Mark George Enriquez v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed June 26, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00133-CR
__________

MARK GEORGE ENRIQUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 39th District Court
Throckmorton County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1356

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury convicted Appellant, Mark George Enriquez, of possession of
a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of less than one gram.
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b) (West Supp. 2024). The
jury assessed his punishment at confinement in a state jail facility for a period of two
years and a $5,000 fine. In two issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence and by overruling his Rule 403 objection
to other items seized from the vehicle that Appellant was driving. We affirm.
Background Facts
On March 25, 2022, Deputy Jordan Roebuck with the Throckmorton County
Sherriff’s Office was working patrol. Deputy Roebuck received a call on his
personal cell phone from the dispatcher who was on her way to work. The dispatcher
reported that there was a vehicle driving erratically and following her too closely.
Deputy Roebuck responded to the location given by the dispatcher and observed the
dispatcher’s vehicle as well as the vehicle she described following her. Using his
radar, Deputy Roebuck determined that the vehicles were traveling at a speed of
seventy-three miles per hour. The vehicle was only “half of a car length” behind the
dispatcher’s vehicle, and Deputy Roebuck testified that that was not a safe distance
based upon the speed of both vehicles. Deputy Roebuck initiated a traffic stop for
the violation of following too closely behind a vehicle. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 545.062(a) (West 2022).
As he approached, Deputy Roebuck smelled a strong odor of marihuana
coming from the vehicle. He made contact with Appellant, who was acting nervous.
Appellant was the only occupant of the vehicle. Deputy Roebuck asked if Appellant
had any illegal drugs. Appellant initially denied having any but later admitted that
he had marihuana in the center console of the vehicle. Deputy Roebuck called for
assistance from Sheriff Doc Wigington and his K-9 and then began a search of
Appellant’s vehicle.
Deputy Roebuck found marihuana in the center console as well as a wallet
containing a security officer badge that had a different name on it. Appellant said
that the badge belonged to his roommate. Deputy Roebuck also found a clear plastic
bottle that contained a yellow liquid and had a temperature-gauge sticker attached to
it. Appellant said the plastic bottle contained “fetish urine.” Deputy Roebuck stated
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that there was a metal box in the front passenger floorboard of the vehicle. The
metal box was locked, but it was not sealed, so Deputy Roebuck was able to see
inside of it. 1 Deputy Roebuck described that he could see plastic baggies inside of
the metal box and that a crystal substance, that he believed to be methamphetamine,
was falling out of the box. Sheriff Wigington removed the box away from the odor
of the vehicle and allowed his K-9 to walk around the box. The K-9 alerted to the
box three separate times.
Deputy Roebuck and Sheriff Wigington pried the box open with a
screwdriver. Inside of the box, officers found a methamphetamine pipe containing
what was believed to be a usable amount of methamphetamine, several different
types of pills, and another individual’s identification. Testing at the Texas
Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory confirmed that the
methamphetamine pipe contained 0.52 grams of methamphetamine.
Matthew Enriquez, Appellant’s brother, testified that he owns a “backyard
living business” and that Appellant is a foreman of the business. Matthew said that
the vehicle Appellant was driving on the night of the offense was used by various
employees of the business.
Analysis
Motion to Suppress
Appellant filed a motion to suppress all tangible evidence seized at the time
of the stop, including the controlled substance. After a hearing, the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion. In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress. He argues that the traffic stop was pretextual in
nature and that the search was not based upon probable cause.

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Sheriff Wigington testified that the metal box “did not have a good seal” and that one could see
inside of the box when turning it on its side.

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“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard.” State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “We afford
almost total deference to a trial court’s findings of historical fact and determinations
of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor if they are
reasonably supported by the record.” Id. “We review de novo a trial court’s
determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not
turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor.” Id. “The trial
court’s ruling will be sustained if it is correct on any applicable theory of law and
the record reasonably supports it.” Id. When the record is silent as to the reasons
for the trial court’s ruling, we infer the necessary fact findings that would support
the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
“An officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the ‘reasonable suspicion’
standard is satisfied.” Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has ‘specific articulable facts that,
when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to
reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be)
engaging in criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The likelihood of criminal activity required for reasonable
suspicion need not rise to the level required for probable cause. State v. Kerwick,
393 S.W.3d 270, 273–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The reasonable-suspicion
standard requires only “some minimal level of objective justification” for the stop.
Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Foster v.
State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). This is an objective inquiry
that disregards the subjective intent of the officer and looks, instead, to whether an

