In Re Patricia Soto Garcia v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00219-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE PATRICIA SOTO GARCIA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Patricia Soto Garcia asserts that the trial

court1 abused its discretion by granting a bill of review in favor of real party in interest

Samuel Porras Mancinas. Because Mancinas failed to meet his burden to plead and

prove the required elements to obtain a bill of review, we conditionally grant the petition

for writ of mandamus.

1 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number CL-24-0920-A in the County Court

at Law No. 1 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Rodolfo “Rudy” Gonzalez.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.
I. BACKGROUND

Garcia filed for divorce against Mancinas. At the final hearing in the case, both

parties appeared pro se. After swearing in the parties, the trial court determined that the

parties did not have minor children and asked the parties about dividing their marital

assets. Garcia advised the trial court that she and Mancinas had reached a “final

agreement” regarding the division of their property and alimony, and Mancinas was

“relinquishing rights to everything and giving [her] alimony [of $]6,500” per month. The

trial court questioned Mancinas regarding whether he agreed with Garcia’s statements,

and Mancinas confirmed that Garcia would “keep all of the properties and everything.”

The trial court reviewed the parties’ agreement, pursuant to which Garcia would

receive the couple’s two properties, including one home in Mercedes, Texas; and one

vacant lot in Kermit, Texas; two trucks; a car; and two RV trailers. The parties further

agreed that Mancinas would be responsible for all payments for these properties and

items and would perform all required maintenance and repair work on them. The parties

also agreed that Mancinas would pay for all their community debts, including loans and

taxes. Mancinas advised the trial court that Garcia would allow him to “borrow” a property

where he could reside, along with a truck and trailer for him to use for work. The trial court

asked Mancinas if he was “basically giving up everything,” and Mancinas confirmed that

he was. The trial court asked Mancinas why he was doing so, and Mancinas answered:

“I do not know, because I guess—I mean, I made a mistake and I just—I do not know. I

mean, the way I should repay it and continue, you know . . . .”

2
The trial court then held a brief off-the-record conference with the parties. After the

hearing resumed, the trial court questioned Mancinas regarding whether he was under

medical care. Mancinas denied receiving any medical treatment. The trial court

questioned him again on this topic later in the hearing, and Mancinas again denied that

he was undergoing any medical care. In response to further questions, Mancinas also

testified he was not taking any medications at the time of the hearing.

Mancinas testified that he was employed as a crane operator and that he earned

approximately $2,500 to $3,000 each week. Garcia was not working at the time of the

hearing, but she explained that she worked as Mancinas’s assistant, so she “only go[es]

to work whenever he finds [her] a position.” According to further testimony, the parties

also agreed that Garcia would continue to manage Mancinas’s finances after the divorce.

Mancinas testified that they reached this agreement because “[he] cannot really manage

the money real good [sic],” “[he] forget[s] to pay stuff,” and “[he] would rather buy [things]

than pay the bills or whatever.” Mancinas advised the trial court that he had asked Garcia

if she wanted to stay with him while she handled his finances, and she agreed to do so.

In this regard, Garcia acknowledged that she was staying with Mancinas at the Kermit

property “with the hopes of getting a job with him.” Mancinas informed the trial court that

“my feelings or my heart is that maybe one day we can work it out again as a married

couple, and so hopefully she is going to start working . . . soon because we usually work

together all the time.”

In contrast, Garcia testified that she wanted to get divorced. The trial court offered

to defer the hearing and allow the parties to “try to work it out and come back in three or

3
four months,” and Garcia reiterated that, “No, I want to get a divorce.” Garcia explained

that “[t]here was infidelity,” that Mancinas had not been faithful to her, and that he had a

long-term relationship with another woman. Garcia also indicated that Mancinas had

committed family violence against her on two different occasions.

In terms of spousal maintenance, or alimony, Garcia advised the trial court that

Mancinas had agreed to pay her $6,500 monthly. Mancinas confirmed that he had agreed

to pay Garcia “for life.” However, despite the parties’ agreement, the trial court instead

ordered Mancinas to pay Garcia $2,000 per month for a three-year period. The trial court

signed the final decree of divorce on September 27, 2023.

