In the Interest of D.M., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed October 23, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00102-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF D.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11291-CX

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from a final order in which the trial court
terminated the parental rights of the mother and alleged father of D.M.1 Only the
mother has appealed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s (1) findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), and (O)2 of the Texas Family Code, and (2) finding that termination of her

1
To protect the child’s identity, we use initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).

We note that the legislature amended Section 161.001(b)(1) and repealed subsection (O) effective
2

September 1, 2025. Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 211, § 2, 4, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 573,
parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2024). Appellant further
challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion for continuance and demand for a
jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. FAM. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed
in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree
of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West
2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the child; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-
being of the child; and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
specifically established the actions necessary for Appellant to obtain the return of
the child, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of
the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) for not less than
nine months as a result of the child’s removal under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect.
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court further found, pursuant to

574–75. This change in the law only applies to suits affecting the parent-child relationship that are pending
on or after the effective date of this statutory amendment. Id. § 3. Thus, we apply the law in effect at the
time the suit was pending below.

2
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Cognizant of the required appellate deference to the
factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,
assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a
reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that
do not support the finding,’” and we recognize that the factfinder is “the sole arbiter
of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266
then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such, when
considering the credibility of the evidence, we may not substitute our judgment for
that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—

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Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
To support a best-interest finding, the Department is not required to prove the
applicability of each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence
of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462,
473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that
proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient,
probative evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at

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548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied)
(citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure and compare a parent’s future
conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-
child relationship is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M.,
665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333
S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer
that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child
may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v.
May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ
denied). Additionally, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet
the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent
to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at
118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. The Evidence Presented at Trial
On January 3, 2024, law enforcement notified the Department that Appellant
was “yelling and cussing” at then-five-year-old D.M., “who was sitting on a curb
crying.” When Department investigator Alyssa Jones arrived, she observed that
Appellant was “very agitated and very abrasive.” Appellant told Jones that she
yelled and cursed at D.M. “because she wouldn’t get off the curb,” and that she
considered contacting the Department herself. Appellant informed Jones that “she
didn’t give two s---s” whether D.M. stayed with her or was removed and placed in
foster care.

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Jones discussed implementing a safety plan with Appellant, but she did not
have a permanent residence or a relative who could care for the child. They had
lived with Appellant’s mother for a brief period following Appellant’s release from
prison in November 2023. But in mid-December 2023, they left her mother’s home
to stay “[w]ith friends here and there,” and had been “bouncing from home to home”
since then. Appellant “said she was staying with a man” that night but refused to
provide his name or contact information. When Jones spoke to D.M., the child
revealed that she was scared and did not want to leave with Appellant. Concerned
for D.M.’s safety, the Department removed the child and placed her in a foster home.
The Department created a family plan of service for Appellant, which was
approved and adopted as an order of the trial court in March 2024. A few weeks
before the status hearing, Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine, although
she consistently tested negative for drug use for the next several months. Appellant
completed her required counseling, parenting classes, stayed in contact with her
caseworker, maintained steady employment, and attended all but one visit with D.M.
Because of her compliance, on August 21, 2024, the trial court signed an agreed
order for the monitored return of D.M. See FAM. § 263.403(a). However, Appellant
permitted her brother to stay with her and D.M. in October without the Department’s
approval, and D.M. tested positive for “very high levels” of methamphetamine the
following month. The trial court terminated the monitored return on November 22,
2024, and extended the dismissal deadline to May 21, 2025. Appellant later revealed
that her brother also struggled with substance abuse, specifically with
methamphetamine and marihuana, and she attributed D.M.’s positive drug test to her
brother’s illegal drug use while in their home. Once D.M. returned to the foster
home, Appellant stopped submitting to drug testing because, according to her, she
“[didn’t] stand a chance” of avoiding termination after that.

