Jeremy Martinez Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 1, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-23-00168-CR
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JEREMY MARTINEZ, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 32nd District Court
Nolan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 13798, 13802, 13804, & 13805

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jeremy Martinez, Jr., was indicted in separate cause numbers
for the offenses of: (1) indecency with a child by contact, a second-degree felony;
(2) indecency with a child by exposure (two offenses), third-degree felonies; and
(3) continuous sexual abuse of a child under fourteen years of age, a first-degree
felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), (h) (West Supp. 2023); § 21.11(a), (d)
(West 2019). These causes were consolidated for trial.1 The jury convicted
Appellant of each offense and assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty years
for the conviction for indecency with a child by contact, ten years for each conviction
for indecency with a child by exposure, and life for the conviction for continuous
sexual abuse of a young child. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and
ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. He contends that we should reverse
the trial court’s judgments and order a judgment of acquittal for each conviction
because there is insufficient evidence that (1) the State of Texas has territorial
jurisdiction to decide these cases and (2) Nolan County is the county of proper venue
for these prosecutions. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Because of the scope of these appeals, we only recite the facts that are
necessary to address the issues that Appellant has raised on appeal.
At trial, the victim, J.M., described her home life and stated that, from the ages
of four to fourteen, she lived with her grandparents, siblings, and Appellant at a
residence on Alamo Street in Sweetwater, Texas. She explained that when she was
fourteen, they moved to a residence on Poplar Street in Nolan County. J.M. testified
that Appellant sexually abused her from the time that she was six until she outcried
to her sister at age fourteen. J.M.’s cousin, A.M., also testified that Appellant
sexually abused her each time that she stayed at her grandparents’ home between the
ages of eight to fourteen.

1
Appellant appealed from each judgment of conviction, and they were originally docketed in our
court as four separate appeals. However, pursuant to Appellant’s request, our Cause Nos. 11-23-00169-
CR, 11-23-00170-CR, and 11-23-00171-CR were consolidated into Cause No. 11-23-00168-CR for
purposes of appeal.
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The State also presented testimony from Cory Stroman, Assistant Chief of
Police for the Sweetwater Police Department, Special Agent Michelle Wilson with
the Texas Department of Public Safety Criminal Investigations Division, and SANE
nurses Susie Striegler and Erica Gooding. Chief Stroman testified that he became
the lead investigator for these cases after he received information from the Roscoe
Police Department that, during their investigation of a custody dispute, there had
been an outcry of potential sexual assault. During his investigation, Chief Stroman
picked Appellant up from his residence on Alamo Street for an interview. Chief
Stroman testified that most of the offenses were alleged to have been committed at
that residence. Further, Chief Stroman notated in the requests that he submitted to
Hendrick Medical Center in Abilene, Texas for J.M.’s and A.M.’s SANE exams,
that the county where these sexual assaults had occurred was Nolan County.
During his interview with Special Agent Wilson, Appellant verified that the
residence on Alamo Street was his residential address, and although he did not
explicitly admit to the offenses for which he was charged, Appellant did admit that
he had sexually abused J.M. and A.M. when they were minors. He specifically
described one incident in which he sexually assaulted J.M. in her bedroom.
Striegler and Gooding recounted the histories that they noted during J.M.’s
and A.M.’s SANE exams. Striegler testified that J.M. reported that she presented to
the hospital because Appellant had touched her, that he was living with her at the
time, and that he would have sex with her and touch her inappropriately when they
were in his bedroom. Gooding testified that A.M. explained that Appellant had
touched her inappropriately multiple times when she was at her grandmother’s house
while her grandparents were either working or outside.
Appellant’s grandmother and the victims testified that she lives in a residence
on Poplar Street and stated that this residence is located in Sweetwater, Texas.

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II. Territorial Jurisdiction
In Appellant’s first issue, he asserts that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that the charged offenses occurred in Texas, which is necessary to
establish the state’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute these offenses. See PENAL
§ 1.04(a)(1) (West 2021). Texas has jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense if
the criminal conduct occurs within its territorial boundaries. Id.; Lee v. State, 537
S.W.3d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Jurisdiction can be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1980); Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 653, 666 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012,
no pet.); Gunter v. State, 327 S.W.3d 797, 799–800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010,
no pet.). We apply the Vaughn standard to determine whether a jury could have
reasonably concluded that the criminal conduct occurred in the State of Texas.
Vaughn, 607 S.W.2d at 919. Under this standard, we review all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
Appellant argues that the State did not present any evidence to establish that
the alleged acts of sexual abuse committed by him occurred in Texas or that Texas
otherwise has territorial jurisdiction over these causes. We disagree. J.M. testified
that the residences where she lived with her grandparents were located on Alamo
Street in Sweetwater, Texas, and Poplar Street in Nolan County. The State presented
evidence that acts of sexual abuse had occurred at the residence on Alamo Street
where J.M. and Appellant resided with their grandparents.2 J.M. testified that
Appellant frequently abused her sexually as a child and she reported during her
SANE exam that he was living with them at the time and would commit the acts of
sexual abuse in his bedroom. A.M. also testified that Appellant abused her at their