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objectively justifiable basis for the detention existed. Derichsweiler v. State, 348
S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Appellant first argues that the initial traffic stop was pretextual in nature. The
Texas Transportation Code provides that:
An operator shall, if following another vehicle, maintain an assured
clear distance between the two vehicles so that, considering the speed
of the vehicles, traffic, and the conditions of the highway, the operator
can safely stop without colliding with the preceding vehicle or veering
into another vehicle, object, or person on or near the highway.
TRANSP. § 545.062(a). Deputy Roebuck testified that he observed Appellant commit
a traffic violation by following the dispatcher’s vehicle too closely—a violation of
Section 545.062. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
“It is well settled that a traffic violation committed in an officer’s presence authorizes
an initial stop.” Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
The subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. State v. Clark,
315 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.). Thus, Deputy Roebuck
conducted a valid traffic stop when he observed Appellant commit a traffic violation.
Appellant next argues that Deputy Roebuck did not have probable cause to
search the vehicle. Under the Fourth Amendment, all searches conducted without a
warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement
applies. Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). One exception to the warrant requirement is the
automobile exception. Id. The automobile exception allows police officers to
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if the vehicle is readily mobile and
the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. Id.
(citing Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). The

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automobile exception to the requirement of a search warrant does not require exigent
circumstances. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Probable cause to support a warrantless search of an automobile exists when
“the facts and circumstances known to law enforcement officers are ‘sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed.’” Id. at 599–600 (quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996) (holding that probable cause to conduct a warrantless search exists if, when
viewing the historical facts, an objectively reasonable police officer would conclude
that probable cause exists). Probable cause exists when there is “a ‘fair probability’
of finding inculpatory evidence at the location being searched.” Marcopoulos, 538
S.W.3d at 600 (citing Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 282). When analyzing the probability of
finding inculpatory evidence, a reviewing court should consider “the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.” Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175). Additionally, we
must consider the “totality of the circumstances known to the officer.” Id. The scope
of a warrantless search that is based on probable cause is just as broad as a search
authorized by a properly obtained warrant. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
823 (1982).
Deputy Roebuck testified that he smelled a very strong odor of marihuana as
he approached Appellant’s vehicle, and that he did not “have to make it to [the
vehicle’s] window before [he] could detect it.” Appellant acknowledges that the
smell and odor of marihuana has been held sufficient to search a vehicle, but he
argues that there must be more than the odor of marihuana when making the initial
probable cause determination. Courts have long held that the odor of marihuana
alone is sufficient to constitute probable cause to search a defendant’s person,
vehicle, and objects within the vehicle. See, e.g., Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817,
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819–20 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Deleon v. State, 530 S.W.3d 207, 211
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d). Thus, there was probable cause to initiate
the search of Appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant next argues that Deputy Roebuck should not have continued the
search to include the locked metal box without a warrant. An officer may conduct a
warrantless search of all containers within a vehicle as long as the officer has
probable cause that the container conceals the object of the search. See Neal, 256
S.W.3d at 282 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825). This rule applies regardless of who
the owner of the container is. See Guajardo v. State, No. 13-19-00424-CR, 2020
WL 7063685, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 302 (1999)).
Deputy Roebuck smelled marihuana coming from the vehicle. Deputy
Roebuck began a search of the vehicle and found the metal box in the front passenger
floorboard. He could see plastic baggies inside of the box as well as a crystal-like
substance that he suspected was methamphetamine. Based upon the smell of
marihuana, Deputy Roebuck had probable cause to search the vehicle and every part
of the vehicle that could conceal marihuana, including the metal box. See Levine v.
State, 794 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, pet. ref’d). Additionally,
Sheriff Wigington’s K-9 alerted on the metal box on three occasions after it was
removed from the vehicle. Sheriff Wigington testified that his K-9 was trained and
certified on the detection of illegal narcotics, including marihuana and
methamphetamine. “The law is well established that as soon as a drug-detection
dog alerts on a car, officers have probable cause to search the car without a warrant.”
Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing
Parker v. State, 182 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Haas v. State, 172
S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tex .App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d); Harrison v. State, 7 S.W.3d 309,
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311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d)). Thus, the officers had
multiple bases for probable cause to search the contents of the metal box.
In summary, Deputy Roebuck initiated a valid traffic stop when he observed
Appellant following a vehicle too closely. Based upon the smell of marihuana,
Deputy Roebuck had probable cause to search the vehicle including any containers
that could conceal marihuana. Thereafter, Deputy Roebuck and Sheriff Wigington
developed additional probable cause that the metal box contained contraband.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. We
overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Admission of Evidence
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling
his objections to the admissibility of evidentiary items seized at the time of his arrest.
Appellant filed a motion in limine requesting that the State not mention or allude to
Appellant engaging in any extraneous wrongs or acts in the presence of the jury.
The trial court granted Appellant’s motion in limine. The trial court later conducted
a hearing outside the presence of the jury to consider Appellant’s objections to the
State’s intent to offer evidence of the pills, fetish urine, and security badge found
during the search of the vehicle. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(b) (“When the court hears a
party’s objections outside the presence of the jury and rules that evidence is
admissible, a party need not renew an objection to preserve a claim of error for
appeal.”) Appellant argued that the evidence was not relevant to whether he
possessed methamphetamine and that it was prejudicial. The trial court overruled
Appellant’s objections and allowed the State to present evidence of the pills, fetish
urine, and security badge found during the search.
Appellant asserts on appeal that the admission of these exhibits was improper
under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. We review a trial court’s ruling
under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 810
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). This standard requires an appellate court to uphold a trial
court’s evidentiary ruling when it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Powell v. State, 63
S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling on
the admission or exclusion of evidence if the ruling was proper under any legal
theory or basis applicable to the case. See Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403; see Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854,
874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “Rule 403 favors admission of relevant evidence and
carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial.” Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Render v.
State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 921 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d). Evidence is
unfairly prejudicial when it has the undue tendency to suggest an improper basis for
reaching a decision. Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
Render, 347 S.W.3d at 921.
In reviewing a trial court’s determination under Rule 403, a reviewing court
is to reverse the trial court’s judgment “rarely and only after a clear abuse of
discretion.” Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). When
conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court must balance:
(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along
with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency
of the evidence to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, (4) any
tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a
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jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the
evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence
already admitted.

