Kertrina Nicole Mims v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00034-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

KERTRINA NICOLE MIMS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 130TH DISTRICT COURT
OF MATAGORDA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Following a jury trial, appellant Kertrina Nicole Mims was convicted of injury to a

child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f). Mims was sentenced

to five years’ imprisonment, see id. § 12.34, which was suspended, and she was placed

on community supervision for five years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.055.
Mims’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no

arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, Mims’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a

brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded

no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Mims’s

counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment. Mims’s counsel also informed this Court in writing that he: (1)

notified Mims that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided

Mims with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Mims of her rights to file pro se

responses, to review the record prior to filing those responses, and to seek discretionary

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review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Mims with a form

motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires Mims’s signature and

date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744;

Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09.

Mims filed a pro se response. When appellate counsel files an Anders brief and

the appellant independently files a pro se response, the court of appeals has two choices:

[i]t may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion
explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error. Or,
it may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the
cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the
issues.

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations

omitted). We are “not required to review the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief

or a pro se response.” Id. at 827. Rather, we must merely determine if there are any

arguable grounds for appeal. Id. If we determine there are such arguable grounds, we

must remand for appointment of new counsel. Id. Reviewing the merits raised in a pro se

response would deprive an appellant of the meaningful assistance of counsel. Id.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Mims’s pro se response,

and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe, 178

S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but

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found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, Mims’s counsel has asked this Court for permission to

withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d

at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days from the date of this

Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s

judgment to Mims and to advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 1

See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.35; Ex parte

Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
24th day of July, 2025.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Mims wish to seek further review of this case by

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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