Robertson Central Appraisal District, Lesley Sootoo, in Her Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Robertson Central Appraisal District, and Ross Simmons, in His Official Capacity as Board Chairman of the Robertson Central Appraisal District v. Karl C. Hoppess, Trustee of the Lily Rush Hoppess Trust, Karl C. Hoppess, Trustee of the Coulter Hoppess Marital Deduction Trust, Terry N. Forrester, Trustee of the Terry N. and Nancy H. Forrester Revocable Living Trust, Karl C. Hoppess, Individually, Judith H. Hood, Martha Helen Hoppess, David N. Forrester and Raelene M. Forrester

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-22-00396-CV

Robertson Central Appraisal District, Lesley Sootoo,
in her official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Robertson Central
Appraisal District, and Ross Simmons, in his official capacity as
Board Chairman of the Robertson Central Appraisal District,
Appellants

v.

Karl C. Hoppess, Trustee of the Lily Rush Hoppess Trust,
Karl C. Hoppess, Trustee of the Coulter Hoppess Marital
Deduction Trust, Terry N. Forrester, Trustee of the Terry N. and
Nancy H. Forrester Revocable Living Trust, Karl C. Hoppess,
Individually, Judith H. Hood, Martha Helen Hoppess, David N. and
Raelene M. Forrester, and Brad and Karalynn Cromeens, et al., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Appellees

On appeal from the
82nd District Court of Robertson County, Texas
Senior Judge Robert M. Stem, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 13-08-19394-CV

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Karl H. Hoppess, individually and as trustee of both the Lily Rush

Hoppess Trust and the Coulter Hoppess Marital Deduction Trust, Terry N.

Forrester, as trustee of the Terry N. and Nancy H. Forrester Revocable Living

Trust, Judith H. Hood, Martha Helen Hoppess, David N. and Raelene M.

Forrester, and Brad and Karalynn Cromeens (collectively, the Property

Owners) have brought this suit against Robertson Central Appraisal District

(RCAD), Lesley Sootoo, in her official capacity as Chief Appraiser of RCAD (the

Chief Appraiser), 1 Ross Simmons, in his official capacity as Board Chairman

of RCAD (the Board Chairman), and Jimmy Reagan, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the Appraisal Review Board for RCAD. RCAD, the Chief

Appraiser, and the Board Chairman (collectively, the Taxing Authorities)

subsequently filed a partial plea to the jurisdiction, 2 which the trial court

denied. The Taxing Authorities then filed a notice of appeal from the trial

court’s interlocutory order denying their partial plea to the jurisdiction. 3 We

will affirm in part and reverse in part.

1 The Property Owners originally brought suit against Nancy Commander, in her official
capacity as RCAD’s chief appraiser, but while this appeal was pending, Sootoo succeeded Commander
in her position. Accordingly, we have substituted Sootoo for Commander in this appeal as RCAD’s
chief appraiser. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).

2 Reagan did not join in filing the partial plea to the jurisdiction.

3 See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing appeal from
interlocutory order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit”); Tex. A &
M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–46 (Tex. 2007) (holding that section 51.014(a)(8) vests
appellate courts with jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals of jurisdictional pleas brought both
by governmental entities and by employees of such governmental entities who have been sued in their
official capacities).

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 2
Background

The original petition in this suit was filed in 2013. The seventh amended

petition, which was filed by the Property Owners in 2022, was the live petition

at the time the trial court considered and denied the plea to the jurisdiction

filed by the Taxing Authorities. In their seventh amended petition, the

Property Owners allege as follows: 4 They are the owners of certain real

property and improvements in Robertson County. There are pipeline

easements passing on, across, and through the acreage in Robertson County,

including passing on, across, and through the Property Owners’ acreage.

