UNITED STATES v. HAYES

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415 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. HAYES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 07–608. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided February 24, 2009
In 1996, Congress extended the federal Gun Control Act of 1968’s prohibi
tion on possession of a firearm by convicted felons to include persons
convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(9). Responding to a 911 call reporting domestic violence, police
officers discovered a rifle in respondent Hayes’s home. Based on this
and other evidence, Hayes was charged under §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2)
with possessing firearms after having been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence. The indictment identified as the predicate
misdemeanor offense Hayes’s 1994 conviction for battery against his
then-wife, in violation of West Virginia law. Hayes moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that his 1994 conviction did not qualify as
a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9) because West Virginia’s generic
battery law did not designate a domestic relationship between aggressor
and victim as an element of the offense. When the District Court de
nied the motion, Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a § 922(g)(9) predicate offense
must have as an element a domestic relationship between offender and
victim.
Held: A domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need
not be a defining element of the predicate offense. Pp. 420–430.
(a) The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” con
tained in § 921(a)(33)(A), imposes two requirements. First, the crime
must have, “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Second,
it must be “committed by” a person who has a specified domestic re
lationship with the victim. Ibid. The definition does not, however,
require the predicate-offense statute to include, as an element, the
existence of that domestic relationship. Instead, it suffices for the
Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for
“an offense . . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse or other
domestic victim. Pp. 420–426.
(1) As an initial matter, § 921(a)(33)(A)’s use of the singular word
“element” suggests that Congress intended to describe only one re
quired element, the use of force. Had Congress also meant to make the

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416 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
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specified relationship a predicate-offense element, it likely would have
used the plural “elements,” as it has done in other offense-defining pro
visions. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3559(c)(2)(A). Treating the specified re
lationship as a predicate-offense element is also awkward as a matter of
syntax. It requires the reader to regard “the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,” as an expres
sion modified by the relative clause “committed by.” It is more natural,
however, to say a person “commit[s]” an “offense” than to say one “com
mit[s]” a “use.” Pp. 421–423.
(2) The Fourth Circuit’s textual arguments to the contrary are un
persuasive. First, that court noted, clause (ii) is separated from clause
(i)—which defines “misdemeanor”—by a line break and a semicolon,
while clause (ii)’s components—force and domestic relationship—are
joined in an unbroken word flow. Such less-than-meticulous drafting
hardly shows that Congress meant to exclude from § 922(g)(9)’s prohibi
tion domestic abusers convicted under generic assault or battery laws.
As structured, § 921(a)(33)(A) defines “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” by addressing in clause (i) the meaning of “misdemeanor,” and
in clause (ii) “crime of domestic violence.” Because a “crime of domes
tic violence” involves both a use of force and a domestic relationship,
joining these features together in clause (ii) would make sense even if
Congress had no design to confine laws qualifying under § 921(a)(33)(A)
to those designating as elements both use of force and domestic relation
ship. A related statutory provision, 25 U. S. C. § 2803(3)(C), indicates
that Congress did not ascribe substantive significance to the placement
of line breaks and semicolons in 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Second, the
Fourth Circuit relied on the “rule of the last antecedent” to read “com
mitted by” as modifying the immediately preceding use-of-force phrase
rather than the earlier word “offense.” The last-antecedent rule, how
ever, “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia
of meaning.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26. Applying the rule
here would require the Court to accept the unlikely premises that Con
gress employed the singular “element” to encompass two distinct con
cepts, and that it adopted the awkward construction “commi[t]” a use.
The rule, moreover, would render the word “committed” superfluous,
for Congress could have conveyed the same meaning by referring sim
ply to “the use . . . of physical force . . . by a current or former
spouse . . . .” Pp. 423–426.
(b) Practical considerations strongly support this Court’s reading of
§ 921(a)(33)(A). By extending the federal firearm prohibition to persons
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, § 922(g)(9)’s pro
ponents sought to close a loophole: Existing felon-in-possession laws
often failed to keep firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers, for