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Rule 403,
however, does not require that the balancing test be performed on the record.
Greene v. State, 287 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d).
In overruling a Rule 403 objection, the trial court is assumed to have applied a
Rule 403 balancing test and determined that the evidence was admissible. Id.
The first Gigliobianco factor focuses on the inherent probative force of the
proffered evidence. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Gigliobianco,
“probative value” is more than just relevance. 210 S.W.3d at 641. It refers to how
strongly an item of evidence “serves to make more or less probable the existence of
a fact of consequence to the litigation[,] coupled with the proponent’s need for that
item of evidence.” Id. Appellant argues that the evidence of the untested pills, the
fetish urine, and the security badge were not needed by the State and was used to
prejudice the jury and make him “look bad.” However, Appellant’s theory at trial
was that the vehicle did not belong to him, that many people drove the vehicle, and
that he was unaware of the contents in the vehicle. He further argued at trial that the
State did not prove intentional or knowing possession of the methamphetamine
because there was no proof that “he was aware of his control of those drugs.”
Appellant acknowledged at the time of the stop that he was aware of the fetish
urine and security badge in the vehicle and offered an explanation for both items.
Therefore, this evidence had probative value to show his awareness of the contents
in the vehicle. In addition, the marihuana and pills provided an affirmative link to
show Appellant’s knowing possession of the methamphetamine. See Tate v. State,
500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). (“[W]hether the defendant possessed

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other contraband or narcotics when arrested” is an affirmative link that connects the
defendant to the knowing possession of contraband.)
With respect to the State’s need for the evidence under the second
Gigliobianco factor, we have already noted how the proffered evidence served to
rebut Appellant’s defense that he did not knowingly possess the methamphetamine.
The remaining Gigliobianco factors focus on the potential negative effects of the
proffered evidence. The third factor focuses on the tendency of the evidence to
suggest a decision on an improper basis. While the proffered evidence was
inherently inflammatory and prejudicial, it was not so extreme as to cause the jury
to render a decision on an improper basis. The fourth factor focuses on the potential
of the proffered evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues. The
fifth factor focuses on the potential of the proffered evidence to mislead the jury.
The fourth and fifth factors weigh in favor of admission because the proffered
evidence was probative of Appellant’s knowledge of the presence of contraband
inside the vehicle. Finally, the sixth factor focuses on the time needed to present the
proffered evidence and whether it is cumulative of other evidence. The evidence of
the other items found in the vehicle only spanned a few pages of the reporter’s record
and it was not cumulative of other evidence.
In summary, the evidence of the other items found in the vehicle was
prejudicial. However, Rule 403 contemplates excluding evidence only when there
is a “clear disparity” between the offered evidence’s prejudice and its probative
value. Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting
Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). Considering the
standard of review, the presumption favoring admissibility of relevant evidence, and
the Gigliobianco factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in overruling Appellant’s Rule 403 objection. See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 568

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(“Because Rule 403 permits the exclusion of admittedly probative evidence, it is a
remedy that should be used sparingly.”). We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

June 26, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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