BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

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938 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
BOYLE v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 07–1309. Argued January 14, 2009—Decided June 8, 2009
The evidence at petitioner Boyle’s trial for violating the Racketeer Influ
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision forbidding “any
person . . . associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity,” 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c), was sufficient to
prove, among other things, that Boyle and others committed a series of
bank thefts in several States; that the participants included a core
group, along with others recruited from time to time; and that the core
group was loosely and informally organized, lacking a leader, hierarchy,
or any long-term master plan. Relying largely on United States v. Tur
kette, 452 U. S. 576, 583, the District Court instructed the jury that to
establish a RICO association-in-fact “enterprise,” the Government must
prove (1) an ongoing organization with a framework, formal or informal,
for carrying out its objectives, and (2) that association members func
tioned as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose. The court
also told the jury that an association-in-fact’s existence is often more
readily proved by what it does than by abstract analysis of its structure,
and denied Boyle’s request for an instruction requiring the Government
to prove that the enterprise had “an ascertainable structural hierarchy
distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Boyle was convicted, and
the Second Circuit affirmed.
Held:
1. An association-in-fact enterprise under RICO must have a “struc
ture,” but the pertinent jury instruction need not be framed in the pre
cise language Boyle proposes, i. e., as having “an ascertainable structure
beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it
engages.” Pp. 943–951.
(a) In light of RICO’s broad statement that an enterprise “includes
any . . . group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en
tity,” § 1961(4), and the requirement that RICO be “liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes,” note following § 1961, Turkette ex
plained that “enterprise” reaches “a group of persons associated to
gether for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct,” 452
U. S., at 583, and “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,

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Syllabus
formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function
as a continuing unit,” ibid. Pp. 943–945.
(b) The question presented by this case is whether an association
in-fact enterprise must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that
inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.”
Pet. for Cert. i. This question can be broken into three parts. First,
the enterprise must have a “structure” that, under RICO’s terms, has
at least three features: a purpose, relationships among the associates,
and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enter
prise’s purpose. See Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583. The instructions need
not actually use the term “structure,” however, so long as the relevant
point’s substance is adequately expressed. Second, because a jury must
find the existence of elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
requiring a jury to find the existence of a structure that is ascertainable
would be redundant and potentially misleading. Third, the phrase “be
yond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity” is correctly
interpreted to mean that the enterprise’s existence is a separate element
that must be proved, not that such existence may never be inferred
from the evidence showing that the associates engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity. See ibid. Pp. 945–947.
(c) Boyle’s argument that an enterprise must have structural fea
tures additional to those that can be fairly inferred from RICO’s lan
guage—e. g., a hierarchical structure or chain of command; fixed roles
for associates; and an enterprise name, regular meetings, dues, estab
lished rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or
initiation ceremonies—has no basis in the statute’s text. As Turkette
said, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that
functions with a common purpose. The breadth of RICO’s “enterprise”
concept is highlighted by comparing the statute with other federal
laws having much more stringent requirements for targeting organized
criminal groups: E. g., § 1955(b) defines an “illegal gambling business”
as one that “involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business.” Pp. 947–949.
(d) Rejection of Boyle’s argument does not lead to a merger of the
§ 1962(c) crime and other federal offenses. For example, proof that a
defendant violated § 1955 does not necessarily establish that he con
spired to participate in a gambling enterprise’s affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity. Rather, that would require the prosecution to
prove either that the defendant committed a pattern of § 1955 violations
or a pattern of state-law gambling crimes. See § 1961(1). Pp. 949–950.
(e) Because RICO’s language is clear, the Court need not reach
Boyle’s statutory purpose, legislative history, or rule-of-lenity argu
ments. Pp. 950–951.

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2. The instructions below were correct and adequate. By explicitly
telling jurors they could not convict on the RICO charges unless they
found that the Government had proved the existence of an enterprise,
the instructions made clear that this was a separate element from the
pattern of racketeering activity. The jurors also were adequately told
that the enterprise needed the structural attributes that may be in
ferred from the statutory language. Finally, the instruction that an
enterprise’s existence “is oftentimes more readily proven by what is
[sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure” properly
conveyed Turkette’s point that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity
may be sufficient in a particular case to permit an inference of the enter
prise’s existence. P. 951.
283 Fed. Appx. 825, affirmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post,
p. 952.
Marc Fernich argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Debra A. Karlstein.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Friedrich, Deputy Solic
itor General Dreeben, and Joel M. Gershowitz.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked in this case to decide whether an
association-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influ
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C.
§ 1961 et seq., must have “an ascertainable structure beyond
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Center on the
Administration of Criminal Law by Aaron M. Panner, Anthony S. Bar
kow, and Rachel E. Barkow; and for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers by William W. Taylor III, Samuel J. Buffone, Richard
D. Willstatter, and Terrance G. Reed.
Kevin P. Roddy and G. Robert Blakey filed a brief for the National
Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys as amicus curiae ur
ging affirmance.
Beth S. Brinkmann, Brian R. Matsui, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D.
Sarwal filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America et al. as amici curiae.