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such offenders generally were not charged with, or convicted of, felonies.
Construing § 922(g)(9) to exclude the domestic abuser convicted under a
generic use-of-force statute would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose.
The statute would have been a dead letter in some two-thirds of the
States because, in 1996, only about one-third of them had criminal stat
utes specifically proscribing domestic violence. Hayes argues that the
measure that became §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A), though it initially
may have had a broadly remedial purpose, was revised and narrowed
during the legislative process, but his argument is not corroborated by
the revisions he identifies. Indeed, § 922(g)(9)’s Senate sponsor ob
served that a domestic relationship often would not be a designated
element of the predicate offense. Such remarks are “not controlling,”
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S.
102, 118, but the legislative record is otherwise silent. Pp. 426–429.
(c) The rule of lenity, on which Hayes also relies, applies only when a
statute is ambiguous. Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition, though not a
model of the careful drafter’s art, is also not “grievous[ly] ambigu[ous].”
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831. The text, context, pur
pose, and what little drafting history there is all point in the same direc
tion: Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to in
clude an offense “committed by” a person who had a specified domestic
relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor statute
itself designates the domestic relationship as an element of the crime.
P. 429.
482 F. 3d 749, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas,
J., joined as to all but Part III. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 430.
Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for the United
States. On the brief were Solicitor General Garre, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Friedrich, Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben, Leondra R. Kruger, and Thomas E. Booth.
Troy Nino Giatras argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Michael F. Smith, James F.
Gehrke, Kimberly Horsley Allen, and John H. Dudley, Jr.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Brady Center
to Prevent Gun Violence et al. by Bert H. Deixler and Daniel R. Vice; for
the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. by Helen Geros

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418 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 921
et seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any
person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended
the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a mis
demeanor crime of domestic violence.” § 922(g)(9). The
definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” con
tained in § 921(a)(33)(A), is at issue in this case. Does that
term cover a misdemeanor battery whenever the battered
victim was in fact the offender’s spouse (or other relation
specified in § 921(a)(33)(A))? Or, to trigger the possession
ban, must the predicate misdemeanor identify as an element
of the crime a domestic relationship between aggressor and
victim? We hold that the domestic relationship, although
it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a
§ 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a de
fining element of the predicate offense.
I
In 2004, law enforcement officers in Marion County, West
Virginia, came to the home of Randy Edward Hayes in re
sponse to a 911 call reporting domestic violence. Hayes con
sented to a search of his home, and the officers discovered a
rifle. Further investigation revealed that Hayes had re
cently possessed several other firearms as well. Based on
this evidence, a federal grand jury returned an indictment in
2005, charging Hayes, under §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2), with
tathos Guyton and Joan S. Meier; and for Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
et al. by Betty Jo Christian.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Eagle Forum
Education and Legal Defense Fund by Douglas G. Smith; for the Gun
Owners Foundation by Herbert W. Titus, William J. Olson, and John S.
Miles; and for the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., by Alan Gura.
Neal Goldfarb filed a brief for Professors of Linguistics and Cognitive
Science as amici curiae.
*Justice Thomas joins all but Part III of this opinion.

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three counts of possessing firearms after having been con
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
The indictment identified Hayes’s predicate misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence as a 1994 conviction for battery
in violation of West Virginia law.1 The victim of that bat
tery, the indictment alleged, was Hayes’s then-wife—a per
son who “shared a child in common” with Hayes and “who
was cohabitating with . . . him as a spouse.” App. 3.2
Asserting that his 1994 West Virginia battery conviction
did not qualify as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9), Hayes
moved to dismiss the indictment. Section 922(g)(9), Hayes
maintained, applies only to persons previously convicted of
an offense that has as an element a domestic relationship
between aggressor and victim. The West Virginia statute
under which he was convicted in 1994, Hayes observed, was
a generic battery proscription, not a law designating a do
mestic relationship between offender and victim as an ele
ment of the offense. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia rejected Hayes’s ar
gument and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.
1 West Virginia’s battery statute provides: “[A]ny person [who] unlaw
fully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking
nature with the person of another or unlawfully and intentionally causes
physical harm to another person, . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–2–9(c) (Lexis 2005).
2 The indictment stated, in relevant part:
“Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES’ February 24, 1994 Battery
conviction . . . constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
because:
“a. Battery is a misdemeanor under State law in West Virginia;
“b. Battery has, as an element, the use and attempted use of physical
force;
“c. Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES committed the offense of
Battery against the victim:
“i. who was his current spouse; and
“ii. who was a person with whom he shared a child in common; and
“iii. who was cohabitating with and had cohabitated with him as a
spouse.” App. 2–3 (bold typeface deleted).

