Racheal Michelle Swanger v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 15, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00183-CR
__________

RACHEAL MICHELLE SWANGER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court
Eastland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2200395

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Racheal Michelle Swanger, was charged by information with the
offense of failure to identify by intentionally providing a false or fictitious name to
a peace officer, a Class B misdemeanor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(b), (c)(2)
(West Supp. 2023). Appellant filed a motion to suppress all written or oral
statements obtained by law enforcement in connection with her detention and arrest
for this offense, asserting that law enforcement (1) did not have reasonable suspicion
for her initial detention and (2) as a result, they violated her rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas
constitution. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant thereafter entered
a plea of guilty to the charged offense, and the trial court assessed Appellant’s
punishment at confinement for one hundred and eighty days in the Eastland County
jail and a $2,000 fine; however, the trial court suspended Appellant’s sentence and
placed her on community supervision for one year.
In Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion to suppress because law enforcement lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain her for speeding. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On September 11, 2022, Officer Edgar Sanchez of the Cisco Police
Department was parked in his patrol unit facing west on I-20, using his LIDAR to
monitor the speed of vehicles traveling east. Officer Sanchez’s LIDAR clocked a
vehicle traveling ninety miles per hour on I-20 in a posted seventy-five mile per hour
speed zone. He testified that he observed the shape, color, model, and direction of
travel of the speeding vehicle as it passed by him. After observing this traffic
violation, Officer Sanchez attempted to initiate a traffic stop but was unable to
immediately do so because of construction on I-20 that had reduced eastbound traffic
to a single lane. A truck and two smaller vehicles were in front of Officer Sanchez’s
patrol unit, which temporarily impeded his view of the speeding vehicle.
During the suppression hearing, Appellant introduced a video recording
excerpt captured by the dashcam in Officer Sanchez’s patrol unit. The dashcam
automatically began recording when Officer Sanchez activated his patrol unit’s

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emergency lights, which occurred when Appellant’s vehicle came into sight.
Consequently, Officer Sanchez’s dashcam did not record the traffic violation.
After the construction zone ended—approximately two miles from his initial
location—Officer Sanchez saw a red Nissan Juke—a small SUV—stopped on the
eastbound shoulder of I-20. This vehicle matched the make, model, color, and
direction of travel of the vehicle that Officer Sanchez had observed speeding, and it
was the only vehicle that matched the vehicle’s description for an approximate two-
mile stretch. Officer Sanchez testified that when his patrol unit initially drove onto
I-20 to pursue the speeding vehicle, he did not see any other small SUVs of the same
or similar color traveling eastbound on I-20. Officer Sanchez noted that the
construction zone, an area that he had been patrolling, had caused all vehicles
traveling east on I-20 to slow down that day, including the vehicle in question. After
confirming that no vehicle had either exited I-20 or could be seen ahead of the
vehicle that he had observed speeding, Officer Sanchez’s patrol unit approached the
red Nissan Juke and stopped behind it; his patrol unit’s emergency lights were
activated. Additionally, Officer Sanchez testified that he had conducted a traffic
stop in the same area approximately thirty to forty minutes before Appellant was
detained, and the red Nissan Juke was not parked there at the time.
When Officer Sanchez initially made contact with Appellant, he inquired if
she was the driver of the red Nissan Juke, to which she responded, “Yes.” Appellant
advised Officer Sanchez that she had been parked at this location on I-20 for almost
an hour because her vehicle had “broken down.” Officer Sanchez asked Appellant
to provide her name and a means of identification, specifically a driver’s license.
Appellant refused to produce a driver’s license even though the law requires that a
driver’s license must be shown to a peace officer upon the officer’s request. See
TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 521.025(a)(2) (West Supp. 2023) (a person required to

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hold a license shall display the license upon the demand of a peace officer). Instead,
and after she had also refused to identify herself, Appellant eventually provided a
date of birth and stated that her name was “Rachel Fowler.” After checking the
accuracy of this information, Officer Sanchez found that the date of birth that
Appellant provided matched Appellant’s true name (Racheal Michelle Swanger),
and with this name Officer Sanchez was able to verify that Appellant’s driver’s
license had been revoked. Based on the circumstances that Officer Sanchez
discovered while investigating the traffic violation, he arrested Appellant for failure
to identify.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review.
Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Martinez, 348
S.W.3d at 922–23. We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination
of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s fact
findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Derichsweiler v.
State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d
666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)). We also defer to the trial court’s findings as to questions of fact
and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the
evidence. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436; Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 666–67
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913.
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of pure questions of law,
the application of the law to established facts, and the legal significance of those
facts. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Wade, 422

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S.W.3d at 667; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54,
62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985)). We also review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that
are not dependent upon credibility determinations. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436;
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673).
If the record is silent as to the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, as in the case
before us, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, infer the necessary fact findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the
evidence supports those findings, and assume that the trial court made implicit
findings to support its ruling. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); see Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When
considering a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). As such, the trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve all
or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Therefore, we will sustain the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, regardless
of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion, if it is supported by the record
and if it is correct under any applicable theory of law. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190;
Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
III. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Hubert v.
State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). These constitutional
protections extend to investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a

