Josue Morales v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 21, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00099-CR
__________

JOSUE MORALES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 106th District Court
Dawson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22-8927

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Josue Morales, was indicted for the offense of continuous violence
against the family, a third-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.11(a), (e)
(West Supp. 2024). The jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense, and the
trial court assessed his punishment at ten years’ imprisonment in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
The indictment charged Appellant with continuous family violence by:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury to Eva Casarez, a
member of Appellant’s family or household or a person with whom he had or has a
dating relationship, on or about October 22, 2021, by striking her with his hand and
causing Casarez’s head to strike a hard object; and (2) intentionally, knowingly, and
recklessly causing bodily injury to Casarez, on or about February 3, 2022, by striking
her with his hand. The evidence presented at trial concerning these alleged incidents
of family violence is outlined below.
A. The October 22, 2021 Incident
Casarez testified that she previously had been in a relationship with Appellant;
one child was born during their relationship. When this incident occurred, she and
Appellant were living together in a “camper.” On this date, Casarez stated that she
and Appellant were arguing when Appellant grabbed her cell phone and ran to his
vehicle.
Casarez, while carrying their infant child, followed Appellant to his vehicle,
opened the front passenger door, and sat in the front passenger seat. Casarez testified
that she repeatedly asked Appellant to return her cell phone, but he refused. Casarez
reached across the vehicle to retrieve her cell phone from Appellant as he repeatedly
“teased” her by moving it “back and forth.” According to Casarez, as she reached
for her cell phone, her hand “brushed” against Appellant. In response to this physical
contact, Appellant “backhanded” Casarez “several times” in the face. As a result,
Casarez suffered a “busted” lip and bruising on the right side of her face.

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After striking Casarez, Appellant drove away with Casarez, and their infant
child seated unsecured in the passenger seat. Casarez stated that she did not want to
“ride around” with Appellant, and she asked Appellant to take her home. Appellant
eventually returned to the camper, and, upon his arrival, he “slammed” on the
vehicle’s brakes, put his hand on the back of Casarez’s head, and pushed her head
into the dashboard. Casarez testified that, at some point after they had returned to
the camper, Appellant “threw” her cell phone at her; Casarez then used her cell
phone to call 9-1-1.
As to the circumstances of the October 2021 incident, Appellant testified that
he did not take Casarez’s cell phone; rather, Appellant stated that Casarez chased
and followed him to his vehicle, while carrying their child, because he had used his
cell phone to record her behavior that day. 1 Appellant testified that he initially told
Casarez that she needed to exit his vehicle because he needed to go to work, but,
after she refused to leave, Appellant told her that she could “drop [him] off [and]
bring the car back.” Appellant stated that, at some point, Casarez hit him. He then
“grabbed” her hands so that she could not hit him again. After Casarez hit Appellant
a second time, he “push[ed]” on the vehicle’s brakes, which caused Casarez’s face
to strike the dashboard. However, Appellant stated that he did not intend to or
purposefully apply the brakes so that Casarez’s face would hit the dashboard.
Officer Vernon Spence of the Lamesa Police Department testified that he
investigated this incident and interviewed Casarez. Officer Spence recounted the
statements that Casarez made to him during the interview, which was consistent with
her trial testimony. Officer Spence observed injuries on the right side of Casarez’s
face—photographs of these injuries were published to the jury—and he testified that
he believed these injuries were consistent with her version of the October 2021