The Property Owners allege in their live petition that, in the years before

this suit was filed, “the appraisals of, and the market value of[,] the pipeline

easements dramatically increased, especially within the industry and within

designated corridors.” The Property Owners allege that RCAD, however,

“continued to classify the oil and gas transportation pipeline business and its

real property easements as special and privileged real property accounts, by

illegally and unconstitutionally having its real property appraisers ignore

pipeline easements and corridors and determine this use of real property

special and non-taxable.” The Property Owners allege that, as a result, the

4 Because Reagan did not join in filing the partial plea to the jurisdiction and is not a party to

this appeal, we limit our discussion in this opinion to the allegations and claims asserted by the
Property Owners against the Taxing Authorities only.

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 3
landowners of Robertson County have borne a tax burden that should have

been shouldered by the oil and gas transportation pipeline business.

The Property Owners allege in their live petition that they therefore

protested the proposed 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and

2021 value of each of their properties and appeared before the RCAD appraisal

review board (the ARB) in formal hearings. Following each hearing, the ARB

issued its order fixing the value of the property that had been challenged.

The Property Owners then filed this suit appealing the orders of the ARB

to the trial court. Additionally, in their live petition, the Property Owners

assert a declaratory judgment action under chapter 37 of the Civil Practice and

Remedies Code (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)), request

injunctive relief, and seek the certification of this suit as a class action.

The Taxing Authorities filed a partial plea to the jurisdiction,

challenging the Property Owners’ requests for declaratory relief, injunctive

relief, and the certification of this suit as a class action. 5 The Taxing

Authorities argued that the Tax Code provides the exclusive procedures and

5 In their supplemental partial plea to the jurisdiction and reply to the Property Owners’

response in opposition to the plea, the Taxing Authorities expressly stated that their partial plea to
the jurisdiction is “focused on three claims: the claims for a class action, injunctive relief, and
declaratory relief.” The Taxing Authorities further indicated that, if necessary, any other
jurisdictional issues will be raised at another time. Accordingly, in their partial plea to the jurisdiction,
the Taxing Authorities did not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over the Property Owners’ appeal
to the trial court of the ARB’s orders fixing the values of their properties.

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 4
remedies for the Property Owners. The trial court denied the Taxing

Authorities’ plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.

Issues

In three issues, the Taxing Authorities contend that the trial court erred

in denying their partial plea to the jurisdiction. In their first issue, the Taxing

Authorities contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Property

Owners’ redundant equitable claims against RCAD because the Tax Code

provides the exclusive remedies against appraisal districts for complaints

concerning the appraisal of property. In their second issue, the Taxing

Authorities contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Property

Owners’ claims against the Chief Appraiser because an ultra vires claim

seeking retrospective relief or seeking relief that is redundant of a statutory

remedy is not viable. Finally, in their third issue, the Taxing Authorities

contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Property Owners’ claims

against the Board Chairman because the relief sought by the Property Owners

is retrospective and redundant of the Tax Code relief they seek and because

the Property Owners have not identified a statutory or constitutional duty

applicable to the Board Chairman that he allegedly violated.

Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 5
(Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a claim-by-claim inquiry. Herrera

v. Mata, 702 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). Whether a court has

subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law; therefore, we apply a de novo

standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. City of

Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).

A jurisdictional plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of

jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544

S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When, as here, the plea challenges only the

pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively

demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally

in the plaintiffs’ favor and look to the pleaders’ intent. Id. If the pleadings are

insufficient to establish jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate an

incurable defect in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should ordinarily be given the

opportunity to amend. See id. at 226–27. But if the pleadings affirmatively

negate the existence of jurisdiction altogether, then a jurisdictional plea may

be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.

Discussion

“The Texas Constitution expressly allows the Legislature to bestow

exclusive original jurisdiction on administrative bodies.” Cameron Appraisal

Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see TEX. CONST.

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 6
art. V, § 8. In the Tax Code, the Legislature intended to bestow exclusive

original jurisdiction on appraisal review boards to decide most matters relating

to ad valorem taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09; Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at

502; Matagorda Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165

S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2005).