On February 23, 2024, Mancinas, now represented by counsel, filed an “Original

Petition for Bill of Review and Motion to Abate All Hearings.” The petition recounts the

history of the parties’ divorce and provides, in relevant part, that:

4. [Mancinas] had no legal representation at the time of the hearing.
The division of the marital [property] was not just and fair. The
movant was not able to appreciate the legal ramifications of what he
signed[.] All assets and property were awarded to [Garcia]. Also, a
claim for alimony was plead[ed] by [Garcia]. The State of Texas does
legally recognize alimony.[2]

5. [Mancinas] has no adequate legal remedy now available to avoid the
effect of the order. Despite the exercise of due diligence, [Garcia]
fraudulently informed [Mancinas] of a possible reconciliation,
convincing him to sign the Decree.

2 We assume that this statement was made in error and Mancinas intended to state that Texas

does not recognize alimony. We note that, since 1995, Texas has recognized both court-ordered spousal
maintenance awards and court-approved voluntary obligations regarding payments made to former
spouses. See, e.g., Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex. 2018).

4
Mancinas thus requested the trial court to set aside the divorce decree and order a new

division of the community estate. He further requested a new trial, and that “all hearings

related to this matter be abated until further notice.”

Garcia, also now represented by counsel, filed a response to Mancinas’s petition

for bill of review alleging, among other things, that Mancinas lacked a meritorious

defense, he failed to pursue his legal remedies, and the divorce was the result of his “own

fault or negligence.” In terms of Mancinas’s request to abate the proceedings, Garcia

explained that she had recently filed a motion for enforcement against Mancinas because

he failed to pay certain debts that he was required to pay pursuant to the divorce decree.

On December 18, 2024, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on

Mancinas’s petition for bill of review and motion to abate. At the hearing, Mancinas’s

counsel argued that Garcia had represented to Mancinas that the parties would reconcile

after he signed the divorce decree. Counsel acknowledged that any such representation

did not explicitly appear in the record of the final hearing, but that such representation

could be inferred from the parties’ testimony.

On January 28, 2025, the trial court signed a first amended order granting

Mancinas’s bill of review. On March 11, 2025, the trial court signed findings of fact and

conclusions of law in support of its ruling. In relevant part, the trial court concluded that:

“Mancinas was not able to appreciate the legal ramifications of what he signed away”;

“Texas does not recognize alimony”; Mancinas agreed to the divorce “because [Garcia]

told him there was a possibility of reconciliation”; Mancinas “believed he would be able to

reconcile with [Garcia] based on her representations, and thus, he did not file a motion

5
for reconsideration or new trial”; and Mancinas did not determine that Garcia’s

“representations were false” until more than thirty days after the divorce decree was

signed. The trial court thus concluded that: Mancinas presented prima facie proof of a

meritorious defense; Mancinas was prevented from fully litigating his rights in the divorce

proceeding due to extrinsic fraud committed by Garcia, which consisted of “deliberately

telling [Mancinas] there was a possibility of reconciliation . . . when there was not,”

thereby convincing him to sign the divorce decree; and Mancinas’s agreement to the

decree “was made under circumstances that impaired his ability to make clear decisions,

constituting a wrongful act by [Garcia],” unmixed with fault or negligence of his own,

because “his mental condition, combined with [Garcia’s] actions, prevented [him] from

fully participating” in the divorce.

This original proceeding ensued. In four issues, Garcia asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion by granting the bill of review because: (1) Mancinas failed to plead

or prove extrinsic fraud, accident, wrongful conduct, or official mistake; (2) Mancinas

failed to exhaust available legal remedies, including a motion for new trial or notice of

appeal; (3) Mancinas lacked a meritorious defense because he did not file a counter-

petition in the divorce proceeding and presented no sworn pleadings or admissible

evidence to support such a defense; and (4) a “subjective misunderstanding of legal

consequences[,] in the absence of competent evidence of fraud or wrongful conduct, “will

not support a bill of review.

We requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from

Mancinas, who asserts in relevant part that: (1) he pleaded and proved extrinsic fraud on

6
Garcia’s part which caused his failure to exhaust his legal remedies or present a

meritorious defense; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting

equitable relief “based on Mancinas’s misunderstanding of legal consequences and

Garcia’s fraud.” Mancinas further argues that mandamus relief should be denied because

Garcia failed to comply with the procedural rules for filing a petition for writ of mandamus.

II. MANDAMUS

Mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d 296, 302 (Tex.

2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d

782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in nature, and it is

governed by equitable principles. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 663 (Tex.

2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding)

(per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show that the trial court clearly

abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Dall.

HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694

S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

“A bill of review which sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose of all the

issues of the case on the merits is interlocutory in nature and not a final judgment

appealable to the court of appeals or the supreme court.” Kiefer v. Touris, 197 S.W.3d

300, 302 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Tesoro Petroleum v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705,

705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)); see In re D.N.C., 656 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, no pet.). Here, the trial court’s order granted Mancinas’s bill of review, but did

not dispose of the case on the merits. See Kiefer, 197 S.W.3d at 302. Thus, Garcia lacks

7
the ability to appeal the trial court’s order until a final judgment in the case has been

rendered.

We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing or weighing the

benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.,

712 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding); In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 32

(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). “No specific definition captures the essence of or

circumscribes what comprises an ‘adequate’ remedy; the term is ‘a proxy for the careful

balance of jurisprudential considerations,’ and its meaning ‘depends heavily on the

circumstances presented.’” In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021)

(orig. proceeding) (cleaned up); see In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 840; In re Prudential Ins.

Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Thus, depending on

the circumstances, mandamus may be available to review an order granting a bill of

review. 21st Century Centennial Ins. v. Ramirez, 675 S.W.3d 356, 362–63 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.) (combined app. & orig. proceeding [mand.

denied]); In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016,

orig. proceeding); see also In re Miramontes, 648 S.W.3d 590, 599–600 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, orig. proceeding) (noting a split among the intermediate appellate courts

regarding whether mandamus relief is available to address an interlocutory order granting

a bill of review).

III. BILL OF REVIEW

“A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside

a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal.”

8
WWLC Inv. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting Caldwell v.

Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)). The bill of review procedure is

founded in equitable principles, but courts do not readily grant bills of review “[b]ecause

it is fundamentally important in the administration of justice that some finality be accorded

to judgments.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Alexander

v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)). Thus, we narrowly construe the grounds on

which a plaintiff may obtain a bill of review. Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., 369 S.W.3d

809, 812 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam). However, even though a bill of review is equitable in

nature, the mere fact that an injustice may have occurred is not sufficient to justify relief.

Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); In re Office of

Atty. Gen., 276 S.W.3d 611, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding

[mand. denied]); Temple v. Archambo, 161 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2005, no pet.).

A bill of review plaintiff must ordinarily plead and prove: (1) a meritorious defense

to the underlying cause of action; (2) which the plaintiff was prevented from making by

the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or official mistake; (3) unmixed

with any fault or negligence on his or her own part. WWLC Inv., 624 S.W.3d at 799; Katy

Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish these elements. King Ranch, Inc. v.

Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. 2003); 21st Century Centennial Ins., 675 S.W.3d

at 363. In this regard, though fraud may be either extrinsic or intrinsic, only extrinsic fraud

will support a bill of review. King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 752. “Extrinsic fraud is fraud

9
that denied a party the opportunity to fully litigate at trial all the rights or defenses that

could have been asserted.” Id.; see In re D.N.C., 656 S.W.3d at 766; In re Marriage of

Mobley, 503 S.W.3d 636, 643 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied).

IV. ANALYSIS

Garcia argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by granting a bill of review

that was legally and factually insufficient on its face.” Mancinas argues that mandamus

relief should not issue for procedural reasons and because Garcia’s claims fail on their

merits.

