication”
virtually always “constitutes the employee’s opposition to
the activity.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
9 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§ 8–II–B(1), (2),
p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)); see also Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399 (2008) (explaining that EEOC
compliance manuals “reflect ‘a body of experience and in
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance’ ” (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S.
624, 642 (1998))). It is true that one can imagine exceptions,
like an employee’s description of a supervisor’s racist joke as

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Opinion of the Court
hilarious, but these will be eccentric cases, and this is not
one of them.2
The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short
of opposition, taking the view that the clause “ ‘demands ac
tive, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant . . . protec
tion against retaliation,’ ” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting
Bell, supra, at 610), and that an employee must “instigat[e]
or initiat[e]” a complaint to be covered, 211 Fed. Appx., at
376. But though these requirements obviously exemplify
opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it.
“Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in or
dinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to
speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance
a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were
known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said
to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public
letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government.
And we would call it “opposition” if an employee took a stand
against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by “insti
gating” action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow
a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discrimina
tory reasons. Cf. McDonnell, supra, at 262 (finding em
ployee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
where his employer retaliated against him for failing to pre
vent his subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). There
is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by
responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by
provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires
2 Metro suggests in passing that it was unclear whether Crawford actu
ally opposed Hughes’s behavior because some of her defensive responses
were “inappropriate,” such as telling Hughes to “bite me” and “flip[ping]
him a bird.” Brief for Respondent 1–2 (internal quotation marks omit
ted). This argument fails not only because at the summary judgment
stage we must “view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in [Craw
ford’s] favor,” Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 195, n. 2, but also because Crawford
gave no indication that Hughes’s gross clowning was anything but offen
sive to her.

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Opinion of the Court
a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimi
nation on her own initiative but not one who reports the
same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks
a question.
Metro and its amici support the Circuit panel’s insistence
on “active” and “consistent” opposition by arguing that the
lower the bar for retaliation claims, the less likely it is that
employers will look into what may be happening outside the
executive suite. As they see it, if retaliation is an easy
charge when things go bad for an employee who responded
to enquiries, employers will avoid the headache by refusing
to raise questions about possible discrimination.
The argument is unconvincing, for we think it underesti
mates the incentive to enquire that follows from our deci
sions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742
(1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998).
Ellerth and Faragher hold “[a]n employer . . . subject to vi
carious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . . author
ity over the employee.” Ellerth, supra, at 765; Faragher,
supra, at 807. Although there is no affirmative defense if
the hostile environment “culminates in a tangible employ
ment action” against the employee, Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765,
an employer does have a defense “[w]hen no tangible employ
ment action is taken” if it “exercised reasonable care to pre
vent and correct promptly any” discriminatory conduct and
“the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advan
tage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” ibid. Em
ployers are thus subject to a strong inducement to ferret out
and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their opera
tions as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability.
Ibid.; see also Brief for Petitioner 24–28, and nn. 31–35 (cit
ing studies demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have
prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen proce
dures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discrimi

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Opinion of the Court
natory conduct). The possibility that an employer might
someday want to fire someone who might charge discrimina
tion traceable to an internal investigation does not strike us
as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense.
That aside, we find it hard to see why the Sixth Circuit’s
rule would not itself largely undermine the Ellerth-Faragher
scheme, along with the statute’s “ ‘primary objective’ ” of
“avoid[ing] harm” to employees. Faragher, supra, at 806
(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417
(1975)). If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could
be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have
a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against
themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible
given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation
is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voic
ing their concerns about bias and discrimination.” Brake,
Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 20 (2005); see also id., at 37,
and n. 58 (compiling studies). The appeals court’s rule
would thus create a real dilemma for any knowledgeable em
ployee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to
assure a defense under our cases. If the employee reported
discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer
might well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if
she kept quiet about the discrimination and later filed a Title
VII claim, the employer might well escape liability, arguing
that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any
discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee unrea
sonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or cor
rective opportunities provided by the employer.” Ellerth,
supra, at 765. Nothing in the statute’s text or our prece
dent supports this catch-22.3
3 Metro also argues that “[r]equiring the employee to actually initiate a
complaint . . . conforms with the employee’s ‘obligation of reasonable care
to avoid harm’ articulated in Faragher and Ellerth.” Brief for Respond

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280 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY.
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
Because Crawford’s conduct is covered by the opposition
clause, we do not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit
misread the participation clause as well. But that does not
mean the end of this case, for Metro’s motion for summary
judgment raised several defenses to the retaliation charge
besides the scope of the two clauses; the District Court never
reached these others owing to its ruling on the elements of
retaliation, and they remain open on remand.
III
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, con
curring in the judgment.
The question in this case is whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and
Supp. V), prohibits retaliation against an employee who tes
tifies in an internal investigation of alleged sexual harass
ent 28 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807 (1998)). But
that mitigation requirement only applies to employees who are suffering
discrimination and have the opportunity to fix it by “tak[ing] advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,”
524 U. S., at 807; it is based on the general principle “that a victim has a
duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to
avoid or minimize . . . damages,’ ” id., at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231, n. 15 (1982)). We have never suggested that
employees have a legal obligation to report discrimination against others
to their employer on their own initiative, let alone lose statutory protec
tion by failing to speak. Extending the mitigation requirement so far
would make no sense; employees will often face retaliation not for oppos
ing discrimination they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination
suffered by others. Thus, they are not “victims” of anything until they
are retaliated against, and it would be absurd to require them to “miti
gate” damages they may be unaware they will suffer.