The Tax Code “provides detailed administrative procedures for those

who would contest their property taxes.” Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502; see

generally TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.01–.71. Specifically, Tax Code subsection

41.41(a) provides in pertinent part:

A property owner is entitled to protest before the appraisal review
board the following actions:

(1) determination of the appraised value of the owner’s
property or, in the case of land appraised as provided by
Subchapter C, D, E, or H, Chapter 23, determination of its
appraised or market value;

(2) unequal appraisal of the owner’s property; [or]

....

(9) any other action of the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or
appraisal review board that applies to and adversely affects the
property owner.

Act of May 22, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 631, § 11, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3197

(amended 2025) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41(a)). The

appraisal review board must “determine the protest and make its decision by

written order.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.47(a).

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 7
A property owner is entitled to appeal the order of the appraisal review

board determining the protest by the property owner. Id. § 42.01(a)(1)(A). To

appeal, the property owner “must file a petition for review with the district

court within 60 days after the [property owner] received notice that a final

order has been entered from which an appeal may be had or at any time after

the hearing [on the protest] but before the 60-day deadline.” Id. § 42.21(a).

Failure to timely file a petition for review bars any appeal of the order of the

appraisal review board to the trial court. Id.

The administrative procedures in the Tax Code are “exclusive.” Id. §

42.09; Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502. Tax Code section 42.09, entitled “Remedies

Exclusive,” provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, procedures
prescribed by this title for adjudication of the grounds of protest
authorized by this title are exclusive, and a property owner may
not raise any of those grounds:

(1) in defense to a suit to enforce collection of delinquent taxes;
or

(2) as a basis of a claim for relief in a suit by the property owner
to arrest or prevent the tax collection process or to obtain a
refund of taxes paid.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09(a). 6

6 Subsection (b) provides that those who do not file administrative protests may still assert

that (1) they did not own the property, or (2) the property was outside the boundaries of the taxing
unit. Id. § 42.09(b). Neither exception applies here.

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 8
Furthermore, “[u]nder the redundant remedies doctrine, courts will not

entertain an action brought under the UDJA when the same claim could be

pursued through different channels.” Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul.,

469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015). “The focus of the doctrine is on the initiation of

the case, that is, whether the Legislature created a statutory waiver of

sovereign immunity that permits the parties to raise their claims through some

avenue other than the UDJA.” Id.

When a statute provides an avenue for attacking an order from an

administrative body, a UDJA claim will not lie to provide redundant remedies.

See id. (citing Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 212 S.W.3d

665, 669 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (en banc)). Accordingly, when a

UDJA action is redundant of an administrative appeal, the trial court lacks

jurisdiction over the UDJA action. See Post Oak Clean Green, Inc. v.

Guadalupe Cnty. Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 04-21-00087-CV, 2022

WL 6815191, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.);

SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 314 S.W.3d 253, 268–70 (Tex. App.—Austin

2010, pet. denied).

Here, the Property Owners allege in their live petition that they followed

the Tax Code’s administrative procedures to protest the proposed 2013, 2014,

2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 appraised values of their

properties; that the ARB thereafter issued final orders fixing the values of the

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 9
properties; and that they are appealing the ARB’s orders to the trial court. As

part of their appeal of the ARB’s orders, the Property Owners allege that the

values fixed by the ARB reflect unequal appraisals of their property, which

entitles them to an adjustment of the appraised values to conform to the

requirements of sections 41.43 and 42.26 of the Tax Code. The Property

Owners further allege that sections 1, 2, and 18 of article VIII of the Texas

Constitution require that the treatment of taxpayers and taxpayers’ property

be equal and uniform; that the manner in which the Taxing Authorities have

appraised the Property Owners’ property violates those sections of the Texas

Constitution; and that those violations entitle the Property Owners to relief for

“such unequal and unlawful valuations” under sections 42.24 and 42.26 of the

Tax Code, as well as to “any other and further relief which the Court may deem

appropriate.”