A. Procedural Deficiencies

We first address Mancinas’s claims that we should deny relief because Garcia’s

petition for writ of mandamus is deficient. First, Mancinas asserts that Garcia’s statement

of the case fails to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(d) because it is

two pages long, discusses the facts, and includes argument. In this regard, Rule 52.3(d)

states that a petition for writ of mandamus “must contain a statement of the case that

should seldom exceed one page and should not discuss the facts,” and it should be

“concise.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(d). We agree that Garcia’s statement of the case fails to

comply with Rule 52.3(d) because it is not concise, and more specifically, because it

includes facts and argument pertaining to the merits. See id.

Second, Mancinas further asserts that we should deny mandamus relief because

Garcia failed to properly authenticate the exhibits in her appendix and record. Under the

appellate rules, the relator’s appendix and record must contain certified or sworn copies

of the documents that are required to be filed. Id. R. 52.3(k)(1)(b), 52.7(a)(1). Similarly,

10
transcripts of relevant testimony must be “properly authenticated.” Id. R. 52.7(a) (2). Most

of the documents included in Garcia’s appendix and record—including, inter alia, the

petition for divorce, the divorce decree, the petition for bill of review, Garcia’s response,

the first amended order granting the bill of review, and the findings of fact and conclusions

of law—are certified as required by the rules. However, the record also contains copies

of the official reporter’s records of the two hearings at issue in this original proceeding,

and those records are not authenticated.

We conclude that these deficiencies do not preclude our review of the merits of

Garcia’s petition for writ of mandamus. In our discretion, we will proceed by disregarding

the facts and argument inappropriately contained in Garcia’s statement of the case. And

because Mancinas does not argue that the reporter’s records are inaccurate or

misleading, we will include them in our review. See id. R. 2; see also In re Bigham, No.

10-13-00355-CV, 2014 WL 285667, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 23, 2014, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.).

B. Merits

Garcia alleges in her first issue that Mancinas failed to plead and prove the

elements required to obtain a bill of review. Thus, we examine whether Mancinas pleaded

and proved that he possessed (1) a meritorious defense to the divorce; (2) which he was

prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of Garcia; (3) unmixed with

any fault or negligence on his own part. WWLC Inv., L.P., 624 S.W.3d at 799; Katy

Venture, Ltd., 469 S.W.3d at 163.3

3 We note that the trial court in this case held a single hearing on the bill of review rather than

following the Baker two-step procedure, which contemplates a preliminary hearing regarding whether the
11
Mancinas’s petition for bill of review alleged that he lacked legal representation at

the divorce hearing; the division of the marital property was not just and fair; he “was not

able to appreciate the legal ramifications of what he signed” as all assets and properties

were awarded to Garcia; Garcia received alimony and “[t]he State of Texas does [not]

legally recognize alimony”; he lacks an “adequate legal remedy now available to avoid

the effect” of the divorce decree; and “[d]espite the exercise of due diligence,” Garcia

“fraudulently informed [him] of a possible reconciliation, convincing him to sign the

[divorce d]ecree.”4

In this original proceeding, Mancinas cites two cases that he alleges support his

contention that fraudulent promises of reconciliation in the context of a divorce can

support a bill of review. See Bobbitt v. Bass, 713 S.W.2d 217, 218–19 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 1986, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (affirming an order granting a bill of review in which husband

testified that wife told him that she had filed for divorce in a “fit of haste, not to worry about

it”; the parties continued to see each other and travel together; and a witness testified that

he heard wife tell husband to disregard the divorce proceedings and that they would

bill of review petitioner made a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense or ground of appeal, followed
by a second hearing regarding the other remaining bill of review issues. See Baker v. Goldsmith, 582
S.W.2d 404, 408–09 (Tex. 1979); Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, no pet.); Morris v. O’Neal, 464 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.);
Ramsey v. State, 249 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). Handling a petition for bill of
review in a single proceeding, as in this case, “often occurs.” Thompson v. Ballard, 149 S.W.3d 161, 165
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.).