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Eight days before the parties were to appear for the final hearing on April 15,
2025, Appellant filed an untimely jury demand and a motion for continuance. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(a). The trial court explained that “this Court and the referring
district court’s schedules are extraordinarily busy[,] and trying to -- in addition to
being untimely, trying to . . . schedule a jury trial before the dismissal deadline
would not be feasible.” As such, the parties proceeded with the final termination
hearing before the trial court.
The Department presented evidence of Appellant’s years of substance abuse,
criminal history, and history with the Department. Appellant began using
methamphetamine and marihuana in 2014 and resumed using methamphetamine
three and one-half weeks after her release from prison. Appellant initially claimed
to have been sober since January 3, 2024, the date of D.M.’s removal, but eventually
admitted that she “went and got high” after the Department removed D.M. She was
also assaulted by her boyfriend later that month, and conceded, “apparently, I have
terrible taste in men.”
Appellant recounted her history with the Department. In July 2016, the
Department removed Appellant’s two-year-old son, A.H., because of Appellant’s
methamphetamine use and her attempted suicide. During the monitored return,
Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine and left A.H. in a known
drug house while she was “highly intoxicated.” Appellant’s parental rights to A.H.
were terminated in October 2017, nine months before she gave birth to D.M. in July
2018. Then in February 2019, when D.M. was eight months old, Appellant was
arrested for the state jail felony offense of possession of methamphetamine (she was
subsequently placed on deferred adjudication community supervision). Soon after
Appellant’s arrest, D.M. tested positive for methamphetamine, and the Department
removed her from Appellant’s care.

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In June 2020, the Department closed its case because Appellant completed her
service plan requirements to regain custody of D.M. and she had been complying
with the conditions of her community supervision. Weeks later, Appellant tested
positive for methamphetamine in violation of her community supervision
conditions. She also stopped reporting to her community supervision officer in
August 2022 and was convicted in March 2023 of criminal trespass and evading
arrest. Upon completing her sixty-day jail sentence for those misdemeanor offenses,
Appellant was adjudicated guilty in May 2023 of the state jail felony
methamphetamine possession charge, her community supervision was revoked, and
she was transferred to a state jail facility where she remained until her release in
November 2023.
During Appellant’s confinement in the state jail facility, D.M. lived with
Appellant’s mother, who also had a criminal history and struggled with
methamphetamine addiction. According to Appellant, her mother had been sober
for several years but relapsed while caring for D.M. in Appellant’s absence.
Permanency case manager Michaela Hill testified that D.M. is “doing well”
in her foster home, is “happy there, and she is very comfortable with all of the family
members and the dogs.” D.M.’s foster parents have cared for her since removal and
after the monitored return ended and hope to adopt her. D.M. is receiving speech
therapy, weekly counseling, and is being tested for dyslexia, but has no other known
medical issues. Hill described D.M. as “a very bright child” who “loves to go to
school.”
The Department recommended terminating Appellant’s parental rights for
D.M.’s “immediate and long-term safety” because Appellant could not provide a
safe and stable home for the child. Hill acknowledged that Appellant and D.M. “are

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bonded and love each other,” but that it was in the child’s best interest to stay with
her foster family with the goal of adoption.
Appellant also agreed that it would not be in D.M.’s best interest for her to
return to Appellant’s care “with [her] mental state of mind at the moment,” because
she was “really struggling with depression.” She also explained why she refused to
submit to drug testing after the monitored return ended:
I’ve given up. I already know the outcome . . . losing my rights to my
kid. . . . [T]his isn’t my first go around. I have a CPS history. . . . I
don’t see y’all re-removing her, coming to trial, and y’all giving her
back to me and closing my case.
The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights under Section
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), and found termination to be in the best interest of
D.M. See FAM. § 161.0001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). This appeal followed.
III. Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) – Endangerment
In her first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court’s
findings that she endangered D.M. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Although only
one statutory ground is necessary to support termination, appellate courts must
address a parent’s challenges to a trial court’s findings under subsections (D) or (E),
as they may have implications for the parent’s rights to other children. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing
due process and due course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of
grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must provide a detailed
analysis if affirming the termination on either ground). Thus, if we conclude that
the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding for
either subsection (D) or (E), we need not address the trial court’s findings as to the
remaining subsections that the trial court found were violated. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. And when the evidence pertaining to both