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377 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541–542 (2005). Hayes then entered a
conditional guilty plea and appealed.
In a 2-to-1 decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed. A § 922(g)(9) predicate of
fense, the Court of Appeals held, must “have as an element a
domestic relationship between the offender and the victim.”
482 F. 3d 749, 751 (2007). In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit
created a split between itself and the nine other Courts of
Appeals that had previously published opinions deciding the
same question.3 According to those courts, § 922(g)(9) does
not require that the offense predicate to the defendant’s
firearm possession conviction have as an element a domestic
relationship between offender and victim. We granted cer
tiorari, 552 U. S. 1279 (2008), to resolve this conflict.
II
Section 922(g)(9) makes it “unlawful for any person . . .
who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition.” Section 921(a)(33)(A) defines
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as follows:
“[T]he term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’
means an offense that—
“(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal
law; and
“(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or
3 See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F. 3d 1048, 1049 (CA10 2006);
United States v. Belless, 338 F. 3d 1063, 1067 (CA9 2003); White v. Depart
ment of Justice, 328 F. 3d 1361, 1364–1367 (CA Fed. 2003); United States
v. Shelton, 325 F. 3d 553, 562 (CA5 2003); United States v. Kavoukian, 315
F. 3d 139, 142–144 (CA2 2002); United States v. Barnes, 295 F. 3d 1354,
1358–1361 (CADC 2002); United States v. Chavez, 204 F. 3d 1305, 1313–
1314 (CA11 2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F. 3d 215, 218–221 (CA1
1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F. 3d 617, 619–621 (CA8 1999).

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guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the vic
tim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohab
itating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a
spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly sit
uated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
(Footnote omitted.)
This definition, all agree, imposes two requirements: First,
a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” must have, “as
an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” Second, it must
be “committed by” a person who has a specified domestic
relationship with the victim. The question here is whether
the language of § 921(a)(33)(A) calls for a further limitation:
Must the statute describing the predicate offense include, as
a discrete element, the existence of a domestic relationship
between offender and victim? In line with the large major
ity of the Courts of Appeals, we conclude that § 921(a)(33)(A)
does not require a predicate-offense statute of that specific
ity. Instead, in a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, it suffices for the
Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was,
in fact, for “an offense . . . committed by” the defendant
against a spouse or other domestic victim.
We note as an initial matter that § 921(a)(33)(A) uses the
word “element” in the singular, which suggests that Con
gress intended to describe only one required element. Im
mediately following the word “element,” § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)
refers to the use of force (undoubtedly a required element)
and thereafter to the relationship between aggressor and
victim, e. g., a current or former spouse. The manner in
which the offender acts, and the offender’s relationship with
the victim, are “conceptually distinct attributes.” United
States v. Meade, 175 F. 3d 215, 218 (CA1 1999).4 Had Con
4 Hayes observes, see Brief for Respondent 24–25, that Congress has
used the singular “element” in defining a “crime of violence” to require
both an action (the use of force) and its object (the person of another).
See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 16(a) (defining “crime of violence” as “an offense

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gress meant to make the latter as well as the former an ele
ment of the predicate offense, it likely would have used the
plural “elements,” as it has done in other offense-defining
provisions. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3559(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he term
‘assault with intent to commit rape’ means an offense that
has as its elements engaging in physical contact with another
person or using or brandishing a weapon against another
person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or
sexual abuse.”). Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 559 (8th ed.
2004) (defining “element” as “[a] constituent part of a claim
that must be proved for the claim to succeed <Burke failed
to prove the element of proximate cause in prosecuting his
negligence claim>”).5
Treating the relationship between aggressor and victim as
an element of the predicate offense is also awkward as a mat
ter of syntax. It requires the reader to regard “the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon” as an expression modified by the relative
clause “committed by.” In ordinary usage, however, we
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi
cal force against the person or property of another”). Although one might
conceive of an action and its object as separate elements, it is unsurprising
that Congress would have chosen to denominate “the use of force against
another” as a single, undifferentiated element. In contrast, the two re
quirements set out in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)—the use of force and the existence
of a specified relationship between aggressor and victim—are not readily
conceptualized as a single element.
5 Invoking the Dictionary Act, Hayes contends that the singular “ele
ment” encompasses the plural “elements.” See Brief for Respondent 25.
The Dictionary Act provides that, “unless the context indicates other
wise,” “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. § 1. On the rare occasions when we have
relied on this rule, doing so was “necessary to carry out the evident intent
of the statute.” First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640,
657 (1924). As we explain infra, at 426–429, Hayes’s reading of 18 U. S. C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A) does not accord with Congress’ aim in extending the gun
possession ban.