According to Appellant, he was unable to produce this video recording at trial because he did not
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have access to his cell phone due to a broken screen.
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incident. Based on his investigation, Officer Spence testified that the lead officer
filed a misdemeanor assault family violence case against Appellant with the Dawson
County Attorney. Following this incident, Casarez moved and ceased living with
Appellant.
B. The February 3, 2022 Incident
Casarez testified that on February 3, 2022, Appellant appeared at her mother’s
home and knocked on the front door. Casarez “figured [Appellant] wanted to see
his [child],” and she asked Appellant to meet her outside because her mother “[did]
not want him . . . at her home.” Casarez went outside and she sat inside Appellant’s
vehicle with their child. At some point, Appellant “drove off”; at the time, Casarez
was seated in the passenger seat, holding their child who, again, was not properly
restrained. Casarez requested that Appellant return to her mother’s house several
times, but he refused and instead drove to his brother’s residence.
Upon arriving there, Appellant told Casarez that he intended to “keep” their
child and that he “wanted to take [the child] inside his brother’s house.” Appellant
then took their child from Casarez and exited his vehicle. Casarez also exited the
vehicle and “pushed on” Appellant to prevent him from taking their child. At some
point, Appellant’s brother heard the commotion and came outside. Appellant
handed the child to his brother and became upset with Casarez for “disrespecting
him”; he also called her “all kinds of names.” Appellant then attacked Casarez and
attempted to bite her face. Casarez testified that Appellant picked her up off the
ground and squeezed her body for a “long duration of time,” which caused her to
urinate on herself. Appellant’s brother eventually separated Appellant and Casarez.
Casarez stated that after she retrieved her child, and while holding him in her arms,
Appellant “backhanded” her in the face. Photographs of Casarez’s injuries depicted
visible bruising around one of her eyes.

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Appellant testified to a different version of events regarding the February
2022 incident. Appellant stated that he drove to Casarez’s mother’s house that day
to “pick [Casarez] up.” According to Appellant, Casarez had agreed to watch a
movie at “[his] house.” Appellant then drove Casarez to his brother’s house and,
once they arrived, Casarez exited the vehicle and maneuvered to the back seat where
she then began hitting Appellant. Appellant stated that he “honk[ed]” the horn to
his vehicle for “a good minute” while Casarez punched him, slapped him, and pulled
his “collar.” At some point, Appellant’s brother came outside, and Appellant handed
him the child. Appellant then “wrapped” his hands around Casarez to “restrain” her
and prevent her from hitting him.
Appellant’s brother, Ricardo Morales, testified that he went outside after he
heard “honking,” and that he saw Casarez “scrambling around” in the backseat of
Appellant’s vehicle. During his recorded interview with law enforcement, Ricardo
stated that he saw Appellant grab Casarez in a “bearhug” after Appellant handed him
the child. Ricardo also saw Appellant “smack” Casarez in the face. Ricardo stated
that, after the incident, he observed red marks on Appellant’s face, “like [Casarez]
had been smacking him,” but he never saw Casarez hit Appellant.
Sergeant Mason Tidwell of the Lamesa Police Department testified that he
was dispatched to investigate the February 2022 incident between Appellant and
Casarez and that he interviewed Casarez. Sergeant Tidwell stated that Casarez
appeared visibly upset during the interview, and that he observed bruising around
one of her eyes. Sergeant Tidwell testified that Appellant was indicted for the
February 2022 incident. Casarez also obtained a protective order against Appellant
following this incident.

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II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899;
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676
S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s role
as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667
S.W.3d at 762 (“[A] reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.”); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Dewberry v. State,
4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). This standard is deferential and
accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder
resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.

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Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d
516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard.
Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, pet. ref’d). The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt;
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the
defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish
guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not
point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of
all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction.
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi,
330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the
charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and

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adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for continuous violence against the family. Specifically,
Appellant contends that there is no evidence to show that (1) he assaulted Casarez,
or (2) he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused any bodily injury to her.
As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the offense of continuous
violence against the family if, during a period that is twelve months or less in
duration, the person commits two or more assaults that cause bodily injury to a
person with whom he has or had a dating relationship. See PENAL §§ 22.01(a)(1),
25.11(a); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (West 2019) (defining “dating
relationship”); see also Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 844 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, no pet.). For purposes of our analysis, there is no dispute that Appellant and
Casarez were either in a dating relationship at the time the alleged assaultive conduct
occurred or that the two alleged incidents outlined above occurred within a twelve-
month period as required by the statute.
“Bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code includes “physical pain.” PENAL
§ 1.07(a)(8). “Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily
injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also
Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hernandez v. State,
531 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.). Further, bodily injury
encompasses “even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute
more than mere offensive touching.” Clark v. State, 461 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989)). In addition to direct evidence that a victim experienced pain, a