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traditional arrest. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). A warrantless
traffic stop by law enforcement personnel to address traffic violations constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is tantamount to a
temporary detention; therefore, the traffic stop must be justified and supported by
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
Reasonable suspicion for a detention exists if a law enforcement officer has
specific, articulable facts, in light of his experience and knowledge, combined with
rational inferences from those facts, that would lead the officer to reasonably
conclude that the person detained has engaged in, is presently engaging in, or soon
will engage in criminal activity. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 7); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); Crain v. State, 315
S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This is an objective standard that
disregards the actual subjective intent of the detaining officer and focuses, instead,
on whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Terry, 392
U.S. at 21–22; York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914.
When we evaluate whether reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the
totality of the circumstances from an objective standpoint and whether the totality
of the objective information available to the detaining officer indicates that the
officer had a particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing. Ramirez-
Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–916 (citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This consideration includes “both the content of

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information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
We may not use a “divide and conquer” approach, in which we disregard some
individual circumstances as not being suspicious; instead, we must consider the
cumulative force of all the circumstances. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 880 n.8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015)). As such, whether the facts known to the officer rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.
State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
A. Reasonable Suspicion
In her sole issue on appeal, Appellant complains that her detention was
unlawful because there is insufficient evidence for Officer Sanchez to reasonably
suspect that Appellant had engaged in criminal activity. Specifically, she asserts that
the facts do not clearly establish that she was the individual who committed the
speeding offense because (1) there is no recording or footage of the speeding vehicle,
(2) Officer Sanchez did not observe her driving onto and stopping her vehicle on the
eastbound shoulder of I-20, and (3) Officer Sanchez did not articulate sufficient facts
that identified the red 2013 Nissan Juke as the speeding vehicle.
Despite Appellant’s assertions, the legality of Appellant’s detention does not
rely on proof that an offense was actually committed; it is sufficient to show that the
law enforcement officer reasonably believed that the person had engaged in criminal
activity. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; State v. Torrez, 490 S.W.3d 279, 283-84
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d); Fernandez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 354, 357
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). Therefore, the State was not obligated to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was speeding, as Appellant
suggests; rather, the State was only required to show that Officer Sanchez had

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reasonable suspicion to conclude that Appellant had committed a traffic violation.
See Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 376 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).
Further, a traffic stop that meets the test for reasonable suspicion is nonetheless
lawful even if the facts supporting the stop are ultimately shown to be inaccurate or
false. Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet.
ref’d). As such, whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion is
determined from the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
detention, not on what the officer could have or should have known. See State v.
Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d
at 436.
A person commits a traffic offense if she operates a motor vehicle at a speed
that (1) is greater than the posted speed limit or (2) is unreasonable under the
circumstances. TRANSP. § 545.351(a), (b) (West 2022). In this regard, “[a] speed in
excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this
subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and
that the speed is unlawful.” TRANSP. § 545.352(a). In this case, Officer Sanchez
testified that he used his LIDAR to record a vehicle traveling fifteen miles per hour
over the posted speed limit. An officer’s observation of a traffic violation—here, a
vehicle’s excessive speed, with or without the use of a radar device—can satisfy the
basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Yoda v. State, 630 S.W.3d
470, 479 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d); Maysonet v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365,
372 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d); Icke, 36 S.W.3d at 916.
Officer Sanchez provided sufficient, specific facts that supported his
reasonable belief that Appellant was the person who committed the traffic violation
that he observed. Officer Sanchez observed identifying details of the speeding
vehicle when it passed him and noticed that these details matched the make and

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unique model, color, and direction of travel of the red Nissan Juke, which was the
only vehicle that matched this description for a considerable distance. Officer
Sanchez also testified that he had conducted a traffic stop in the same area where
Appellant was detained approximately thirty to forty minutes prior, and that the red
Nissan Juke, to which Appellant acknowledged she was driving that day, was not
there at that time. He also articulated that construction on I-20 likely hindered the
speeding vehicle, and that he did not see a vehicle traveling in front of Appellant’s
vehicle for over a mile. Further, Officer Sanchez emphasized that he did not see any
other small SUVs traveling eastbound when he began his pursuit, and no eastbound
vehicle exited I-20 before his patrol unit stopped behind the red Nissan Juke.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Sanchez articulated
sufficient, specific facts that amounted to reasonable suspicion. See Jaganathan v.
State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). As we have said, a police
officer’s reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred justifies
stopping a vehicle to investigate the circumstances of the offense. Lerma, 543
S.W.3d at 190. Here, Appellant could have been stopped based on the suspicion of
speeding alone. See TRANSP. § 545.352. As such, because Officer Sanchez had an
objectively justifiable basis to detain Appellant and investigate the circumstances of
the traffic violation, the traffic stop did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights.
See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; see also Orsag v. State, 312 S.W.3d 105,
112–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding that the
arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant for speeding when
the vehicle’s make, type, and color combined with its location and direction of travel
were consistent with the report from a fellow officer and there were no other vehicles
of the same make and color in the area). The trial court impliedly found Officer

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Sanchez’s testimony to be credible when it denied Appellant’s motion, and we defer
to that finding. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on
appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 15, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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