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that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which
it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We hold that such an enter
prise must have a “structure” but that an instruction framed
in this precise language is not necessary. The District
Court properly instructed the jury in this case. We there
fore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
A
The evidence at petitioner’s trial was sufficient to prove
the following: Petitioner and others participated in a series
of bank thefts in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin
during the 1990’s. The participants in these crimes included
a core group, along with others who were recruited from
time to time. Although the participants sometimes at
tempted bank-vault burglaries and bank robberies, the group
usually targeted cash-laden night-deposit boxes, which are
often found in banks in retail areas.
Each theft was typically carried out by a group of partici
pants who met beforehand to plan the crime, gather tools
(such as crowbars, fishing gaffs, and walkie-talkies), and
assign the roles that each participant would play (such as
lookout and driver). The participants generally split the
proceeds from the thefts. The group was loosely and infor
mally organized. It does not appear to have had a leader
or hierarchy; nor does it appear that the participants ever
formulated any long-term master plan or agreement.
From 1991 to 1994, the core group was responsible for
more than 30 night-deposit-box thefts. By 1994, petitioner
had joined the group, and over the next five years, he partici
pated in numerous attempted night-deposit-box thefts and at
least two attempted bank-vault burglaries.
In 2003, petitioner was indicted for participation in the
conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c); con
spiracy to commit that offense, in violation of § 1962(d); con
spiracy to commit bank burglary, in violation of § 371; and

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nine counts of bank burglary and attempted bank burglary,
in violation of § 2113(a).
B
In instructing the jury on the meaning of a RICO “enter
prise,” the District Court relied largely on language in
United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981). The court
told the jurors that, in order to establish the existence of
such an enterprise, the Government had to prove that: “(1)
There [was] an ongoing organization with some sort of frame
work, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and
(2) the various members and associates of the association
function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a common pur
pose.” App. 112. Over petitioner’s objection, the court
also told the jury that it could “find an enterprise where
an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy,
form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of
racketeering acts” and that “[c]ommon sense suggests that
the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more
readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract
analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111–112.1
1 The relevant portion of the instructions was as follows:
“The term ‘enterprise’ as used in these instructions may also include a
group of people associated in fact, even though this association is not rec
ognized as a legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name.
Thus, an enterprise need not be a form[al] business entity such as a corpo
ration, but may be merely an informal association of individuals. A group
or association of people can be an ‘enterprise’ if, among other require
ments, these individuals ‘associate’ together for a purpose of engaging in
a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that the existence of an
association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does,
rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.
“Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individu
als, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying
out a pattern of racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may
be established by evidence showing an ongoing organization, formal or
informal, and . . . by evidence that the people making up the association
functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in order to establish the exist

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Petitioner requested an instruction that the Government
was required to prove that the enterprise “had an ongoing
organization, a core membership that functioned as a contin
uing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct
from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. The District
Court refused to give that instruction.
Petitioner was convicted on 11 of the 12 counts against
him, including the RICO counts, and was sentenced to 151
months’ imprisonment. In a summary order, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction but
vacated the sentence on a ground not relevant to the issues
before us. 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2007). The Court of Ap
peals did not specifically address the RICO jury instructions,
stating only that the arguments not discussed in the order
were “without merit.” Id., at 826. Petitioner was then re
sentenced, and we granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 944 (2008), to
resolve conflicts among the Courts of Appeals concerning the
meaning of a RICO enterprise.
II
A
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ
ence of such an enterprise, the government must prove that: (1) There is
an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal,
for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associ
ates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common
purpose.
“Regarding ‘organization,’ it is not necessary that the enterprise have
any particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organiza
tion that its members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner in
order to carry out the alleged common purpose or purposes of the enter
prise.” App. 111–113 (emphasis added).

