In the Interest of M.H., a Child

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 25-1084
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In the Interest of D.T. and M.B.M.V. a/k/a M.V., Children

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
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No. 25-1103
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In the Interest of L.J.K., a Child

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
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No. 25-1159
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In the Interest of K-K.J.B., a Child

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
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No. 26-0287
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In the Interest of E.J.S., a Child

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
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No. 26-0316
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In the Interest of M.H., a Child

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
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JUSTICE SULLIVAN, joined by Justice Young, concurring in the
denial of the petitions for review.

In each of these five cases, the parents didn’t spot, let alone
preserve, any reversible error. Yet the same glaring deficiency is
present in each case: The district court didn’t make all the findings
necessary to terminate parental rights.
Section 161.001(f ) of the Family Code prohibits a court from
terminating parental rights unless it first makes certain findings.
Specifically, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
(absent aggravated circumstances) the Department of Family and
Protective Services “made reasonable efforts to return the child to the
parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those
reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that
prevents the return of the child to the parent.” Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(f )(1). In making those findings, the court must describe the
reasonable efforts “with specificity” in “a separate section of its
[termination] order.” Id. § 161.001(g); see also id. § 161.001(f ).

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Section 161.001(f ) had been in effect for over a year and a half
when the district courts rendered the five termination orders at issue
here. See Act of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 7–8, 2023 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1644, 1645. All five of the cases were commenced after its
effective date. See id. 1 The courts therefore had to follow the new
statutory requirement. They didn’t.
Start with the Bexar County case. See No. 04-25-00489-CV, 2025
WL 3223754 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2025). The district court
said nothing at all about reasonable efforts. It appears the court simply
used an outdated version of the standard-form termination order.
The rest of the cases—all from Harris County—include identically
wrong findings. True, the orders referenced the correct substantive
findings: “The Court finds that [DFPS] made reasonable efforts to return
the child[ren] to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits
and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the
home that prevents the return of the child[ren] to the parent.”
But that isn’t enough anymore. Section 161.001(g) says that an
order must include a “separate section . . . describing with specificity the
reasonable efforts [DFPS] made to return the child to the child’s home.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(g). 2 Copying and pasting the legal standard

1 In re K-K.J.B. is a modification suit seeking termination of the father’s

rights that was filed in late 2023 after Section 161.001(f) went into effect. The
original suit, which resulted in termination of the mother’s rights, was filed in
2021. A modification suit is a suit affecting the parent–child relationship, so
it’s governed by the new law despite its 2021 cause number. See id.
2 That wasn’t the only problem.
None of the orders said whether the
findings were “by clear and convincing evidence,” as required, see id.

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into an order doesn’t qualify as “specificity.” That error made
termination improper because a “court may not order termination of the
parent-child relationship . . . unless the court . . . describes [the applicable
finding] in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order.”
Id. § 161.001(f ). Had that error been preserved, in my view, we’d likely
have to reverse and remand for a new trial, see Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan
Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam), or at the very least
vacate in part and remand for the district court to render an amended
judgment making those findings (assuming the record contained
sufficient evidence to support them). 3

§ 161.001(f), or by another standard, see id. § 105.005. A district court
shouldn’t bank on an appellate court’s generosity by assuming that it’ll imply
a heightened standard of proof on the district court’s behalf. That’s especially
true when talking about orders that expressly said “clear and convincing
evidence” for every other finding subject to a heightened standard.
3 This would differ from the remedy for missing findings of fact in
ordinary civil cases. Normally, a trial court must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law only if a party requests them after the court renders
judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. Because the findings are filed “separate
and apart from the judgment,” id. 299a, their omission can be corrected
without vacating the judgment, see Ad Villarai, 519 S.W.3d at 135–36. But
because the termination statute modifies the normal process by requiring
findings to be in the order itself, a court can correct a missing finding only by
modifying the order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(f) (requiring a court to
describe the findings “in a separate section of the order”); id. § 161.001(g)
(“[T]he court shall include in a separate section of its order written
findings . . . .”). But see D.F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-
25-00738-CV, 2026 WL 59729, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 8, 2026, pet. filed)
(per curiam) (applying the ordinary rule for missing findings of fact without
considering whether the unique language of Section 161.001(f)–(g) requires a
different procedure).

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* * *
Because the Section 161.001(f ) error wasn’t preserved in any of
these cases, I concur in the Court’s decision to deny review. But ignoring
statutory requirements for orders that permanently sever one of the
most important relationships recognized by law is a recurring problem
for our State’s family courts. I write separately to remind them to pay
careful attention to statutes—especially the ones that tell them how to
do their jobs.

James P. Sullivan
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 5, 2026

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