2
Appellant emphasizes that there were two homes where the sexual abuse committed against J.M.
allegedly occurred: the residence on Alamo Street and the residence on Poplar Street. He notes that if these
offenses were committed when J.M. was younger than fourteen, these offenses could only have been
committed at the residence on Alamo Street, because she lived there until she attained the age of fourteen.
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grandparents’ house on Alamo Street when their grandparents were not home, and
the grandmother confirmed that there were many times that Appellant was alone
with the children. In fact, Appellant even conceded during his interview with Special
Agent Wilson that an instance of sexual abuse occurred at the residence on Alamo
Street. Additionally, Chief Stroman testified that most of the charged offenses were
alleged to have been committed at the residence on Alamo Street and he noted on
the SANE exam request forms he submitted that the county where the sexual abuse
had occurred was Nolan County.
Appellant argues that while J.M. testified that the residence on Poplar Street
is located in Nolan County, she never testified that this house is also located in Texas.
Although J.M. did not specifically indicate that this residence is located in Texas,
medical records admitted by the trial court state that J.M.’s residence was on Poplar
Street in Sweetwater, Texas. The grandmother also confirmed that the Poplar Street
residence is located in Texas.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, we
conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational
jury could have reasonably concluded that the charged criminal conduct occurred in
Texas. See Vaughn, 607 S.W.2d at 919. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the
evidence—which shows that the offenses occurred in Sweetwater, Nolan County,
Texas—is sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction in Texas. Accordingly, we
overrule Appellant’s first issue on appeal.
III. Venue
In Appellant’s second issue, he asserts that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that venue for the prosecution of the charged offenses was proper
in Nolan County.
Despite Appellant labeling his venue complaint as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, venue is not an element of any criminal offense, and the
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State’s failure to prove it does not implicate sufficiency of the evidence concerns or
require that an acquittal be ordered under the standard set forth in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014); Foster v. State, No. 11-21-00175-CR, 2022 WL 5237134, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Oct. 6, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Instead, when a party raises a venue challenge on appeal, the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure require appellate courts to presume that venue was proven
unless it is “disputed in the trial court” or “the record affirmatively shows the
contrary.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); see Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 35. Venue need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 13.17 (West 2015); Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1981). Further, venue may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence, and the factfinder may make reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Cox v. State, 497 S.W.3d 42, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d.).
Here, Appellant did not contest or object to Nolan County being the county of
proper venue for these prosecutions in the trial court. Therefore, we presume that
venue was proven in the trial court unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1). For the charged offenses in these cases, venue is
proper in the county in which: (1) any element of the offense was committed, (2) the
defendant is apprehended, (3) the victim resides, or (4) the defendant resides. CRIM.
PROC. art. 13.075.
Appellant asserts that the totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to
support the determination that the alleged acts of sexual abuse committed by him
occurred in Nolan County. However, we have already concluded, as noted above,
that the State adduced sufficient evidence that the sexual abuse committed by
Appellant occurred at the victims’ grandparents’ residence in Sweetwater, Texas,
where Appellant and J.M. resided. Despite this, Appellant argues that, although the
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State adduced evidence that this residence is located on Alamo Street in Sweetwater,
Texas, it did not prove that Sweetwater, Texas is situated in Nolan County, Texas.
We may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute if it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2); see Barton v.
State, 948 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam)
(appellate courts may take judicial notice of geographical facts because they are
“easily ascertainable and capable of verifiable certainty”). We may do so sua sponte
or if a party requests it; we may also do so for the first time on appeal. TEX. R.
EVID. 201(c); Granados v. State, 843 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1992, no pet.). In this regard, we take judicial notice, as we have before,
that the City of Sweetwater, Texas is situated in Nolan County, Texas. Leyva v.
State, 552 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (judicial notice taken that
El Paso County is situated in Texas); Williams v. State, 924 S.W.2d 189, 191–92
(Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) (taking judicial notice that a particular
location in the City of Sweetwater, where the offense occurred, was situated in Nolan
County, Texas); Sixta v. State, 875 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, pet. ref’d) (holding that the court may take judicial notice of the fact that the
City of Houston is situated in Harris County, Texas); Garcia v. State, 819 S.W.2d
634, 636 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, no pet.) (judicial notice taken
sua sponte that Goliad County is situated in Texas).
The record shows that the victims and Appellant all resided in Nolan County
when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. J.M. testified that she lived on Poplar Street
in Nolan County. Appellant confirmed that he resided on Alamo Street in his
interview with Special Agent Wilson, and Chief Stroman testified that he picked up
Appellant for an interview from Appellant’s residence on Alamo Street.

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Further, Appellant has failed to show that the record affirmatively (1) negates
the State’s proof of venue or (2) establishes that proper venue for these prosecutions
exists in a county other than Nolan County. Therefore, we presume that the State
sufficiently proved that Nolan County is the county of proper venue for these
prosecutions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s
second issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 1, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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