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ity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (em
phasis added).
The statute does not specifically define the outer bound
aries of the “enterprise” concept but states that the term
“includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individu
als associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4).2
This enumeration of included enterprises is obviously broad,
encompassing “any . . . group of individuals associated in
fact.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The term “any” ensures
that the definition has a wide reach, see, e. g., Ali v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 218–219 (2008), and the
very concept of an association in fact is expansive. In ad
dition, the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be
“liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, note following 18 U. S. C. § 1961; see
also, e. g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly defines
‘enterprise’ ”); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479,
497 (1985) (“RICO is to be read broadly”); Russello v. United
States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983) (noting “the pattern of the
RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth”).
In light of these statutory features, we explained in Tur
kette that “an enterprise includes any union or group of indi
viduals associated in fact” and that RICO reaches “a group
of persons associated together for a common purpose of en
gaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 580, 583. Such
2 This provision does not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of
the term “enterprise.” Compare §§ 1961(1)–(2) (defining what the terms
“racketeering activity” and “State” mean) with §§ 1961(3)–(4) (defining
what the terms “person” and “enterprise” include). Accordingly, this
provision does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include, in
addition to the specifically enumerated entities, others that fall within the
ordinary meaning of the term “enterprise.” See H. J. Inc. v. Northwest
ern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 238 (1989) (explaining that the term
“pattern” also retains its ordinary meaning notwithstanding the statutory
definition in § 1961(5)).

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an enterprise, we said, “is proved by evidence of an ongo
ing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that
the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Id.,
at 583.
Notwithstanding these precedents, the dissent asserts
that the definition of a RICO enterprise is limited to “busi
nesslike entities.” See post, at 952 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
We see no basis to impose such an extratextual requirement.3
B
As noted, the specific question on which we granted cer
tiorari is whether an association-in-fact enterprise must
have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the
pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet.
for Cert. i. We will break this question into three parts.
First, must an association-in-fact enterprise have a “struc
ture”? Second, must the structure be “ascertainable”?
Third, must the “structure” go “beyond that inherent in
the pattern of racketeering activity” in which its members
engage?
“Str ucture.” We agree w ith petiti oner that an
association-in-fact enterprise must have a structure. In the
sense relevant here, the term “structure” means “[t]he way
in which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole”
3 The dissent claims that the “businesslike” limitation “is confirmed by
the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S.
170 (1993).” Post, at 953. Section 1962(c), however, states only that one
may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
[an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”
Whatever businesslike characteristics the dissent has in mind, we do not
see them in § 1962(c). Furthermore, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S.
170 (1993), is inapposite because that case turned on our interpretation
of the participation requirement of § 1962, not the definition of “enter
prise.” See id., at 184–185. In any case, it would be an interpretive
stretch to deduce from the requirement that an enterprise must be “di
rected” to impose the much broader, amorphous requirement that it be
“businesslike.”

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and “[t]he interrelation or arrangement of parts in a complex
entity.” American Heritage Dictionary 1718 (4th ed. 2000);
see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1410 (1967) (defining structure to mean, among other things,
“the pattern of relationships, as of status or friendship, exist
ing among the members of a group or society”).
From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an
association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three struc
tural features: a purpose, relationships among those associ
ated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit
these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. As we
succinctly put it in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise
is “a group of persons associated together for a common pur
pose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 583.
That an “enterprise” must have a purpose is apparent from
the meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i. e., a “venture,”
“undertaking,” or “project.” Webster’s Third New Interna
tional Dictionary 757 (1976). The concept of “associat[ion]”
requires both interpersonal relationships and a common in
terest. See id., at 132 (defining “association” as “an organi
zation of persons having a common interest”); Black’s Law
Dictionary 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “association” as a
“collection of persons who have joined together for a certain
object”). Section 1962(c) reinforces this conclusion and also
shows that an “enterprise” must have some longevity, since
the offense proscribed by that provision demands proof that
the enterprise had “affairs” of sufficient duration to per
mit an associate to “participate” in those affairs through
“a pattern of racketeering activity.”
Although an association-in-fact enterprise must have these
structural features, it does not follow that a district court
must use the term “structure” in its jury instructions. A
trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the lan
guage of an instruction so long as the substance of the rele
vant point is adequately expressed.