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would not say that a person “commit[s]” a “use.” It is more
natural to say that a person “commit[s]” an “offense.” See,
e. g., United States v. Belless, 338 F. 3d 1063, 1066 (CA9 2003)
(“One can ‘commit’ a crime or an offense, but one does not
‘commit’ ‘force’ or ‘use.’ ”).
In reaching the conclusion that § 921(a)(33)(A) renders
both the use of force and a domestic relationship between
aggressor and victim necessary elements of a qualifying
predicate offense, the Fourth Circuit majority relied on two
textual arguments. First, the court noted that clause (ii) is
separated from clause (i) by a line break and a semicolon; in
contrast, the components of clause (ii)—force and domestic
relationship—are joined in an unbroken word flow. See 482
F. 3d, at 753.
Had Congress placed the “committed by” phrase in its own
clause, set off from clause (ii) by a semicolon or a line break,
the lawmakers might have better conveyed that “committed
by” modifies only “offense” and not “use” or “element.”
Congress’ less-than-meticulous drafting, however, hardly
shows that the legislators meant to exclude from § 922(g)(9)’s
firearm possession prohibition domestic abusers convicted
under generic assault or battery provisions.
As structured, § 921(a)(33)(A) defines “misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence” by addressing in clause (i) the meaning
of “misdemeanor” and, in turn, in clause (ii), “crime of do
mestic violence.” Because a “crime of domestic violence”
involves both a use of force and a domestic relationship, join
ing these features together in clause (ii) would make sense
even if Congress had no design to confine laws qualifying
under § 921(a)(33)(A) to those designating as elements both
use of force and domestic relationship between aggressor and
victim. See id., at 761 (Williams, J., dissenting). See also
United States v. Barnes, 295 F. 3d 1354, 1358–1360, 1361
(CADC 2002) (“The fact that the Congress somewhat awk
wardly included the ‘committed by’ phrase in subpart (ii) (in

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stead of adding a subpart (iii)) is not significant in view of
the unnatural reading that would result if ‘committed by’
were construed to modify ‘use of force.’ ”).
A related statutory provision, 25 U. S. C. § 2803(3)(C),
indicates that Congress did not ascribe substantive signifi
cance to the placement of line breaks and semicolons
in 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(33)(A). In 2006, Congress amended
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(i) to include misdemeanors under “[t]ribal
law” as predicate offenses. As a companion measure, Con
gress simultaneously enacted § 2803(3)(C), which employs
use-of-force and domestic-relationship language virtually
identical to the language earlier placed in § 921(a)(33)(A)(i),
except that § 2803(3)(C) uses no semicolon or line break.
Section 2803(3)(C) authorizes federal agents to “make an
arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in Indian
country if—”
“the offense is a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio
lence . . . and has, as an element, the use or attempted
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, par
ent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom
the victim shares a child in common, by a person who
is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim
as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person simi
larly situated to a spouse, parent or guardian of the
victim . . . .”
At the time Congress enacted § 2803(3)(C), the Courts of Ap
peals uniformly agreed that § 921(a)(33)(A) did not limit
predicate offenses to statutory texts specifying both a use of
force and a domestic relationship as offense elements. Con
gress presumably knew how § 921(a)(33)(A) had been con
strued, and presumably intended § 2803(3)(C) to bear the
same meaning. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 85–86 (2006) (“[W]hen ‘judicial

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interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing stat
utory provision, repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorpo
rate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’ ” (quoting Brag
don v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645 (1998))). Relying on spac
ing and punctuation to hem in § 921(a)(33)(A), while reading
§ 2803(3)(C) to contain no similar limitation, would create
a disjunction between these two provisions that Congress
could not have intended.
As a second justification for its construction of § 921(a)
(33)(A), the Court of Appeals invoked the “rule of the last
antecedent,” under which “a limiting clause or phrase . . .
should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or
phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas,
540 U. S. 20, 26 (2003). The words “committed by” immedi
ately follow the use-of-force language, the court observed,
and therefore should be read to modify that phrase, not the
earlier word “offense.” See 482 F. 3d, at 753–755. The rule
of the last antecedent, however, “is not an absolute and can
assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning.” Barn
hart, 540 U. S., at 26.6
Applying the rule of the last antecedent here would re
quire us to accept two unlikely premises: that Congress
employed the singular “element” to encompass two distinct
concepts, and that it adopted the awkward construction
“commi[t]” a “use.” See supra, at 421–423. Moreover, as the
dissent acknowledges, post, at 433, the last-antecedent rule
6 As the United States points out, the Court of Appeals “itself recog
nized the flexibility of the rule [of the last antecedent].” Brief for United
States 20, n. 7. Under a strict application of the rule, the “committed by”
phrase would modify only its immediate antecedent, i. e., “the threatened
use of a deadly weapon,” and not the entire phrase “use or attempted use
of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” The court
rightly regarded such a reading as implausible. See 482 F. 3d 749, 755
(CA4 2007).