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subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, as it is here, we may conduct a consolidated
review of the trial court’s endangerment findings. See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257,
263–64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 114; In re
M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
The statutory endangerment grounds require clear and convincing proof that
the parent has: “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of
the child,” or “(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex.
2014). “[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that ‘expose[s a
child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269,
277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533
(Tex. 1987)). The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential
ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,” but “does not require actual
harm.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); see R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at
277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
To terminate a parent’s rights for endangerment under subsections (D) or (E),
the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child,’” nor must “the
child actually suffer[] injury.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd, 727
S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination under
[subsection] (D) requires that the child’s environment is a source of endangerment,
and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.” C.E., 687 S.W.3d
at 310. “A parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make the child’s
environment endangering to the child.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the parent is aware

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that the environment creates a potential danger to the child but the parent disregards
that risk.” Id. Because conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless
the child is exposed to it, the relevant time frame for evaluating the application of
subsection (D) is before the child’s removal. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749.
Endangerment under subsection (E), in contrast, focuses on the parent’s
conduct, and whether the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct
result of the parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550.
Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or
omission; rather, a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the
parent is required. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). “A factfinder may infer endangerment from
‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or
emotional well-being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. “[E]ndangerment under
Subsection (E) . . . ‘does not require [that the parent’s conduct] directly harm the
child.’” In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. 2025) (quoting R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d
at 278). Further, a parent’s actions prior to and after the child’s removal may show
an endangering course of conduct. See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[E]ndangering
conduct may include a parent’s actions before the child’s birth and may relate to the
parent’s actions while the parent had possession of other children.”). “Even
evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and imprisonment prior to the birth of a
child will support a finding that a parent engaged in a course of conduct that
endangered the child’s well-being.” In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (Illegal
drug use and offenses that occurred before the child’s birth may be considered as
part of a course of conduct that endangers a child.); see N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d at 765.

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Contrary to Appellant’s contention that there is “absolutely no evidence” of
endangerment, her testimony alone established that she engaged in an endangering
course of conduct and knowingly allowed D.M. to remain in an endangering
environment. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573
(Tex. 2005). Appellant’s decade use of drugs and its effects on her ability to parent
demonstrated an endangering course of conduct. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In
re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)
(“Illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent will be impaired or
imprisoned and incapable of parenting.”). “While illegal drug use alone may not be
sufficient to show endangerment, a pattern of drug use accompanied by
circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish a substantial
risk of harm.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. “A reviewing court should not evaluate
drug-use evidence in isolation; rather, it should consider additional evidence that a
factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a
risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” Id. (quoting J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345).
Thus, under certain circumstances, such as those that are present in this case, “any
drug activity may render the parent incapable of parenting.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 554
(citing R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278).
Appellant’s protracted pattern of drug use contributed to the termination of
her parental rights to her son, A.H., in 2017. See In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV,
2020 WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (The “factfinder may consider prior CPS history of neglect, drug use, or lack of
care for the children.”). It also resulted in her 2019 arrest and the first removal of
D.M. after the child tested positive for methamphetamine. Immediately after the
Department closed its case in June 2020, Appellant resumed using
methamphetamine, despite being on community supervision for felony drug

12
possession. Her drug-related criminal conduct culminated in her confinement in a
state jail facility for approximately nine months in 2023. Appellant knew that her
mother struggled with methamphetamine addiction, but, during her confinement, she
nevertheless left D.M. in her mother’s care, who subsequently relapsed.
Additionally, Appellant’s drug use persisted after her release from prison and D.M.’s
removal. Such drug-related criminal conduct and the failure to remove D.M. from
an endangering environment support the trial court’s endangerment findings. See
J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315–17; see J.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
592 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.); In re A.L.H., 468 S.W.3d
738, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
Appellant attempts to distinguish the present case from her past engagement
in services: “[F]or the first time in my whole life I actually wanted to get sober.” In
her previous cases with the Department, her intention was to complete her service
plan requirements “just to check the box and get [the Department] out of [her] life.”
She never took it seriously until now: “I’ve never cared, I guess, to really try to get
sober . . . this case I kind of took serious.” Yet, Appellant’s responsibility as a parent
was not limited to maintaining her own sobriety—permitting her brother, a known
drug user, to live with her and D.M. during the monitored return created conditions
or surroundings that endangered D.M.’s physical and emotional well-being. See In
re K.G., No. 11-24-00236-CV, 2025 WL 477650, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s decision to leave a child in the care
of a known drug user subjects the child to a life of uncertainty and instability that
endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.”); E.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00469-CV, 2022 WL 17970222, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Austin Dec. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (The father endangered the child
by leaving the child with the mother, whom he knew to be a methamphetamine