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“Ascertainable.” Whenever a jury is told that it must find
the existence of an element beyond a reasonable doubt, that
element must be “ascertainable” or else the jury could not
find that it was proved. Therefore, telling the members of
the jury that they had to ascertain the existence of an “ascer
tainable structure” would have been redundant and poten
tially misleading.
“Beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering
activity.” This phrase may be interpreted in at least two
different ways, and its correctness depends on the particular
sense in which the phrase is used. If the phrase is inter
preted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is a sepa
rate element that must be proved, it is of course correct. As
we explained in Turkette, the existence of an enterprise is
an element distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity
and “proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.” 4
452 U. S., at 583.
On the other hand, if the phrase is used to mean that the
existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from the
evidence showing that persons associated with the enter
prise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, it is in
correct. We recognized in Turkette that the evidence used
to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evi
dence establishing an enterprise “may in particular cases co
alesce.” Ibid.
C
The crux of petitioner’s argument is that a RICO enter
prise must have structural features in addition to those that
4 It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence of
an enterprise. For example, suppose that several individuals, independ
ently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as
RICO predicates—for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of these pat
terns would not be enough to show that the individuals were members of
an enterprise.

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we think can be fairly inferred from the language of the stat
ute. Although petitioner concedes that an association-in
fact enterprise may be an “ ‘informal’ ” group and that “not
‘much’ ” structure is needed, Reply Brief for Petitioner 24,
he contends that such an enterprise must have at least some
additional structural attributes, such as a structural “hierar
chy,” “role differentiation,” a “unique modus operandi,” a
“chain of command,” “professionalism and sophistication of
organization,” “diversity and complexity of crimes,” “mem
bership dues, rules and regulations,” “uncharged or addi
tional crimes aside from predicate acts,” an “internal disci
pline mechanism,” “regular meetings regarding enterprise
affairs,” an “enterprise ‘name,’ ” and “induction or initiation
ceremonies and rituals,” id., at 31–35; see also Brief for Peti
tioner 26–28, 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 8, 17.
We see no basis in the language of RICO for the structural
requirements that petitioner asks us to recognize. As we
said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a
continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.
Such a group need not have a hierarchical structure or a
“chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc
basis and by any number of methods—by majority vote, con
sensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need
not have fixed roles; different members may perform differ
ent roles at different times. The group need not have a
name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regula
tions, disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation cere
monies. While the group must function as a continuing unit
and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of
conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose asso
ciates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of
quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups whose
crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for ex
ample, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion
through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means
may fall squarely within the statute’s reach.

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The breadth of the “enterprise” concept in RICO is high
lighted by comparing the statute with other federal statutes
that target organized criminal groups. For example, 18
U. S. C. § 1955(b), which was enacted together with RICO as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922, defines an “illegal gambling business”
as one that “involves five or more persons who conduct, fi
nance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such
business.” A “continuing criminal enterprise,” as defined in
21 U. S. C. § 848(c), must involve more than five persons who
act in concert and must have an “organizer,” supervisor, or
other manager. Congress included no such requirements
in RICO.
III
A
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, rejection of his argument
regarding these structural characteristics does not lead to a
merger of the crime proscribed by 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (par
ticipating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity) and any of the following offenses:
operating a gambling business, § 1955; conspiring to com
mit one or more crimes that are listed as RICO predicate
offenses, § 371; or conspiring to violate the RICO statute,
§ 1962(d).
Proof that a defendant violated § 1955 does not necessarily
establish that the defendant conspired to participate in the
affairs of a gambling enterprise through a pattern of rack
eteering activity. In order to prove the latter offense, the
prosecution must prove either that the defendant committed
a pattern of § 1955 violations or a pattern of state-law gam
bling crimes. See § 1961(1). No such proof is needed to es
tablish a simple violation of § 1955.
Likewise, proof that a defendant conspired to commit a
RICO predicate offense—for example, arson—does not nec
essarily establish that the defendant participated in the af

