Daniel Granado v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00234-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DANIEL GRANADO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 117TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

Appellant Daniel Granado was charged and adjudicated guilty (following a bench

trial) of one count of kidnapping—a third-degree felony—and one count of aggravated

assault—a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.03(a), 22.02(a)(2).

Given Granado’s prior felony convictions, the trial court applied the repeat offender

enhancement. See id. § 12.42(d). Granado was sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment on each count, running concurrently. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel

has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978), and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant

of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and

to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided

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appellant with a copy of the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436

S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. On October 15, 2025,

appellant filed a pro se motion for access to the appellate record. On October 29, 2025,

we ordered the trial court to provide appellant access to the appellate record and that

appellant shall have thirty days to file a pro se response from the date the appellate record

is made available to him. Delivery receipts filed with the Court demonstrate the clerk’s

record was made available on November 4, 2025, and the reporter’s record was made

available on November 17, 2025. Appellant’s pro se response was due December 17,

2025. Appellant has not filed a pro se response. 1

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

1 Appellant filed a second pro se motion for access to the appellate record and requested
unspecified time to file a pro-se response on November 3, 2025. Appellant also filed a pro se motion for
appointment of new counsel on November 4, 2025.
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Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s amended motion to withdraw.

Within five days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy

of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file

a petition for discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JON WEST
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of January, 2026.

2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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