Desmond Tuggle v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed March 13, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-22-00142-CR
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DESMOND TUGGLE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 70th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A-20-0984-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury found Appellant, Desmond Tuggle, guilty of the offense of murder
and assessed his punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for sixty years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.02(b) (West Supp. 2024). In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.
Background Facts
Appellant’s girlfriend, Destiny Barrera, testified that she arranged to meet and
sell marihuana to an individual at an apartment complex in Odessa. Because she did
not know the buyer, Barrera asked Appellant to go with her when she made the sale.
Appellant drove Barrera to the apartment complex and took a silver revolver with
him. When they arrived, the individual, who Barrera later learned was Osvaldo
Renteria, approached the passenger side window of Appellant’s vehicle and asked
her if she had the marihuana. Barrera testified that she then gave Renteria the
marihuana, and he gave her the money.
According to Barrera, she believed Renteria had given her a counterfeit one-
hundred-dollar bill. She handed the money to Appellant, and he also believed that
the money was fake. When Barrera looked back to the passenger window, Renteria
was gone. Barrera then saw Appellant with the gun in his hand, and he was pointing
it across her body out of the passenger window. Barrera covered her ears, and
Appellant fired one shot out of the window. Appellant hurriedly drove away, and
Barrera asked him if he shot Renteria. Appellant told Barrera either Renteria fell
because he was scared or because he was shot.
Officer James Kyper with the Odessa Police Department was dispatched to
the apartment complex in response to a call of shots fired. Officer Kyper saw
Renteria lying on the ground and observed that he had a gunshot wound that entered
his back and exited his chest. Officer Kyper provided aid to Renteria until medics
arrived on scene. Renteria was taken to the hospital where he later died from the
gunshot wound.
Officer Kyper contacted the apartment manager to obtain security footage of
the area. Officer Kyper described the security footage, wherein he saw Renteria
walk over to the passenger side of a black SUV, engage in a hand-to-hand
transaction, and then run away from the vehicle. Officer Kyper then observed an
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arm extend from the driver’s side of the vehicle to the passenger side and then a
muzzle flash. Renteria immediately fell to the ground. The security footage was
played before the jury.
After reviewing the security footage, Sergeant Justin Caid with the Odessa
Police Department was able to develop a suspect vehicle description that was
associated with Appellant. Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence of
Appellant and Barrera where they found a counterfeit one-hundred-dollar bill as well
as a revolver that was wrapped up in a T-shirt and hidden in a bush. Appellant was
taken into custody and interviewed by Sergeant Caid. Sergeant Caid testified that
Appellant admitted to shooting Renteria. Appellant told Sergeant Caid that Renteria
“tried to rob [him]” and that he fired a shot in defense. However, according to
Sergeant Caid, there was no evidence that Renteria had attempted to rob Appellant
or Barrera. Sergeant Caid’s interview with Appellant was admitted into evidence
and published to the jury.
Appellant testified at trial that on the night of the offense, Barrera asked him
to “take her somewhere” but that he did not know that she was going to sell
marihuana until they arrived at the apartment complex. Appellant said that Renteria
gave Barrera the counterfeit money, but Barrera did not give him the marihuana at
that time. Barrera handed Appellant the money, and he agreed that it was fake.
According to Appellant, Renteria then reached into the vehicle and took the
marihuana from Barrera. Appellant testified that he was “scared,” so he grabbed his
gun. He explained that “in the heat of the moment,” he shot his gun one time out of
the window but that he was not trying to “hit [Renteria]” or kill him.
Analysis
In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction for murder. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
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307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v.
State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the
Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted.
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be
afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to
that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Id.
Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction for murder and asks this court to reform the judgment to reflect a
conviction for the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and remand the case for
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a new punishment hearing. Appellant acknowledges that he did not request a jury
instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Appellant contends that
in Bowen v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals eliminated the requirement that
either the defense or the State must request a jury instruction on a lesser-included
offense before a court of appeals can reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for
the lesser-included offense. 374 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Appellant is
correct in his assertion that Bowen allows an appellate court to reform a judgment
without a request for an instruction on lesser-included offense. See id. at 432; see
also Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“If after finding
the evidence insufficient to support a greater-inclusive offense the record clearly
supports a conviction for an uncharged lesser-included offense, we are authorized,
‘indeed required,’ to avoid the ‘unjust’ result of an outright acquittal by reforming
the judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense.” (quoting
Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014))).
Before Bowen is applicable, however, we must determine that the evidence
was insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for murder. Thornton, 425 S.W.3d
at 299–300. Appellant was charged with murdering Renteria in two ways:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causing Renteria’s death by shooting him with a
deadly weapon, and (2) intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly
dangerous to human life—shooting Renteria with a deadly weapon—with the intent
to cause serious bodily injury to Renteria, which caused Renteria’s death. See PENAL
§19.02(b)(1), (2). Manslaughter differs from murder with regard to the culpable
mental state—manslaughter requires that the defendant acted recklessly, whereas
murder requires that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. Compare id.
§ 19.04(a) (stating that a person commits manslaughter if the person “recklessly
causes the death of an individual”) with id. § 19.02(b)(1), (2); see Cavazos v. State,
382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (addressing Section 19.02(b)(2) and
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Section 19.04(a)); Arnold v. State, 234 S.W.3d 664, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (addressing Section 19.02(b)(1)); see also Walter v. State, 581
S.W.3d 957, 969–71 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (discussing the forms of
conduct and mens rea for each statutory method of committing murder under
Section 19.02(b)).
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove the requisite intent
of intentionally or knowingly required to convict him for murder. He maintains that
he acted recklessly by “firing a shot into the night” but that he did not intend to cause
Renteria’s death or intend to cause serious bodily injury to Renteria.
The jury was able to view security footage video that showed the entire
encounter between Appellant, Barrera, and Renteria. Further, the jury heard
evidence that after Renteria gave Barrera what was believed to be counterfeit money,
Appellant aimed his gun out of the passenger window and fired a shot. Appellant’s
use of a deadly weapon in this manner is evidence from which the jury can infer a
specific intent to kill. Ayala v. State, 267 S.W.3d 428, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d. 633, 637 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999)).
Additionally, the evidence shows that Appellant immediately fled the scene
after firing a shot out of the passenger window. Appellant’s acts of fleeing the scene
and not reporting the shooting may be evidence of his specific intent to kill. See
Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Evans v. State, 440
S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref’d); see also Clayton, 235 S.W.3d
at 780 (“[A] factfinder may draw an inference of guilt from the circumstance of
flight.”).
Appellant testified that he was scared because he believed Renteria was going
to rob them. Additionally, Appellant testified that he did not try to shoot or kill
Renteria. These matters to which Appellant testified were inherently credibility
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questions for the jury to resolve. We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge
of the witnesses’ credibility. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see Martin v. State, 635
S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). Thus, the jury was free to reject Appellant’s version of events if
it did not believe he was being truthful. See Trevino v. State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
The jury heard evidence that Renteria did not take the marihuana from Barrera
and that there was no evidence of a robbery. Appellant admitted during his testimony
at trial that he was in a “flight or fight moment” and that he chose to fight. He stated
that he pointed the gun and shot.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense of murder. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
support Appellant’s conviction for murder, we need not consider his request to
reform the judgment to reflect the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. See
Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 299–300. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

March 13, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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