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fairs of an arson enterprise through a pattern of arson
crimes. Under § 371, a conspiracy is an inchoate crime that
may be completed in the brief period needed for the forma
tion of the agreement and the commission of a single overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 694 (1975). Section 1962(c) demands
much more: the creation of an “enterprise”—a group with
a common purpose and course of conduct—and the actual
commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.5
Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation of
§§ 1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even
if petitioner’s conception of an association-in-fact enterprise
were accepted.
B
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to
reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statutory
purpose, legislative history, or the rule of lenity. In prior
cases, we have rejected similar arguments in favor of the
clear but expansive text of the statute. See National Orga
nization for Women, 510 U. S., at 262 (“The fact that RICO
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth” (quoting Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499; brackets and in
ternal quotation marks omitted)); see also Turkette, 452
U. S., at 589–591. “We have repeatedly refused to adopt
narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it con
form to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to
proscribe.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553
U. S. 639, 660 (2008); see also, e. g., National Organization
for Women, supra, at 252 (rejecting the argument that
“RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise
5 The dissent states that “[o]nly if proof of the enterprise element
. . . requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in
the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an identity distinct
from § 371 offenses.” Post, at 957. This is incorrect: Even if the same
evidence may prove two separate elements, this does not mean that the
two elements collapse into one.

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or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an
economic purpose”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele
phone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (declining to read “an
organized crime limitation into RICO’s pattern concept”);
Sedima, supra, at 481 (rejecting the view that RICO pro
vides a private right of action “only against defendants who
had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where
there had occurred a ‘racketeering injury’ ”).
IV
The instructions the District Court Judge gave to the jury
in this case were correct and adequate. These instructions
explicitly told the jurors that they could not convict on the
RICO charges unless they found that the Government had
proved the existence of an enterprise. See App. 111. The
instructions made clear that this was a separate element
from the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid.
The instructions also adequately told the jury that the en
terprise needed to have the structural attributes that may
be inferred from the statutory language. As noted, the trial
judge told the jury that the Government was required to
prove that there was “an ongoing organization with some
sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its
objectives” and that “the various members and associates of
the association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a
common purpose.” Id., at 112.
Finally, the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury
that “the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes
more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by
abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111–112. This in
struction properly conveyed the point we made in Turkette
that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be suffi
cient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the exist
ence of an association-in-fact enterprise.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.

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952 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
In my view, Congress intended the term “enterprise” as it
is used in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza
tions Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., to refer only to
businesslike entities that have an existence apart from the
predicate acts committed by their employees or associates.
The trial judge in this case committed two significant errors
relating to the meaning of that term. First, he instructed
the jury that “an association of individuals, without struc
tural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying
out a pattern of racketeering acts” can constitute an enter
prise. App. 112. And he allowed the jury to find that ele
ment satisfied by evidence showing a group of criminals with
no existence beyond its intermittent commission of rack
eteering acts and related offenses. Because the Court’s de
cision affirming petitioner’s conviction is inconsistent with
the statutory meaning of the term enterprise and serves to
expand RICO liability far beyond the bounds Congress in
tended, I respectfully dissent.
I
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ
ity.” § 1962(c). The statute defines “enterprise” to include
“any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals asso
ciated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4).
It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions con
struing the term that Congress used “enterprise” in these
provisions in the sense of “a business organization,” Web
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976), rather
than “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or ‘project,’ ” ante, at 946

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953 Cite as: 556 U. S. 938 (2009)
Stevens, J., dissenting
(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at
757). First, the terms “individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity” describe entities with for
mal legal structures most commonly established for business
purposes. § 1961(4). In context, the subsequent reference
to any “union or group of individuals associated in fact al
though not a legal entity” reflects an intended commonality
between the legal and nonlegal entities included in the pro
vision. Ibid. (emphasis added). “The juxtaposition of the
two phrases suggests that ‘associated in fact’ just means
structured without the aid of legally defined structural forms
such as the business corporation.” Limestone Development
Corp. v. Lemont, 520 F. 3d 797, 804–805 (CA7 2008).1
That an enterprise must have businesslike characteristics
is confirmed by the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993). Section 1962(c) cre
ates liability for “conduct[ing] or participat[ing] . . . in the
conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of rack
eteering activity.” In Reves, we examined that provision’s
meaning and held that, “[i]n order to ‘participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ one
must have some part in directing those affairs.” Id., at 179
(quoting § 1962(c)). It is not enough for a defendant to
1 To be sure, we have read RICO’s enterprise term broadly to include
entities with exclusively noneconomic motives or wholly unlawful pur
poses. See National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510
U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (NOW); United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580–
581 (1981). But those holdings are consistent with the conclusion that an
enterprise is a businesslike entity. Indeed, the examples of qualifying
associations cited in Turkette—including loan-sharking, property-fencing,
drug-trafficking, and counterfeiting operations—satisfy that criterion, as
each describes an organization with continuing operations directed toward
providing goods or services to its customers. See id., at 589–590 (citing
84 Stat. 923; 116 Cong. Rec. 592 (1970)). Similarly, the enterprise at issue
in NOW was a nationwide network of antiabortion groups that had a lead
ership counsel and regular conferences and whose members undertook an
extensive pattern of extortion, arson, and other racketeering activity for
the purpose of “shut[ting] down abortion clinics.” 510 U. S., at 253.