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would render the word “committed” superfluous: Congress
could have conveyed the same meaning by referring simply
to the “use . . . of [physical] force . . . by a current or former
spouse . . . .” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. “Committed” retains
its operative meaning only if it is read to modify “offense.”
Most sensibly read, then, § 921(a)(33)(A) defines “misde
meanor crime of domestic violence” as a misdemeanor of
fense that (1) “has, as an element, the use [of force],” and
(2) is committed by a person who has a specified domestic
relationship with the victim. To obtain a conviction in a
§ 922(g)(9) prosecution, the Government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the victim of the predicate offense
was the defendant’s current or former spouse or was related
to the defendant in another specified way. But that relation
ship, while it must be established, need not be denominated
an element of the predicate offense.7
III
Practical considerations strongly support our reading of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)’s language. Existing felon-in-possession
laws, Congress recognized, were not keeping firearms out of
the hands of domestic abusers, because “many people who
engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not
charged with or convicted of felonies.” 142 Cong. Rec.
22985 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). By extending
the federal firearm prohibition to persons convicted of “mis
demeanor crime[s] of domestic violence,” proponents of
§ 922(g)(9) sought to “close this dangerous loophole.” Id.,
at 22986.
Construing § 922(g)(9) to exclude the domestic abuser con
victed under a generic use-of-force statute (one that does not
7 We find it not at all “surprising”—indeed, it seems to us “most natu
ral”—to read § 921(a)(33)(A) to convey that a person convicted of battering
a spouse or other domestic victim has committed a “crime of domestic
violence,” whether or not the statute of conviction happens to contain a
domestic-relationship element. Cf. post, at 431.

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designate a domestic relationship as an element of the
offense) would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose. Fire
arms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combina
tion nationwide. See, e. g., Brief for Brady Center To Pre
vent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 8–15; Brief for
National Network To End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici
Curiae 2–8. Yet, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit,
§ 922(g)(9) would have been “a dead letter” in some two
thirds of the States from the very moment of its enactment.
482 F. 3d, at 762 (Williams, J., dissenting).
As of 1996, only about one-third of the States had criminal
statutes that specifically proscribed domestic violence. See
Brief for United States 23, n. 8.8 Even in those States, do
mestic abusers were (and are) routinely prosecuted under
generally applicable assault or battery laws. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 19. And no statute defining a distinct federal misde
meanor designated as an element of the offense a domestic
relationship between aggressor and victim. Yet Congress
defined “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include
“misdemeanor[s] under Federal . . . law.” § 921(a)(33)(A)(i).
Given the paucity of state and federal statutes targeting do
mestic violence, we find it highly improbable that Congress
meant to extend § 922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban only to
the relatively few domestic abusers prosecuted under laws
rendering a domestic relationship an element of the offense.
See Barnes, 295 F. 3d, at 1364 (rejecting the view that “Con
gress remedied one disparity—between felony and misde
meanor domestic violence convictions—while at the same
time creating a new disparity among (and sometimes,
within) states”).9
8 Additional States have enacted such statutes since 1996, but about
one-half of the States still prosecute domestic violence exclusively under
generally applicable criminal laws. See Brief for United States 23–24,
and n. 9.
9 Generally, as in this case, it would entail no “ ‘elaborate factfinding
process,’ ” post, at 436, to determine whether the victim of a violent assault