13
user.). As a result, D.M. suffered actual harm—she tested positive for
methamphetamine—far beyond “a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill
effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803.
Thus, on this record, the trial court could have formed a firm conviction or belief
that Appellant’s actions and inactions exposed D.M. to illegal drugs, which
contributed to the endangering environment.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence is sufficiently clear
and convincing such that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm
conviction or belief that Appellant disregarded her parental obligations to the degree
that she knowingly allowed D.M. to remain in an endangering environment and
knowingly placed D.M. with persons who engaged in endangering conduct. FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); see J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 750.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. In light of our disposition,
we need not address Appellant’s second issue in which she challenges the trial
court’s finding under subsection (O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
551.
IV. Best Interest of the Child
In her third issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is
in the best interest of D.M. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much
broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant
discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72). We reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty
to disturb the determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Giving the requisite

14
deference due the trial court, we conclude that, based on the evidence and the
application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of
D.M. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best-interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some Holley factors will not preclude a best-interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows [that] the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). Consequently,
“evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to
support a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child.” J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.)). Furthermore, evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1)
termination grounds may also be probative of the child’s best interest. See In re
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
The clear and convincing evidence that Appellant endangered D.M. also
establishes that terminating her parental rights is in D.M.’s best interest. Given the
risk of a parent’s erratic employment situation, unstable housing, the possibility of
an extended or permanent absence from the child because of incarceration and
otherwise, and an ongoing pattern of drug use can support a best-interest finding. In
re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).
Here, Appellant’s drug use, drug-related criminal activity, and incarceration posed

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infinite potential dangers to D.M. and “implicates most of the Holley factors.” Id.
Not only did Appellant engage in persistent drug use and permit D.M. to be in the
presence of known drug users, she admitted to having “terrible taste in men,” one of
whom had assaulted her around the time that the Department removed D.M. In re
O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical
violence in the home leads to an unstable and unpredictable environment for
children.”); see also In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2017, no pet.) (“Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence
may be considered as evidence of endangerment.” (quoting In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d
841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.))).
Appellant attested to her inability or unwillingness to achieve the permanence
and stability that D.M. needs to thrive. See In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (“Stability and permanence are
paramount in the upbringing of children.”). When asked what she had learned
throughout the duration of this case, Appellant replied: “I’m not fit to have no kids.
That’s what I’ve learned. . . . I’m just not a good parent.” She stated that it was in
D.M.’s best interest to be in a “[d]rug-free, violence-free home” with caregivers who
will “pay for sports and stuff because . . . I can’t do that on my own income.”
Therefore, the trial court could have rationally inferred that relinquishing D.M. to
Appellant’s care would subject D.M. to a life of uncertainty, unnecessary risks, and
instability, which is contrary to D.M.’s best interest. See In re E.M., No. 11-24-
00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,
pet. denied)).
Evidence was also presented concerning Appellant’s mental health issues and
her failure to properly address them. Appellant’s recurring unstable behavior and

16
untreated mental health issues existed when her son was removed in 2016 after she
attempted suicide. Nearly a decade later, and a month before the final hearing in this
case commenced, Appellant expressed suicidal ideations after a visit with D.M. The
support worker who drove Appellant home contacted law enforcement and requested
that they conduct a welfare check because she perceived that Appellant was at risk
for suicide. “While mental incompetence or mental illness alone are not grounds for
termination of the parent-child relationship, ‘[w]hen a parent’s mental state allows
the parent to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child, that conduct has bearing’” on the trial court’s decision to terminate a
person’s parental rights. In re E.G., 643 S.W.3d 236, 253 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2022, no pet.) (quoting In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2019, no pet)).
Appellant’s methamphetamine use persisted after the Department removed
D.M. in January 2024, after which Appellant immediately “went and got high.”
Appellant also refused to submit to drug testing after the trial court terminated the
monitored return because she had “given up.” “A fact finder reasonably can infer
that a parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is
avoiding testing because they were using illegal drugs.” In re A.R.D., 694 S.W.3d
829, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied); see also R.R.A., 687
S.W.3d at 281 (father’s positive drug tests and subsequent “across-the-board refusal
to undergo service-plan tests” permit the inference of drug use). Considering
Appellant’s testimony, history of drug abuse, and positive tests at the beginning of
the case, the trial court could rationally infer that Appellant was using illegal drugs
while she failed to submit to court-ordered drug tests.
Following Appellant’s failure to comply with the drug testing that her service
plan required, the trial court explicitly ordered her to submit to drug testing two