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954 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
“carry on” or “participate in” an enterprise’s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity; instead, evidence that he
operated, managed, or directed those affairs is required.
See id., at 177–179. This requirement confirms that the en
terprise element demands evidence of a certain quantum of
businesslike organization—i. e., a system of processes, deal
ings, or other affairs that can be “directed.”
Our cases also make clear that an enterprise “is an entity
separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 583
(1981). As with the requirement that an enterprise have
businesslike characteristics, that an enterprise must have a
separate existence is confirmed by § 1962(c) and Reves. If
an entity’s existence consisted solely of its members’ per
formance of a pattern of racketeering acts, the “enterprise’s
affairs” would be synonymous with the “pattern of rack
eteering activity.” Section 1962(c) would then prohibit an
individual from conducting or participating in “the conduct
of [a pattern of racketeering activity] through a pattern of
racketeering activity”—a reading that is unbearably redun
dant, particularly in a case like this one in which a single
pattern of activity is alleged. The only way to avoid that
result is to require that an “enterprise’s affairs” be some
thing other than the pattern of racketeering activity under
taken by its members.2
2 The other subsections of 18 U. S. C. § 1962 further demonstrate the
businesslike nature of the enterprise element and its necessary distinct
ness from the pattern of racketeering activity. Subsection (a) prohibits
anyone who receives income derived from a pattern of racketeering activ
ity from “us[ing] or invest[ing], directly or indirectly, any part of such
income . . . in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera
tion of, any enterprise.” And subsection (b) prohibits anyone from “ac
quir[ing] or maintain[ing]” any interest in or control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. We noted in NOW that the
term enterprise “plays a different role in the structure” of those subsec
tions than it does in subsection (c) because the enterprise in those subsec
tions is the victim. 510 U. S., at 258–259. We did not, however, suggest

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955 Cite as: 556 U. S. 938 (2009)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Recognizing an enterprise’s businesslike nature and its
distinctness from the pattern of predicate acts, however,
does not answer the question of what proof each element
requires. In cases involving a legal entity, the matter of
proving the enterprise element is straightforward, as the en
tity’s legal existence will always be something apart from
the pattern of activity performed by the defendant or his
associates. Cf. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King,
533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001). But in the case of an association
in-fact enterprise, the Government must adduce other evi
dence of the entity’s “separate” existence and “ongoing orga
nization.” Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583. There may be cases
in which a jury can infer that existence and continuity from
the evidence used to establish the pattern of racketeering
activity. Ibid. But that will be true only when the pattern
of activity is so complex that it could not be performed in
the absence of structures or processes for planning or con
cealing the illegal conduct beyond those inherent in perform
ing the predicate acts. More often, proof of an enterprise’s
separate existence will require different evidence from that
used to establish the pattern of predicate acts.
Precisely what proof is required in each case is a more
difficult question, largely due to the abundant variety of
RICO predicates and enterprises. Because covered enter
prises are necessarily businesslike in nature, however, proof
of an association-in-fact enterprise’s separate existence will
generally require evidence of rules, routines, or processes
through which the entity maintains its continuing operations
and seeks to conceal its illegal acts. As petitioner suggests,
this requirement will usually be satisfied by evidence that
that the term has a substantially different meaning in each subsection.
To the contrary, our observation that the enterprise in subsection (c) is
“the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity
is committed,” id., at 259, indicates that, as in subsections (a) and (b), the
enterprise must have an existence apart from the pattern of racketeer
ing activity.