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factfinder may infer that a victim felt or experienced physical pain because people
of common intelligence understand the effects of pain and some of its natural causes.
See Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 688 (citing Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 774 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)); Clark, 461 S.W.3d at 248.
For purposes of this charged offense, a person acts intentionally “when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.” PENAL § 6.03(a) (West 2021). A person acts knowingly “when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). A person
acts recklessly “when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the . . . result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). Recklessness requires
that the defendant foresee the risk involved and in turn consciously ignore it.
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
“Intent and knowledge are fact questions for the jury and are almost always
proven through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Manrique v.
State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring); Luna v.
State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d). A jury may infer
intent and knowledge from any facts that tend to prove its existence, “including the
acts, words, and conduct of the accused,” and “the nature of wounds inflicted on the
victims.” Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting
Manrique, 994 S.W.2d at 649); Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 93.
Here, the jury could have reasonably inferred and found from the evidence
that Casarez suffered physical discomfort and pain because of Appellant’s assaultive
conduct. See Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 688; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 524; Bolton v. State,
619 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (testimony that relates to the extent of
the victim’s injuries is sufficient to show bodily injury without direct testimony of
physical pain); Settlemyre v. State, 489 S.W.3d 607, 608–09 (Tex. App.—Eastland

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2016, pet. ref’d) (scratch marks on an assault family violence victim’s wrists
constituted bodily injury). Casarez testified that Appellant struck her multiple times
with his hand during the October 2021 incident and that he slammed her head into
the dashboard of his vehicle. As a result, she sustained a “busted lip” and bruising
on her face. Casarez demonstrated to the jury how Appellant grabbed her head and
caused it to strike the dashboard of his vehicle. Casarez further testified that
Appellant struck her face during the February 2022 incident. Her testimony and
version of events was corroborated by Officer Spence and Sergeant Tidwell, who
each observed injuries on Casarez’s face following these incidents. Finally, during
Ricardo’s recorded interview he stated that he saw Appellant “smack [Casarez] in
the face” during the February 2022 incident.
Seven photographs that depicted Casarez’s injuries were admitted and
published to the jury. These images were taken shortly after the assaults occurred
and clearly depict visible bruising and red marks on Casarez’s face, injuries that
Casarez claimed were caused by Appellant striking her. Photographs of injuries that
a victim sustained during an assault, without testimony of any physical pain endured
by the victim, are alone sufficient to show bodily injury. Aguilar v. State, 263
S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). Consequently,
we conclude that Casarez’s testimony, along with the photographs of her injuries,
are sufficient to show, and the jury could have reasonably inferred, that she
experienced bodily injury because of Appellant’s assaultive conduct. See Bin
Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
(holding that evidence of a cut or bruise is sufficient to establish bodily injury).
Appellant argues that his testimony established that Casarez was the
aggressor, and that his actions were designed to “restrain” Casarez and “did not
cause [her] bodily injury.” As such, Appellant contends that there was no evidence

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presented to show that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused any bodily
injury to her. However, in this case, as in all cases, the jury may believe all, some,
or none of any witness’s testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992); Reyes v. State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015,
pet. ref’d) (citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. As the trier of fact, it is
the jury’s duty, as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, to weigh and resolve
any conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to
ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761–62;
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
In this case, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence
presented that Appellant, by his conduct, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
caused bodily injury to Casarez. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 524 (“One’s acts are
generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s intent.” (quoting Rodriguez v.
State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.))).
Moreover, the jury was also able to employ common sense in its consideration of
the evidence to determine whether Casarez suffered bodily injury because of
Appellant’s assaultive conduct. See PENAL § 1.07(a)(8); Aguilar, 263 S.W.3d at 434
(citing Wawrykow v. State, 866 S.W.2d 96, 99–100 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993,
no pet.)). Generally, the testimony of a single eyewitness, here Casarez, can be
sufficient to support a conviction. See Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971). The jury’s apparent decision to credit and believe Casarez’s
accounts of the assaults committed upon her by Appellant was inherently a
credibility determination to which we defer under the Jackson standard of review.
We have reviewed the cumulative force of all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, and we conclude that the record before

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us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically
inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense
of continuous violence against the family as charged in the indictment. Accordingly,
we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 21, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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