17
months before the final hearing setting, which she ignored. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
at 249 (A parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can support a best-
interest finding.); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the
initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of [her] child that
[she] does not have the ability to motivate [herself] to seek out available resources
needed now or in the future.”). Notwithstanding Appellant’s substantial compliance
with her service plan, Appellant failed to address and resolve the Department’s and
the trial court’s prevailing concerns with her illegal drug use and D.M.’s exposure
to it. Consequently, Appellant’s continued drug use and failure to complete a
material court-ordered task support the trial court’s best-interest finding.
Because of the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not
discount D.M.’s improvement since removal, and her bond with her foster family.
See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746–47; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that evidence showing that a young
child had bonded with foster family supported best-interest finding). We do not
ignore D.M.’s expressed desire to return to Appellant, but it is only one factor that
we consider in the overall best interest analysis. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at
372; cf. In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, pet. denied) (“A child’s love for a parent cannot be ignored as a reflection of
the parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional needs.”). Although a child’s
desires or wishes for residing with a parent is an important consideration in
determining the best interest of the child, “it cannot override or outweigh evidence of
danger to the child.” F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 732. Moreover, a child’s expressed
preference is not binding on the trial court; rather, it is only one factor, among others,
that the trial court considers in its best interest determination. See Hart v. Kozik, 242

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S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing In re Marriage of
Stockett, 570 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ)).
Here, Appellant’s drug use directly endangered D.M., and even Appellant
agreed and conceded that D.M. requires the support that she cannot provide.
Appellant’s remote desire to eventually support D.M. is not enough to alleviate the
trial court’s and the Department’s concerns for D.M.’s safety and well-being. See
J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119 (“A parent’s inability to provide adequate care for her
children, unstable lifestyle, lack of a home and income, lack of parenting skills, and
poor judgment may be considered when looking at the children’s best interest.”);
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Thus, this factor does not weigh against a finding of
termination. See Hart, 242 S.W.3d at 109.
Despite Appellant’s limited and negligible efforts to reform, it became clearly
and convincingly apparent that her primary interest was not D.M.’s protection and
well-being. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). Although Appellant
attempted to comply with the required court-ordered services and temporarily
achieved sobriety during her prior Department investigations, she would
nevertheless revert to drug use and criminal activity once the State’s involvement
had concluded. Thus, any recent, temporary improvement is not enough to avoid
the termination of her parental rights. See N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 479.
When we consider the evidence of Appellant’s persistent substance abuse,
criminal history, and negative history with the Department, the emotional and
physical needs of D.M. now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to
D.M. now and in the future, Appellant’s lack of parental abilities and refusal to
address the issues that precipitated the Department’s involvement in this matter, the
future plans for D.M., Appellant’s unstable living and employment situations, and
Appellant’s unexcused conduct, we conclude that such evidence supports the trial

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court’s firm belief or conviction that the termination of Appellant’s parental rights
is in D.M.’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; see also Yonko v. Dep’t
of Family & Protective Servs., 196 S.W.3d 236, 245 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
V. Jury Demand & Motion for Continuance
Appellant contends in her fourth issue that the trial court violated her due
process right to a jury trial when it denied her jury demand and motion for
continuance. Specifically, Appellant asserts that she “simply needed to do the drug
tests,” and “[t]here was no indication that a continuance with extension would be
harmful in any manner . . . as no extension had been granted.”
A. Jury Demand
We review the denial of a jury demand for an abuse of discretion. In re
A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019). A trial court abuses its discretion if it
acts “without reference to guiding rules and principles such that the ruling is arbitrary
or unreasonable.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 717
(Tex. 2020). If some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision, the
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if it
would have reached a contrary conclusion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d
198, 211 (Tex. 2002); DLA Piper LLP (US) v. Linegar, 539 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2017, pet. denied).
To assert the right to a jury trial in a civil case, a litigant must file a jury
demand with the trial court clerk within “a reasonable time before the date set for
trial of the cause on the non-jury docket, but not less than thirty days in advance.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(a). However, filing an untimely jury demand does not
necessarily defeat a party’s right to a jury trial. E.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. &