Additionally, the Property Owners allege in their live petition as part of

their appeal of the ARB’s orders to the trial court that sections 1, 2, 11, and 18

of article VIII of the Texas Constitution require the Taxing Authorities to

prevent and avoid unequal appraisals, and thereby unequal taxation, of real

property within the appraisal district and that the Taxing Authorities’ failures

to “avoid such discrimination,” by excluding certain properties from appraisal

and assessment or by undervaluing certain properties, entitle the Property

Owners to relief under sections 41.43, 42.24, and 42.26 of the Tax Code and to

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 10
the equalization of all taxable properties in the appraisal district under

sections 1, 2, 11, and 18 of article VIII of the Texas Constitution. The Property

Owners specifically assert:

[The Taxing Authorities’] courses of action having caused [the
Property Owners’] properties to be excessively and unequally
taxed, [the Property Owners] are entitled to have the Court require
and order [the Taxing Authorities] to reset their tax rolls and
include those real properties which they have systematically
excluded or undervalued and which they continue to
systematically exclude or undervalue by openly ignoring or defying
the law and the requests or directives of the commissioners and
judges of Robertson County, Texas.

In addition to their appeal of the ARB’s orders to the trial court, as just

described, the Property Owners then allege in their live petition a standalone

UDJA action and include another section entitled “INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.”

In the UDJA action, the Property Owners assert that “[f]or reasons stated

above,” they seek a declaration that “the current tax appraisal system violates

Article VIII, §§1, 2, 11 and 18 of the Texas Constitution in that it causes

properties to be excessively and unequally taxed.” The Property Owners

further seek declarations that “the current tax appraisal system unlawfully

permits arbitrary and unreasonable property tax appraisals in violation of

Article VIII, §1 of the Texas Constitution because certain specific properties

are knowingly excluded from appraisal and are therefore not appraised at

market value” and that “mandatory equalization is necessary to enable the

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 11
appraisal district to comply with its statutory and constitutional

requirements.”

In the “INJUNCTIVE RELIEF” section of their petition, the Property

Owners then specifically assert that under subsection 42.24(1) of the Tax Code,

they request that the trial court order the Tax Authorities “to reappraise the

subject properties for the tax years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019,

2020, 2021 and 2022 to ensure compliance with the statutory and

constitutional requirement that all property be taxed equally and at market

value.” The Property Owners also request a “permanent injunction”

prohibiting the Tax Authorities “from giving any force and effect to the

appraisals complained of [in the live petition] until its constitutional violations

are remedied.” The Property Owners then request that, under subsection

42.24(2) of the Tax Code, the trial court enter all orders that “are necessary to

ensure equal treatment under the law for the property owners herein and for

those similarly situated.” And the Property Owners request that, under

subsection 42.24(3) of the Tax Code, the trial court “enter all other orders

necessary to preserve rights protected by and impose duties required by law.”

As stated above, subsection 41.41(a) of the Tax Code provides that a

property owner is entitled to protest before the appraisal review board the

determination of the appraised value of the owner’s property and whether the

owner’s property has been unequally appraised. Act of May 22, 1999, 76th

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 12
Leg., R.S., ch. 631, § 11, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3197 (amended 2025). Section

42.09 of the Tax Code further provides that the administrative procedures

prescribed by the Tax Code for adjudication of the grounds of protest under

subsection 41.41(a) are exclusive. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09(a).

Here, the Property Owners have utilized the administrative procedures

under the Tax Code to protest before the ARB the determination of the

appraised value of their property and whether their property has been

unequally appraised and to appeal the ARB’s orders to the trial court. The

Property Owners then allege a standalone UDJA action that is based on the

same grounds as those raised in their administrative appeal. The Property

Owners even expressly indicate in the section of their petition alleging the

standalone UDJA action that they are seeking declaratory relief “[f]or reasons

stated above” in the section of their petition appealing the ARB’s orders to the

trial court. Furthermore, in the section of their petition entitled

“INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,” the Property Owners have expressly pleaded for

relief under section 42.24 of the Tax Code. Section 42.24 of the Tax Code

provides:

In determining an appeal [of an ARB order to the trial court], the
district court may:

(1) fix the appraised value of property in accordance with the
requirements of law if the appraised value is at issue;

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 13
(2) enter the orders necessary to ensure equal treatment under
the law for the appealing property owner if inequality in the
appraisal of his property is at issue; or

(3) enter other orders necessary to preserve rights protected by
and impose duties required by the law.