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428 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Opinion of the Court
The measure that became §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A),
Hayes acknowledges, initially may have had a broadly reme
dial purpose, see Brief for Respondent 28–29, but the text of
the proposal, he maintains, was revised and narrowed while
the measure remained in the congressional hopper. The
compromise reflected in the text that gained passage, Hayes
argues, restricted the legislation to offenses specifically de
nominating a domestic relationship as a defining element.
The changes Hayes identifies, however, do not corroborate
his argument.
Congress did revise the language of § 921(a)(33)(A) to spell
out the use-of-force requirement. The proposed legislation
initially described the predicate domestic-violence offense as
a “crime of violence . . . committed by” a person who had a
domestic relationship with the victim. 142 Cong. Rec. 5840.
The final version replaced the unelaborated phrase “crime of
violence” with the phrase “has, as an element, the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon.” This apparently last-minute insertion may
help to explain some of the syntactical awkwardness of the
enacted language, but it does not evince an intention to con
vert the “committed by” phrase into a required element of
the predicate offense.
Indeed, in a floor statement discussing the revised version
of § 922(g)(9), Senator Frank Lautenberg, the sponsor of the
provision, observed that a domestic relationship between ag
gressor and victim often would not be a designated element
of the predicate offense:
“[C]onvictions for domestic violence-related crimes
often are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explic
itly identified as related to domestic violence. There
fore, it will not always be possible for law enforcement
authorities to determine from the face of someone’s
criminal record whether a particular misdemeanor con
was the perpetrator’s “current or former spouse” or bore one of the other
domestic relationships specified in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) to the perpetrator.

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429 Cite as: 555 U. S. 415 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
viction involves domestic violence, as defined in the new
law.” Id., at 26675.
The remarks of a single Senator are “not controlling,” Con
sumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 118 (1980), but, as Hayes recognizes, the legislative
record is otherwise “absolutely silent.” See Tr. of Oral Arg.
32, 35. It contains no suggestion that Congress intended
to confine § 922(g)(9) to abusers who had violated statutes
rendering the domestic relationship between aggressor and
victim an element of the offense.
IV
The rule of lenity, Hayes contends, provides an additional
reason to construe §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A) to apply
only to predicate offenses that specify a domestic relation
ship as an element of the crime. “[T]he touchstone of the
rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We apply the rule “only when, after consulting
traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with
an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S.
10, 17 (1994). Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition of “misde
meanor crime of domestic violence,” we acknowledge, is not
a model of the careful drafter’s art. See Barnes, 295 F. 3d,
at 1356. But neither is it “grievous[ly] ambigu[ous].” Hud
dleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831 (1974). The text,
context, purpose, and what little there is of drafting history
all point in the same direction: Congress defined “misde
meanor crime of domestic violence” to include an offense
“committed by” a person who had a specified domestic rela
tionship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor
statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an ele
ment of the crime.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the

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430 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia
joins, dissenting.
A person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domes
tic violence” is prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18
U. S. C. § 922(g)(9). The question before the Court is
whether the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” in § 921(a)(33)(A) includes misdemeanor offenses
with no domestic-relationship element.
Section 921(a)(33)(A) provides:
“[T]he term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’
means an offense that—
“(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal
law; and
“(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the vic
tim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohab
itating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a
spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly sit
uated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
(Footnote omitted.)
The majority would read the “committed by” phrase in
clause (ii) to modify the word “offense” in the opening clause
of subparagraph (A), leapfrogging the word “element” at the
outset of clause (ii). That reading does not require the spec
ified domestic relationship in clause (ii) to be an element of
the predicate misdemeanor statute. Individuals convicted
under generic use-of-force statutes containing no reference
to domestic violence would therefore be subject to prosecu
tion under § 922(g)(9).

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431 Cite as: 555 U. S. 415 (2009)
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
The Court of Appeals held to the contrary that “committed
by” modifies the immediately preceding phrase: “the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of
a deadly weapon.” § 921(a)(33)(A); 482 F. 3d 749, 753–754
(CA4 2007). Read that way, a domestic relationship is an
element of the prior offense.
That seems to be the most natural reading right off the
bat. The term at issue is “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.” That is a defined term—so the definition cer
tainly must be parsed—but it would be at least surprising to
find from that parsing that a “misdemeanor crime of domes
tic violence” need not by its terms have anything to do with
domestic violence.
1. The grammatical rule of the last antecedent indicates
that the domestic relationship is a required element of the
predicate offense. That rule instructs that “a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barn
hart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 (2003). Pursuant to that
rule, the “committed by” phrase in clause (ii) is best read to
modify the preceding phrase “the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”
See 482 F. 3d, at 754–755. By not following the usual gram
matical rule, the majority’s reading requires jumping over
two line breaks, clause (i), a semicolon, and the first portion
of clause (ii) to reach the more distant antecedent (“offense”).
Due to the floating “that” after “offense,” if “committed by”
modified “offense” the text would read “offense that com
mitted by.”
The majority counters that people do not ordinarily say
someone “commit[s]” a “use” of force. See ante, at 423. True
enough, but only because “use” of force is a term that encom
passes a variety of conduct, which if listed separately would
not pose the objection the majority raises (e. g., commits a
battery, robbery, or kidnaping). There is no reason to be
lieve that the reasonable drafting decision to insert “use” of