4 A petition for a bill of review “must allege factually and with particularity that the prior judgment

was rendered as the result of fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party or official mistake unmixed
with his own negligence.” Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408; see State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d
463, 464 (Tex. 1989); Mosley v. Dallas Cnty. Child Protective Servs., 110 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2003, pet. denied). Bare conclusory statements do not meet this requirement. See Baker, 582
S.W.2d at 408–09; In re Office of Attorney Gen. of Tex., 193 S.W.3d 690, 694 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006,
orig. proceeding).

12
“straighten all of this out later”); McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 623–28 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (concluding that wife’s verified petition for bill of

review adequately pleaded fraud where wife alleged that husband told her that they could

reconcile and remarry if she agreed to a divorce and gave husband custody of their minor

children and their community property).

The foregoing cases are instructive regarding the pleading and proof requirements

regarding fraudulent misrepresentations in bills of review concerning divorce

proceedings. However, on this record, we agree with Garcia that Mancinas has failed to

meet his burden of proving his right to a bill of review. In a bill of review proceeding, the

petitioner “must open and assume the burden of proving that the judgment was rendered

as the result of the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party or official mistake

unmixed with any negligence of his own.” Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex.

1979); see In re Office of Att’y Gen., 276 S.W.3d at 618; see also Moccia v. Benn, No.

01-23-00089-CV, 2024 WL 3608198, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2024,

no pet.) (mem. op.). Mancinas failed to meet his threshold burden by failing to verify his

petition for bill of review. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408; Bevering v. Bevering ex rel.

Bevering, 401 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); see also

Thomas v. 462 Thomas Fam. Props., LP, 559 S.W.3d 634, 641 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2018, pet. denied). More saliently, however, Mancinas offered no evidence in support of

any of his contentions. At the hearing on the bill of review, the trial court and the parties

discussed the terms of the original divorce decree and the testimony adduced at the

13
hearing on that decree,5 but no evidence was adduced regarding the issues raised in

Mancinas’s petition for bill of review.

Mancinas argues that the facts to support his request for a bill of review are found

in the transcript from the divorce hearing—that is, testimony that Garcia was living with

him at the time of the hearing “while she manages the money,” and Mancinas’s testimony

that “maybe one day [they] can work it out again as a married couple.” According to

Mancinas, this testimony is sufficient to show that Garcia promised to reconcile with

Mancinas if he signed the divorce decree. However, the reporter’s record from the divorce

hearing fails to reveal that Garcia made any representations regarding a wish or plan to

reconcile after the divorce. To the contrary, Garcia testified unequivocally that she wanted

a divorce and rejected any possibility of reconciliation when the trial court offered to defer

the hearing to allow the parties an opportunity for rapprochement. The record from the

divorce hearing fails to contain any testimony or evidence that Garcia had fraudulently

promised Mancinas reconciliation in exchange for the divorce.

The record thus reflects that Mancinas failed to prove that he possessed a

meritorious defense which he was prevented from making by Garcia’s alleged fraud or

wrongful act unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own. See King Ranch, Inc., 118

S.W.3d at 752; Bobbitt, 713 S.W.2d at 218–19; see also In re Beamon, No. 05-25-00266-

CV, 2025 WL 1570532, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.) (conditionally granting mandamus relief to set aside an order granting a bill of review

5 In a bill of review proceeding, the trial court may take judicial notice of the record in the original

suit. See 48 TEX. JUR. 3d Judgments § 269 (2025) (citing, inter alia, Strickland v. Ward, 185 S.W.2d 736,
736 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1945, no writ)).

14
in a divorce case where the record failed to contain representations constituting fraudulent

promises for reconciliation).

C. Summary

We conclude that the trial court erred by granting Mancinas’s bill of review because

he failed to plead and prove the necessary elements to obtain an equitable bill of review.

Accordingly, we sustain Garcia’s first issue. Having done so, we need not address her

remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

Mancinas’s response, the record, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Garcia has

met her burden to obtain mandamus relief as discussed herein. Accordingly, we

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to: (1) vacate

its order granting the bill of review; and (2) deny the petition for bill of review. Our writ will

issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this memorandum opinion.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of June, 2025.

15