Zubiate, Leroy Hilbert

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. WR-95,541-01

EX PARTE LEROY HILBERT ZUBIATE, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN CAUSE NO. 13935-A IN THE 118TH DISTRICT COURT
FROM HOWARD COUNTY

NEWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which WALKER, J., joined.

This case is about using Zoom for witness testimony at a parole

revocation hearing. I agree with the Court and Judge Walker that

Applicant, Leroy Hilbert Zubiate, is not entitled to habeas relief given

the nature of parole revocation hearings. The United States Supreme

Court has already held that the Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses applies to “criminal prosecutions” not parole revocations. 1 So

1
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
Zubiate Concurring — 2

to the extent that he’s now claiming that the process used violates his

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, his complaint fails under

binding United States Supreme Court precedent. It is enough to simply

say that the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a criminal

proceeding does not apply to parole revocations as the United States

Supreme Court has already said. 2 There is no reason to embellish the

Court’s legal analysis further with cases involving other applications of

the Sixth Amendment in other types of proceedings. 3 Rather than try

to inflate the value and reach of an otherwise routine case, we should

just rely upon Morrissey instead of trying to walk needlessly through wet

cement. With these thoughts, I concur in the judgment only.

Filed: March 26, 2025

Publish

2
Id.

3
By way of example, I see no need to consider the application of speedy trial rights post-
conviction. Maj. Op. at 2 (citing Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016) (the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial does not apply after a conviction or guilty plea)). Nor is it
necessary to address the question of what a witness is or is not. Maj. Op. at 3 (citing Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190 (1987) (recognizing that the principle that “a witness whose
testimony is introduced in a joint trial with the limited instruction that it be used only to assess
the guilt of one of the defendants will not be considered a witness ‘against’ the other
defendants” does not apply to “validate, under the Confrontation Clause, introduction of a
non-testifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant, with instructions that the
jury should disregard the confession insofar as its consideration of the defendant’s guilt is
concerned”)).