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432 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
force rather than coming up with a laundry list of offenses
was meant to alter the meaning of the statute.
The majority also relies on Congress’s use of the word “el
ement” in the singular. From that, the majority infers that
Congress intended to describe only one required element—
the use of force. Ante, at 421–422. In its view, Congress
would have used the plural “elements” if it meant to encom
pass both the use of force and the offender’s relationship
with the victim. Ibid.
That argument is contrary to the Dictionary Act, which
specifies that unless the context indicates otherwise, “words
importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. § 1; see Rowland v. Califor
nia Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506
U. S. 194, 200 (1993). More significantly, reading “element”
as limited to the singular does not resolve what that element
is. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F. 3d 1354, 1369 (CADC
2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). A single element often con
tains multiple components. In the very provision at issue,
the “threatened use of a deadly weapon” includes three con
cepts: (1) the threatened use (2) of a weapon (3) that is
deadly.
In other statutes, Congress has used the word “element”
in the singular to refer to the use of force and its object.
See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 16(a) (defining “crime of violence” as
“an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another”). The majority finds it “unsurprising”
that Congress would have chosen to combine the mode of
aggression and its object in a “single, undifferentiated ele
ment.” Ante, at 422, n. 4. It asserts, however, that Con
gress would not have so joined the use of force and the offend
er’s relationship with the victim, because those requirements
“are not readily conceptualized as a single element.” Ibid.
That distinction is elusive; both 18 U. S. C. § 16(a) and the
provision at issue here contain as distinct components the

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433 Cite as: 555 U. S. 415 (2009)
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
act (use of force) and the target (person or property in the
former case, domestic-relationship victim in the latter).
The majority also points out that interpreting “committed
by” to modify the “use” of force would render the word “com
mitted” superfluous. That may be so, but as shown, reading
“committed by” to modify “offense” has its own flaws. All
this goes to show that the statute is not an example of ele
gant syntax under either reading. The majority properly
acknowledges that, under its view, the statutory language
reflects “less-than-meticulous drafting ” and “syntactical
awkwardness,” and “is not a model of the careful drafter’s
art.” Ante, at 423, 428, 429. I am willing to acknowledge the
same with respect to my reading. But I conclude from such
reciprocal shortcomings that the text is at least ambiguous.
2. That brings us to the structure of the statute. The
most natural reading of the statute, as it is laid out, is that
the underlying misdemeanor must have as an element the
use of force committed by a person in a domestic relationship
with the victim. The definition of “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” is twice qualified: first, by the relative
clause “is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal
law”; and second, by the relative clause “has, as an element,
the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened
use of a deadly weapon, committed by [a person in a speci
fied domestic relationship with the victim].” § 921(a)(33)(A)
(footnote omitted). The fact that Congress included the
domestic-relationship language in the clause of the statute
designating the element of the predicate offense strongly
suggests that it is in fact part of the required element.
The majority’s contrary reading requires restructuring the
statute and adding words. The majority first must place the
“committed by” phrase in its own clause—set off by a line
break, a semicolon, or “(iii)”—to indicate that “committed
by” refers all the way back to “offense.” And, as noted, be
cause the word “that” appears at the end of subparagraph
(A), the statute would then read “an offense that committed

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434 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
by.” To arrive at its reading, the majority must ignore the
floating “that” or add “and is” before “committed by.”
The Government would define “misdemeanor crime of do
mestic violence” as “an offense, committed by a person with
a domestic relationship with the victim, that is a misde
meanor and has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”
Brief for United States 13; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9.
That reading also requires rearranging the statute. The
“committed by” phrase would have to be severed from clause
(ii) and moved up to appear after the word “offense” in sub
paragraph (A). Changing and rearranging the wording as
the Government does to explain what the actual words mean
is, in any event, not a compelling line of argument.
The majority attempts to diminish the magnitude of these
alterations by stating that the lawmakers might have better
conveyed their intent by setting off the “committed by”
phrase with “a semicolon” or “a line break.” Ante, at 423.
But those are not insignificant revisions; they alter the struc
ture of the statute, and we have recognized that structure is
often critical in resolving verbal ambiguity. See Castillo v.
United States, 530 U. S. 120, 124 (2000) (“The statute’s struc
ture clarifies any ambiguity inherent in its literal language”).
I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority that
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is most sensibly
read as including misdemeanor offenses without a domestic
relationship element.
3. Moving beyond text and structure, the majority recog
nizes that there is “little . . . drafting history,” ante, at 429,
but gamely trots out what there is: a statement on the floor
of the Senate by the bill’s sponsor, see ante, at 428–429.
Such tidbits do not amount to much. See Consumer Prod
uct Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118
(1980). This is especially true here where the statement
was delivered the day the legislation was passed and after
the House of Representatives had passed the pertinent pro