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Protective Servs., 598 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). When
a jury demand is untimely, a trial court should accord the request for a jury trial if it
can be done without disrupting the trial court’s docket, delaying the trial, or causing
injury to the other parties, including the child. Id. at 396–97; In re C.Z.M., No. 10-
21-00302-CV, 2022 WL 806320, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 16, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see In re A.L.M.-F., 564 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Tex. App.—Waco
2017), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. 2019). To prevail on appeal, the party
challenging the trial court’s denial of the untimely jury demand bears the burden to
show that granting the request for a jury trial would not have interfered with the
disposition of the trial court’s docket or the pending case or prejudiced the other
parties. C.Z.M., 2022 WL 806320, at *2.
It is undisputed that Appellant’s jury demand was not timely filed—on
April 7, 2025, eight days before the final termination hearing commenced before the
trial court.3 The trial court had previously extended the dismissal deadline after it
terminated the monitored return. With the impending May 21 dismissal deadline
and the trial court’s and referring court’s “extraordinarily busy” dockets at the time,
another extension of the dismissal deadline, if feasible, would have been necessary,
and indeed the only option available to the trial court, to accommodate Appellant’s
request. However, Appellant presented no evidence that extraordinary
circumstances necessitated that D.M. remain in the Department’s care, or that it
would be in D.M.’s best interest for that to occur. See FAM. § 263.401(b). Appellant
therefore failed to show that her untimely demand would not have (1) disrupted or
interfered with the trial court’s docket, (2) caused significant delay in the disposition

3
We note that, at trial, Appellant blamed her attorney for the untimely filing. However, the evidence
shows that Appellant had numerous opportunities to invoke her right to a jury trial—whether through in-
person discussions with her attorney or directly to the trial court at various hearings—in the months leading
up to the final termination hearing.

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of the case, or (3) resulted in prejudice to the other parties, including D.M. See
C.Z.M., 2022 WL 806320, at *2. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its
discretion, with D.M.’s best interest as its paramount consideration, when it denied
Appellant’s untimely jury demand and refused to further delay the proceedings and
disposition of this case.
B. Motion for Continuance
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance is likewise reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008,
pet. denied). Under Rule 251 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a continuance
shall not be granted except for sufficient cause shown and supported by affidavit, by
mutual consent of the parties, or by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 251. If a
motion for continuance does not comply with Rule 251, we presume that the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. In re D.L., No. 01-25-00186-
CV, 2025 WL 2495880, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, Appellant’s motion for continuance does not comport with Rule 251—
it fails to show (1) sufficient cause supported by affidavit, (2) mutual consent of the
parties, or (3) support by operation of law—nor does it state a basis for relief under
Rule 252. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 251, 252. As such, we may presume that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion. In re E.L.T.,
93 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); In re J.S., 02-
24-00564-CV, 2025 WL 1478394, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
We also conclude that the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s requested
continuance was reasonably supported by some evidence. See D.W., 249 S.W.3d at
647. As shown by the evidence, Appellant ceased cooperating with the Department

22
in November 2024 and ignored the trial court’s order to submit to periodic drug
testing. At the time of the final hearing, D.M. was almost seven, and she had been
in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for over sixteen
months. “[T]he goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a
compelling government interest that may justify the trial court’s denial of a motion
for continuance in a parental termination case.” In re J.P.H., No. 04-23-00131-CV,
2023 WL 5280376, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 16, 2023, pet. denied)
(mem. op.). Moreover, the congested trial dockets of the trial court and referring
court could not accommodate such a request, one which the trial court could have
reasonably perceived to be made “for purposes of delay.” Given Appellant’s
shortcomings and D.M.’s need for permanence, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s “eleventh hour” motion for
continuance.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
VI. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

October 23, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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