Diamontae Okiese Dunson v. the State of Texas

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-23-00151-CR

DIAMONTAE OKIESE DUNSON,
Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

From the 443rd District Court
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court No. 47161CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant Diamontae Okiese Dunson guilty of the offense of capital

murder, and the trial court imposed an automatic life sentence. This appeal ensued. In

his sole issue, Dunson argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the

conviction for capital murder. We affirm.

Authority

The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of a sufficiency

issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State,
514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the
appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
“divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of
all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate
about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any
reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported
by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder
resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict,
and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the
testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so
long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law
as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
S.W.3d at 665.

Dunson v. State Page 2
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Discussion

Dunson argues that the evidence was not sufficient, specifically to prove that (1)

the murder was committed intentionally and (2) Dunson was a party or co-conspirator to

the offense.

Intent is often proven by circumstantial evidence. Here, evidence was presented

showing that the victim was shot from close range. Where a deadly weapon is fired at

close range and death results, the law presumes an intent to kill. Watkins v. State, 333

S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d). Additionally, the shooter confessed

that the victim looked like he had a gun, and the shooter shot the victim because he

thought the victim was going to pull a gun on him. While this may be evidence of self-

defense justification, a justification “by definition, does not negate any element of the

offense, including culpable intent; it only excuses what would otherwise constitute

criminal conduct.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore,

a justification defense can be evidence used to infer or show intent. A jury may infer

intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and

conduct of the accused, the method of committing the crime, and the nature of the

wounds inflicted on the victims. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

(quoting Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J.,

concurring)). Jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses,

and the weight to be given to the testimony. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Therefore, we

Dunson v. State Page 3
presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of

the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525.

“A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of

another if…acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he

solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2). Dunson argues that he could not have been

a party to the offense because: (1) he was not present at the scene of the offense, (2) there

was no evidence he agreed to share in the proceeds of the robbery, and (3) he could not

have anticipated that the victim would be murdered during the robbery. While these are

all factors which could be considered in determining party liability, none of them are

required elements. Courts may consider “events occurring before, during, and after the

commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an

understanding and common design to commit the offense.” See Burdine v. State, 719

S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Additionally, evidence that a defendant knew

his co-conspirators might use guns during the robbery can be sufficient to demonstrate

that the defendant should have anticipated the possibility of murder occurring during

the course of the robbery. See Davis v. State, 276 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008,

pet. ref’d). Here, Dunson admitted he knew it was a robbery and that he gave a gun to

one of the participants to effectuate the robbery.

Considering the foregoing evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, we conclude that the jury could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt

that the murder was intentional and that Dunson was a party to the offense. Therefore,

Dunson v. State Page 4
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have rationally determined that the murder

was committed intentionally, and that Dunson was a party or co-conspirator to the

offense.

We overrule Dunson’s sole issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Dunson’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

MATT JOHNSON
Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 29, 2024
Do not publish
[CRPM]

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