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435 Cite as: 555 U. S. 415 (2009)
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
vision. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,
545 U. S. 546, 568 (2005); see also Brief for Respondent 33.
The majority nonetheless looks to the floor statement be
cause “the legislative record is otherwise ‘absolutely silent.’ ”
Ante, at 429. But that is no reason to accord the statement
significance: We dismiss the value of such statements due to
their inherent flaws as guides to legislative intent, flaws that
persist (and indeed may be amplified) in the absence of other
indicia of intent.
The majority also finds it “highly improbable that Con
gress meant to extend § 922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban
only to the relatively few domestic abusers prosecuted under
laws rendering a domestic relationship an element of the of
fense.” Ante, at 427. In its view, construing § 922(g)(9) to
exclude persons convicted under a generic use-of-force stat
ute would “frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose,” ante, at
427, of keeping guns out of the hands of domestic abusers.
See ante, at 426 (quoting statement of Sen. Lautenberg, 142
Cong. Rec. 22985 (1996)).
Invoking the sponsor’s objective as Congress’s manifest
purpose, however, “ignores the complexity of the problems
Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of legis
lative action.” Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Fi
nancial Corp., 474 U. S. 361, 373–374 (1986). Legislative
enactments are the result of negotiations between competing
interests; “the final language of the legislation may reflect
hard-fought compromises.” Id., at 374. Even if there were
sufficient sentiment to extend the gun ban, individual legisla
tors might have disagreed on the appropriate reach of the
new provision. See ibid. Some members might well have
been willing to extend the ban beyond individuals convicted
of felonies, but only if the predicate misdemeanor by its
terms was addressed to domestic violence.
4. The majority’s approach will entail significant problems
in application. Under the interpretation adopted by the
court below, it is easy to determine whether an individual is

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436 UNITED STATES v. HAYES
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
covered by the gun ban: Simply look to the record of the
prior conviction. Under the majority’s approach, on the
other hand, it will often be necessary to go beyond the fact
of conviction and “engage in an elaborate factfinding process
regarding the defendant’s prior offens[e],” Taylor v. United
States, 495 U. S. 575, 601 (1990), to determine whether it hap
pened to involve domestic violence.
That is one reason we adopted a categorical approach to
predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U. S. C. § 924(e)(1), “looking only to the statutory definitions
of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underly
ing those convictions.” Taylor, supra, at 600; see Shepard
v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 19 (2005) (Court considered
“predicate offens[e] in terms not of prior conduct but of prior
‘convictions’ and the ‘element[s]’ of crimes”). As we warned
in Taylor and reaffirmed in Shepard, “the practical difficul
ties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunt
ing.” Taylor, supra, at 601; see Shepard, supra, at 20.
Those same concerns are implicated here, given that the ma
jority would require juries and courts to look at the par
ticular facts of a prior conviction to determine whether it
happened to involve domestic violence, rather than simply
looking to the elements of the predicate offense. See ante,
at 421.
5. Taking a fair view, the text of § 921(a)(33)(A) is ambigu
ous, the structure leans in the defendant’s favor, the purpose
leans in the Government’s favor, and the legislative history
does not amount to much. This is a textbook case for appli
cation of the rule of lenity.
“Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided
by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history
or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute
broader than that clearly warranted by the text.” Crandon
v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 160 (1990). It cannot fairly
be said here that the text “clearly warrants” the counterintu
itive conclusion that a “crime of domestic violence” need not

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437 Cite as: 555 U. S. 415 (2009)
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
have domestic violence as an element. That leaves the ma
jority’s arguments about legislative history and statutory
purpose. This is not the “rare” case in which such grounds
provide “fair warning,” especially given that there is nothing
wrong with the conduct punished—possessing a firearm—if
the prior misdemeanor is not covered by the statute.
If the rule of lenity means anything, it is that an individual
should not go to jail for failing to conduct a 50-state survey
or comb through obscure legislative history. Ten years in
jail is too much to hinge on the will-o’-the-wisp of statutory
meaning pursued by the majority.