Id. § 42.24 (emphasis added).

The Property Owners’ standalone UDJA action and request for

injunctive relief is therefore redundant of their administrative appeal, and the

trial court lacks jurisdiction over them. See Post Oak Clean Green, Inc., 2022

WL 6815191, at *5; SWEPI LP, 314 S.W.3d at 268–70. This is true even to the

extent that the Property Owners have attempted to recharacterize their

protests of the determination of the appraised value of their property and of

whether their property has been unequally appraised as a challenge to alleged

ultra vires acts of the Chief Appraiser and the Board Chairman. See Tex. Parks

& Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (“[A]

litigant’s couching its requested relief in terms of declaratory relief does not

alter the underlying nature of the suit.”); McLane Co. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage

Comm’n, 514 S.W.3d 871, 877–78 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied).

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the Taxing Authorities’ plea to the

jurisdiction as to the Property Owners’ UDJA action and request for injunctive

relief. See Post Oak Clean Green, Inc., 2022 WL 6815191, at *5.

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 14
Finally, in their live petition, the Property Owners include a separate

section seeking the certification of this suit as a class action. The Property

Owners identify the class members as consisting of “all owners of real

properties within the jurisdictional limits of” RCAD. The Property Owners

clarify, however, that they “do not seek any monetary relief for any class

member who has not exhausted their statutory and/or administrative

remedies.”

“The class action is a procedural device intended to advance judicial

economy by trying claims together that lend themselves to collective

treatment.” Sw. Refin. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex. 2000). It may

“not be construed to enlarge or diminish any substantive rights or obligations

of any parties to any civil action.” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 815).

Accordingly, having determined above that the trial court lacks jurisdiction

over the Property Owners’ standalone UDJA action and request for injunctive

relief, we conclude that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to maintain a class

action regarding those allegations. See id. The trial court therefore erred in

denying the Taxing Authorities’ plea to the jurisdiction as to the Property

Owners’ request to certify a class action regarding their standalone UDJA

claim and request for injunctive relief.

The Taxing Authorities further argue that the trial court lacks

jurisdiction over any class action regarding the Property Owners’ appeal of the

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 15
ARB’s orders to the trial court because the failure of other property owners to

pursue their administrative remedies before the ARB and then to timely file

petitions for review bars any appeal under the Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE

ANN. § 42.21(a). But the Property Owners specifically state in their petition

that they “do not seek any monetary relief for any class member who has not

exhausted their statutory and/or administrative remedies.” Construing the

Property Owners’ live petition liberally, we therefore conclude that the

Property Owners have at least alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the

trial court’s jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Accordingly, the

trial court did not err in denying the Taxing Authorities’ plea to the jurisdiction

as to the Property Owners’ request to certify a class action regarding their

appeal of the ARB’s orders to the trial court.

The Taxing Authorities’ first issue is sustained in part and overruled in

part. The Taxing Authorities’ second and third issues are sustained.

Conclusion

We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order denying the Taxing

Authorities’ partial plea to the jurisdiction as to the Property Owners’ UDJA

action, request for injunctive relief, and request to certify a class action

regarding their standalone UDJA claim and request for injunctive relief. We

render judgment dismissing the Property Owners’ UDJA action, request for

injunctive relief, and request to certify a class action regarding their

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 16
standalone UDJA claim and request for injunctive relief. We otherwise affirm

the trial court’s order denying the Taxing Authorities’ partial plea to the

jurisdiction.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 16, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
CV06

Robertson Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hoppess Page 17