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956 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
the association has an “ascertainable structure beyond that
inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it
engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. Examples of such structure in
clude an organizational hierarchy, a “framework for mak
ing decisions,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regular
meetings,” or a practice of “reinvest[ing] . . . proceeds to
promote and expand the enterprise.” Reply Brief for Pe
titioner 31–34. In other cases, the enterprise’s existence
might be established through evidence that it provides goods
or services to third parties, as such an undertaking will
require organizational elements more comprehensive than
those necessary to perform a pattern of predicate acts.
Thus, the evidence needed to establish an enterprise will
vary from case to case, but in every case the Government
must carry its burden of proving that an alleged enterprise
has an existence separate from the pattern of racketeering
activity undertaken by its constituents.
II
In some respects, my reading of the statute is not very
different from that adopted by the Court. We agree that
“an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those as
sociated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to per
mit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”
Ante, at 946. But the Court stops short of giving con
tent to that requirement. It states only that RICO “de
mands proof that the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of sufficient du
ration to permit an associate to ‘participate’ in those affairs
through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity,’ ” before conclud
ing that “[a] trial judge has considerable discretion in choos
ing the language of an instruction” and need not use the term
“structure.” Ibid. While I agree the word “structure” is
not talismanic, I would hold that the instructions must con
vey the requirement that the alleged enterprise have an ex
istence apart from the alleged pattern of predicate acts.

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957 Cite as: 556 U. S. 938 (2009)
Stevens, J., dissenting
The Court’s decision, by contrast, will allow juries to infer
the existence of an enterprise in every case involving a
pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by two or more
associates.
By permitting the Government to prove both elements
with the same evidence, the Court renders the enterprise
requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact
cases. It also threatens to make that category of § 1962(c)
offenses indistinguishable from conspiracies to commit predi
cate acts, see § 371, as the only remaining difference is
§ 1962(c)’s pattern requirement. The Court resists this criti
cism, arguing that § 1962(c) “demands much more” than the
inchoate offense defined in § 371. Ante, at 950. It states
that the latter “may be completed in the brief period needed
for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a
single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,” whereas
the former requires the creation of “a group with a common
purpose and course of conduct—and the actual commission
of a pattern of predicate offenses.” Ibid. Given that it is
also unlawful to conspire to violate § 1962(c), see § 1962(d),
this comment provides no assurance that RICO and § 371
offenses remain distinct. Only if proof of the enterprise ele
ment—the “group with a common purpose and course of con
duct”—requires evidence of activity or organization beyond
that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO of
fenses retain an identity distinct from § 371 offenses.
This case illustrates these concerns. The trial judge in
structed the jury that an enterprise need have only the
degree of organization necessary “for carrying out its objec
tives” and that it could “find an enterprise where an associa
tion of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely
for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering
acts.” App. 112.3 These instructions were plainly defi
cient, as they did not require the Government to prove that
3 For the full text of the relevant portion of the instructions, see ante,
at 942–943, n. 1.

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958 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
the alleged enterprise had an existence apart from the pat
tern of predicate acts. Instead, they permitted the Gov
ernment’s proof of the enterprise’s structure and continuing
nature—requirements on which all agree—to consist only of
evidence that petitioner and his associates performed a pat
tern of racketeering activity.
Petitioner’s requested instruction would have required the
jury to find that the alleged enterprise “had an ongoing orga
nization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing
unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from
the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. That instruction
does not precisely track my understanding of the statute;
although evidence of “structural hierarchy” can evidence an
enterprise, it is not necessary to establish that element.
Nevertheless, the proposed instruction would have better di
rected the jury to consider whether the alleged enterprise
possessed the separate existence necessary to expose peti
tioner to liability under § 1962(c), and the trial judge should
have considered an instruction along those lines.
The trial judge also erred in finding the Government’s evi
dence in this case sufficient to support petitioner’s RICO
convictions. Petitioner was alleged to have participated and
conspired to participate in the conduct of an enterprise’s af
fairs through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of
one act of bank robbery and three acts of interstate transpor
tation of stolen funds. Id., at 15–19. The “primary goals”
of the alleged enterprise “included generating money for its
members and associates through the commission of criminal
activity, including bank robberies, bank burglaries and inter
state transportation of stolen money.” Id., at 14. And its
modus operandi was to congregate periodically when an as
sociate had a lead on a night-deposit box that the group could
break into. Whoever among the associates was available
would bring screwdrivers, crowbars, and walkie-talkies to
the location. Some acted as lookouts, while others retrieved
the money. When the endeavor was successful, the par

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959 Cite as: 556 U. S. 938 (2009)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ticipants would split the proceeds. Thus, the group’s pur
pose and activities, and petitioner’s participation therein,
were limited to sporadic acts of taking money from bank de
posit boxes. There is no evidence in RICO’s text or history
that Congress intended it to reach such ad hoc associations
of thieves.
III
Because the instructions and evidence in this case did not
satisfy the requirement that an alleged enterprise have an
existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages, I respectfully dissent.