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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
ment. I agree with the Court that the “opposition clause” of
§ 2000e–3(a) (2000 ed.) prohibits retaliation for such conduct.
I also agree with the Court’s primary reasoning, which is
based on “the point argued by the Government and ex
plained by an [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)] guideline: ‘When an employee communicates to her
employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a
form of employment discrimination, that communication’ vir
tually always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the
activity.’ ” Ante, at 276. I write separately to emphasize
my understanding that the Court’s holding does not and
should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal
investigations or engage in analogous purposive conduct.
As the Court concludes, the term “oppose” does not denote
conduct that necessarily rises to the level required by the
Sixth Circuit—i. e., conduct that is “ ‘consistent’ ” and “insti
gated or initiated” by the employee. 211 Fed. Appx. 373,
376 (2006). The primary definitions of the term “oppose” do,
however, require conduct that is active and purposive. See
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1709–1710 (2d ed.
1953); Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1010 (1966) (hereinafter Random Dict.); 10 Oxford English
Dictionary 866–867 (2d ed. 1989). For example, the first
three definitions of the term in the dictionary upon which
the Court principally relies are as follows:
“1. to act against or provide resistance to; combat. 2. to
stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set as an
opponent or adversary.” Random Dict. 1359 (2d ed.
1987).
In accordance with these definitions, petitioner contends that
the statutory term “oppose” means “taking action (including
making a statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct un
lawful discrimination.” Brief for Petitioner 40.
In order to decide the question that is before us, we have
no need to adopt a definition of the term “oppose” that is

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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
broader than the definition that petitioner advances. But in
dicta, the Court notes that the fourth listed definition in the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language goes fur
ther, defining “oppose” to mean “ ‘to be hostile or adverse to,
as in opinion.’ ” Ante, at 276 (emphasis added). Thus, this
definition embraces silent opposition.
While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term “op
pose,” the term is not always used in this sense, and it is
questionable whether silent opposition is covered by the op
position clause of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a). It is noteworthy
that all of the other conduct protected by this provision—
making a charge, testifying, or assisting or participating in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing—requires active and
purposive conduct. “ ‘That several items in a list share an
attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as
possessing that attribute as well.’ ” S. D. Warren Co. v.
Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 378
(2006) (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371
(1994)).
An interpretation of the opposition clause that protects
conduct that is not active and purposive would have impor
tant practical implications. It would open the door to retali
ation claims by employees who never expressed a word of
opposition to their employers. To be sure, in many cases,
such employees would not be able to show that management
was aware of their opposition and thus would not be able to
show that their opposition caused the adverse actions at
issue. But in other cases, such employees might well be able
to create a genuine factual issue on the question of causation.
Suppose, for example, that an employee alleges that he or
she expressed opposition while informally chatting with a
co-worker at the proverbial water cooler or in a workplace
telephone conversation that was overheard by a co-worker.
Or suppose that an employee alleges that such a conversation
occurred after work at a restaurant or tavern frequented by
co-workers or at a neighborhood picnic attended by a friend
or relative of a supervisor.

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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
Some courts hold that an employee asserting a retaliation
claim can prove causation simply by showing that the ad
verse employment action occurred within a short time after
the protected conduct. See, e. g., Clark County School Dist.
v. Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting
that some cases “accept mere temporal proximity between
an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an ad
verse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality
to establish a prima facie case”); see also Gorman-Bakos v.
Cornell Cooperative Extension of Schenectady Cty., 252
F. 3d 545, 554 (CA2 2001); Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc.,
121 F. 3d 1390, 1395 (CA10 1997); Dey v. Colt Constr. & De
velopment Co., 28 F. 3d 1446, 1458 (CA7 1994). As a result,
an employee claiming retaliation may be able to establish
causation simply by showing that, within some time period
prior to the adverse action, the employer, by some indirect
means, became aware of the views that the employee had
expressed. Where the protected conduct consisted of a pri
vate conversation, application of this rule would be especially
problematic because of uncertainty regarding the point in
time when the employer became aware of the employee’s pri
vate expressions of disapproval.
The number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has
proliferated in recent years. See U. S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1997
Through FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html;
Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through FY 1996, http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (as visited Jan. 16, 2009,
and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (showing that re
taliation charges filed with the EEOC doubled between 1992
and 2007). An expansive interpretation of protected opposi
tion conduct would likely cause this trend to accelerate.
The question whether the opposition clause shields em
ployees who do not communicate their views to their employ
ers through purposive conduct is not before us in this case;
the answer to that question is far from clear; and I do not
understand the Court’s holding to reach that issue here.

555US2 Unit: $U16 [01-13-14 09:16:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
284 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY.
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
For present purposes, it is enough to hold that the opposition
clause does protect an employee, like petitioner, who testifies
about unlawful conduct in an internal investigation.