In Re David Q. Rogers v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00585-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE DAVID Q. ROGERS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1

By pro se petition for writ of mandamus, relator David Q. Rogers contends that the

trial court 2 abused its discretion by failing to comply with the mandate that we issued in

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so,” but “[w]hen granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case”);
id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number F-2112-20-7 in the County Court at

Law No. 7 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Sergio Valdez. See id. R. 52.2.
a separate appeal. See In re D.P.R., No. 13-24-00302-CV, 2025 WL 1587758, at *1–7

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). We conditionally

grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2025, in Rogers’s appeal arising from the underlying suit affecting the

parent child relationship (SAPCR), this Court issued an opinion which reversed the trial

court’s May 7, 2024 and May 22, 2024 judgments modifying possession and child

support. See id. at *1, *4, *7. In the trial court proceedings, Rogers and Eve Robledo had

entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) which provided, among other

things, that:

(1) the parties agree to be joint managing conservators “with primary
designation granted to mother and a geographic restriction of Hidalgo
County for the residence of the child”; (2) Rogers shall pay $50 per month
in child support, plus daycare expenses up to $130 per month and medical
and dental insurance of $150 per month; and (3) the parties “will follow a 2-
2-3 schedule” for possession of the child.

Id. at *1. On July 14, 2020, the trial court signed an order consistent with the terms of the

MSA, and thereafter, on September 25, 2020, signed a judgment nunc pro tunc correcting

clerical errors. See id. Robledo thereafter filed a petition to modify the 2020 orders, and

after additional litigation, the trial court signed an order on May 7, 2024, granting

Robledo’s request for relief and directing the parties to prepare a more detailed order. Id.

at *4. On May 22, 2024, the trial court signed its final “Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship.” Id. On appeal, Rogers asserted that the trial court abused its discretion

because: (1) the MSA complied with statutory requirements; (2) there was no evidence

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of a material and substantial change in circumstances since 2020; and (3) the trial court’s

decision lacked supporting evidence and was “arbitrary.” Id. at *5.

We determined that “the trial court abused its discretion by finding that there has

been a material and substantial change in circumstances since the 2020 MSA,” and the

trial court erred in granting the relief requested in Robledo’s petition to modify. Id. at *7.

We thus reversed the trial court’s 2024 judgments, we rendered judgment denying

Robledo’s petition to modify in its entirety, and we stated that “[p]ossession, access, and

child support shall proceed according to the 2020 orders.” Id. We issued our mandate in

the appeal on September 8, 2025.

In this original proceeding, Rogers asserts that the trial court has failed and refused

to enforce our mandate in the appeal and has instead set the case to be heard on its

dismissal docket. In this regard, Rogers further contends that the Office of the Attorney

General (OAG) continues to enforce the vacated judgments and is maintaining a “license

hold” on his dental license, reporting adverse credit, and attempting to collect on the 2024

judgments that we reversed in the appeal. The Court requested but did not receive

responses to the petition for writ of mandamus from Robledo and the OAG. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.4, 52.8(b).

II. MANDAMUS

“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only on a showing that (1) the

trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate

remedy on appeal.” In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig.

proceeding); see In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig.

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proceeding) (per curiam). Mandamus relief is available to enforce an appellate court’s

mandate. See In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 563 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex. 2018) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam); see also Lee v. Downey, 842 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. 1992)

(orig. proceeding) (stating that either mandamus or prohibition is appropriate to ensure

compliance with an appellate court’s mandate and opinion); In re Elite Door & Trim, Inc.,

362 S.W.3d 199, 201 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (same);

see also In re Port Isabel Logistical Offshore Terminal, Inc., No. 13-20-00562-CV, 2021

WL 1536591, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 19, 2021, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.)

III. THE MANDATE

“A mandate is an appellate court’s formal command requiring the lower court to

comply with the appellate court’s judgment.” In re Estate of Tillotson, 647 S.W.3d 447,

457 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (quoting Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, 578

S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.); see In re Elite Door & Trim, Inc., 362

S.W.3d at 200; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 18, 51.1, 65.2. The trial court “has no authority to

take any action that is inconsistent with or beyond the scope of that which is necessary

to give full effect to the appellate court’s judgment and mandate.” Seger v. Yorkshire Ins.,

503 S.W.3d 388, 408 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tex.

2013)); see Scott Pelley P.C., 578 S.W.3d at 699. The appellate court’s mandate and

judgment do not limit the trial court’s jurisdiction to preside over the case but instead limit

the trial court’s authority in exercising that jurisdiction. Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at 234.

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The trial court has no discretion to review or interpret the appellate court’s mandate

but must instead carry out the mandate. In re Elite Door & Trim, Inc., 362 S.W.3d at 200–

01; In re Richardson, 327 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, orig.

proceeding); Oualline v. Burns, 321 S.W.3d 719, 722 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet.

denied). The scope of the mandate is determined with reference to both the appellate

court’s opinion and the mandate itself. See Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630

(Tex. 1986); Scott Pelley P.C., 578 S.W.3d at 699; Dernick Res., Inc. v. Wilstein, 471

S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); see also In re

Marriage of Burkett, No. 13-20-00539-CV, 2023 WL 407375, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[T]he trial court has a mandatory,

ministerial duty to enforce the appellate court’s judgment.” In re A. H. S., 676 S.W.3d 355,

362 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023, pet. denied); see In re Henry, 388 S.W.3d 719, 726 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (combined app. & orig. proceeding); In re

Richardson, 327 S.W.3d at 850; see also In re K.S., No. 13-21-00006-CV, 2021 WL

832715, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 4, 2021, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.).

IV. ANALYSIS

We examine this Court’s mandate and the memorandum opinion issued in the

appeal in our cause number 13-24-00302-CV. See Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630; Scott

Pelley P.C., 578 S.W.3d at 699; Dernick Res., Inc., 471 S.W.3d at 477. Our mandate

states, in relevant part, that “[t]he Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED

and RENDERS judgment in accordance with its opinion.” The mandate also states that

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“[w]e further order this decision certified below for observance.” And finally, the mandate

concludes by stating, “WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our

said Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things

have it duly recognized, obeyed[,] and executed.”

Our memorandum opinion in this cause provided “that the record evidence does

not support a finding that there was a material and substantial change in the

circumstances of D.P.R. or any other affected party since the date the parties signed the

MSA in June of 2020.” In re D.P.R., 2025 WL 1587758, at *6. We further stated that “the

trial court abused its discretion by finding that there has been a material and substantial

change in circumstances since the 2020 MSA,” and “[t]herefore, the court erred in

granting the relief requested in Robledo’s petition to modify.” Id. at *7. In our conclusion,

we specifically stated that “[t]he trial court’s 2024 judgments are reversed and we render

judgment denying Robledo’s petition to modify in its entirety. Possession, access, and

child support shall proceed according to the 2020 orders.” Id.

Our memorandum opinion and accompanying judgment have not been reversed

or vacated by a higher court, and we have not withdrawn our mandate. Our mandate

reversed and rendered the trial court’s 2024 judgments and required the trial court to

proceed pursuant to the 2020 orders rendered in conjunction with the MSA. The trial court

had no authority to take any action inconsistent with our judgment and mandate. See

Seger, 503 S.W.3d at 408; Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at 234; Scott Pelley P.C., 578 S.W.3d at

699.

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Rogers asserts that the trial court has taken no action to implement our

memorandum opinion and mandate and that, as a consequence, Rogers has been

subject to the erroneous provisions of the 2024 judgments despite our decision in the

appeal. We conclude that the trial court failed in its “mandatory, ministerial duty” to enforce

our judgment. See In re A. H. S., 676 S.W.3d at 362; In re Henry, 388 S.W.3d at 726; In

re Richardson, 327 S.W.3d at 850; see also In re K.S., 2021 WL 832715, at *4. We sustain

the sole issue presented in this original proceeding.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the lack of any response from real parties in interest Robledo and the OAG, and the

applicable law, is of the opinion that Rogers has met his burden to obtain mandamus

relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P.

52.10. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court

to review our memorandum opinion, judgment, and mandate issued in cause number 13-

24-00302-CV, and to proceed in accordance with our orders therein. We specifically direct

the trial court to ensure that the 2024 judgments, having been reversed and rendered by

this Court, have been vacated and are not being enforced, and to ensure that possession,

access, and child support in this case shall proceed in accordance with the 2020 orders.

In this regard, the trial court shall use whatever means necessary to address and

reconcile Rogers’s child support obligations so that they are consistent with the 2020

orders.

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We will issue the writ only if the trial court fails to promptly comply.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
21st day of November, 2025.

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